Fixed Cross wrote:Zeroeth Nature wrote:Granted, this seems to follow from Nietzsche's premise of a finite world. I haven't accepted that premise for a few years now, although I now think the infinite is filled with stuff that indefinitely becomes smaller but will never be infinitesimal.
I personally go by the findings of physics in this regard, meaning I accept a Planck length as a true minimum. I recommend reading a bit of Niels Bohr on QM, you'll find it lucid in a philosophic sense.
The surprise encountered by the quantum mechanics is that on this scale, existence isnt a continuum, but changes stepwise, which entirely alters the math.
Essentially this means that the structure of the universe is numerical.
Thus indeed, made up out of value relations, where each minimal value is a (self)-valuing
Thanks for the recommendation. As for the Planck length: even if it's
the true minimum, I contend that that, too, becomes indefinitely smaller! though it will never be infinitesimal. More on this below.
And as for the surprise you mention, it reminds me of this:
"Let’s consider the shortest interval of time and the smallest extent of space. These units are determined by an observer. When the sampling rate of the observer reaches its limit, space and time stop being continuous and start to be discontinuous. In other words, the motion of the object will change from being smooth to occurring in jumps [...]. If the object changes location between the smallest units of time, then its change in location is instantaneous. There is no unit of time small enough to measure between the smallest units of time. Likewise, an object is stationary during its appearance for the smallest interval of time because there is no unit of space small enough to measure between the smallest units of space possible." (Source:
http://rosmappedcmmodel.com/public_html/Images/ROSMappedCMModel.pdf.)
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Fixed Cross wrote:Fixed Cross wrote:He must value his valuing activity - not so much the precise coordinates of value in which he thereby ends up entangled -
because valuation is close to evaluation, and evaluations pertain to the outside rather than the inside.
He must thus, while valuing, remain detached from that which he values. Even if his valuing is absolute!
A contradiction, or so it seems when we formulate it.
He must, in other words, value without asserting true knowledge of that which he values.
Valuing one's own Valuing, "directly", is only possible by way of the duality between oneself as "nothing", as absence of being(s)¹, and oneself as a being, a Valuing—which is not an objection, by the way. Again, still, more on this below.
¹ Compare: '[W]illing is transformed into acceptance. The knower thereby transcends the will to power, and becomes one with the "Nothing", which is and is not will to power—is and is not a being.' (
https://pathos-of-distance.forumotion.com/t107-spacelight-continuing#2566)
That seems right.
Good. Still, I want to add something. I now realise the duality mentioned is basically Heidegger's "ontological difference": the difference between Being, or the meaning (
sense!) of Being, and
being(s). In order to value one's own Valuing, "directly", one needs to sense one's own Being, one's Being-a-being... (Actually this Sensing is itself already the Valuing of one's own Valuing! For it is aesthetically "pleasing", "pleasurable",—
beatific!
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Fixed Cross wrote:Fixed Cross wrote:All that is truly known is the valuing. And the object of value is valued because it offers the opportunity for valuing, as that is all that is truly known about it. After all, the object which is valued can not be known in its own terms except by itself, as discussed above.
[...]
Because being is constantly in the process of emerging, there can not ever be a heat death.
I offer that the background radiation which leads to the hypothesis of a big bang is really a constantly emerging being from the void of Ein Soph, or Ginnungagap. (the nothingness which, even though it may be absolute (I havent fully understood that yet), must negate itself by virtue of its quality of nonexistence)
Here we finally arrive at the "below" I kept referring to.
Note that, on page 1 of this thread, I also said: 'The heat death of the universe is [...] the end that never ends, just as the Big Bang is the beginning that never began.'
How can the beginning have never begun? Well, consider this passage from Nietzsche (as mistranslated by Kaufmann!):
"Lately one has sought several times to find a contradiction in the concept 'temporal infinity of the world in the past' (
regressus in infinitum): one has even found it, although at the cost of confusing the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me from reckoning backward from this moment and saying 'I shall never reach the end'; just as I can reckon forward from the same moment into the infinite. Only if I made the mistake—I shall guard against it—of equating this correct concept of a
regressus in infinitum with an utterly unrealizable concept of a
finite progressus up to this present, only if I suppose that the direction (forward or backward) is logically a matter of indifference, would I take the head—this moment—for the tail[.]" (Workbook Spring 1888 14 [188] =
WP 1066, with added emphasis in underlined script.)
