iambiguous wrote:Here we are clearly stuck.
gib wrote: I don't think we were ever moving.
But where I am stuck in particular is in discerning "once and for all" if I was ever able to decide that I am
not stuck instead. Autonomously, freely or whatever else one calls "I" making a choice in a world not entirely in sync with the laws of matter.
If the things I think, feel and do are all intertwined necessarily in a brain intertwined necessarily in the laws of matters, what is the point of making such a distinction? Other than because "I" was never able not to make it?
gib wrote: For you? None. For everyone else? Tons.
From my frame of mind, this doesn't make my point go away until someone is able to demonstrate that either for me or for "tons" of others, the things that we think, feel and do were or were not in fact the things that we were only able to think, feel and do. Psychologically, we seem able to convince ourselves that we choose freely. But how is this in and of itself demonstrated to not merely be an inherent manifestation of life evolving into the human brain on earth? Evolving wholly in sync with the laws of matter?
iambiguous wrote:I just don't grasp this "psychological freedom" the way you do.
gib wrote: Sure you do. You just don't like. So you block it out.
Same thing. Until it can be demonstrated that the choice I made to block it out was not the only choice I was ever able going to make, we just go around and around in circles. Why? Because we were never able not to.
Again, I'm not arguing that I believe this beyond all doubt. I'm only suggesting that my ambivalence here may well be "beyond my control". And that even the arguments that some make in concluding that it is not beyond their control is in fact beyond their control. In that they were never able to argue otherwise.
Here I often go back to dreams. In them, I think that I am calling the shots. But it is only my brain matter creating what seem to be very real experiences to me.
gib wrote: I haven't quite grasped what you're ultimate aim in pursuing this all-encompassing determinism is, but given your interest in bringing the topic to the lives and struggles of human beings competing with each other and making moral judgement on each other, I'm going to guess that you want to prove to the world that no one is at fault for anything... ever... and thereby undermine all moral judgements.
No, that's your assumption. My own aim instead revolves around grappling with human autonomy in a world where "free will" has been debated now for many, many centuries. There is no clear cut consesnsus by any means.
And, so, I am not pursuing determinism. I am not pursuing anything other than an attempt to come to grips with my own ambivalence. And to question those who actually do seem convinced that their own understanding of all this is the right one.
That's the part where human psychology comes into play here for me. This need to believe that there is but one correct answer. Why? Well, because they have already found it. And that allows them to anchor "I" in a foundation that is able to sustain some measure of comfort and consolation.
gib wrote: And here I come with my proposal of alternate meanings of freedom and ruin everything. How can no one be at fault for anything if yet another form of freedom rears its ugly head, a form by which we can continue to make moral judgements?
How can you ruin something for me that does not even exist? I am not arguing as either an objectivist or as a determinist. I am acknowledging right from the start that my own frame of mind here is both an "existential contraption" ever subject to change given new information, knowledge and ideas, and, in turn, woefully incomplete given the gap between what I think I know here and now and all that can be known about the existence of existence itself.
After all, I haven't written a book that comes to certain --
certain? -- conclusions about mind and matter.
That would be you, right?
Mostly I am trying to grasp how you reconcile the psychological freedom of any particular individual in a world in which mind is matter and matter is in sync with necessary laws.
How can these not be understood as compatible only in the sense that you were never ever able
not to make
that distinction? Unless of course you can convince, among others, the philosophical and scientific communities that your conclusions are in fact the most reasonable. And that you either were or were not in fact free to come to that conclusion.
iambiguous wrote:My point here however is that I am conflicted.
I doubt that.
Perhaps because you were never able to not doubt it. But if, in fact, you were, how could you possibly even begin to truly grasp my motivations and intentions anymore than I could truly grasp your own? Try to even imagine the existential gap between your "I" and my "I" in this exhange.
I am of "two minds". A part of me is convinced that any autonomy we do possess in the is/ought world is circumscribed by the manner in which I construe the components of my own moral philosophy. But another part of me is not even convinced that we possess autonomy in the either/or world.
gib wrote: If I didn't know any better, I'd say it was the whole you.
