Prismatic567 wrote:felix dakat wrote:Prismatic567 wrote:Kant CPR ultimate focus is about metaphysics and ontology where he demonstrated metaphysical-ontology are impossibility as contrasted to Mathematics and Science.
Yes, Kant is a deist and did align with the idea of God [I do not agree with Kant on this] but only for moral reasons not as a reality within the empirical world.
No I am not relying on "an ontology in which God has the attribute of absolute perfection". I doubt human beings are capable of knowing what that is. If you were only saying that it is impossible for God to be known rationally or empirically as a totality or an absolute certainty that would make sense to me. But to say that it's impossible for God “to be real empirically’ suggests that empiricism is closed system which it isn't.
To Kant God was unknowably transcendent. Kant maintained that neither human reason nor the empirical world could give any direct or unequivocal indication of divine reality. He refuted the rationalistic arguments for the existence of God. But Kant left open the possibility of faith in the transcendent God and belief in the soul’s freedom and immortality. It seems to me you’re trying to use Kant to refute Kant.
A religious tradition that recognizes that God is ultimately unknowable didn't start with Kant. It has a long history in Christianity. According to this way of thinking whatever qualities the human mind attributes to God cannot be considered ultimately valid for if they are humanly comprehensible they must be limited to the finitude of human understanding which can't possibly comprehend the infinite nature of God. Kant's philosophy of God is consistent with this perspective. Yours isn't.
I did not state I agreed with Kant totally, not where he kept the term 'God' in the deistic sense. Note deistic not theistic.
Kant's argument is the idea of God is an illusion if claimed to be empirically real, i.e. to the extent of a God that listens and answers prayers, plus created and sustaining the Universe.
The only provision by Kant for the idea of God is for the purpose of morality where God is absolute [not real].
Note:
Kant: God is a Transcendental Illusionhttp://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 5&t=195263To Kant, the idea of God should never be reified as real, but merely adapted for the purpose of morality and absolute moral laws.
Perhaps you are banking on the following quote;
For in order to arrive at such insight it must make use of Principles which, in fact, extend only to Objects of Possible Experience,
and which, if also applied to what cannot be an Object of Experience, always really change this into an Appearance,
thus rendering all Practical Extension [i.e. morality] of Pure Reason impossible.
I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.
-Bxxx -Kant in CPR
The above is merely a point in the Preface. The details of the above statement do not provide for any belief i.e. God exists as real. The term 'deny' 'faith' are not the direct translation of their German equivalent.
The main purpose in this case is to make room for the Practical [i.e. Morality] which has nothing to do with any real God but merely with an ontological God [illusion] with the attribute of absolute perfection.
Your use of the term "real" above continues to suggest that you are conflating Kant's epistemology with ontology. Kant abandons objective anthropomorphism and possibility of knowing God absolutely or as God as God is in God's self. He does not give up the possibility of Supreme Being as he elucidates here:
When we connect the command to avoid all transcendent
judgments of pure reason with the apparently conflicting
command to proceed to concepts that lie beyond the domain
of immanent (empirical) use, we become aware that the
two commands can subsist together, but only right on the
boundary of all permitted use of reason—for this boundary
belongs equally to the domain of experience and to that of the
creations of thought [= Ideas]. And through that awareness
we also learn how these Ideas, remarkable as they are, serve
merely for marking the boundaries of human reason. On
the one hand they give warning •not to go on extending
our empirical knowledge with no thought of boundaries, as
though nothing but sheer world remained for us to know,
and yet on the other hand •not to overstep the bounds of
experience and want to make judgments about things beyond
them, as things in themselves.
But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment
merely to how •the world may relate to •a being whose very
concept lies beyond the reach of any knowledge we are
capable of within the world. For we don’t then attribute to the
supreme being in itself any of the properties through which
we represent objects of experience, and so we avoid dogmatic
anthropomorphism; but we attribute those properties to the
supreme being’s relation to the world, thus allowing ourselves
a symbolic anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns only
language and not the object itself.
When I say that we are compelled to view the world as
if it were the work of a supreme understanding and will,
I actually say nothing more than that a watch, a ship, a
regiment, are related to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the
commanding officer in the same way that the sensible world
(or everything that underlies this complex of appearances) is
related to the unknown; and in saying this I don’t claim to
know the unknown as it is •in itself, but only as it is •for me
or •in relation to the world of which I am a part Such knowledge is knowledge by analogy. This doesn’t
involve (as the word ‘analogy’ is commonly thought to do)
•an imperfect similarity of two things, but rather
•a perfect similarity of relations between the members
of two quite dissimilar pairs of things.13
By means of this analogy we are left with a concept of the
supreme being that is detailed enough for us, though we
have omitted from it everything that could characterize it
absolutely or in itself ; for we characterize only its relation
to the world and thus to ourselves, and that is all we need.
Hume’s attacks on those who want to determine this concept
absolutely, taking the materials for doing so from themselves
and the world, don’t affect my position; he can’t object
against me that if we give up the objective anthropomorphism
of the concept of the supreme being we have nothing left.
Prolegomena, Immanuel Kant, pgs 66-67
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets ... nt1783.pdfAnd here:
Thus I see before me order and design in nature, and need not resort to speculation to assure myself of their reality, but to explain them I have to presuppose a Deity as their cause; and then since the inference from an effect to a definite cause is always uncertain and doubtful, especially to a cause so precise and so perfectly defined as we have to conceive in God, hence the highest degree of certainty to which this pre-supposition can be brought is that it is the most rational opinion for us men. * On the other hand, a requirement of pure practical reason is based on a duty, that of making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to promote it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its possibility and, consequently, also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality; since I cannot prove these by my speculative reason, although
neither can I refute them.Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Practical Reason (p. 113). Public Domain Books. Kindle Edition.
In the latter quotation, Kant admits he can't refute the possibility of God as you argue you have done.