The manuscript actually reads "
infinite
progressus up to this present"... The Big Bang as a beginning that never began actually reconciles the concept of a regressus in infinitum with the likewise realisable concept of a
finite progressus up to this present!
Now for nothingness or the "nothing" (
WP 1067). Some pointers:
"According to Tsongkhapa, for the
Prāsaṅgika the philosophical position of emptiness is itself a non-affirming negation, since emptiness is a 'lack of inherent existence.' One is not affirming anything in the place of that absence of inherence. It is not the presence of some other quality. If one were to describe emptiness as the presence of some quality—for example, a 'voidness' or a 'thusness'—it would linguistically and philosophically contradict the nature of the object which it is attempting to characterize.
[...]
Inseparability of Conventional & Ultimate TruthAccording to the Prasangika, dependent-arising and emptiness are inseparable, and exist in a relationship of entity or identity. A relationship of entity or identity is one in which two objects are merely conceptually distinct, but not actually distinct. [...] Additionally, this relationship applies to impermanent phenomen[a] and products: if it's impermanent, it must be a product. Similarly, if it is a conventional arising then
it is emptiness, and if it is emptiness, then
it is a conventional arising. These two are merely conceptually distinct, but not actually distinct. [...]
'Form is empty. Emptiness is form.
Emptiness is not other than form; form is also not other than emptiness.
[...]'
All phenomena are of the nature of emptiness and emptiness is nowhere to be found except as the nature of all phenomena. Emptiness is established as being synonymous with dependent arising. Dependent arising, also, is established as being synonymous with emptiness. The mere appearance of phenomena due to dependent designation [
i.e., to the designation of being(s) as separate things!—compare Silhouette's "continuous experience"] is inseparable
from the non-obstruction to their arising, which is emptiness.Emptiness of EmptinessAccording to both Tsongkhapa and Nagarjuna, emptiness is also empty of inherent existence: emptiness only exists nominally and conventionally. Emptiness is co-dependently arisen as a quality of conventional phenomena and is itself a conventional phenomenon. There is no emptiness just 'floating around out there' or a 'Great Emptiness from which everything else arises.' For example, a table is empty of inherently being a table from its own side. This is referred to as 'the emptiness of the table.' The emptiness of the table exists conventionally as a property of that particular table. Lama Tsongkhapa quoting Chandrakirti:
[']Since there is nothing at all that is not empty of intrinsic existence, it is perfectly reasonable to say that even the emptiness which is a seedling's lack of intrinsic nature lacks essential existence. [Which Chanrakirti agrees with when he states] If that which is called emptiness did have some essential existence, then things would have intrinsic nature. However, it does not.[']
Very interesting, but I am not sure I agree with the last statement, on which the rest seems to depend.
How can emptiness have an essential nature? Only by standing in relation to non-emptiness, and only when non emptiness has an essential nature - which it does, namely, valuing.
Thus, emptiness itself is a reflection, in as far as we can speak of it at all, of non-emptiness - we can only speak of emptiness in terms of that which is not empty.
We can presume an emptiness without an essence, but not engage on in some logical thoughtform.
I suppose therefore, final emptiness is experienced as sublime, rather than as worthless.
I see now that the last statement you quote here is indeed paradoxical. However, what is meant is that, if emptiness would have some essential existence, then things would have the intrinsic nature
of emptiness. But "emptiness" does not designate something that things
have, but something that they
don't have: as mentioned in the first statement, it's a non-affirming negation. (More precisely, it designates things' not Having something, namely an intrinsic nature (
svabhava,
atman, etc.).)
In my understanding, that all beings are Valuings and nothing besides is precisely why they are empty! To be sure, though, what you say here does make me realise that my subsequent understanding of Valuing as self-Lightening implies that beings are not
absolutely empty—and thereby relatively full—in the following respect. A self-Lightening is a Lightening of itself, i.e. of that very Lightening. As such, the Lightening, (even) if it is not recharged by other self-Lightenings, becomes ever lighter, less vehement, meaning it lightens itself ever less. This is why it can never become infinitesimal, never disappear completely, and thereby never become absolutely empty in that respect! It will always have something left of which to lighten itself. However, compared to absolute
fullness, it's only relatively full and in that respect
absolutely empty... My cosmology holds that the Big Bang is the beginning that never began, in the sense that the "beginning" of the Big Bang is an asymptote, a limit, something that would never be reached (even) if time was reversed! And likewise, the heat death of the universe (Big Chill, Big Freeze) is the end that never ends, not in the sense that it's an eternal standstill, but an eternal Stand
ing-still
er ("Standing" in the dynamic sense, of "Causing-oneself or Being-caused to stand, to be static"—).
