Never exact, but the degree of exactness does make a differance.
It may have taken a dab of hash oil to open my eyes up to it, obe; but that was some good writing. Still, I have to figure out what it is, exactly, you are saying before I can, with any self respect, respond.
For me, what lies at the core of the pragmatic sensibility is the synthetic role it played in the dialectic between the inductive and deductive truth tests. Pretty much throughout the before that Rorty describes in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the discourse was pretty much dominated by a dichotomy between the inductive truth test (that which was dependent on the accumulation of data but limited by the inductive limit of always only being able to state: it seems true barring any further evidence against it (and deductive truth test which was dependent on the inherent meaning of words (?: how did the analytics ever think they could get away with it !!! (and limited by the nature of the relationship between language (which mainly refers to our mental concepts (and reality.
The pragmatic truth test, on the other hand, only asks if it works and serves (it being a mainly American approach (and America being a relatively young country (as the most recent and revolutionary of the 3: the synthesis in the textbook sense of the dialectic:as a compromise between the inductive and deductive and more.
(And note here that I mainly working from James L. Christian’s philosophy textbook The Art of Wondering.)
Now the cool thing about it is that it enfolds the two previous criteria by admitting that they work when they work, but goes beyond them by asserting that they must not only work within their limited scope, but work within the general discourse as well. They must ultimately satisfy Dewey’s criteria of justified assertability.
Take evolution, for instance: we can assume from the evidence presented (both deductive and inductive (that it is the means by which all this came to be. And we do so because (despite all the language games we can engage in against it (for instance: the argument that there is no way of knowing that there wasn’t some guy with horns and cloven hooves planting all this evidence as a red herring to lead us from God: a deductive trick if there ever was one (it continues to work for whatever reason.
Of course, the classicist sensibility (that which Rorty and the pragmatic is opposed to (will have none of this. They want a path that is straight and true. They want a clear way of solving the world’s problems, which is pretty much the same thing that every tyrant and authoritarian has wanted.
The irony of it is that America, which managed to create such a beautiful democratic sensibility, has also managed (through the bad faith of making everything work like a fine tuned machine (to twist it in to what works for Capitalism. The only thing that works now is what turns a profit. Not what works for everyone but the rich, but what works to turn a profit. What is economics but a description of the workings of the machine of Capitalism? What seems to be working? Like every other sensibility, Capitalism has managed to hijack the pragmatic and created a situation that no longer works.
*
Sorry guys: almost every day I find myself despising Capitalism because it just works for me –that is as compared to dropping to my knees and kissing the ass of every rich person that comes along.
“But it is fruitless to ask whether the Greek language, or Greek economic conditions, or the idle fancy of some nameless pre-Socratic , is responsible for viewing this sort of knowledge as “looking” at something [the mirror of nature] (rather than, say, rubbing up against it, or crushing it underfoot, or having sexual intercourse with it). “ Rorty: PMN: pg. 39
This seems to get at Rorty’s agenda and the reason he props it up with a sort of qualified eliminative materialism (that is as compared to the fanatical one of Churchland (much like that of Deluze’s (with and w/out Guattari (desiring machines which constitute the plane of immanence and his transcendental materialism. If I understand it right, it goes back to Heidegger (an influence on both Rorty and Deleuze (and his concept of dasein: the self as that which is constituted by its interaction with the world. This, in turn, goes back to Husserl’s phenomenology and its understanding of intentionality: that consciousness is always consciousness of something.
The main thing to note here is that the materialism of both Rorty and Deleuze is not a matter of making smug assertions about the existence of the self or its capacity for free will, but rather one of getting us to see ourselves as transit points (participants (in a general exchange of energy that is bigger than any one of us. It is a matter of letting go of the notion of ourselves as some soul (a mirror of nature (that stands above it all and can have power over it if we tweak our personal mirror just right. It is the democratic assertion of finding our worth in how we participate rather than the corporate hierarchal one of how high we climb towards the ideal which has been laid out by those who have gotten there first and have the power to tell us what the ideal actually is.
We can further trace this, as Rorty points out in PMN, to man’s desire to put his/her self above the brutes. And in that sense, we can see it as an evolutionary necessity to the extent that our memes, and the culture that has resulted, is as much a product of our evolution as the physiological changes we as a species have gone through. I mean it stands to reason that our desire to do so would naturally intertwine knowledge into such a hierarchy as was articulated in Plato’s Republic which was divided (demarcated if you will (sorry: new word I couldn’t help but slip in there (by analogy to mind, emotion, and body.
