A Shieldmaiden wrote:Man is not inherently "good", man is inherently "bad".
That is a famous morality, I know of its existence.
Therefore conflict between good and good is good, and the end of a good being is good.
Fixed Cross wrote:We have since long been 'more than enough' -- to ourselves, as nature to nature; man has been a reflection of his own excess, and the most formal and conservative cultures were forced into form by the most powerfully excessive human types. The delight in his own restriction through the collective means of the state is a distinctly military pleasure - i.e. it is only pleasurable when it is serves a purpose of war, of sacrifice and spending, which amounts to the absence of true restrictions and the immense (and immensely restricting) consequences of that momentary freedom, the completely unrestricted individual fate within the machineries of power which are always already in the future.
Power resides in the future, or: future is a term that reflects more truly by what we mean when we say power.
The future is that which reflects the "to power" in the phrase "will to power" -- it is the true character of will.
A Shieldmaiden wrote:Making the distinction between good and right is important, for it to be well explained and understood. The "good" and the "right" each have their own area of relevance and are separate.
Good relates to an advantage or profit gained from something
and right has to do with acting in accordance to rules. Humans seem to have an innate sense of morality which may have been taught to them by parents, religion, etc.
Using right and wrong, could be seen as simply favoring or an attempt to influence another's behavior, if this is so, the doctrine or system of moral conduct would be meaningless. Ignoring the fact that all things are for some reason interconnected, if one pays particular attention to good over right, this could also easily lead to contention, as many wars have shown, on the other hand, the action or manner of justifying such wars is usually found in a rules-based morality.
"Because we so commonly take it for granted that moral values are intimately connected with the goal of human well-being or happiness, Kant insists that these two concepts are absolutely independent". Something that is classified as "moral" does not always make it "good".
Fixed Cross wrote:All races are fundamentally good. All humans are fundamentally, good.
Therefore conflict between good and good is good, and the end of a good being is good.
It is what keeps good from going bad.
Arcturus Descending wrote:Fixed Cross wrote:All races are fundamentally good. All humans are fundamentally, good.
Therefore conflict between good and good is good, and the end of a good being is good.
It is what keeps good from going bad.
Wouldn't you say that "fundamentally" all races and humans are "natural"? Or evolution-wise, am i wrong in this?
Fixed Cross wrote:Arcturus Descending wrote:Fixed Cross wrote:All races are fundamentally good. All humans are fundamentally, good.
Therefore conflict between good and good is good, and the end of a good being is good.
It is what keeps good from going bad.
Wouldn't you say that "fundamentally" all races and humans are "natural"? Or evolution-wise, am i wrong in this?
I would not even now why anyone needs to be reminded of this. What I am saying on the other hand is quite radical.
and the end of a good being is good.
The Artful Pauper wrote:Good is really what is approved of and bad is what is disapproved of, and also what acheives the results of a preconceived program. In reality I don't think there is an objective good or bad implanted in nature, but different natures interpret facts as good or bad depending on their affects and relation to those facts.
In a pragmatic sense you could say there exists "evil", because we have created the term and have defined it. Oxford defines it : "Profoundly immoral and wicked:" but even that definition doesn't demand a value judgement. Someone could come along and say immorality and wickedness is good for this and this reason, and potentially their reasoning could be logically sound.
But in the end good and bad are interpretations and as assertions which stand alone they can be denied on the basis of prejudice alone. Nietzsche for example backed up his interpretations with considerations such as, the old morality of good and evil was based a false conception of reality that saw the universe governed by a perfect diety who willed the good, so to interpret the world in the old sense is to interpret it falsely, and so forth.
Creating a new interpretation (or spreading one) requires a series of steps, logical arguments, facts, or even just tempting potentialities, all the while aware of how conflicting interpretations might view these same facts and potentialities.
I think that really morality is an interpretation that supports or is consequential of the structures of life as they progress, and this goes for all interpretation and not just morality, which is not to say it is necessarily the way of truth (which is an important distinction).
Because interpretation is an aid to understanding the world as well as dealing with it psychologically, dominant interpretations are generally attached to the various social strata in different ways and coloured by their current activity and perspectival relationships.
As for philosophical truth, I do think it is beyond good and evil, it simply is, and we attach value to what exists after the fact as ways of dealing with it, and because it is part of human psychology to experience affects.
When Nietzsche attached valuations to different things it was part of a political program and was a result of philosophical inquiry, it was truth in itself reached by philosophical inquiry.
It is true that he may have felt that the new valuation of good and bad was part of a philanthopy, that is, that it would benefit humanity as he saw it, which is another story and another inquiry.
James S Saint wrote: But what if there are specific abstract concerns that every life form shares as being to its subjective benefit?
If every life form requires "property A", can't we say that property A is objectively good? And if so, and other such properties are listed, we would then have a basis from which morality could be deduced ... rationally. And if that deduction turned out to be exactly correct, wouldn't that constitute an "objective morality", verifiable from anyone's stance?
The Artful Pauper wrote:Good is really what is approved of and bad is what is disapproved of, and also what acheives the results of a preconceived program. In reality I don't think there is an objective good or bad implanted in nature, but different natures interpret facts as good or bad depending on their affects and relation to those facts.
