Delueze Study:

[d63]

I’m going to approach this one a little differently than I did the one on Dennett’s book. In the spirit of Deleuze and his rhizomatic epistemology, and the sense that his writings should be read like poetry (enjoyed for their surface effects until you manage to get to the deeper aspects –the meanings –if such a thing can be attributed to him), I’m just going to put everything I have of his on the turntable and hit random play and see how I respond.

I’m pretty sure I’ll have to do the same with Derrida.
*
Fucking French, anyway!
*
The books that may be included (but not limited to:

Delueze:
Difference and Repetition
The Logic of Sense

Delueze & Guattarri:
Both books from Capitalism and Schizophrenia
And What is Philosophy

And Brian Massumi:

A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia


The problem is, having just started to dive into Difference and Repetition, you get the feeling that you’re up against a writer that is going to offer everything up to you in oblique ways. At this point, it feels too impenetrable to just read and hope to have something to respond with. All you can do is immerse yourself and hope that something emerges in an oblique way.

I get the feeling that Deleuze is more interested in a performance as compared to Dennett who just wants to push a point.
*
At the start, I suppose we have to take Difference and Repetition as analogous, or at least comparable to, chaos and order.

However, from what I gather, Delueze sees the 2 as intertwined. He sees Repetition underlying Difference, and Difference underlying Repetition.
*
I think what mainly draws me to Delueze (as well as Guattarri) is a epistemological network that is a vast relationship of ideas that have no center: the rhizome.

Anyone who has known me on this board can appreciate why I am attracted to it.

Hopefully at the end of it, I’ll get to trip again.
*
Don’t you think it strange that Delueze would write in a standard prose style, to such an extent and length, while Wittgenstein felt forced to write in a aphoristic style?

I mean Delueze, like Nietzsche, seems way more engaged in the dance of thought than Wittgenstein did.
*
Hopefully, this project will allow me to push deeper into the nihilistic perspective or the implications of it.

Unfortunately,

…………………that may involve


Those kind of:

…..Zen Haikus




…………..I like to indulge in
*
Reading Repetition and Difference, I got the feel of someone who had a lot of things to say about a lot of things. But at the same time, it was all over the place. There was a kind of postmodern ADD about it. But then that may have been the result of having a lot of things to say about anything.
*
At one point though, Delueze seemed bound to protect the beautiful soul that saw the intertwined nature of difference and repetition to the extent of recognizing that our differences are ultimately superficial.

Perhaps Delueze was the ultimate hippy.
*
Hopefully, this will be a journal as much as a study.

The cool thing about it is that I'm quite certain this study will go with the music I listen to.

[d63]

The rules are the same:

it's up to me to keep it on topic.


You can follow whatever fancy or flow takes you.

[Orbie]

D63-- a very interesting topic. One with which I was vaguely familiar with back in hippy happy days. However plus give a time to take a refresher before I can attempt any kind of response. Wanted to signal my interest, however it's probable I'll be preempted. Leave in on the back-burner.

[d63]

D63-- a very interesting topic. One with which I was vaguely familiar with back in hippy happy days. However plus give a time to take a refresher before I can attempt any kind of response. Wanted to signal my interest, however it's probable I'll be preempted. Leave in on the back-burner.

The main thing is that you find your flow with it, brother. It's pretty much what I will have to do as well.


Clearly, it's going to be a challenge. The study of Mind, Brain, and Consciousness will seem like a cakewalk compared to it. But that's all the more reason for appreciation for any help I get.


But in the spirit of Delueze, it would have to be like a jam. And in like spirit, there cannot be any rules as to what constitutes a relevant statement. At the same time, we have to reign it in by our intuitions about what is relevant. I would argue that Delueze was as about as far away from Sartrean Bad Faith as far away could be. I think Delueze would turn in his grave if we worked by anything more than our instincts here -that is as long as we, at least, made the attempt to attach them as close as we could to his instincts as we could.


I Think Delueze was as much of a writer as he was a philosopher.

No matter what we think or write here:

the main thing is to pay tribute.

[d63]

I just want to jam with Delueze:


like him, I want to see what my mind can do.

[d63]

Delueze teaches us that we encounter philosophy in such things as songs.



He calls them engagements.