To put it to in more immediate terms: the TlBs (Troll-like Behaviors (you tend to encounter on these boards (if you really look at their arguments (tend to be the result of failing to let go of this tradition. I mean how many trolls have you encountered that, rather than an extreme materialism or libertarianism, are championing Rorty or Deleuze? Or any other continental philosopher for that matter?
Think about it.
“I argue that when extended in a certain way they [Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey] let us see truth as , in Jame’s phrase, “what it is better for us to believe,” rather than as “the accurate representation of reality.” Or, to put the point less provocatively, they show us that the notion of “accurate representation” is simply an automatic and empty compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we want to do.”- Rorty: PMN: pg. 10
And why wouldn’t we? Why wouldn’t we generally favor the truths that science has to offer since, that is, philosophy cannot create an i-pad? And in this sense, isn’t philosophy an evolutionary extension of the brain/environment thinking that our primal ancestors had to deal with?
Therefore, it makes perfect sense for Rorty and Deleuze to argue that the self and mind (or our experience of them (are entities intertwined into the complex that emerges between the body, the brain attached to it, and its environment as compared to standing above it all and passing judgment.
The catch, however, is that it is never exactly about The Environment which we all share. It is generally about the environment of the individual that they, at best, share with like-minded individuals. Hence: the dark side of pragmatism in that we have a lot of individuals out there who are in denial about climate change, the finite nature of our natural resources, and the emerging aristocracy/oligarchy of global Capitalism that is undermining our democracies because that is what is best for them to believe –that is since it is what serves their personal interest. Why else would Americans continue to embrace our present healthcare when we’re paying 3 times more for inferior results than Canada than a fear that their access to healthcare (their environment (might be compromised?
Pragmatism is a two edged sword. And, unfortunately, the pragmatic truth of the progressive may not ring as true as it actually is until the consequences of the clearly false beliefs of the above catch up with them. We can only hope it is not too late by then. We can only hope that the pragmatic truth test proves itself by, in the general scheme of things, working, by helping us do what we really want to do: survive and remain free.
“Another good post D Edward Tarkington. I’m becoming a real fan!"
As flattered as I am about the term “fan” (which I hope to be hyperbolic and ironic (I’m a little more excited by finding a peer and jam-mate who clearly knows what they’re doing.
“In this post I think it [the pragmatic approach] gets more complicated than people simply believing what “serves their personal interest”. Sure the beliefs you mention serves SOMEBODY’S interests, but if we are talking numbers, I don’t think they are very large.”
After writing this post, I thought back to a point made by Michael Williams in the introduction to PMN:
“What Rorty teaches is not skepticism , or relativism, or irrationalism, but modesty. As he puts it in a late paper, if we could give up our addiction to underwriting current ideas with philosophical gimmicks, “we might be able to dispense with words like “intrinsic”, “authentic”, “unconditional”, “legitimate”…. [and] get along with such banal expressions of praise or blame as “fits the data”, “sounds plausible”, “would do more harm than good”, “offends our instincts”, “might be worth a try”, and “is too ridiculous to take seriously”.”
And I think the 2 phrases we need to focus on here is “fits the data” and “too ridiculous to take seriously”. It is in these two that the pragmatic approach fails to work for the self interested (what I like to call the competitive model in terms of the relationship between our baser impulses and our more cognitive functions –that is since their self interest is given privilege over their cognitive functions. This is why the argument for climate change denial may seem to work for those engaging in it, but fails the pragmatic truth test by failing to fit the data outside of the data they are working from.
To add to your point: it is not just a matter of whether something works; you also have to consider who it is working for and why. And this suggests the beauty of the pragmatic approach in that it doesn’t shackle us by a lot of classicist harping on a legitimate ad hominem attack on some very bad reasoning. It doesn’t succumb to the operationalism at work in dismissing arguments simply because they are aimed at the motivation behind a bad argument.
“The problem is that these interests are disseminated by structures of power represented by phenomena as varied as gerrymandered Congressional Districts where Democrats can get more votes nationwide yet more Republicans are elected to Congress- wasn’t even close really in the last general election- and specialized think tanks, the funding of popular and academic journals, the funding of academic appointments, an entire "news’ network etc. etc.
So I think by any rational measure, the majority of people who end up supporting such views do so AGAINST their own best interests.”