'The heat death of the universe means that the universe approaches (but only as an asymptote, a limit that can never be reached but only approximated) absolute darkness and cold. I was thinking absolute darkness and cold could again give birth to light and heat if confronted with another darkness and cold. What's certain is that, to absolute darkness and cold, another absolute darkness and cold would not be dark and cold—and therefore, relatively bright and warm, if formerly the former was not absolute... This means the absolute darkness and cold which our universe "approaches" becomes ever less dark and cold to it. Logically, it's the same limit as that "before" the Big Bang... The only thing missing for the ER according to current scientific consensus, then, is that the limit is actually reached.' (
https://pathos-of-distance.forumotion.com/t107-spacelight-continuing#2721)
But: it doesn't
matter if the limit is reached or not! It doesn't matter whether the cosmic serpent bites itself in the tail or ever so slightly misses the mark. (Reminds me of a D&D session in which Bobo, as the dungeon master, said the spider that sat on my arm tried to bite me but
missed... (What he meant was the spider's fangs failed to pierce my scales.))
"Movement [of history] in a circle can have a beginning and an end (a single great cycle ending in a universal conflagration or an eschatological cataclysm) or, like a pure circle, have no beginning and no end. There will then be eternal return." (Mahdi, "Religion and the Cyclical View of History".)
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Fixed Cross wrote:From the Prasaṅgika point of view, it is the same with all types of emptiness. There is no 'independent emptiness' or 'ultimate emptiness.'
There is no independent emptiness but there is I would say, as I just did, a final emptiness - at least a finality to all analysis and experience which its emptiness.
This emptiness is final for all intents and purposes.
That whole long Wikipedia excerpt is about Prasangika according to
Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelug, the youngest of the major Tibetan Buddhist schools. I value him greatly, but I also really value the oldest of those schools, the Nyingma, and the closely related
Bön religion (which is now also considered a school in its own right). Note that the Dalai Lama belongs to the Gelug, but somewhat controversially practices
Dzogchen, which is rather a Nyingma and Bön technique. Dzogchen is aimed at becoming and remaining aware of "the Ground", which
is basically a "voidness" or "thusness", a "Great Emptiness from which everything else arises". (I identify it with the Abyss, the
Abgrund, "Offground".) So I do value the idea of a final or ultimate emptiness. However, in my view this emptiness is not
absolute (nothingness) in the respect indicated above; instead, it is "empty space", which as you know I take to constitute a unity with light: light-space, or in other words the space-radiation duality. I contend that where there's space, there is radiation, and where there's radiation, there is space—within "matter" as well. In fact all "matter" ultimately
is radiation/space, and as such is "empty". The amplitude and the frequency of all radiation may become ever lower, but it will never completely flatline. In that sense, "emptiness",
being self-Lightening, is a relative fullness and, compared to absolute nothingness (which doesn't exist—), even an
absolute fullness, yes... The universe
is a self-Lightening—an infinite one! And as such the only one.—
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Fixed Cross wrote:As I recently wrote in a private message:
'Note though that "Buddha-nature" is precisely the lack of a "nature" in the strict sense: it is the emptiness of svabhava ("self-nature"; a combined Latin-Greek transliteration would be suiphysis).'
I disagree, as I see Buddha nature as the orientation by a human on emptiness, not emptiness itself.
Well, so
I see Buddha-nature as the orientation by emptiness on a—being! :)
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Fixed Cross wrote:And last week, I came to think of redshifting—as in cosmic microwave background radiation—like the
stretching of a spring... I half-jokingly call this idea "spring theory". I'm thinking the higher the frequency of the radiation, the greater its
radiation pressure! (Likewise the higher the
amplitude of the radiation the greater its radiation pressure, just as two equal springs have twice the tensile force of one.)
It is true that the shorter the wave, the harder it is for it to penetrate anything - because indeed, it forms more of an actual pressure.
(Hence why the current generation of communication signal, a very short wave, had to be amplified tremendously with respect to the previous generation to be able to pass through walls (so much so that the signal is actually a significance force causing very magnetic fields heavier than our own), and why light, ultra short wave, cant pass through walls at all, unless it comes in such power as to obliterate the wall.