[Orbie]

D63: my starter is with differentiated planes. The way I would start to understand topically the problems, I would start with Deleuze's epistemology and work backward into ontology. Its the very reversal I have been seeking, the beginning seems simple::let's reverse ontology , choosing as the pont of departure the probable (multiplicity) and declare that the unity (at least 2 observers-sartre claims this is as solipsisitic as the 1). I am just laying down the ground rules,and not going into any judgment calls here) so it's an de-i differentiation, 5iffering from an integration--since it has already been differentiated) how this measures up with repetition--can be later explored.

(Repetition was kierkegaard's idea--was this borrowed? If so what is the significance for deleuze)$


If Oedipus is derivative, anti Oedipus is anti derivative--(de-differentiated).

Oedipus, maybe an asset to narcissism, is an anomalous structure combining context (perspective) bit displaced from the focus (or center of consciousness and projected as the other) as in the myth, of an aligned myth of narcissus, ((and seek a connection between oedipus and narcissus)

Narcissus as phenomenological ly de-differentiated as an anomalous cognitive structure of not being able to differentiate between the subject and the object.

The de-differentiation involves a cognitive/Phenomenological reduction into less complex levels of symbolic concepts, a sort of regression.

Here the lower levels of consciousness are as an "underworld" make their appearance.


At this level, the ideal shifts into the center as either inflated or deflated.

Take the example of a convex/concave visual apparatus, placed into a cognitively central position, where visual (self images) are anomalous with the concepts of the self. Here central magnification produce visual singular points or reference both to the singular (subjective point of view, and the one of manifold points. The connections are seen as increasingly complex toward the center, and increasingly simple from multiple points of view.

I think optical analogy is a good starting point, because on this level on consciousness it's safe to say, the ideal structures can be at once constructed and de constructed, making way for the cognitive---structural pre suppositions to be built, (as in the development of differentiation of the figurative from the cognitive. The cognitive is effected by some kind of surplus value (a marx ian term) which de constructed will become the symbol for the surplus.

In capitalism, too (the literal representation of surplus value) some kind or de-differentiation into an anomalies of the body, and the organs--as I understand this dissection.

So these are some of the dis sections (above) that this way of thinking can be approached.

Modern views of schizophrenia distinguish a schizoid, continuum, where types are determined, rather then the other way around, and the continuum seems to be related to functional determinants, so the older "atypical" categorical interpretation, of categorical classifications have outlived their usefulness. Why? Because of advances in pharmacology, of de constructing the myth of strict causality (freud) and of course the search into the lowest type of consciousness (Archetypes)

It is useful, to propose an epistomologically naïve thesis , as a starting point, because this is what anti determinism requires, a wiping of the sleigh! Not by erasing everything, but taking an essentially built up construct and reversing it, not linearly (freud) but de constructing it pehomenologically,b using the baggage that it has come to add, and using that, to arrive at the origin of the transcendental ideal. I believe deleuze spell that out in the beginning of his ontology.

So let's start with self image as the displacement of self concept, (that becoming a referentially preconceived, a privileged position through which, the role and function of the Object become fetishized, cut off). The re assemblage of these parts, become the existential project.

I do not wish to say that these are either original re creations, or aphoristic disassembliges, but perhaps, repetitious processes of both. (I believe he wrote sense and nonsense, and I use that as also a very general defensive way of basing this as redundantly as possible, since ultimately entropy is a de construction of redundant ways of communication.)

[Bill Wiltrack]

.













....................................................................
















.

[kyle2000]

The problem is, having just started to dive into Difference and Repetition, you get the feeling that you’re up against a writer that is going to offer everything up to you in oblique ways. At this point, it feels too impenetrable to just read and hope to have something to respond with. All you can do is immerse yourself and hope that something emerges in an oblique way.

Delueze, like much continental philosophy, is bunk. If a philosopher makes his points in an oblique manner that is a good indication that he's covering up his ignorance behind abstruse language. Most, if not all of the great philosophical arguments, can be stated in such a way that the man on the street can understand them.

I am willing to bet that you can take any statement by Delueze that you think is profound and I will show you that at least one of the words in that statement refers to something that does not exist or is undefined. When I press you to define it, your definition will harbor another undefined word. I will now scroll through your summary looking for undefined words.

At the start, I suppose we have to take Difference and Repetition as analogous, or at least comparable to, chaos and order.

