Delueze Study:

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“From the very beginning of this study, we have maintained both that social-production and desiring-production are one and the same, and that they have differing regimes, with the result that a social form of production exercises an essential repression of desiring-production, and also that desiring-production - "real" desire - is potentially capable of demolishing the social form. (116/138)” -Holland, Eugene W. (2002-01-04). Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis (p. 56). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

I would first point out that this is a quote from Anti-Oedipus extracted from Holland’s book.

That formality dealt with, this brings to mind a quote from Picasso (a connection that suggests (call it confirmation bias if you will (what I’ve always said about Deleuze: that the creative act is never that far from his mind. Anyway, Picasso said:

“Taste is the enemy of art.”

But I would humbly propose that this warrants revision. Picasso was a visual artist which commits him to feel over meaning. What Archibald MacLeish said about the poem:

“A poem should not mean but be.”

:holds even more true for the work of art. A work of art, much like a dream, gets most of its meaning from the discourse that goes on around it via the very network of desiring and social production that D & G describe. But Picasso being a visual artist, we can assume him to not be one to clearly define his terms. Philosophy, however, is defined by the attempt to do so –even if it is an often failed one or one, such as that of Derrida’s, that defies meaning for the sake of making meaning.

I would start with the term ‘art’. I would argue that art is, by definition, a social phenomenon defined by publically shared taste. This was, for instance, what Duchamp (as well the dada movement as a whole (was getting at when he hung a urinal in an art gallery to suggest that it became art by receiving the validation of the authority of the gallery or museum.

What I actually think Picasso was referring to was the creative act which is childlike, instinctive, and spontaneously private in nature. One only need experience the process by which the private act of improvisation (bricolage (becomes a work of art in order to get this. Therefore, I believe we can twist Picasso’s statement (in a strangely ironic way (to:

“Art is the enemy of the creative act.”

Unfortunately, in terms of D & G’s model of machinic production, this shows itself to be little more than a momentary stay against confusion: an arborescent calcification in the vast rhizomatic flux they ask us to immerse ourselves in. By their model, we can see, rather, a feedback-loop between the private and the public. While the creative act must begin in an act that any child could engage in and return to it frequently, it still has to engage in the discourse of the public: look what I’ve done, Mom!!!. And it is this discourse with the public that can lead to the blocks in the flows of energy that can deflect those flows into nomadic trajectories. Once again:

“From the very beginning of this study, we have maintained both that social-production and desiring-production are one and the same, and that they have differing regimes, with the result that a social form of production exercises an essential repression of desiring-production, and also that desiring-production - "real" desire - is potentially capable of demolishing the social form. (116/138)”

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“What the Oedipal family-machine produces is just enough: obedient ascetic subjects programmed to accept the mediation of capital between their productive life-activity and their own enjoyment of it, who will work for an internalized prohibitive authority and defer gratification until the day they die, the day after retiring.” -Holland, Eugene W. (2002-01-04). Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis (p. 55). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

Here we run into the kind of conflicts and contradictions that can occur in the general flux of desiring and social production in the context of D & G’s points about debt. What I’m mainly thinking about here is the paradox of thrift which notes that, on one hand, thrift and saving is encouraged as the way to get ahead or be blessed by the religion of Capitalism. At the same time, living in a debt based economy as we do, if everyone were thrifty and saved until they got too old to actually enjoy it, our economy would implode. The odious aspect of it is that once the individual (in support of our expansion based economy (goes into debt to the point of no longer being able to dig themselves out, they find themselves subject to the Calvinistic finger wag of some kind of moral failure on their part, that referred to as the pathetic fallacy in sociological circles. In other words, our system gives praise (and can only give praise (to the ascetic lifestyle because so few people engage in it as to not present the very real threat it actually presents if practiced universally –a threat Capitalism is perfectly aware is there.

This can be seen in the workings of Alan Greenspan who, being an inflation hawk, always recommended raising the interest rate when the economy got too hot then, upon seeing the effect of this on his country-club buddies, turned to the import of expanding credit.

We can see a similar dynamic in Capitalism’s claim to an intimate and exclusive relationship to freedom in terms of the automaton. On the production side of the equation, the automaton would be perfectly suitable. The problem is that, on the consumption side of the equation, automatons don’t need much: nourishment, shelter, sleep, little more. They are the perfect ascetics. And we can see it all over the semiotics of advertising as well as media in general. On one hand, it offers these paths to freedom which we can buy our way into; while on the other hand, it is always describing to us the perimeters we must stay within in order to have that freedom. Lately, according to most beer commercials, it’s been the hipsters. And to see the most extreme aspect of this dynamic, all you need to look at is an infomercial that happens to have an audience. It’s surreal: an audience cheering at the product the host is selling. We see something similar on game shows.

And we see as much in the world presented in the shows that corporate owned media presents us with (Seinfeld for instance: a world in which no one has to ask what they can afford, but what product to buy. We see a similar dynamic in Modern Family as well –that is as much as I like the show.

Basically what we’re looking at through media is the creation of consumer bots. The scary thing is that most of us (at least the intellectually curious who inhabit these boards (know better. The problem is that we can’t be sure our politicians do. We can’t help but feel that most policy is based on what they see on media.

As D&G point out: Capitalism should, in theory, deterritorialize, yet, always seems work back to reterritorializations.

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First of all, an update for my fellow Deleuzians: this will likely be my last rhizome from this particular immersion for several weeks until I return to the actual text of Anti-Oedipus. So breath a sigh of relief and keep doing what you do until I get back. Anyway:

“More significantly, the infant may pull away from the breast for other reasons, without any ultimate physiological satisfaction having been achieved. Perhaps a smile catches its eye, and it suspends the mouth-breast connection to pursue an eye-face connection instead - and then maybe looks away and brings a finger into connection with a lock of hair: in each case the disjunctive energy of anti-production functions to suspend one organ-machine connection, but only for the sake of another, in an open-ended series: either mouth-breast, or eye-smile, or finger-hair, or whatever.” -Holland, Eugene W. (2002-01-04). Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis (p. 32). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

This gets at my understanding of D & G’s almost metaphysical system of desiring and social production –especially in the context of the right-wing in America. It’s about the micro(molecular(molar flows of energy that can, due to conflicting trajectories, result in blockages of those flows. We need only think here of resistance as defined by physical law: that which also requires energy to exist. And what can result from these blockages is a kind calcification that can, at best, redirect the flows of energies that go on around it.

