fuse wrote:Hi Prismatic,
Nice thread.
Prismatic567 wrote:Philosophical Anti-Realism claims that objects [things] exist in reality interdependent with our [human] conception schemes.
However, Kantian Transcendental Idealism posits two different types of objects: things in themselves (mind-independent, transcendental reality) and things in space, i.e. appearances, representations (human interdependent, empirical reality).
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason wrote:But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself [Ding an sich selbst], exists distinct from us and sometimes merely that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance—in which it is taken in the proper psychological question about the reality of our outer intuition—we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that might be called “external” in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them “things that are to be encountered in space”.
In terms of transcendental Idealism, the thing-in-itself to Kant is an illusion.
In the above Kant refer to external empirical objects/things which appear in space and in reality.
To clarify your argument, I would reformulate it as such:
P1 Appearance [the empirically real] is conditioned by humans [PAR]
P2 Humans condition OUGHT_ness
C1 Therefore, OUGHT is derived from Appearance
With or without the clarification, I can't say that I follow the logic.
What's empirically real is conditioned by humans.
What ought to be is conditioned by humans.
Thus, the empirically real and what ought to be are derived from a common source (or parent), human conception, but one (child) does not necessarily derive from the other (child). Some additional premise would be required for this conclusion to make sense to me. I added parent/child characterization because thinking about the terms in a branching tree structure helps illustrate the issue I'm having.
My original argument;
P1 'IS' [empirical] is conditioned by humans [PAR]
P2 Humans condition OUGHT_ness
C1 Therefore, OUGHT is derived from IS
"What
is" is the reality of external objects/things which appear as appearance to the conscious mind.
Appearance is merely a representation of the external objects/things.
"IS" is the reality, i.e. all-there-
is.
Thus my P1 should be maintained.
I can change my P1 to be more realistic, i.e.
P1 'IS' [reality - 'all-there-is' -empirical] is conditioned by humans [PAR]
Re P2, obligations or oughtness are inherent within the human DNA or psyche.
E.g. humans ought to breathe is inherent from the DNA.
Whatever the 'ought' it has to be conditioned from humans and no where else, not God nor Plato's Forms.
Thus my P2 is valid.
Therefore my conclusion follows from P1 to P2.
There is no need for additional premises, except for the above additional explanation.
A simple counter-possibility could be that while both the 'empirically real' and 'what ought to be' derive from human conception, they do not derive from human conception in exactly the same way, and the process for determining ought requires, let's say, some additional rational scheme to be applied for its generation.
Point here is P1 is universal, i.e.
Reality, what-IS is all-there-is.
Human are part and parcel of all-there-is [reality].
The impulse of oughtness from humans are also part and parcel of all-there-is [reality].
Therefore minor premise P1 can qualify to be subsumed with the major Premise P1.
It is all logical.
I am a progressive human being, a World Citizen, NOT-a-theist and not religious.