In a pragmatic sense you could say there exists "evil", because we have created the term and have defined it. Oxford defines it : "Profoundly immoral and wicked:" but even that definition doesn't demand a value judgement. Someone could come along and say immorality and wickedness is good for this and this reason, and potentially their reasoning could be logically sound.
But in the end good and bad are interpretations and as assertions which stand alone they can be denied on the basis of prejudice alone. Nietzsche for example backed up his interpretations with considerations such as, the old morality of good and evil was based a false conception of reality that saw the universe governed by a perfect diety who willed the good, so to interpret the world in the old sense is to interpret it falsely, and so forth.
Creating a new interpretation (or spreading one) requires a series of steps, logical arguments, facts, or even just tempting potentialities, all the while aware of how conflicting interpretations might view these same facts and potentialities.
I think that really morality is an interpretation that supports or is consequential of the structures of life as they progress, and this goes for all interpretation and not just morality, which is not to say it is necessarily the way of truth (which is an important distinction).
Because interpretation is an aid to understanding the world as well as dealing with it psychologically, dominant interpretations are generally attached to the various social strata in different ways and coloured by their current activity and perspectival relationships.
As for philosophical truth, I do think it is beyond good and evil, it simply is, and we attach value to what exists after the fact as ways of dealing with it, and because it is part of human psychology to experience affects.
When Nietzsche attached valuations to different things it was part of a political program and was a result of philosophical inquiry, it was truth in itself reached by philosophical inquiry.
It is true that he may have felt that the new valuation of good and bad was part of a philanthopy, that is, that it would benefit humanity as he saw it, which is another story and another inquiry.
Fixed Cross wrote:All races are fundamentally good. All humans are fundamentally, good.
Therefore conflict between good and good is good, and the end of a good being is good.
It is what keeps good from going bad.
The Artful Pauper wrote:One thing that might strike me as fitting your description could be something as vague as "food", but what is for some series of reasons the subject doesn't even want to live?
James S Saint wrote:Morality is about the interaction between entities such that the greater good is served. When the logic is locked on a local subjective level due to equal opposition, the greater good can be found by raising the scope of the interactions being assessed. Because the two entities are in opposition, a third entity must be considered in order to determine the greater good and the "moral choice to make". Examples might be; "which has a dependent child", "which will be able to be better off in the future", "which is most likely to be of benefit to someone else", or in a socialist society, "which better serves the state" (which is intentionally used to authorize the state).
So even though the logic is locked by contrary directions of the local good, an increase in scope unlocks the logic to provide an objective good and a moral code; eg. "in the case of divorce, the state is best served if the women gets to keep the pink panties" or "in the case of the baby on the train tracks, which ever is most likely to benefit future anentropic harmony has the priority".
The Artful Pauper wrote:But ultimately you are basing the logic on presuppositions, like the best interests of the state, and an abstract notion of which is most likely to benefit. In the case of the state it becomes a subjective assertion that the best of the state is best, but the best for whom? The best for the state may not serve the individuals who make up the state. And depending on the characteristics of the state the outcome might change. The state might value gay rights, for example, the woman not like pink panties and the male be a transvestite who in fact had bought those panties himself. The state might simultaneously be engaged in a PR campaign about its support of gay rights, and the man appearing in a TV spot wearing them might benefit the state, if the audience is receptive.
And the notion of the future benefit again is in need of clarification, what does benefit entail, according to whom? And answers to these questions can involve infinite regression.
The case of the plant being watered is particular in that all we know by plants is that they live by water (and other factors of course) and die without it, at least some measure of it. Whether the plant should live or die is the realm of morality — and in a garden, if the plant is a weed, we might wish it gone.
Also, when we are talking about morality we are talking about a human process of relating to the world with meanings and principles which provide behavioral laws. In nature, either the plant will get what it needs or it won't. For humanity, the question is whether there is some "moral" obligation, and there is no obligation to do what is objectively beneficial to a plant despite the fact that it is beneficial to the plant.
Obligations, it seems to me, are conventional, not universal or stable. With the right amount of coercion or the proper circumstance, they may be more or less stable, but not because they represent some underlying law of moral truth.
James S Saint wrote:Again, although I agree completely, you seem to be missing the point.
The fact that most people presume does not constitute a fact that presumption is the only option. Thus the fact of the existence of presumption doesn't negate logic as a viable option, it only implies a typical misuse. There wouldn't be so much conflict on these issues if there was no misuse of logic. So the point is actually to get the logic straight void of presumption, not to presume presumption and thus presume defeat.
....
For example, to me this all a moot point already rationally resolved. In my RM:AO:Psychology, Sociology, and Economics, the word "good" and "of benefit" are defined as "maximal anentropic harmony" and is equivalent to the religious concept of the "Son of God" for mortal entities ("God" being defined as the ultimate determiner of what can or cannot happen). And with those definition, rational decisions concerning morality can be rationally assessed such that the minimum amount of suffering and/or death occurs. And note that it is issue of minimal achievable, not absolute zero.
With such an understanding, there can be no ambiguity concerning morality. Morality can be objectively assessed even though subjectively amended. If one chooses to not define the relevant words in his chosen ontological understanding, he cannot resolve anything rationally and must merely bow to another and/or never be able to assess good from bad nor morality (which is why it is called "Rational Metaphysics", RM, the very seed of the last enlightenment era).
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