For instance, we tend to think of sexuality as historically being repressed. But as Foucault points out, this has never been the case. It has, rather, always been channeled to the needs of the given power structure. And we see this to this day in the semiotics of advertising which is notorious for exploiting our sexuality for the sake of getting us to buy a given product and sell possibility which is what Capitalism is best at selling, thereby, selling itself: Who wants to be a Millionaire! Take, for instance, the recent onslaught of Viagra commercials that show utterly hot middle aged women who assure us that it is normal and alright for middle aged men to suffer from E.D.. Now note the environments they are always moving in: ones that are clearly above most of our pay-grades. It is as if to say that the only men who need apply are those who work in the 6 figure range.

That said, we can see the D & G metaphysics in the brown shirt activities of the right: a clear expression of hysteria. What they represent is blockages of the flows of energy that have calcified into paranoid/fascist centers. The problem is that they cannot stop (being as finite as they are (all flows of energy: all acts of desiring and social production. Therefore, those flows get directed into expressions of hysteria. And this redirection takes expression in every cheap tactic they resort to. Take, for instance, the goonish (brown shirt (nature of the voter ID laws that must have been cause for a lot of triumphant chuckling among the tea party as they attempted to ram them through. They, of course, threw up their hands and argued they were just trying to maintain the integrity of the voting process -that is when it was never really in question.

Still, I am fully aware that schizoanalysis takes up no one cause. And in this sense, I would point out the similarity of it to the ultimate deconstructive rebellion of Christ: the fact that he belonged to everyone while belonging to no one at the same time. It’s basically what got him killed.

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One of the first things I’m noting about Spinoza (that is as I scratch the surface of The Ethics (is how he seems to be using arguments similar to Anselm’s ontological proof of God, but towards clearly different ends. I mean even on a first run through (on the audio book even (you get a sense of what it was that got him in so much trouble. The most notable is his argument that God, as substance, by careful reasoning, cannot possess free will which must have seemed quite offensive to those who held a more conventional view of God.

And I can tell already, given how my filters are working, that this particular immersion will be primarily focused on the relationship between Deleuze and Spinoza and may well lead to a following immersion in Deleuze’s book on Spinoza –that is: just to see what happens. For instance:

“Proof.— If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications— as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),— it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,— that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 44-49). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.

(Now first of all, I’m hoping someone here (perhaps my German jam-mate, Harald​ (can help me on what “Q.E.D.” means as it is sprinkled throughout the book.)

That said, I can’t help but read the BwO into this. If I am getting Spinoza right, it is as if Substance is like a plane upon which various intensities (attributes and modes (can break into their various and individual nomadic flights (expansion (while still being attached to the BwO of Substance: contraction.

And I’m starting to see the connection between the BwO as described above and Deleuze and Guatarri’s sense of desiring production or the rhizomatic network of it –at least within Spinoza’s emphasis on the infinite as compared to the finite. And I would also note the possible foundation of Deleuze’s materialism in:

“That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.” -Ibid

And I, once again, have to approach this with the same provisional materialism I approach Deleuze with(as well as Rorty (for the sake of a workable model –that is in a pragmatic spirit. And I do so with full acknowledgement that this is the very same argument that hardcore materialists have been throwing at me over the years.

This, of course, has been wide swipes and the fumbling around of someone out their comfort zone. But as Deleuze tells us: we write at the edge of what we know. And we do that to hopefully zero in on the particulars. May I not waste my time and yours.

[d63]

One of the first things I’m noting about Spinoza (that is as I scratch the surface of The Ethics (is how he seems to be using arguments similar to Anselm’s ontological proof of God, but towards clearly different ends. I mean even on a first run through (on the audio book even (you get a sense of what it was that got him in so much trouble. The most notable is his argument that God, as substance, by careful reasoning, cannot possess free will which must have seemed quite offensive to those who held a more conventional view of God.

And I can tell already, given how my filters are working, that this particular immersion will be primarily focused on the relationship between Deleuze and Spinoza and may well lead to a following immersion in Deleuze’s book on Spinoza –that is: just to see what happens. For instance:

“Proof.— If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications— as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),— it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,— that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 44-49). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.

(Now first of all, I’m hoping someone here (perhaps my German jam-mate, Harald​ (can help me on what “Q.E.D.” means as it is sprinkled throughout the book.)

That said, I can’t help but read the BwO into this. If I am getting Spinoza right, it is as if Substance is like a plane upon which various intensities (attributes and modes (can break into their various and individual nomadic flights (expansion (while still being attached to the BwO of Substance: contraction.

And I’m starting to see the connection between the BwO as described above and Deleuze and Guatarri’s sense of desiring production or the rhizomatic network of it –at least within Spinoza’s emphasis on the infinite as compared to the finite. And I would also note the possible foundation of Deleuze’s materialism in:

“That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.” -Ibid

And I, once again, have to approach this with the same provisional materialism I approach Deleuze with(as well as Rorty (for the sake of a workable model –that is in a pragmatic spirit. And I do so with full acknowledgement that this is the very same argument that hardcore materialists have been throwing at me over the years.

This, of course, has been wide swipes and the fumbling around of someone out their comfort zone. But as Deleuze tells us: we write at the edge of what we know. And we do that to hopefully zero in on the particulars. May I not waste my time and yours.

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“I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They assign to him, in short, absolute free will.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 440-442). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.

In a sense, it is as if Spinoza is exploring the same territory of as Deleuze and Rorty in reaction to the folly that results from Cartesian dualism. The difference is that Deleuze and Rorty do so in terms of human behavior and our cultural history while Spinoza works in an analytic style focused on the contradiction at work in the notion of a perfect God and that god having Free Will. And his argument is interesting and compelling in that context.

“But, it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God.” –ibid (different page

Now to the best of my ability to explain it, the idea is that if God had free will, it would open Him up to the possibility of making other choices than what he has. In other words, this opens Him up to the possibility of making better choices than what he already has. And this is a direct contradiction to the notion of a perfect god. In other words, a perfect god could not possibly make any choices other than those it makes in order to be perfect. This can, according to Spinoza, only mean that God (that is as substance (can only act according to a fixed and determined nature.