The above is a textbook example of what I'm talking about. Define chaos, define order, define difference. To be quite honest, defining difference and sameness is very difficult.

[Orbie]

The problem is, having just started to dive into Difference and Repetition, you get the feeling that you’re up against a writer that is going to offer everything up to you in oblique ways. At this point, it feels too impenetrable to just read and hope to have something to respond with. All you can do is immerse yourself and hope that something emerges in an oblique way.

Delueze, like much continental philosophy, is bunk. If a philosopher makes his points in an oblique manner that is a good indication that he's covering up his ignorance behind abstruse language. Most, if not all of the great philosophical arguments, can be stated in such a way that the man on the street can understand them.

I am willing to bet that you can take any statement by Delueze that you think is profound and I will show you that at least one of the words in that statement refers to something that does not exist or is undefined. When I press you to define it, your definition will harbor another undefined word. I will now scroll through your summary looking for undefined words.

At the start, I suppose we have to take Difference and Repetition as analogous, or at least comparable to, chaos and order.

The above is a textbook example of what I'm talking about. Define chaos, define order, define difference. To be quite honest, defining difference and sameness is very difficult.

That is the point. The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis. It's a reversal of using probable value ---instead of certain. Language is too limited to include the experience.

[kyle2000]

The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis.

You probably don't even know what analytical and synthetic means.

Further you're just begging the question that: "The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis." Prove it

It's a reversal of using probable value ---instead of certain.

Don't understand

Language is too limited to include the experience.

I think you mean language does not faithfully describe experience. True, but irrelevant to this discussion.

[Orbie]

The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis.

Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their meaning, synthetic propositions by virtue of their relationship to the worldm

How we relate to the world synthetically is an objective way, since verification is inter jubjective, whereas anayltic inquiery is simply looking at the meaning of that truth.
You probably don't even know what analytical and synthetic means.

Further you're just begging the question that: "The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis." Prove it



Change implies shifting the starting point of inquiery from a subjective to an objective starting point, understanding definitional logic as an anti derivitive of intersubjectivity.

It's a reversal of using probable value ---instead of certain.

Don't understand



In inter subjective truth (proposition) the traditional validation is via understanding grounded in intioitive, apriori understanding of the meaning and the truth of that value. They are based on logical structural affirmations of identiifying one thing with another thing. Anything can be qualified as having truth, if it can not be excluded on basis of non distintion.

Synthetic truth on the other hand can be verified by similar, shared qualities. They do not impinge qualititavily on the identity of the values, they are ascertaind by quantitative analysis, vis. As in set theory -certain values having similar traits, belonging to sets. There is no exclusion on basis of non identity.

Language is too limited to include the experience.

I think you mean language does not faithfully describe experience. True, but irrelevant to this discussion.

Deleuze brings up the relevancy, in terms of the surplus value as a relational product of the experiential to the. Desription.

[d63]

First of all, obe, seems like you’re off to a good start. You seem to be enjoying the Play of it.

Kyle, you seem a little more interested in so called “serious philosophy”. So I suggest you seek it elsewhere.

We fail to see that the purpose or force of art and philosophy goes beyond what life is to what it might become. Today, no one really seems to ask what science is for, and this is probably because science is manifestly functional. Much of Deleuze's project was spent in showing a force of life beyond everyday function, such as the force and value of change and becoming: not a becoming for some preconceived end, but a becoming for the sake of change itself. Deleuze drew from science in all its forms, but he did so in order to extend the powers of literature and philosophy, all the while arguing for the necessity of literature and philosophy for life.
Colebrook, Claire (2002-12-07). Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers) (p. 14). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.

Now is it any wonder I am so drawn to Delueze?

At the same time, it seems to me that what he sold into was one of the primary strategies of Capitalism in that Capitalism eventually hijacked the concept in order to sustain our role as consumers at a time when we’re being asked to consume more while being given less resources to do so. Therefore, they had to turn to virtual tactics to keep us consuming: such as keep things in a constant state of change. This was primarily a lack of foresight, not incompetence on Delueze’s part. And as any psych 101 class will tell you: change is synonymous with stress.

At the same time, you have to admit that becoming is freedom as compared to being.

