phyllo wrote:It's also your contention that :Thus it is my contention that the moral objectivist may well be concerned more with acquiring [subconsciously?] a soothing psychological serenity that comes with believing that this can be accomplished, then in actually demonstrating that his or her own moral narrative does in fact necessarily reflect the optimal point of view.
- the "moral objectivist" out to be concerned with that "his or her own moral narrative does in fact necessarily reflect the optimal point of view."
- the "moral objectivist" ought to spend his time demonstrating it
- the "moral objectivist" ought to demonstrate it for ALL men and women
- the "moral objectivist" ought to demonstrate it to the point that becomes an obligation for them ALL to follow.
Which seem to be a preposterous set of demands that you are putting on the "moral objectivist".
Perhaps you have designed it so that the "moral objectivist" always fails.
On the other hand, it is also my contention that the moral objectivist may well not be concerned with these things.
And that is wrapped up in the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein on this thread: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=176529
The point then is to make a distinction between what we are in fact able to demonstrate as true for all rational men and women, and that which seems more embedded [to me] in one or another subjective/subjunctive "existential contraption".
Like this one for example:
But what if, instead, the workman picks up the hammer and uses it to kill someone; and is then able to rationalize/justify it "in his head" as "the right thing to do"?
This is the part where [Heidegger's] take on Dasein most intrigues me. The fact of his killing a perceived enemy/threat can be established.
But how is it established that this behavior is either moral or immoral? That all rational men and women are obligated to construe it as either one or the other?
How does that not revolve around a particular context understood in particular [and often conflicting] ways by particular individuals who have come upon their own moral narrative existentially given the sequence of actual experiences they have come to encompass/embody in a particular life?
If, instead of a workman using a hammer to kill an adversary, it is a soldier using a rifle to kill a Jew -- "out in a world" that Heidegger himself inhabited -- how are philosophers able to establish either behavior as either necessarily right or necessarily wrong?
In a No God world?
On the other hand, in a manner I still do not fully understand, your own narrative seems to unfold in a God world.
Using this example or one of your own, lets explore our respective narratives regarding the interaction between value judgments and identity out in a particular context.