(Once again: it’s no wonder he got his ass in the sling he did.)

And we can see this as a variation of Leibniz’s best of all possible worlds. The thing that is interesting to me is how Spinoza (given his description of God as substance (still refers to it as Him as compared to It. My guess would be that it is the result of a lag in the multiplicity of our cultural evolution. And we can see this in the masculine/feminine scheme implied in:

“But, it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God.”

What we see here is the patriarchal vision of nature as feminine while God hovers above it all decreeing the laws by which nature must work. And why couldn’t those laws be feminine? But then I am prone to the kind of “loose thinking” that Spinoza condemns when he says:

“No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely…. “ -Ibid (different page

Guilty as charged. But there is a method to the madness in that I think loosely to work my way to clearer thought: my hermeneutic. But that is an issue for a future rhizome.

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“PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 664-665). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.

This, of course, reads like representation. So it seems kind of strange that Deleuze would have taken to Spinoza like he did. But this is easily attributable to same thing any student of philosophy (or intellectual inquiry in general (has to do when approaching a more established practitioner: steal what they can use.

That said, I think I might have found a couple of quotes that point towards the univocity of Being that Claire Colebrook connects between Deleuze and Spinoza in her Routledge Guide to Deleuze. But I’m finding it in a weird roundabout way:

“This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes.” –Ibid (different page

Given that, in terms of substance, mind and body are just two sides of the same thing, what we find ourselves approaching here is something similar to Berkley’s Idealism in which he argues that given that everything exists in the perception of it, the only thing that could be keeping our individual perceptions of the world consistent with other individual perceptions is our sharing in the mind of God. Spinoza then goes on to say:

“PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.”

What I’m getting at here is the univocity of Being comes out of the fact that reality for us can only come out of how it registers in the mind. Therefore, its very existence is not so much conditional on existing in the mind as its participation in a vast exchange of energy between minds and their objects. And the univocity of Being makes perfect sense since, logically, a thing either is or isn’t. Because of this, it makes little sense to talk about (as Rorty points out (ontological status since, once again, a thing either exists or it doesn’t. Being, unlike everything else in reality, is a is or is not situation.

Think, for instance, of a unicorn. Now while all evidence points to the probability that unicorns don’t exist, we still have to admit that the concept of one does and that the concept has as much being as a real one standing before our very eyes. The idea, in conclusion, is to recognize that our perceptions of and interactions with the world , our emotional responses, our passions (in short: our subjective experiences, have the same ontological status (Being (as the rock that stubs your toe: the so-called objective.

And we might consider here the implications this would have for Deleuze and Guatarri’s model of desiring production as well as Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism.

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As it stands, the latter part of Spinoza’s The Ethics strikes me as common sense explained in elaborate logical language that, at times, seems to obscure the issues involved. It seems almost too mundane to add to the philosophical process of anyone who might read it –including Deleuze. At the same time, I thought the same thing about Rawls’ Laws of the Peoples while now finding myself recognizing some value in it. So I defer judgment.

On the other hand, as I find myself going back (in my study points (to Part 1 on the nature of God as Substance, I’m starting to see that one of Deleuze’s main attraction to him may have lain in the mind-bending logic of it, that which Deleuze revised by translating substance to a more secular understanding. For instance:

“PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. Proof.— If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.).

“If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications— as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),— it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,— that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 43-49). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.

I would start my fumblings by pointing out that Substance (being an uncaused cause (would precede all attributions (that which knows the essence: that which without it could not be what it is: of a thing (and modifications. This creates a kind of paradox in that we have to ask how substance can precede the attribute and still be defined by an attribute. What we’re basically looking at here is a set of all sets type situation.

At the same time, I can’t help but agree with Spinoza’s conclusion that there can only be one substance in that (perhaps because of it being an uncaused cause (since attributions and modifications are somehow separate from substance, there could not be any attributions and moderations to separate one substance from the other. At least to me that seems to be the more blue collar to approach Spinoza’s point.

We could also see this as how Substance, Attributes, and Modifications are intimately intertwined (while Substance is given privilege (and the source of Deleuze’s notorious obscurity and the headache I’m experiencing while writing this, a headache that the beer and Jager is doing little to appease. And I can’t help but throw this out there in the hope it will make a solid connection:

I can’t help but feel this mish-mash is the source of Deleuze’s explorations in Difference and Repetition. All one would have to do is translate Spinoza’s god into Being and you stand a chance of getting it if the headache doesn’t kill you.

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“Deleuze gives us new concepts to account for what exists and for reality, in particular, in his definition of reality as both the virtual and the actual. For example, a coconut is both an actual coconut and the intensities or pure becomings it expresses in the encounter with the sensations of individuals (to become hard, to become grainy, to become hairy, to quench, to nourish).” -Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (pp. 7-8). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

What Williams seems to be referencing here is the Doctrine of the Faculties as described by Joe Hughes in his secondary text on Difference and Repetition. And I can’t help but see an overlap (or hangover (with my recent immersion in Stanley Fish. I can’t help but see that the temporal changes everything and is what distinguishes contemporary thought from the modern.

As Fish pointed out to me, the static notion of text acts as if the text is just there waiting to be understood in a static kind of way –as if the meaning is just there waiting to be discovered. But as Fish’s opposition to the intentional fallacy suggests, the writer’s intention tends to change with the text they are writing. I have experienced this myself. Therefore, because of the temporal shared by all parties involved (writer, reader, text (the causal chains tend to spread into kind of plane of immanence as Deleuze described it. Deleuze basically describes this same dynamic through the doctrine of the faculties in which the object becomes the text continually becoming through the mind’s temporal process of recognizing.

And in both cases, it is like imagining this simple linear causal chain occurring between subject and object and, in terms of temporality, smearing it across the canvas until it all blends into an abstract whole that is beyond simple interpretation.