That’s just it. But they do so because they think it is in their interest. But because they have failed to make the evolutionary leap from the competitive model of the cognitive/base-impulse relationship in which the cognitive acts in service of their baser impulses to the cooperative one in which our baser impulses see it in their interest to look out for the interest of others and thereby create a partnership between the two, their only pragmatic truth test is what their power allows them to do and assert: a kind of in-crowd mentality that, like the cult dynamic, can prop up some really bad reasoning. For instance: note the semiotic behind a hot republican like Anne Coulter or Sarah Palin. They’re both morons. Yet the competitive model that the republicans live by embraces them because of the message they present: vote and think republican if you ever want to even hope to fuck a woman as hot as Anne Coulter or Sarah Palin. And though this person has shown themselves to be a little more reasonable than this suggests:
“ it seems you’d be wanting a straight line of economics thinking there is some ultimate form which is better than the one you dislike, no?
it is no longer an economic issue then, but a moral one instead. in your picture of what would work better, you will always be crafting the “straight line” of authoritarianistic truth; your ideal.”
:it suggests the kind of language games that pro-Capitalists tend to engage in trying to make it seem like it is the left that is the fascistic threat when the left has no real political power as compared to the right. As Christopher Hitchens pointed out:
There is no left actually left. All there actually is is the middle to right.
:and not because they were actually right or were working towards what worked for anything outside of themselves and their interest, but because they had the power to make it seem right: to define the criteria by which a statement is deemed right or wrong. It’s a little like our right-wing Christians who stand in the most powerful country on the face of earth and argue that the Beast will emerge “over-there” (either the European Union, Russia, or the Arab countries (while embracing the most obvious candidate for such a beast: global producer/consumer Capitalism.
Anyway: ran out my run. Will try to get to more of this tomorrow. You owe me 4$ for the extra beer I had to buy at the bar so I could read your post. And while that may not work for you, it certainly works for me: warranted assertability.
Hi d63 - In the way the terms pragmatist, and utilitarian, the concepts seem to correspond and relate. However, there seems to be a divergence here. A pragmatist will fore go any ideal re-presentation of prior trans-action, hence the mirroring will become subsumed for the sake of effects. (Effects, effected, for the sake of......) Hard core pragmatists do not really care if they have to subsume morality, whatever (like it's ok to steal from your mother, etc) for the sake of a gross effect of succeeding. This is the mirror through which , 'pragmatic rationalizations have to be found. These mirrors are really very primitive, subscribing to the sensibility of the infantile mirroring of very young children, beginning to build their self images. ((The primitiveness of introducing morality is subliminal, as in the case of Rorty, not being able to disengage the work ethic from the same Protestantism, Nietzsche was said to subliminally suffer from, this nowadays being debated by those who interpret Antichrist, as being revised by his sister))
Utilitarians correspond more, by adhering to social determinants of utilization , and i think this is why, Rorty may be fined tuned to co-relate this very early mirror, to a later, more developed one, of finding functional determinants which can co-relate, the early image with the later. Utility can not dismiss the function of the means of achieving goals (production machines of products, pleasure, etc) by dismissing the reason for them, and a sort of reasonable morality has to be considered, to keep up the functions of the machines.
Do the two mirrors merely produce a third? A coherent one where, through the;reflected eyes of a child, or an immature adult, there may be correspondence, but only a limited, (if any) correlation.
A mature reflection moves beyond the self preoccupation of naive perception, with an infantile narcissistic orientation, toward one where the adult has to nurture the child. This nurturing is a function of the adult’s responsibility.
In Europe, if i may make a bold assumption, pragmatism has a short shadow, and the difference, between the social responsibility, and the personal awareness of this, has not been a primal function of his orientation. The split is evident even now in the ongoing debates of the necessity of social welfare, much more so than here in the US.
That the Deleuze model became so immensely popular during the 60’s is a prima facia reflection of reverting to the notion of shifting the social responsibility issue away from the burden of the individual toward that of society.
Utilitarianism of Deleuze seems a reverse reflection of American pragmatism, in a sense, because the European , more mature view casts a moral debt upon the latter, hence it projects the inverse (the Differance), in terms of it’s own sense of primarily a social responsibility toward the individual psychology)
On the other hand, American pragmatism seems only to entail the formal outlines of the protestant work ethic, it is a stand, irrespective of reflection.
Obe: always grateful to hear from you. Hope to get to your points as soon as I can. Love ya, brother.