Excellent! And you're talking about 5G there, right?
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Fixed Cross wrote:Fixed Cross wrote:On the other hand, any notion of such show-ness must indeed be grounded in particular experiences.
Yes, but it can be generalised, like I said: 'that other beings, too, are not just objects, but worlds in their own right.'
Yes, but the term "world" is inevitably understood in terms of ones own world.
And that such terms may differ quite fundamentally is becoming clearer and clearer these days.
All worlds have some space, no matter how small; some light, no matter how dim. Have an enlightening, mind-expanding year!
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I didn't address this bit before, but I will now:
Fixed Cross wrote:Fixed Cross wrote:The nature of relating is only understood in terms of involvement'; love, hate, like, dislike, embrace, reject, as well as more complex forms of valuing. Thus, true understanding of a being can only exist in terms of itself.
I don't see how that necessarily follows; your "thus" requires a second (if only a minor) premise. Can you state that, please?
It is because love, hate, etc are all subjective, one sided relatings.
y loves x doesnt say anything about x. Whereas y = 2x is a definition of y and x in terms of each other.
In the latter example we can understand y in terms of x, in the former we can not -
In the former example we may claim that what y loves in x is y's own love - or the power x gives y to experience love.
This is not a definitely explicated attribute of x.
I must say I find this quite odd, coming from the founder of Value Ontology! I'd say that, insofar as we know y, "y (dis)values x" tells us something about x; whereas, insofar as we know x, it tells us something about y. Also, that what y (dis)values in x is that y is able to get charged by or discharge itself into x... This is the abysmal thought! "[T]heir essence lies in their relation to all [their] other[s]", that is to say in their Affecting them
and their Being affected by them. As I wrote in the sequel to that private message I mentioned:
Zeroeth Nature wrote:When Zarathustra says that all feeling (in the sense of "all that feels":
alles Fühlende) suffers in him and is in prison(s), what he means is this: feeling is something
passive, i.e. something "suffering" in the sense of
"undergoing". Willing (
Wollen, "to will"), on the other hand, frees (
befreit, "emancipateth"), in the sense that it's "liberating" because it
feels free (I think will is nothing else than the feeling of freedom, which in turn is nothing else than the feeling of power; will
is the feeling of {free will}/{willpower}...).
In other words, feeling is something unfree, something that overcomes you, whereas willing appears to be active (i.e., involving
agency, "self-acting"), spontaneous. Now Zarathustra says this in the second chapter of Part II, but by the twentieth chapter (out of twenty-two), he has learned that the will itself is still a prisoner ("Redemption"). The will is a prisoner, is in prison(s), because it's something passive—a
pathos, as N says in
WP 635 (
passio(n-) was used as the Late Latin rendition of Greek
pathos; "the Passion of Christ" doesn't mean his strong emotion but his
suffering).
"Are you now
prepared? You must have lived through every degree of skepticism [...]—otherwise you have no right to this thought [i.e., the idea of eternal recurrence.]" (Nietzsche, workbook Autumn 1881 11 [339].)
The skepticism immediately preceding this demand, in the same workbook, involves what I used to translate as "the imagining Being" [...]. I will now translate it as "the (re)presenting Being". Here's from entry [324]:
"Feeling and will [
Gefühl und Wille] are only known to us as (re)presentations, so their existence is
not proven."
Here feeling and will are presented, not even as
things that befall us (things that truly exist, noumena, things-in-themselves), but as mere
semblances that befall us (things that merely
seem, phenomena, appearances). And here's from entry [325]:
"The (re)presenting Being is
certain, indeed our only certainty:
what it (re)presents and
how it must (re)present, is the problem. That Being (re)presents is not a problem, it is just
the (matter of) fact [die Tatsache]:
whether there is another Being than the (re)presenting Being,
whether (Re)presenting doesn't belong to the
property of Being, is the problem."