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Today was a kind of Sartre day. To quote an entry from Nausea:

Today: nothing: existed

I mean it: I got nothing from today’s study point at the library. Fortunately, my process allows for a few fallbacks. I can (and will), for instance, go back through some of my previous notes on this particular book (James William’s guide to Difference and Repetition). There is always, everyday that space to fill. And it is not coincidental that I bring Sartre into the mix. So let’s roll the dice:

“At this point, the extent of the ambitions and revolutionary aims of Difference and Repetition come into view. It is not only a book on ‘how a life is lived best’, rather, it is a book that claims that pure differences are the other face of all actual things – there is no such thing as a well-defined actual life.” -Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (p. 13). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

What I want to explore here is the influence of Sartre on Deleuze in that what Deleuze is confronting and opposing here is a kind of Sartrean Bad Faith: that which seeks to fix the precarious nature of reality. The main difference lies in Deleuze’s prescription of “connect and forget” whereas Sartre was attempting to be descriptive in the ontological model of the relationship between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. Whereas Sartre was mainly submitting to a kind of existential forward flight (as it had been described by his critics), Deleuze was basically egging it on.

And the reason (as I see it (that Deleuze did so has to do with his inclusion of Leibniz’s description of an seascape in which the individual enjoys a composite effect that could be broke down to an infinite series of individual events –that is if one had the resources. The problem for him was the subject always working in a finite space attempting to broach the infinite. So his solution was a kind of intellectual attention deficit disorder in which the subject bounced around the rhizomatic matrixes (he had yet to develop (in order to broach (or “traverse” as he liked to say (a sense of the whole. Hence the manifesto of “connect and forget” that puts the individual at any given point in the matrix while anchoring them (in a very loose sense (through the residual effects of previous points in the matrix the individual is wandering. And to Deleuze, clinging to those previous points can only weigh the flight down.

Now the important thing to note here is how this escalated (w/Guatarri (into the too-accelerated process encouraged by The Anti-Oedipus. As D & G saw: too many people with a taste for chaos were using it as a justification for self destruction. This is why they had to back down in A Thousand Plateaus.

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“Contrary to appearances, his work has little to do with empirical methods of contemporary cultural criticism or empirical sociology or psychology.” -Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (p. 28). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

Now as I have said repeatedly: the main flaw with and weakness in the continental approach lies not with and in its practitioners, but rather its detractors in that it is not meant to be taken literally. Living in the Midwest and working among more “down to earth and day to day” type of guys as I do, I often (in the stream of consciousness that flows through my brain (come up against the question of how I would answer the question that might come from any of them: why philosophy? What does it do?

And the answer I imagine giving them is that it is a form of poetic speculation or a poetic way of engaging with reality. Of course, we have to be careful here in that such a description gives license (especially among younger practitioners (to new age romanticism: becoming one with the universe and all that. As William’s says after:

“Are we not on the verge of the worst kind of mysticism when we begin to speak of real but not actual differences?” -ibid

And we are broaching mysticism with Deleuze. Take, for instance, the notion of all subject/object relationships being a process that goes from the initial sensible encounter to understanding and recognition. We deduce this from the temporal, much as all mystical assertions are basically deduced. But how do we know that those encounters aren’t more immediate? We assume the temporal due to our temporal position in space. Still, we can’t totally dismiss it given its deductive power. And that is the power (the resonance and seduction (of Deleuze.

And excuse the “dear diary” moment, but it is the poetry of Deleuze (as well as philosophy (that makes it hard for me to go back to poetry as it is commonly defined –that is even though I know good and well that I should in order to get back to the day to day matters of the human condition.

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“Deleuze gives us new concepts to account for what exists and for reality, in particular, in his definition of reality as both the virtual and the actual. For example, a coconut is both an actual coconut and the intensities or pure becomings it expresses in the encounter with the sensations of individuals (to become hard, to become grainy, to become hairy, to quench, to nourish).” -Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (pp. 7-8). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

Been considering doing this for some time now, but have been holding back out of intimidation. But sometimes it’s like skydiving: you step through the threshold and gravity does the rest. I want to attempt a rough (and necessarily incomplete (sketch of what Williams describes as lying at the core of Difference and Repetition.

It starts with Deleuze’s slant on Kant’s model of how we come to know reality via the sensible, imagination, and apprehension. Deleuze’s model or Doctrine of the Faculties (according to Hughes’ secondary text (runs from the sensible to imagination onto memory and, finally, into thought. In terms of the first three points, we are looking at passive syntheses. It is not until we reach thought in Deleuze’s model (or Apprehension in Kant’s (that we start to move into active synthesis.

Now, returning to Williams, what this results in (and here we have to think of the individual as a space in which thoughts take place (is the subject’s engagement with reality or an object (or even an experience (as not an “all at once thing” thing, but rather a process of becoming. Whatever we are looking at or analyzing, we are always doing so in a shifting context: the virtual as compared to the actual. And the rest of the book is pretty much an analysis of the relationship between the virtual and the actual and its implications –that is if I am understanding it right.

And here again, we return to the import of the temporal in post-structuralist/modern thought that leads to the kind of postmodern smear that is so attractive (that which seduces and resonates with (to so many of its practitioners. Here we see the genealogical root of why it was Deleuze & Guatarri had to “tone it down” for A Thousand Plateaus after seeing how self destructive people (for instance: drug addicts (adapted many of the ideas and concepts of The Anti-Oedipus to their own ends: how they embraced the speed smear of the constant acceleration that Deleuze saw our full potential in.

[d63]

One of the things that comes up in James Williams secondary text on Difference and Repetition is Deleuze’s concept of the block. And if I’m reading it right, it has to do with the subject’s (the place where thoughts take place (finite capabilities in the face of the infinite. It comes down to the limited capacity of concepts to include the infinite multiplicities of causality contributing to any given event.

And if you think about it in a genealogical sense, this may well be at the bottom of Deleuze and Guatarri’s distinction between the molar and the molecular. The molar, as Brian Massumi describes it, is a kind of blur effect of the molecular that allows us to actually comprehend what is before us. And the best way to describe it, as Massumi did, is through its negative effects. If you look at how minorities have come to be accepted (especially in the case of TV ads (it has generally been in terms of their being legitimate producer/consumers: basically molarizations defined by white heterosexual males.

Take, for instance, the TV series Will and Grace which made homosexuality more acceptable. Let’s take a look at how it made it work: taking an attractive male that happened to be homosexual and presenting him as someone who was perfectly as capable of producing and consuming as anyone else. In other words, he was made acceptable by presenting him within the perimeters of producer/consumer Capitalism and the tyranny of the functional. He was molarized: blocked from the infinite. And the same goes for minorities you see in TV ads who often come off as yuppies or hipsters who happen to have dark skin.