And that is certainly in sync with an assumption of my own: that you actually are convinced that these are things you can in fact know. And how gratifying [psychologically] that must be.
You actually seem to think that I like thinking that we live in an essentially meaningless world on this side of the grave that ends in the obliteration of "I" for all time to come on the other side of it. And you think that I think about this as I think that you think about it.
But only one of us seems rather smug about it all.
Then this part:
iambiguous wrote:If I thought like that, I would never pursue my other aim here: groping with the existential parameters of this: How ought one to live?
gib wrote: Prove it to me. The next time you remind us that you do or say or think X because you could never have not done or said or thought X, try coupling that with a statement underscoring what you would do if free will were real. You can begin with "On the other hand..." But I'll bet my children's education fund, I'll never see you say it.
But I am not saying "that I do or say or think X only because I could never have not done or said or thought X." That is you saying what you insist I am saying. Instead, I'm pointing out that I read the arguments of the determinists and the nondeterminists and they both make points that the other side is not able to just make go away. Points that cannot be demonstrated to be necessarily irrational.
I'm pulled and tugged in both directions. And, in fact, if I were wholly convinced that determinism is the optimal or only rational frame of mind here, the only explanation for pursuing dasein, conflicting goods and political economy in my is/ought world discussions is because I was never able not to. But how exactly would I go about determining that?
Is "free will" real? Here and now I can only think I know this or that about the answer. But I can't determine if what I think I do know here and now is closer or farther away from what you think you know given that neither of us is probably even close to whatever the answer might be given an actual ontological understanding of existence itself.
iambiguous wrote:Yes, that's what we are attempting to come to grips with here: the extent to which any reactions from any of us were/are within our capacity to have been other than what they were/are instead.
gib wrote: Ah, but... are we attempting to come to grips with this because we are freely choosing to? Or is it because we could never have not attempted to come to grips with it?
Exactly! Some think that their own attempts are freely chosen, while others think that, in thinking this, the attempts in and of themselves are just another manifestation of what we still don't know about how mindless matter could have evolved into brain matter evolving into human minds.
Are memes and genes essentially interchangable in an existence that trudges on necessarily only as it ever could?
gib wrote: And BTW, why are you agreeing with me? What happened to the gap between what you think you know "in your head" and all that would be needed to know in order to say for sure what we are attempting to come to grips with?
Agreeing with you about what? We can both agree that we are exchanging posts here at ILP. We can both agree that we have different takes regarding the existential significance of "psychological freedom" given the choices that we make.
But how would anything that we either agree or disagree about not still be embedded in the gap between what we think we know about these things here and now and all that can be known in about them in order to assess the reality of existence essentially, necessarily?I'm basically at a loss regarding why you can't own up to this profoundly significant chasm. Unless, of course, you were never really able to.
gib wrote:I would very much like an answer to my question: do you think that in order to have a subjective experience, one must be able to choose that subjective experience (this was the example about choosing to see a banana as blue).
But how does this not immediately take us on to the next question: do you think that what you do think here is something that you chose to think "of your own free will"?
gib wrote: Everything takes you to that question, Biggy.
No, everything takes me to the question of how it can be determined that "everything" -- "anything" -- here was or was not ever within my capacity to have chosen otherwise.
The banana is blue because someone painted it blue, or because you have taken LSD, or because your brain is diseased, or because you are dreaming it is blue.
gib wrote: Is this really your answer? Ha! You couldn't even answer the question!
Note to others:
What sort of answer is he after here? Please provide me with the manner in which you would answer him instead. So that I can make comparisons.
gib wrote: Your brain distorted what you read. In a panic over the prospect of being shown up, your brain convert this: "Do you think that in order to have a subjective experience, one must be able to choose that subjective experience?"... to this: "Why is the banana blue?"
Sure, maybe. But all I can do here is to respond to the best of my ability. For me, there is no question that we choose our subjective experiences. Instead, the question is the extent to which it is possible that "I" could have freely chosen another experience instead. Or that I could have freely chosen to react to the experiences of others otherwise.
Right now there is a part of me convinced I am freely choosing to type these words. That, in other words, I can stop doing so and freely choose to do something else instead.