The following is response to someone who, with some justification, accused me of being authoritarian in my objections to Capitalism.
In all honesty, Steve, I try to make peace with it not because I have doubts about my own issues with it, but because there is nothing I can do about it (I don’t see some individual act of terrorism like McVeigh as a rational or productive solution –in fact, the opposite (and I get tired of being pissed about it and running the risk of alienating otherwise decent people. And quite frankly, I’m a little disconcerted at some the overlaps between my frustration with Capitalism and that of Islamic terrorists. At best, it allows for a deeper understanding of what motivates them. But, beyond that my sympathy for them ends. And I sometimes almost manage it by concerning myself with more abstract concerns.
Unfortunately, all it takes is a good Op-Ed by Krugman or some anecdotal incident that reminds me of what a bunch of petty money-grubbing goons Capitalism has reduced us to, and it all comes back. And put in mind here that most of the pro-Capitalists I have encountered have been far less reasonable than you and generally prone to TlBs (Troll-like Behaviors). It’s generally more of an attack (they usually run in packs (than an inducement to discourse. So I tend to be little reactive when it comes to pro-Capitalist perspectives, especially on the boards since, as compared to the real world where I’m generally dealing with the person as a whole, from where I sit, that individual is generally what they say. Furthermore, as mean spirited as I can be about it, it can’t be any worse than the crap thrown at progressives. Let’s see: we’ve been accused of being whiners, anti-American, fascists (as you attempted to do), out to soak the rich of whom we’re allegedly envious, looters (according to Ayn Rand), tree-hugging queers, and more than I can remember.
Nevertheless, the phrase “ass-kissing” is a little hyperbolic. And I apologize for it. It’s a bad habit. At the same time it seems like every time America tries to address its economic issues, the same solution keeps coming up: maybe if we give the rich a little more of they want, maybe we’ll get a little something back –an approach, by the way, that we’ve been trying since Reagan only to see things get worse . And while that might not exactly be “ass-kissing”, there is certainly some common ground between the two.
As far as the issue of progressives being “authoritarian”, I would point out it was that exact same argument that was leveled by the South against the North when they were facing the prospect of having to free their slaves. It is this same kind of nonsensical and cheap tactic that neo-Cons and right-wingers are using today. Take, for instance, Jonah Goldberg’s Liberal Fascism which the bulk of historians have dismissed as being on the level of writings by Neo-Nazis and conspiracy theorists. Yet, neo-cons keep trying based on the fact that the acronym NAZI contains the word “socialism”.
But demanding that the rich to see themselves as benefactors of a system that we all share as compared to their seeing the system as existing solely for their benefit does not constitute fascism. Fascism, by its inherent nature, emerges where the power is. And to find out where the power is, all you have to do is follow the money. All you have to do is look at the goonish tactics of the Tea Party who may well be our version of brownshirt thugs. If there is authoritarianism or Fascism in America, it lies clearly and explicitly in the corner of the right and the pro-Capitalists who must protect their interests by any means necessary.
“So I think by any rational measure, the majority of people who end up supporting such views do so AGAINST their own best interests.”
“As [Wilhelm] Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice , and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves.” – Deleuze and Guattarri, The Anti-Oedipus, pg. 29.
This, Greg, is perhaps one the most important issues that philosophy has to engage. It’s not just you. And while you make a reasonable argument:
“This presumes a great deal I know- but rather than defining the ‘best interests’ of these people for them- they might claim that their best interests are ‘moral’ or ‘principled’ rather than economic or social- I see no other way to make sense of the decisions they end up supporting.”
:I would offer 2 approaches to this:
For one, I would refer to Sartre’s concept of Bad Faith in which being-for-itself (that which is haunted by its underlying nothingness (wants to be more like being-in-itself. It wants that feeling of having a solid foundation rather than the feeling of anguish as defined by Heidegger: the deep feeling of ungroundedness, the nihilistic perspective of recognizing that all our assertions about the world rest on assumptions, and that ultimately those assumptions float on thin air. Therefore, it stands to reason that the more fearful among us would engage in the bad faith of thinking we might find some all-encompassing system (some grand narrative (that will make everything work like some fine-tuned machine. And sometimes that might involve simply accepting the status quo since that is what is most likely to reinforce our choice. For instance (and I hate to harp on this: Capitalism does not reward merit as much as it rewards the true believer. Capitalism is the present Grand Narrative. Therefore, anyone that is capable of accepting it fully on blind faith is most likely to feel they are on solid ground. In that sense, Capitalism has become the new religion. As I like to joke:
It use to be: pray hard and follow these principles, and you too may enter the kingdom of heaven.