And none of it, of course, gets to the molecular aspects of reality: the actual complexity of the players involved. But given our finite position in the scheme of things, how could any of us actually contain, in our heads, the infinite?

And this is where the molar steps in and proves useful –even heroic. We as the intellectually curious TRY to capture the infinite only to find our efforts frustrated. Still, we have to try. Now imagine a comedian trying to do the same thing: saying something funny about the other then backtracking with: but on the other hand. Comedy is about the war rally: that which confirms unity among those with common belief systems. Think Bill Maher, John Oliver, and Samantha Bee here.

But then this may well have been why Deleuze made the distinction between humor and satire.

[d63]

“There are of course, many other important works that have appeared in recent years, but I will focus on these because they take Difference and Repetition as one of their principal sources. Each of these studies takes the book in different directions to mine, demonstrating the limitations of my selections and the promise of others.” -Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (p. 229). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

And I would also add:

“In each case, I will study passages from the conclusion of Deleuze's book, adding insights from interpretations of Deleuze's work that have appeared since the first edition of my book in important studies by Anne Sauvagnargues, Daniel W. Smith, Miguel de Beistegui, Levi Bryant, Joe Hughes and Henry Somers-Hall (Every order is a selection with its dark precursors and emergent illusions.).”

:then note that I have both Hughes’ and Levi Bryant’s book, have read both all the way through and done so several times with Hughes’. And as concerns Hughes’ book: you know you’re up against something deep and obscure when you have to read the secondary text several times only to find yourself still confused.

That said (and speaking of osmosis), the quote pretty much backs up my initial instincts as concerns the secondary text on Difference and Repetition: that it’s like reading several different readings of the same text. And this, of course, is exactly what Deleuze wanted: various individuations of the series and events involved in Deleuze’s text.

Furthermore (and thank you osmosis), Williams, towards the end of his book, confirms my metaphor: that of a beautiful Mademoiselle that will lead you to believe that you can have her, yet slip away when you approach her. Hence the not altogether explainable (sometimes frustrating), yet compelling attraction I feel towards Difference and Repetition. I hate myself for wanting to go forward with it; yet can’t walk away.

[d63]

Difference, Repetition, Ball Joints, and Other Drivers:

“Thus we make things the same, even the most simple things, against the background that they could be very different (I can't believe the bolt failed . . .). So each bolt, each simple same thing, matters because it carries with it the possibility that it could be different.” -Williams, James. Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (p. 35). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.

Just to offer a personal analogy (as a steppingstone and not to fix what Deleuze was talking about), I would turn the issue of repetition and difference to the issue of driving. I, myself, tend to drive like most of your grandparents: slow. I will even take the slower routes on regular streets as compared to the faster routes of interstates. And this may well be (perhaps because of Deleuze or perhaps other reasons (because my faith in repetition has decreased while my faith in difference has increased. And the same dynamic might be at work in my increasing fear of heights in the overlap between the potentially self destructive forward flight (connect and forget (of Deleuze (that which was fully expressed in The Anti-Oedipus) and Sartre’s Vertigo of the Possible (and I am paraphrasing here from memory) :

“The Vertigo of the Possible, then, is not so much a fear of falling into the abyss as throwing one’s self in.”

My children, however, have tended to drive like their full faith was in repetition. They assumed, given the repeated environments they were driving in, all variables involved would repeat their selves: that all other drivers would act in expected ways and the mechanics of their automobiles would continue to repeat what they had always done. My son, however, discovered difference when his ball joints broke twice on him: once on the interstate and another time in the neighborhood. I have, personally, experienced difference in other drivers when my first Spark got totaled by a young man who was paying more attention to his senorita than the red light in front of him.

Luckily, no one has gotten hurt so far. But, in a blue-collarized way (and I think Deleuze would agree with me here), it does give you a sense of the danger of an over-exaggerated faith in repetition. At the same time, I’m equally sure that Deleuze would see my recognition of difference and concerns about it as a kind of neurosis and prelude to a paranoid/fascist center.

I mean thank god (whatever it is (I stake my faith in the difference described above.

[gustaave]

Thanks for contributing, guys.

nope lol

[URUZ]

"Hence one is correct in speaking of a profound dissimulation of the dualism of these two forms of money, payment and financing–––the two aspects of banking practice. But this dissimulation does not depend on a faulty understanding so much as it expresses the capitalist field of immanence, the apparent objective moment where the lower or subordinate form is no less necessary than the other (it is necessary for money to play on both boards), and where no integration of the dominated classes could occur without the shadow of this unapplied principle of convertibility–––which is enough, however, to ensure that the Desire of the most disadvantaged creature will invest with all its strength, irrespective of any economic understanding or lack of it, the capitalist social field as a whole. Flows, who doesn't desire flows, and relationships between flows, and breaks in flows?–––all of which capitalism was able to mobilize and break under these hitherto unknown conditions of money. While it is true that capitalism is industrial in its essence or mode of production, it functions only as merchant capitalism. While it is true that it is filiative industrial capital in its essence, it functions only through its alliance with commercial and financial capital. In a sense, it is the bank that controls the whole system and the investment of desire."


--Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 229-230

[d63]

"Hence one is correct in speaking of a profound dissimulation of the dualism of these two forms of money, payment and financing–––the two aspects of banking practice. But this dissimulation does not depend on a faulty understanding so much as it expresses the capitalist field of immanence, the apparent objective moment where the lower or subordinate form is no less necessary than the other (it is necessary for money to play on both boards), and where no integration of the dominated classes could occur without the shadow of this unapplied principle of convertibility–––which is enough, however, to ensure that the Desire of the most disadvantaged creature will invest with all its strength, irrespective of any economic understanding or lack of it, the capitalist social field as a whole. Flows, who doesn't desire flows, and relationships between flows, and breaks in flows?–––all of which capitalism was able to mobilize and break under these hitherto unknown conditions of money. While it is true that capitalism is industrial in its essence or mode of production, it functions only as merchant capitalism. While it is true that it is filiative industrial capital in its essence, it functions only through its alliance with commercial and financial capital. In a sense, it is the bank that controls the whole system and the investment of desire."


--Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 229-230

Makes me wish I was presently doing an immersion in the Anti-Oedipus, Void. Good quote.

[d63]

"Last but not least, the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism (whereas Anti-Oedipus' to the others is more of a tactical engagement). And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini -which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively- but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us." -from Michel Foucault's preface to The Anti-Oedipus

Approaching Deleuze and Guatarri’s Anti-Oedipus for the nth time (via the book itself and Buchanan’s reader guide), it suddenly strikes me how relevant the book is to the present political climate –especially in America as concerns our present president. What makes it especially relevant is how D & G stress that fascistic experiments are not the result of who happens to obtain power, but rather a social environment that is conducive to it. And let’s face it: Trump is not the cause of the problem; he is a symptom. He is, rather, little more than a node in a vast rhizomatic network of machinic production. And we cannot stress the import of this enough since addressing Trump alone (through impeachment or whatever other means (will not solve the problem.

For instance, while it is Trump who publically turns to Gordian Knot solutions, it was private citizens looking for those kind of solutions that got him in. In fact, it is this basic human need for simplicity that lies behind the whole alt-right movement and their propensity towards such solutions. And this leaves us with a vicious feedback loop (a snowball effect (that starts with Trumps simple answer to a sluggish economy: deregulation and the withdrawal from the Paris Treaty. But as most scientists note, the first effects of global warming will lie heavily on third world countries close to the equator. So what do we think is going to happen when those areas become so uninhabitable that its occupants are forced to migrate north? What it will likely do is legitimize the alt-right position (the fascism (through excessive illegal immigration. And don’t think of it as some thought-out conspiracy. Think it, rather, as ignorance propping itself up through a kind of accidental Orwellian staged event.

On the uptick, though, Trump may well end up renewing interest in the work of Deleuze and Guatarri –especially the Anti-Oedipus. It may well result in the Deleuzian century that Foucault joked about.

[d63]

"To be anti-oedipal is to be anti-ego as well as anti-homo, willfully attacking all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke. For Oedipus is not a mere psychoanalytic construct, Deleuze and Guattari explain. Oedipus is the figurehead of imperialism, "colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home... it is our intimate colonial education."" -from Mark Seem's intro to The Anti-Oedipus

"Depression and Oedipus are agencies of the State, agencies of paranoia, agencies of power, long before being delegated to the family. Oedipus is the figure of power as such, just as neurosis is the result of power on individuals. Oedipus is everywhere.

"For anti-oedipalists the ego, like Oedipus, is "part of those things we must dismantle through the united through the united assault of analytical and political forces." Oedipus is belief injected into the unconscious, it is what gives us faith as it robs us of power, it is what teaches us to desire our own repression." -ibid

First of all, I gotta say it again: while the e-book technology is cool in how you can easily copy and paste quotes from the book, there is still something to be said for having to physically write out a quote from another writer. You just seem to assimilate the content as well as the style all that much more.

Secondly, I want to (in this window (frame these quotes in terms of a recent article I wrote for Philosophy Now (publication pending or, more likely, not gonna happen): In Defense of the Nihilism and the Nihilistic Perspective: https://trollersandtyrants.blogspot.com ... &type=POST

It seems to me that Seem is getting at the spiritual aspect of nihilism in terms of the Anti-Oedipus. We basically broach the possibility of a Zen Nihilism when we say things like:

"To be anti-oedipal is to be anti-ego as well as anti-homo, willfully attacking all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke.”

It’s basically what we do when we begin to tap into the underlying nothingness of things. I mean isn’t that what Zen is about? Dissolving the ego? And what would the ego dissolve into but nothingness? And in this sense, D & G work explicitly in the psychotic mode I describe in the article:

“The psychotic mode is a strategy of retreat. The individual, having no real criteria by which to judge action, recedes into their own semiotic bubble with its own vocabulary and systemic constructs –think the rules of grammar here. At its most extreme, it recedes to a point where the Symbolic Order is incapable of interacting with it while it is incapable of interacting with the Symbolic Order. The most obvious example, of course, is the schizophrenic walking down the street engaged in their own discourse, either with their self or some imaginary other. But it also takes on more watered down and socially understandable (if not acceptable) forms. Drug addicts and alcoholics, for instance, also recede into their own bubbles with their own systems of meaning (vocabulary) and rules of interaction (rules of construct). They too create their own semiotic systems that seem alien to the general Symbolic Order. We also see this at work in the more socially acceptable and productive form of the avant garde, that which addresses various conventions and power discourses and seeks to change flaws and injustices in the Symbolic Order.”

What D & G seem to be getting at (via their materialistic model (is an egoless state in which we see ourselves as nodes (not individuals with egos that might try to take control (in a de-centered system of exchange. And they do so in relation to the Symbolic Order as defined by Lacan. Once again:

“We also see this at work in the more socially acceptable and productive form of the avant garde, that which addresses various conventions and power discourses and seeks to change flaws and injustices in the Symbolic Order.”

This, of course, points to the very problem Rorty saw in the subject/object dichotomy: as long we maintain it, we continue to see ourselves as some kind of lord over the object, authorized to pass judgment on it. But by Rorty and D & G’s model, we rid ourselves of such erroneous models, and see ourselves as systems with various subsystems interacting with other systems with their various subsystems.

[d63]

"It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breaths, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines -real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the one produces a flow that the other interrupts. The breast is a machine that produces milk, and the mouth a machine coupled to it. The mouth of the anorexic wavers between several functions: its possessor is uncertain as to whether it is an eating-machine, an anal machine, a talking-machine, or a breathing-machine (asthma attacks). Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy machine: all the time, flows and interruptions. Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus. Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere metaphors." -from the Anti-Oedipus

Today I want to speak from a position I am most comfortable with: that as a guy trying to be a good writer who also enjoys the philosophical process of going from empathy to outright sympathy. I’ve always kind of “gotten” the Anti-Oedipus. It’s why I’ve returned to it as well as Deleuze. (Perhaps it’s the challenge or something. And I mean it: damn the French and their weird obscure philosophies anyway!) But having approached this book for the nth time, I am starting to see how truly beautiful the writing is in this book. I would note, for instance, the disjunctive effect of:

“For every organ-machine, an energy machine: all the time, flows and interruptions. Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus.”

