Dan~ wrote:That's random will, not free will.
Random will is even worse than structured fate.
lordoflight wrote:Think free will is real because, no way for supercomputers to predict our every move (which is a relief, thank jebus.) Because of this, free will exists on a quantum level.
lordoflight wrote:there are different future outcomes, depending on human choices. If there are different outcomes, determinism is not real.
Artimas wrote:I think the ancients deemed free will as being conscious of instincts(subconscious). Consciousness of environment and the effects of it and the effects of self in it. Choice regardless is still limited.
lordoflight wrote:There would be certain futures that would return an "error" or recursive infinite glitch.
Some futures it could predict. But that implies there are multiple options of futures. Including futures that would return an "error" if trying to compute them. Such futures are non-deterministic, since they cannot be determined.
Silhouette wrote:lordoflight wrote:there are different future outcomes, depending on human choices. If there are different outcomes, determinism is not real.
So your argument is that a human being determined to choose one way determines one future outcome, and a human being determined to choose another way determines a different future outcome, and due to this Determinism, Determinism is not real?
This may be due to a very common misunderstanding of Determinism as Fatalism. Fatalism is to have one outcome regardless of how you get there, Determinism can have many outcomes - what matters is the mechanics of how you get to each one one, so your thought experiment doesn't disprove it.
But if by Determinism you mean Hard Determinism, however, that is Determinism which is pervasive such that only one outcome is going to be determined to occur, not because of fate, but because of a rigid set of mechanics. However, your thought experiment still doesn't disprove this because the scope is larger than your presentation of it.
Under Hard Determinism, the supercomputer is going to be determined to give one answer either way, and this answer could be given in the knowledge that it will be either wrong or right. That is whether it gives an answer at all: because if it calculates that giving one answer results in a different answer, and giving that answer results in the previous answer it will get stuck in an infinite loop. However, it may still be able to foresee this possibility, and give a different answer that doesn't result in an infinite loop, perhaps even at the cost of knowingly giving the wrong answer, knowing the effect that this will have on the human to cause the answer to turn out wrong. It may even delay the answer until such a point that the infinite loop will no longer occur, which may be after the point at which foresight will be useful. It may simply tell you that giving the answer will change it, which is probably always going to be the case.
So you're asking the wrong question about your thought experiment.
The better question will be whether asking a supercomputer about the future is of any use - and this goes for whether it can predict the future or not. Even if it can, as I explained it doesn't guarantee that asking about the future will result in any answer at all, or even a right answer when the supercomputer foresees the paradox of giving the right answer. Neither would mean the supercomputer can't predict the future, only that giving an answer about it may or may not be problematic.Artimas wrote:I think the ancients deemed free will as being conscious of instincts(subconscious). Consciousness of environment and the effects of it and the effects of self in it. Choice regardless is still limited.
You are probably right, which is why I raise the necessity of defining what you mean by "free". Free from what? Free to do what?
If free will is merely will that is free from sticking to the "id", then free will is merely the "ego" - no less constrained by Determinism etc. and thus not free beyond such a narrow scope, therefore posing itself to be a problematic term at a philosophical level.
Meno_ wrote:Artimas, the thing is, it is far more probable to get into an eternally recurrent tube, then it is to seek a way out, even the most advanced computer system imaginable.
And that is a problem almost identical to a thesis of lets say finding a modus operans to salvage the econo-politocal vestige point of the rest of society's 98%.
There is virtually no two way mirror in this fun house.
For one thing , even the necessity of a possible congruence lands one in a never never land of simulated nonsense.
Meno_ wrote:The 'in' is always' OUT' In fact it's way out. Way out where galactic black holes are vampirically are after more and more stuff to suck in.
Most are holdouts as to the danger.of This fear, for it is nothing but a fear It's self. When that transpires or configures , it becomes just another illusive delusion.