Now it’s: work hard and follow these principles, and you too may enter the kingdom of success.
When it comes to dogma, even the illusion of a lie is a kind of truth in itself.
The other proposal I would offer is that what we are dealing with is a kind of evolutionary backlash. You have to look at how we came to our cognitive selves: the experience of mind and consciousness. Life started as simple organisms with simple nervous systems that eventually evolved into central nervous systems that eventually developed brain stems that eventually evolved into the frontal cortex which is the home base of our ability to think like we do. However, throughout this process, it would stand to reason that our higher cognitive functions developed in the service of our baser impulses. This would be the source of the competitive model in which our higher cognitive functions act in the service of our baser impulses. And it has been the cornerstone of our evolutionary development to the point we are now and that of Capitalism as well.
However, throughout our history, certain individuals have emerged who have worked from a more cooperative model in which our baser impulses, our self interest, see it in their self interest to consider the interest of other things in their environment. In this sense, our baser impulses work in tandem with our higher functions.
And in this sense, I think we are at an important evolutionary milestone. Do we continue with the competitive model at the risk of our self destruction through manmade climate change or the depletion of our natural resources or our enslavement to the emerging aristocracy/oligarchy of global Capitalism? Or do we adapt to our environment, as evolution mandates, by turning to the cooperative model?
Anyway, sorry I couldn’t get through more of you guy’s points. My mind just wanders and my fingers follow. I love writing more than I do the truth.
Christ! Obe… Are you schizophrenic?
Christ! Obe… Are you schizophrenic?
“On the other hand, American pragmatism seems only to entail the formal outlines of the protestant work ethic, it is a stand, irrespective of reflection.”
Now this I can respond to:
I have to say, obe, it is a profound point. Pragmatism is an explicitly American method and it does seem seem to be rooted in the American work ethic.
d63 i came upon Rorty’s 'contingency, irony, and solidarity-(he coined the word -irony) in ref. to Nietzche, and Heidegger, and others. Will try to relate, am writing this in deference, to Your request, to fill into Deleuze’s vs. Rorty’s possible mirror interpretation? Probably worth to look at, -no e-book, and the text is expensive, but maybe there is something available on it.
I hope not, but if i am, well…the better to see You, dear.
In essence the mirroring here, is kind of a reverse image, between utility and pragmatism, where the only difference is where one functions on an infantile-mirror of identity-Deleuze, and the other, a more realistic(pragmatic) , natural mirror-Rorty. The undertow of moral justification, separates one from the other.
I will explain my loose associations in the former, less thought out blog, with an undifferentiated, loosely defined wordage where the term ‘schizophrenia’ may not have the negative connotations psychologically described, as in the text-Capitalism & Schizophrenia may imply. As tenuous this connection may be ascribed, into the text, it may be useful in gauging connections,in both ways:
Other than that, other loosely connected ideas, would fare no better, and a decision as to interpretation would have to be made, regarding the intent of the meaning.
This is where the above cited text becomes interesting, and i think a good starting reference point , as to how he (Rorty) came to innovate two useful concepts: irony, and hermeneutics. These play into his studies of Proust, and Nietzche.Nietzche is seen as more of a deconstructionist than Proust, and Rorty’s work is basically an attempt to deal with their (especially) Nietzhe’s resulting nihilism.
The basic tenets of irony relate to the thinking of not only Nietzsche, but to Rorty, the latter, using Nietzsche as his example in defining irony as an appropriate concept.
Again, i did some work, in response to your comment, above, that You have not read much Rorty, and since we are partners in crime in this study, i hoped it will help, or at least augment it.
There are a lot of fill ins but the two mirrors can be contrasted, vis that of Deleuze, and of Rorty, one being with a moral undertow, the other without. This is the basic difference, and Deleuze uses the infantile - identity construction for pre verbal formation, whereas Rorty’s approach is post verbal.
I hope this made more sense, in developing a more coherent set of associations between the two forms of reflection. Nietzsche’s sense of irony, as developed by Rorty, has relevance here, and it would be interesting, if we could come to some idea as to how these could hang together. (For Nietzche and others)
That ‘schizophrenia’ is used generically does not detract it’s clinical significance, and the connection is there as a way to show the tenuous dual way the mirror works one way (pragmatist/utilitarian) in the US and on the continent. That does not mean, You or I are schizophrenic. However, as Your blogs indicate, Capitalism may literally drive some people out of their mind, and be a causative agent of serious mental derangement.