But how can I determine this beyond all doubt? Is the fact that psychologically I "think" and I "feel" that I am free the same as actually being so? I think and feel that I am free in my dreams. But it's all brain matter creating a reality "in my head" to the best of my knowledge.
It still comes down to whether with respect to any of these contexts there is an element of autonomy present.
gib wrote: Not really.
So, that settles it?
iambiguous wrote:To the extent that anyone is able to point out the weaknesses of this assessment, I can only be grateful.
gib wrote: We're all human, Biggy, and I think we'd all take comfort in knowing that we'll be taken care of by a benevolent God after we die, but there are some things we cling to more than hope in a blissful afterlife. Stakes in an argument, for example. You've clung to your nihilistic position for so long, and spoke in defence of it so many times, I think at this point, you'd prefer to be right despite knowing the implications that has for your "I".
Again: To the extent that anyone is able to point out the weaknesses in my assessment, I can only be grateful.
Nothing that you've noted above changes that. Though, sure, you can think what you will in exposing "the real me" to others here.
But I'm the one who has to live from day to day with what I have "here and now" thought myself into believing is true about these things. And, your own contentions to the contrary, it is a really,
really,
really grim point of view.
iambiguous wrote:And I suspect that the peace of mind that you and "most others" are able to sustain here is embedded in a psychological defense mechinism that revolves around one or another rendition of this: viewtopic.php?f=15&t=185296
gib wrote:That doesn't sound too peaceful. If I may suggest, maybe it's just not having to be confused by how the world works. I have an understanding of how the world works on a fundamental metaphysical level. I may be right, I may be wrong. But once engraved into my mind, how can I undo this understanding? And why would I? Just for the sake of taking the hard road? Of being tormented by confusion and existential angst? <-- No thanks.
Bingo. You admit that your own answers here may be right, may be wrong. But [from my frame of mind] that's not the point. Instead, the point is that you have managed to convince yourself that there is a right answer to be had here. So, again, why not yours. It's the part about
having an answer --
any answer -- that propels the objectivist mind.
Why would you want to "undo" the answer given that having one was the whole point in the first place?
That's the part where "comfort and consolation" comes in.
The arguments on this thread however revolve more around are the extent to which, psychologicaly and/or metaphysically,
anything that we chose here was or was not only as we ever could have chosen it.
Not only do I not know the answer to this, I can't even imagine the minds of any mere mortals on this tiny little rock in the vastness of what may or may not be the multiverse, actually thinking that they have one!
The fucking answer!!!
To me, that's analogous to insisting that you believe in the existence of
the fucking God! And then demonstrating that He does in fact fucking exist!!
iambiguous wrote:...in a way that really doesn't make much sense to me. I'm simply not free to make a ham and cheese sandwich if I was always ever going to make it. If thinking that I am free is in turn the only way I was ever able to think about it, then this feeling of "compatibilism" is in turn illusory.
gib wrote: Not if you understand what it's saying.
And again, the feeling of freedom is no more an illusion than a dark room is the illusion of emptiness.
Again, if the human brain is matter wholly in sync with the necessary laws of matter, human thoughts and feelings are either wholly in sync with that or there is something very, very special about human "minds".
Or, perhaps, souls?
If I could not
not have made the sandwich and if I could not
not have thought I was doing this freely...
What does freedom mean here? For all practical purposes?
iambiguous wrote:...is just another intellectual contraption that your brain was determined to concoct in order to sustain the illusion that a part of you -- the psychological "I" -- might have chosen something different.
gib wrote: The advantage of compatibilism is that you actually can say that.
In a determined universe [if that be the case] in which you were never able to
not say it.
gib wrote: You phrase it: "I could have chosen different, if I wanted to."--the catch being that your wanting to is the determining force that decides your choosing one way or another. That we were destined to choose one way over another is neither here nor there with compatibilism.
But my wanting to is or is not no less entangled in my
having to want to. My brain/mind is or is not compelled [by whatever brought into existence existence itself]
to want or not want things only as it ever
could have wanted or not wanted to.
My "sense of freedom" here in making the sandwich would seem to be interchangeable with the prisoner begging the guard for food. We both think and feel and behave as we do only because there was never any real possibility of it being otherwise.