It's basis in the nothingness of it's form, is but a needless preoccupation with transcending it's self.
promethean75 wrote:and maybe this should be clarified again for those who like to get into these freewill/determinism debates... because it's a subtle detail that can be easily overlooked.
the doctrine of freewill is a version of determinism, since it asserts that there is something causing one's actions. namely, the person, who exercises an 'agent causality' when they 'choose' to act.
so here the determining force is switched from the natural laws to the person... who can do to his body (through that connection with the material that descartes never explained) what the natural laws do to all the other things in the universe.
so really the freewillist is putting forth an even stranger thesis than hard determinism; he's saying that there are two different kinds of causality operating in nature. one is the laws of physics and chemistry, and the other is the law of moi. and any time my body moves voluntarily, it doesn't result from the influence of the laws of physics and chemistry, but from the influence of causal agent moi. the moi acts on the body like the laws of physics and chemistry act on a tree, or a microwave, or an earthquake, or a solar flare, or a car wash, or a camel cricket.
it's like everything in the brain is moving right along according to these natural laws and then... suddenly... the whole thing seizes its gears and stops. why? because moi is thinking about ordering a number five with a sprite rather than the two piece dinner. a force field spontaneously generates around moi as he stands at the menu board, completely insulating his body from the natural laws. the very existence of space/time halts... waiting for the agent causation to pick up where the natural laws stopped, and put moi's lips in motion when he utters the words 'you know what, lemme just get an order of chicken tenders and a vanilla milkshake.'
artimas wrote:Or maybe determinism is based off of a fear of responsibility and one being in control of self
promethean75 wrote:artimas wrote:Or maybe determinism is based off of a fear of responsibility and one being in control of self
for a great deal of philosophy, various defense mechanisms can be subconsciously enacted (e.g., rationalization) to bring us to beliefs that are most agreeable to us, but i wouldn't classify the philosophy of determinism as an example. i mean one doesn't believe in determinism because it 'feels good' or not. in the same way, one wouldn't believe that 1+1=2 or that atlanta is the capital of gorgia because they 'liked' these truths... and neither would one deny them if they didn't find these truths agreeable. granted, determinism is not a strictly empirical philosophy, but its line of reasoning follows logically from various deductive truths upon which it is based and found. if and when one is able to follow these lines of reasoning, the conclusion is not something you can 'argue away' because you find it disagreeable.
fortunately, most who believe in freewill aren't lying or playing tricks. they actually believe it is real, so we wouldn't charge them with a philosophical crime.
but what happens is, because most simply can't grasp the truth of determinism, they naturally suspect ulterior motives in the philosopher who endorses it... and they do this because they can't understand a belief in it for any other reason than for the purposes of deceiving themselves and/or others. it's analogous to one child calling another child evil because he doesn't believe in santa claus (or santa's clause). to the child who believes in santa, saying santa doesn't exist is simply preposterous and unheard of.
but no... think about what you're saying (we'll grant your point for a moment). do you think someone who really believed in freewill could lie to themselves and pretend to believe in determinism instead because they weren't comfortable with the truth of freewill?
if i wasn't happy with the fact that i can't fly, could i decide to no longer believe in gravity?
also, determinism doesn't denote a 'fear of responsibility and being in control of self'. instead, it changes how we conceive of the 'self' and the concept of 'responsibility' and 'control'. ironically, it rather greatly expands the capacity of the self as well as the identity; instead of you being an isolated acausal agency, you are an expression of a much bigger matrix (or ecology) of causes and effects that speak for a wider range of forces than a meager personal 'choice'. think of yourself not as a person, but an entire environment that interacts with countless causes and effects. that old notion of the private cartesian self 'inside the head' is dead, and your control extends much further than what you have the capacity to do with yourself. think of it like this; artimas is nature controlling itself through the proxy of a 'you'.
and because of that tremendous power, you are far more 'responsible' than you'd ever be if you only had freewill.
you like that irony, didn't ya? i'm pretty fuckin' tight with the ironies, man. got a whole library of em in my head.
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