Something that has been kind revolutionary for me in my recent studies of Rorty and Deleuze is their twist on the materialist position (myself having been, and still being to some extent, a property dualist (and the practical ends towards which they use it –their common ground if you will. Rorty basically dismisses the mind/body problem as a waste of time when we could focus on what has basically always determined the worth of an assertion: discourse: while Deleuze (even though he describes the human condition as a complex interactions of machines (makes no real effort (as far as I know (to make any final declarations on the existence of free will or the self.
(?:And haven’t we exerted a lot of energy on these boards on heated debates over the existence of self and free will, energy that could have been exerted on more practical matters such as how to make a better society(
As Rorty points out: nothing we could say about the mind or brain or how they accumulate knowledge could give any real clue as to how to clearly distinguish between a true or false statement in the general scheme of things. All we can truly know is what we agree on through discourse.
And in this sense, we can see the common revolutionary aspect of Rorty and Deleuze in that what they are arguing for is not a search for some ultimate truth, but an acceleration of our natural evolutionary heritage that started with simple organisms that evolved simple nervous systems that evolved into central nervous systems that eventually evolved the base of the brain that evolved into the cortex and our higher intellectual functions that, in turn, evolved into philosophy, art, and the sciences. As Rorty points out: our culture is as much a product of our evolution as we as physical beings are.
In other words, what both sought to accelerate was a kind of natural bricolage (Rorty through discourse and Deleuze through creativity (that has played a crucial role in our cultural evolution. So while the result of many materialist perspectives has been one of a metaphysical atheism in which all there is is what we can observe (nothing transcendent (the primary end of Rorty and Deleuze is self transcendence (which can translate into cultural transcendence (through engagement with the world without the burden of some epistemological system (the block in the exchanges of energy( by which all true statements must be underwritten.
And from my perspective, Rorty’s and Deleuze’s agenda is underwritten by the very bricolage that the mind/brain complex is engaging in when it dreams: a kind of mental inventory that takes pleasure in juxtaposing one mental element on the other until it finds patterns that resonates with and seduces it and that it, in turn, stores (assimilates( as a repeatable pattern that it can, in turn, use as yet another mental element that it can juxtapose with other mental elements and repeat at its pleasure.
The revolutionary and profound thing about this as concerns Rorty and Deleuze is that science has, as of late, posed the possibility that what happens during dreams serves a function in the process of brain plasticity –a concept that, as far as I know was not available to either Rorty or Deleuze. Yet both of them wanted to accelerate that very process before that process was scientifically explained.
For them, it was about evolving and understanding and the understanding that all attempts to find the ultimate truth could only serve as obstacles to that process.
Good point, and therefore Rorty goes the way of other materialists,of signifying truth in terms of statements about the truth, whereas, Deleuze deconstructs, cuts up the truth into the various parts.
“Christ! Obe… Are you schizophrenic?”
“d63 i came upon Rorty’s 'contingency, irony, and solidarity-(he coined the word -irony) in ref. to Nietzche, and Heidegger, and others….
I hope not, but if i am, well…the better to see You, dear. “
First of all, I was just fucking with the man/woman/not sure: I never really ask or assume. And I have, with a good tap of hash oil, been impressed with the poetics of this particular peer’s writing style even though I have yet to understand a lot of what they’re actually saying. And they are right in pointing to Rorty’s concept of irony in that it encourages a more human approach that gives beauty equal privilege to “The Truth” and the cold mathematics of the analytic/scientific approach we’re told will get us to it –a coldness, BTW, that not even the scientific approach always shares with its analytic cheer squad. Take, for instance, the work of Brian Greene or even Einstein.
And I see, yet again, another connection in that Rorty’s irony (especially since he associated it with Heidegger and Neitzsche (seems to work in a similar spirit of the free indirect discourse associated with Deleuze in that both embrace the literary possibilities of Philosophy. What is interesting to me is how many people (many of which I assume to be younger than me (are embracing the method despite the pressure from university and academic circles towards the marketability of the more analytic approach. To give you some examples:
“In essence the mirroring here, is kind of a reverse image, between utility and pragmatism, where the only difference is where one functions on an infantile-mirror of identity-Deleuze, and the other, a more realistic(pragmatic) , natural mirror-Rorty. The undertow of moral justification, separates one from the other. “
“America is somewhere in between
Microcosmic Vision and Microcosmic Action on the one hand and
Macrocosmic Vision and and Macrocosmic Action on the other –
Libertarianism and New Deal respectively, Hard Work free from Government (human free will?) versus Coca Cola and Damascrucaeh. Damascruciaciticy? Democrisisiphusphoracity -plutokratzi -
Pluto was never meant to be here.