Here we get a dissonant effect similar to a Stravinsky or Schoenberg piece. This, to me, creates a kind of Jouissance (that kind of push/pull effect (that defines true greatness. Depth, intensity, and lightness of touch. I would also note how D & G manage a subtle humor by looping back to previous points:

“Not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe."

I would especially focus in on “the sun into his asshole” which refers back to “Judge Schreber has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus.” We can also see this in “a breast into his mouth” which not only refers to the breast machine connecting with the mouth machine, but the complex sexuality involved as well.

The main thing to understand for now is that in order to get at the expositional aspect of the book, you first have to understand the aesthetic aspect of it. You have to turn content into form via form.

[d63]

"When Claude Levi-Strauss defines bricolage, he does so in terms of a set of closely related characteristics: the possession of a stock of materials or of rules of thumb that are fairly extensive, though more or less a hodgepodge -multiple and at the same time limited; the ability to rearrange fragments continually in new and different patterns or configurations ; and as a consequence, an indifference toward the act of producing and toward the product, toward the set of instruments to be used and toward the over-all result to be achieved."

"Hence the coupling that takes place within the partial object-flow connective synthesis also has another form: product/producing. Producing is always something "grafted onto" the product; and for that reason desiring production is production of production, just as every machine is a machine connected to another machine." –both from D & G’s Anti-Oedipus

Of course, my method of operation (or method of madness –take your pick) is becoming more obvious here. I mean the way my trajectory is going, it may come to randomly picking a paragraph out of whatever book I’m reading and just bouncing off of it with my own thoughts. But it seems appropriate in terms of my relationship to philosophy: not as a philosopher (I simply don’t have the training), but as someone trying to be a good writer who happens to like the philosophical process: that of turning empathy into sympathy, thereby assimilating theory to the point you can play with it. In that spirit, I would ask the reader to consider everything I write (especially on these boards (as a journal entry describing a philosophical process.

I mainly bring this up because what I am about to do is relate what I get out of these quotes to articles (unpublished articles (as well as articles I want to write. This may come off as self-promoting. But that is not my intention –that is despite the fact that I will also include links to articles I have written. It is merely to point out (in a dear diary kind of way (that I am finding some support for my instincts. My appeal to authority (and that is exactly what it is), however, is not meant to confirm my conceptual play as the final word. I consider it a form of play. And that is all I ever want it to be. Anyway:

"Hence the coupling that takes place within the partial object-flow connective synthesis also has another form: product/producing. Producing is always something "grafted onto" the product; and for that reason desiring production is production of production, just as every machine is a machine connected to another machine."

I would first reference the reader towards my concept of Efficiency: http://moretha.blogspot.com/2017/08/eff ... ticle.html

Then I would point out that one of the main reasons Efficiency has stuck with me is that along the way is that it has found some confirmation and articulation (as well as expansion (through two of my holy triad: Deleuze and Rorty. I see it as a synthesis of the two as Deleuze (as well as Guattari (provide the de-centered, rhizomatic network in which Efficiency works while Rorty’s pragmatism (I consider myself drawn to French theory while being equally drawn to the Anglo-American style of exposition (provides a more accessible approach to it.

But the main reason I bring this quote into it is that it points to one of the main points I want to make about Efficiency: that the idea is to produce output that can produce output down the line: to produce production. This is the very point of minimizing the differential between the resources put into an act and those gotten out: to put off heat death as long as possible. There is only so much energy in the universe. So it makes perfect sense to engage in every act in a way that will ensure further acts.

"When Claude Levi-Strauss defines bricolage, he does so in terms of a set of closely related characteristics: the possession of a stock of materials or of rules of thumb that are fairly extensive, though more or less a hodgepodge -multiple and at the same time limited; the ability to rearrange fragments continually in new and different patterns or configurations ; and as a consequence, an indifference toward the act of producing and toward the product, toward the set of instruments to be used and toward the over-all result to be achieved."

This one is dear to me because of an article I want to write on my next output phase:

Bricolage: the Ultimate Epistemology

This is Deleuze as the philosopher for which the creative act is never that far from his mind. (And let us not leave out Guattari as anyone knows who has read The Anti-Oedipus Papers.) And as Deleuze argues (via Bergson: nature, as a whole, is creative. Bricolage is the very process (by using what is at hand (by which all things change –including a creative process. As I will point out in the article, we only need look at dreams which have been scientifically pointed out to play an important role in brain plasticity. Think about it: the brain does a random inventory of its contents and randomly juxtaposes one mental element on another until it finds patterns that resonate with and seduces it. Then it stores those patterns as an element it can juxtapose with other random elements.

And let us note here the important role that chancing (as described in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense ( seems to be playing here.

[d63]

"Just as a part of the libido as energy of production was transformed into energy of recording (Numen), a part of this energy of recording is transformed into energy of consummation (Voluptas). It is this residual energy that is the motive force behind the third synthesis of the unconscious: the conjunctive synthesis "so it's...," or the production of consumption." -from the Anti-Oedipus

I want to return to this with different intentions than yesterday. But before I do, I want to show a little integrity in pointing out I was, to some extent, wrong when I said:

“First of all, I would thank Mr. (or is it Professor? (Dr. perhaps? (Buchanan for doing the footwork of extracting and giving me (for the mere price of a book: his reader’s guide to the Anti-Oedipus (the three syntheses of Anti-Oedipus: the connective, the disjunctive, and the conjunctive. As dialectic of the unconscious, it’s been useful to me. And it’s not like D & G make an effort to lay them out in any organized manner. They just kind of fold it all into their aesthetic approach to exposition.”

I was right to thank Buchanan for pointing out the triad to me. Without doing so, it might have passed by me yet again. Where I went wrong was:

“And it’s not like D & G make an effort to lay them out in any organized manner. They just kind of fold it all into their aesthetic approach to exposition.”

One could almost believe in a higher power in the way fate seeks to make a fool of you. And as fate would have it, I came across 4 sections: 3 of which are dedicated to each individual synthesis and one at the end to sum them up. Yes, I’m a little slow on the uptake; but at least I’m getting there.