This is the highest degree of skepticism. It's what I meant when I wrote that Nietzsche and I were 'both coming from the most extreme skepticism (nihilism).' Note that Greek
skepsis literally means a "looking-on", and that the first Skeptics were followers of
Pyrrho.—
And again in that private message itself:
Zeroeth Nature wrote:[T]o stand "above" everything as its own heaven etc. means to adore it from the deepest point of view. (Compare the Seventh Seal: "Thus however speaketh avian wisdom: 'Lo, there is no above and no below![']")
Note though that "Buddha-nature" is precisely the lack of a "nature" in the strict sense: it is the emptiness of svabhava ("self-nature"; a combined Latin-Greek transliteration would be suiphysis). Compare:
"Nothing is easier to perceive than reality's emptiness. Genuine philosophy or science is the realization that nothing, no divine or natural order, endows anything with a non-arbitrary [B]eing,¹ an identity not subject to radical change at any moment. There is nothing in (or behind or above) things to make them more than empty experiences, impressions as Hume called them. Reality and everything in it is nothing but empty impressions, experiences, bigotries, dreams whose dreamer is himself a dream." (Neumann, "What is Bigotry? A Note on Academic and Un-Academic Philosophers", with my emphasis.)
¹ "Being" is cognate with bhava and physis.
Nietzsche's blessing, then, finds a very early formulation in The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 1, where it says: "It's a dream! I want to dream it further!" (Note by the way that Neumann elsewhere speaks of "dreams whose dreamers are themselves dreams"—so it's not as if there need be only one such a blesser.) Picht complements Neumann when he says:
"The truth is not outside of creating, it is rather the carrying-out of creating itself. The truth is the composing¹ of truthful show.² Since however the composer of this show is himself only a dream, only the mask which Dionysianly conjures the omnipresence of the horizon of the millennia, the composer becomes transparent to himself as the steward of the dream of history on which the whole past continues to compose. He is the dreamer who knows that he's dreaming, that he's being borne, led, formed, guided and composed by a power which eludes his own control. Hence 'Gay Science' 54 begins with the statement: 'How marvelously and newly and at the same time how horrifically and ironically do I feel disposed towards the entirety of existence with my cognisance!' (V 2, 90) The marvel is the discovery that, through the inversion of the statement 'God is dead' and through the cognisance of truthful show, the show of the world rays forth in a divine lustre. The new is the discovery of the future, the horrific is the shattering of the subjectivity of the subject, is the cognisance that the subject is nothing else than the embodiment of past and future history, thus, as I've said, the mask in which the omnipresence of history is conjured in the creative moment. This discovery is horrific for this reason, that through it the principium individuationis [principle of individuation] shatters, that man becomes aware of the fact that his own existence, too, is only a dream, only show, only a designing-oneself into new possibility, only a hovering without support. The irony, finally, is in the fact that the man who has attained to the cognisance of this truth is like a dreamer who knows that he's dreaming, like a creator who no longer creates unconsciously but sees through his own creating at the same time. In this way existence becomes perspectival in the dual sense that it's conscious of the historical limitedness of its own horizon and at the same time knows that, precisely through this limitedness, it provides and possesses insight into the contradictory structure of the Being of beings-as-a-whole. The dreamer who knows that he's dreaming is a symbol which sees through itself as a symbol." (Picht, Nietzsche, page 319. The word I've translated as "cognisance" is the same word Common translates as "discernment", by the way; it's usually translated simply as "knowledge".)
¹ Dichten, literally "poetising" or "tightening".
² Schein, literally "semblance" or "shine".
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[...T]he inversion of the statement "God is dead" would be: "Life [or existence] is divine" (compare BGE 37: the God who is now dead was rather the Devil). But look how this is attained: the will to appearance (Schein) is deeper, more original, more metaphysical than the will to truth [WP 853 III], precisely because of the nature of truth:
"All striving to do or be anything arises from a nihilist will to overpower nihilism, the will of nothing to be more than nothing. Like everything else that will is nothing." (Neumann, "Nihilism Challenged and Defended". This is from the same page as his mention of dreamers, plural, by the way.)
It is precisely because of the nature of truth—i.e., because the will to appearance is so deep, or in other words because the world is false (WP 853 I)—that the will to truth can develop: for the show (maya) veils the truth, so that its terrible nature is concealed and the show itself gets to be seen as terrible.
The redemptive quality of nihilism, i.e. of the truth, then, is again [i.e., as in the case of procrastination] in its being an example of that fragment from Heraclitus: "Sickness makes health agreeable and good, hunger satiety, fatigue rest." To be sure, Neumann himself could not access this redemptive quality, instead exclaiming:
"[H]ow anyone can experience nihilism as pleasurable is beyond me!" (Neumann, "Reply to Professor Shadia Drury".)