We do philosophy because we can, and if we can do philosophy – if we can ask ‘big’ and possibly unsolvable questions – then we ought to. Why? For Deleuze life in general proceeds by creatively maximising its potential; philosophy is one of the directions by which a certain line of life (thinking) increases its power. For Deleuze there is a direct link between philosophy, literature and ethics. If we limit thought to simple acts of representation and cognition – ‘this is a chair’, ‘this is a table’ – then we impose all sorts of dogmas and rules upon thinking (Deleuze 1994: 135). We fail to extend life to its maximum. We use a creation of thought – logic and grammar – to imprison thought. The fact is that there are all sorts of texts and styles of thinking that go well beyond representation or simple pictures of the world.

Colebrook, Claire (2002-12-07). Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers) (pp. 14-15). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.

And that’s just it, isn’t it? We do it because we love doing it. And doesn’t the analytic, as Delueze describes it, shut off that flow of energy? Doesn’t the analytic shut down Play? Do you think it some kind of coincidence that it is always the analytic that is trying to control the discourse?

Delueze is the anti-analytic. And that is why I’ve got to love him. It’s why I’m drawn to what we has done. Simply pointing to posers who parody his style of exposition does little to discourage me.

*
Logically: what wannabe guru would want someone like Delueze to exist?
*
And isn’t the rhizomatic epistemology homologous to the structure of the brain?
*
The history of philosophy has moved towards the possibility that there is an underlying nothingness to any assumption we can base our assertions on. All Delueze has done is accelerate that process.

Of course, the analytics will oppose him. They will claim to have found real truth. But all they have done is hit a mark by pulling the target closer.

One only need look at the materialists claim to the ultimate truth as concerns consciousness to understand this.
*
Kyle: I literally hope you become a blindspot for me. And I mean this in the sense that Dennett described the natural blindspot that people have in their eyes. Basically, what Dennett done was dispell the old myth that the reason we don’t see it is that the mind fills it in. Instead, he made the profound point that what happens is that the brain doesn’t just gloss over it; it actually just ignores it. In other words, it’s just non-existent data. It’s a little like most of us not thinking about people not existing on the moon, not because our brains are glossing over their non-existence, but because they simply don’t exist.

I mean it, Kyle: I could give a shit how opposed you are to what we’re looking into here (do you actually think I didn't expect you?). And I could equally give a fuck about what you think is the Truth. What I do care about is that this exploration is allowed to go on without a heckler. That's my Truth.

(As compared to bitching about non-serious philosophy

(You need to seek “serious philosophy”.

[d63]

Really don't care if it's wrong or right(






(just feel like I've found a common soul w/ Delueze


From what I understand,




He was an alcoholic 2.

[d63]

The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis.

Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their meaning, synthetic propositions by virtue of their relationship to the worldm

How we relate to the world synthetically is an objective way, since verification is inter jubjective, whereas anayltic inquiery is simply looking at the meaning of that truth.
You probably don't even know what analytical and synthetic means.

Further you're just begging the question that: "The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthethic analysis." Prove it



Change implies shifting the starting point of inquiery from a subjective to an objective starting point, understanding definitional logic as an anti derivitive of intersubjectivity.

It's a reversal of using probable value ---instead of certain.

Don't understand



In inter subjective truth (proposition) the traditional validation is via understanding grounded in intioitive, apriori understanding of the meaning and the truth of that value. They are based on logical structural affirmations of identiifying one thing with another thing. Anything can be qualified as having truth, if it can not be excluded on basis of non distintion.

Synthetic truth on the other hand can be verified by similar, shared qualities. They do not impinge qualititavily on the identity of the values, they are ascertaind by quantitative analysis, vis. As in set theory -certain values having similar traits, belonging to sets. There is no exclusion on basis of non identity.

Language is too limited to include the experience.

I think you mean language does not faithfully describe experience. True, but irrelevant to this discussion.

Deleuze brings up the relevancy, in terms of the surplus value as a relational product of the experiential to the. Desription.

There you go, brother.

How ahead of me could you be?

[d63]

The person who complains that the film is ‘nothing like the book’ ought to read the book. (Similarly, the scientist who complained about a philosophy being ‘inaccurate’ or a philosopher who complained about a novel being ‘illogical’ would merely be imposing their own dogmatic image of thought on thought's other possibilities.)

Colebrook, Claire (2002-12-07). Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers) (pp. 30-31). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.