That is his meaning. His course distorts the flat plane of the original planets and creates a wobble, Maybe Pluto caused the wobble in the Earths axis.”
“I see each personal ‘method’ as a particular iteration on common themes and ideas, rooted in the psychological substratum which, to the degree this substratum is not absolutely malleable with respect to those themes and ideas, is always going to be generally similar from one person to another. Applying synthetic understanding we can grasp these particular methods and observe how they are similar and dissimilar to each other, form them into larger series of objects where given that series it becomes possible to analyze, predict, and judge these methods. Of course our general simply language already has some basic conceptual divisions to acknowledge these different methods; religion, mysticism, lust, the poetic, the political, philosophy, barbarism, etc.”
Now it is kind of hard to disagree with any of these since it would take a lot of decoding to know what you were reacting against. The best you can do is read through it and react to what it is you think they are saying. And I have done so only to have them respond in the same stream of consciousness style. But at no point have I ever had them berate me for not understanding them correctly or demand that I so. And to me there is a kind of sincerity in it in that you get the feel of someone taking pleasure in the command of a particular semiotic system (with its individual set of rules and meanings ( they are immersed in much as a guitarist takes pleasure in their command of musical scales. Much like Deleuze (or even Derrida (you have to take pleasure in what you feel: their enthusiasm about what they’re doing. And you have to work from that, through repeated encounters (along with the osmosis that might result from the feel (until you get where they’re actually coming from.
And this is why I give them more credit than stuffier perspectives like this:
“I think the notion of philosophy as ‘the mirror of nature’ is a very natural assumption that extends the human default naive realism.
And I think Rorty is completely mistaken to suggest that the fact of this presupposition of perception ‘mirroring’ reality is somehow arbitrary.
Also I don’t really understand why you think the Continental philosophers require the services of us poor simps to “champion” them. Many of them are so ‘clever’ that just to understand them seems to require years of study. ( And well might one wonder whether the return would be worth the investment).
When I have at times tried to read Derrida or Lacan, for example, before fairly soon giving up in disgust I am reminded of Nietzsche’s criticism of the German Idealists that they “muddied the waters to make them appear deep”.Personally I think that clarity is a virtue in philosophy. Deleuze, Foucault and Badiou are admittedly not as guilty in this, and Meillassoux is a paragon of clarity (at least i am able to determine that I disagree with him).”
Now I am a big fan of the Nietzsche quote from Thus Spake Zarathrusta. I’m quite sure a lot of shallow poets would do so. The problem is, it is one thing to write a poet off because they happen to be obscure, and quite another to take the effort of digging deep enough to find out how shallow it actually is. And while I am a fan of that quote (and have even used against others myself (I am also a fan of another ironic quote from Barthes’ Mythologies:
“I do not understand. Therefore, you are ignorant.”
Too often, the Nietzsche quote is used as an excuse for laziness as was the case with Sokal and Brickmont when they pulled their little prank on postmodernism and celebrated their “victory” in Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science. As Joe Hughes points out in his reader’s guide to Difference and Repetition: much of their argument against Deleuze was peppered with references to what they did not understand. It would be like me arguing that since I don’t understand quantum physics, it must be a sham.
Anyway, more on this quote tomorrow.
d63-
The muddy waters really become clear, once the mud settles. Something stirs things up, and for a while it just seems as if it’s a waste of time to get to the bottom of it, the very messy, but settled bottom. The identity is of issue here, that is the modicum of not only clinical schizophrenia, where there is an inference to loose writing, and it really started with Joyce, where impressions, reflect from the surface, breaking up the image into partial images, and it is the reflection of the viewer, (reflection in the sense of ‘thinking about’).
The reflections(sense data), impress the viewer, so as to reflect(think about it) The modicum lies in this double meaning, and in that sense that he was able to use the primal image, the one which have had no cognitive reference, or frame, and construct identity.
