Meaning...indicates relationships and their degrees.
Seeking meaning, defined as magical, as absolute, as supernatural, makes the word 'meaning' meaningless.
no it doesn't, and let me explain. statements don't have to be 'true' to be meaningful, and creating meaningful statements is not a matter of mapping the logical form of the world. what makes a statement meaningful is its use-value in its particular language game. statements about 'god', for example, are not true in the verificationists sense (which seeks to map the world logically), but can be quite meaningful in other ways. one says 'the mighty zeus'. this of course is not true, because there is no zeus. but the existence of zeus, or not, is not what that statement is trying to convey. what it does convey, implicitly, are the kinds of things that can be meant by that statement indirectly; zeus is not to be fucked with, zeus is all powerful, zeus is glorious, etc.
the use-value of such a statement is determined by examining the context around which the implicit meanings become effectual in their purpose. with that statement one might be saying to an enemy 'is you mess with us, zeus will have your ass.' again, this is certainly not true, but it's purpose is not to make a statement about a feature of the world that is true or not. and, if the enemy, upon hearing that statement, decides to back the fuck off, we can say that they found the statement to be quite meaningful.
but i see what you're
trying to do in your own special way. and that is complete an inventory of what kinds of words can mean anything at all, something which you feel yourself to be the proper arbiter of. problem is, all philosophers believe they are the arbiter of this, and yet so many of them disagree. now it could be that one or more of them are right and the rest are wrong, or all of them are wrong. fortunately for these guys, verifiable statements of fact are either handled quite well already by the natural sciences, or are simply tautologies and a matter of definitional logic. that being the case, there isn't much left for them to do but argue about what words mean in a linguistic and conceptual environment that is free from the restrictions of these two fields. free to roam in a more or less poetic atmosphere in which nothing can really be true or false, right or wrong. or better yet, free to construct elaborate theses that are founded and supported by more elaborate theses, none of which can actually be denied or confirmed beyond their correspondence to each other (which becomes a circular progression).
so i like to divide most philosophers up into two camps. it's easier that way and you don't have to spend much time sorting through their nonsense. you have the logicians, the sharper ones, who make it their task to transcend the naturalistic fallacy and make of value statements something solid like statements about facts, events and affairs in the world (which they have mastered). these are the guys who try to give moral direction to the natural sciences, you might say. then you have the emotivists who, lacking logical rigor, try to do the same thing... but with a much more ambiguous and obscure language... making them poets. with the former, you find a competent and honest attempt to 'solve problems', although it never works. with the latter, you find that philosophy is more of an emotional sounding board through which you have a terribly confused person trying to make sense of his frustration by forcing his thoughts into what he perceives (and hopefully others too) as clear and sensible expression.