That confession out of the way, I want to get at the element of Lacanian Jouissance involved in the three syntheses: connection, disjunction, and conjunction. But I first have to explain my understanding of Jouissance as I got it from a graphic guide: Lacan for Beginners. And thumb down your nose if you will. But I have found the concept very useful, not just in my own thought, but in the way I interpret the work of not only D & G, but Slavoj Zizek as well.

Jouissance, as many of you might know, is about sexual ecstasy: the experience of pleasure. But Lacan makes it a little more complex than that. He first points out that in the act of sex, we experience pleasure at a conscious level while experiencing discomfort at a subconscious level. The example he gives is that of engaging in sex then, right when the male is about to climax, pulling out the penis and clamping down on it. This, of course, would create discomfort –not to mention blue-balls. Then he goes on to reverse this and point out that many psychological symptoms (since they tend to be repeated (are a matter of experiencing discomfort at a conscious level while experiencing pleasure at a subconscious one. And it makes perfect sense since people with such maladies tend to repeat behaviors that give them discomfort. Why else would they?

But it goes even deeper, and more subtle, than that. If you think about it, sex is a process of working towards a thresh-hold that will take you out of a place you are really enjoying at the time. It’s like you’re going in two directions at the same time. And this can lead to a kind of push/pull experience that underlies much of what we experience, including D & G’s dialectic of the three syntheses: connection, disjunction, and conjunction. I mainly see it in the latter two. Disjunction speaks for itself. Conjunction expresses it through consumption and “consummation” –both of which feel like orgasm. As was pointed out in a footnote:

"The word consommation has a number of meanings in French, among them consummation (as of a marriage); an ultimate fulfillment or perfection; and consumption (as of raw material, fuel, or products).”

And I hope to elaborate on this. But my window is closing. Before I go, I would also note the feel of Jouissance in:

"Delirium and hallucination are secondary in relation to the really primary emotion, which in the beginning only experiences intensities, becomings, transitions. Where do these pure intensities come from? They come from the two preceding forces, repulsion and attraction, and from the opposition of these two forces."

And it is from the opposition of repulsion and attraction that we experience Jouissance.

[d63]

"How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: "More taxes! Less bread!" As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? Reich is as a thinker at his profoundest when he refuses to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in terms of desire: no, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for." -From D & G's Anti-Oedipus (pg. 29)

To be honest, while this has always been a section of the Anti-Oedipus that I have assimilated the most (through both original and secondary text (in fact, one my favorite quotes (and I have quoted it often (has been and remains:

“As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike….”

(I now have mixed feelings about it. It is, of course, a concern we all share –that is because people do seem to seek their own oppression. And I cannot speak for people in other advanced nations. But there is a lot here that does not jive with the American experience of emergent fascism –especially as it is coming to a head under Trump. It becomes immediately suspect with:

"How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: "More taxes! Less bread!"”

This is by no means the call of the right. In fact, it is the opposite. And I do, without qualification, attribute the American propensity for fascism with the right. While there are fascist impulses in the left (I’ve experienced them in myself as well as others), the left simply does not have the pull with the Capitalistic regime to be as dangerous.

For the right in America, it is more about empowerment through more money in their pocket. It is more about how they could be doing great if it wasn’t for the undesirables: immigrants, welfare mothers, tax and spend liberals, etc., etc... In this sense (and at the risk of making the same mistake as Bill Maher), I would argue that Malcolm X’s house-slave dynamic actually works better in that no tyrant works in a vacuum. What they must do, rather (much as Trump is doing with the military), is create a cushion between themselves and those who will suffer with well compensated acolytes. And this worked as well for Stalin as it did Hitler. I would also note:

“….after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves?”

The problem is that, in America, anyone who has watched the TV show COPS can see that humiliation and slavery are mainly aimed at the undesirable other: in this case, white trash and minorities –or rather non-producer/consumers. We see this at work, as well, in a guy who stood outside a Trump rally and waxed wishfully about the day he could go to the Mexican border, buy a 25$ permit and get 50$ per confirmed kill.

At the same time, I would not totally dismiss D&G’s, as well as Reich’s, deeper and more desire based understanding. It would be hard to maintain that self-interest is purely to blame when you have food stamp recipients in Louisiana expressing nothing but hate for the federal government. But couldn’t we blame that on ignorance and illusion?

The point is not to dismiss D & G’s model of social production and the folly it can lead to. I have every intention of pursuing it further myself. All I am saying is that we have to be a little wary of theoretical overreach and recognize that simpler and more accessible models (such as Malcolm X’s house slave dynamic (are as worthy of consideration, that simply because a conceptual model is more subtle and complex (the radical purely for the sake of the radical (we must accept it as the right explanation.

[d63]

One of the things I’m starting to get from Eugene Holland’s reader guide to the Anti-Oedipus is the inherent opposition between desiring production and anti-production via the former’s inherent tension with social production –that is even though both are basically the same thing. On the other hand, it might be better to say that anti-production is opposed to desiring production while naturally emerging from social production. Let me explain and hope I don’t fuck it up, hope I make more sense to you than it might be making to me.

I would start by pointing out that desiring production works at a subconscious level. It works in the pings, grunts, and silences in the meat of the brain. That is the language of the brain. But evolutionary mandates require that those pings, grunts, and silences connect with other bodies -the brain basically being the ambassador of the body. It is at this point that desiring production translates into social production. But at this point, desiring production comes up against the hard reality of other bodies with their own matrixes of desiring production. Hence: anti-production –and furthermore: the disjunctive syntheses that Deleuze and Guatarri include in the triad of connection, disjunction, and conjunction.

The best analogy I can offer is a point made by Picasso: that taste is the enemy of art. But Picasso was an artist and not a man to clearly define his terms. I would argue that what he was getting at was that taste was rather a hindrance to the creative act, that which any child could engage in, and is also a form of desiring production. Art, on the other hand, is a form of social production in that it is always about group taste while the creative act still remains a form of social production in that it is desiring- production made public. Therefore, from D & G’s perspective, Art becomes a form of anti-production in the way it filters “bad art” from “good art”. From this perspective, it would have been better for Picasso to say that Art (social and anti-production (is the enemy of the creative act: desiring production.

As I have always said: the creative act never seems that far from Deleuze’s mind. Perhaps this is why I have managed to get myself trapped in the web of that goddamn Frenchman.