This is what he was replying to there:
"The philosophers alone have the fortitude to withstand nihilism or the truth. They alone can love myth and illusion while knowing that they are merely products of art. [...] In the face of the nothingness of reality, they are the makers of [so-called] truth, the interpreters of the nonexistent text. No activity could be higher or more pleasurable. This is not to say that the order the philosophers impose on reality's chaos is arbitrary. Even though nature and human nature set no limits on human conduct (they contain no moral standards), they nevertheless provide the rough outlines of what is necessary for collective preservation. The philosophers fashion the horizons of the herd which endow the good and evil with meaning, but the philosophers are themselves beyond good and evil." (Drury, "Strauss and Nihilism: Response to Professor Harry Neumann". Compare Z II "On Self-Overcoming"/"Self-Surpassing".)
Again, this is complemented by Picht. I can't do justice to it without quoting him at length, though:
"The traditional, metaphysically grounded morality [...] is false in the sense of falseness raised to a higher power. It does not just posit the necessary show, but on top of that it passes this show off as truth. Traditional morality is therefore false in a dual sense, whereas the world is only singly false. In morality, the spiral of show is, if I may say so, rotated a full rotation further. Therefore, the truthful show of the world is not affirmed; the world is rather, on the basis of an additional deceit, negated in the name of the alleged truth. [...]
Now [Nietzsche's note] continues: 'The will to truth is a making steadfast, a making true/permanent, a making disappear-from-view of that false character [of the world], a reinterpretation thereof into something being.' Here we again run into the concept 'will to truth'. On first sight, the opinion must suggest itself that, by 'truth', at least at this point only the so-called truth of metaphysics can be understood—after all, doesn't Nietzsche say that the will to truth is a making disappear-from-view of that false character, a reinterpretation thereof into something being? The will to truth is thus determined here as the will, active in metaphysical morality, to the reinterpretation of show into something being, thus to the grounding of the fundamental error of metaphysics. The true is understood in this will as the permanent. Permanent however is only the imaginary counterworld to the absolute flux, permanent is therefore only show. No doubt: the truth, thus understood, is show and, when the show is passed off as truth, error. But how does it stand with the will to truth? Nietzsche does not say, as would have to be said from the standpoint of metaphysics: The will to truth is the will to cognisance of the steadfast, the true, the permanent; he rather says: 'The will to truth is a making steadfast, a making true/permanent', a reinterpretation of show into Being. When one oneself first makes what shall be cognised as true, when one gains Being only thereby that one reinterprets show into Being, then the will which accomplishes that cannot avoid eventually discovering that what it must first make steadfast is not yet steadfast by itself, and that the permanence which it must first create is not already given in advance. As Nietzsche puts the concept 'will to truth' in place of cognisance of the truth, he has thus carried out the great inversion. He wants to cognise the problem of science no longer on the soil of science, but sees the process of designing the schema of a permanent world from the perspective of the artist. From this perspective, too, the truth is still only so-called truth; it is the show in which the counterworld shows up. But only when considered from the standpoint of the will to truth does it come to light what is really true about the so-called truth, namely the necessity to found an abiding order, in which life is possible. Once again it turns out that Nietzsche's inversion of metaphysics has a double meaning. On the one hand, the fundamental error of metaphysics is as it were unmasked; it is now no longer possible to pass off as Being what in truth is show. On the other hand, however, it is through the exposure of the will which is active in its ground that the proceedings of metaphysics in their inner necessity first become understandable and in this sense get justified. Only through the overcoming of the error of metaphysics does what had been true in all metaphysics come to the surface. If one understands 'truth' in the concept 'will to truth' as the truth in truthful show, then the will to truth is no more only a will to so-called truth; it is then rather the will to poiesis or, as Nietzsche says here, to 'making', that is to say to the production of a show which does not negate life but affirms it; which is thereby in unison with life and thanks its truth to this unison." (Picht, Nietzsche, pp. 280-82, with added emphasis.)
"The ancient tradition that the world will be consumed in fire at the end of six thousand years is true, as I have heard from Hell.
For the cherub with his flaming sword is hereby commanded to leave his guard at tree of life, and when he does, the whole creation will be consumed, and appear infinite, and holy whereas it now appears finite & corrupt.
This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment." (William Blake,
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell.)
I now take this to mean that the philosopher takes upon himself as his ownmost the political task (
Aufgabe, "Given or Giving up"—) of
no longer imposing a herd-preserving
order on reality's
chaos—so that by far
most people must perish!
I now take the sensual enjoyment mentioned to be especially that of the sense of Being.
"Enough!" (ibid.)