Rorty, on the other hand uses the reflection as a naturally, formative concept, and sees no necessity to differentiate the image from the concept , he does not find it useful or necessary. He has no use for ‘truth’ as a self prescribed ontology, and this is where Continental philosophy albeit, utility, is different from American pragmatism.
You do not have to dig into the ego’s problem of self valuing, for Rorty, since his starting point reflects on givens. This is why pragmatism is not reductive in that sense, Deleuze’s debt is to and the existentialists in that respect.
It’s not ironic that it was existential psychiatry, Binswanger , Laing et al, who delved into the ontological analysis of the relationship between gross econo-political schizms, as they relate to individually, reflecting cognitive content, and it is the acute analyst who can re-associate the various data fragments from their reflected sense.
You do have to dig deep between the lines, accordingly, and the depth which has a lot to uncover.
Freud could not do it, but Jung could, his archetypes transcended the imminent field.
In the gross sense the identity is caught betwixt the reflection as image and that of the concept.
I do not see a need to exclude a psychology from the philosophy, thereby moving it to the psych forum, because, was not psychology it’s self included as part of philosophy, prior to becoming a separate field?
“I think the notion of philosophy as ‘the mirror of nature’ is a very natural assumption that extends the human default naive realism.
And I think Rorty is completely mistaken to suggest that the fact of this presupposition of perception ‘mirroring’ reality is somehow arbitrary.
Also I don’t really understand why you think the Continental philosophers require the services of us poor simps to “champion” them. Many of them are so ‘clever’ that just to understand them seems to require years of study. ( And well might one wonder whether the return would be worth the investment).
When I have at times tried to read Derrida or Lacan, for example, before fairly soon giving up in disgust I am reminded of Nietzsche’s criticism of the German Idealists that they “muddied the waters to make them appear deep”.Personally I think that clarity is a virtue in philosophy. Deleuze, Foucault and Badiou are admittedly not as guilty in this, and Meillassoux is a paragon of clarity (at least i am able to determine that I disagree with him).”
Just a couple of more respectful jabs at this, then I want to balance it out with some of the common ground I have with it:
First of all I would note the contradiction involved in debasing the continental method then basically turning to it in the Nietzsche quote. Granted, some historians of it start with Husserl and work through Heidegger, Merleu Ponty, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida, Levinas, then Zizek who is really not as obscure as this poster describes. Still, Nietzsche (given his poetic approach (worked clearly in the continental manner. I mean he clearly didn’t work in the more sterile analytic manner. Nor did he muddy his waters much as Jaspers or Barthes (both within the tradition (didn’t either.
My second point wouldn’t have been mentioned were it not for a profound reminder from a peer:
“Not everything is meant to be deep.”
Sometimes a thing, such as a love song or poem, a work of abstract art, or a dream can be of value simply for the experience they have given us. As Archibald MacLeish points out in Ars Poetica:
A poem should not mean but be.
Beyond that, all there is is the pragmatic criteria of the discourse that goes on around it.
That said, I am not totally unsympathetic with the above. I, myself, have thrown down Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition in disgust and frustration. I was only able to get through it after several readings of Joe Hughes’ and James William’s studies that gave me enough tools to do so. And I have yet to get through The Logic of Sense and probably won’t until I engage the secondary text on it. And as far as Lacan, given the limited time I have, I don’t ever see myself approaching him through anything other than the vast secondary text available, but will still do so because a lot of the concepts I get through the secondary text are useful to me: they pass the pragmatic test of working. And I see the case being the same with Heidegger and Being and Time.
Nor am I opposed to the analytic approach. For me, it is all fuel for the fire. And I’m quite sure the analytics have a lot interesting things to say about how things hang together. And if I don’t read them as much the continentals, it is not so much a matter of indifference as my individual sensibility and what reading wish list that particular sensibility has given privilege to. The only motivation for my venom against it is its propensity towards elitism and the lack of a live and let live approach to the general discourse: its obtuse dismissal of the continental approach.
And while I have issues with the above post, I have to give them credit for admitting to what they do not know. It gets even worse when that smug dismissal consists of a claim to know exactly what the continental is talking about. I saw this recently with Raymond Tallis when he claimed, in a recent issue of Philosophy Now, that the whole of Derrida’s philosophy broke down to the distinction between reality and the language we use to describe it. “Nothing to get terribly excited about,” as he summed it up. Really? Thousands of pages written on what Derrida actually meant (by people every bit as educated as Tallis (wasted on what could be summed up in so few words?