Despite my initial reaction to Kyle’s heckling, I think it only right that I give him credit for kindly offering himself up as a perfect example as to why Delueze (among other continentals) is of import. When he first came into this, one could imagine him strolling in, fists tightened at the end of the arms that flailed at his side as he snarled to himself:

Let me set these scrappers strait.

And while he reads as having the intellect to do so (at times he reads like Searle to me), what he seems to lack is the wisdom to recognize the folly of turning his intellectual curiosity into a common pissing contest, the Oedipal structures underlying his train of thought (he wants to put us on the right path like a loving father), and the extent to which he has placed himself in a fascist (with a small f)/paranoid center. But then it’s not like we should be surprised. This kind of smug bah-humbugging is common among the analytics. Take, for example, Searle’s smug dismissal of Derrida –that he was some kind of charlatan of import only to literary critics and people who knew nothing about philosophy. But then you have to wonder if Searle’s reaction wasn’t sour grapes in the face of the difficulty of trying to understand Derrida. I mean I know how he feels. I too have experienced that frustration. And given the clarity that Searle writes with, you have to take note of the compassion involved in advocating for clarity. This is why you have to take a more rounded view of Kyle when he says:

Delueze, like much continental philosophy, is bunk. If a philosopher makes his points in an oblique manner that is a good indication that he's covering up his ignorance behind abstruse language. Most, if not all of the great philosophical arguments, can be stated in such a way that the man on the street can understand them.

Now on one hand, I can relate to him to the extent that I agree that most concepts should be able to be explained to the man on the street. Underlying his hostility is an almost Marxist adversity to esoterism and elitism. But then he indulges in the same esoterism and, more importantly, the elitism of smugly dismissing the millions of people who made it possible for Delueze to even be an issue today. In other words, if there was any compassion in his agenda, it was pretty much overridden by his hypocrisy. And, to my mind, that makes the supposed compassion little more than gloss for a more important agenda: the domination of discourse. And isn’t that exactly what the fascist/paranoid center does? Case in point: most of Kyle’s arguments assume that philosophy has some fixed function –one by the way that he is best adapted to. But where does that fixed function, given the multiplicity of our philosophical tradition, come from? Who made Kyle the boss of philosophy?

He, of course, assumes that this authority comes from his attachment to analytic, that which dominates the university due to the rising influence of corporate sponsorship due to decreasing state funds.

And this is the import of the continental that Kyle fails to see, the seeds of de-territorialization that lie inherent in the territorrialization of Capitalism that, through its influence on the academic culture, allows Kyle to act as if he has the authority he, in truth, lacks.

What he fails to see is that that very same Capitalism that seeks what sells is engaged in the dissemination of continental thought through the Sisyphean distribution of philosophy through graphic guides and the philosophy and popular culture series. The continental is winning. The analytic can be only be said to be winning to the extent that they are contributing to what will participate in the latest gadget that science can produce and corporations can sell. And I'm sure they'll be well compensated which can only act as reinforcement for their arrogance.

The gift that Kyle has offered us lies in mirroring the paranoid/fascist center the analytics have drawn to in order to maintain their exclusive claim to philosophy and “the Truth”. But the only Truth involved is that dictated by producer/consumer Capitalism.

[Orbie]

Actually you are way ahead, give me time to catch up, I can only do snippets, since my wife came back. But I am extremely intrigued. But I love philosophy.
(Two)-(serious)-(lye)


There appears to be no (1), or (3), at this moment.
Whatever seems redundant, just omit. Will briefly look into sense and nonsense, my only problem, by the time I do, I may have more blogs to refresh and be charged with irrelevancy. But isn't that the way of existentialism at the present time?

[d63]

Actually you are way ahead, give me time to catch up, I can only do snippets, since my wife came back. But I am extremely intrigued. But I love philosophy.
(Two)-(serious)-(lye)


There appears to be no (1), or (3), at this moment.
Whatever seems redundant, just omit. Will briefly look into sense and nonsense, my only problem, by the time I do, I may have more blogs to refresh and be charged with irrelevancy. But isn't that the way of existentialism at the present time?

I would say, and I think Delueze would concur with me on this, that we're just here to jam together. We're just here to push our minds as far as we can -hence (and take note,' Kyle): Delueze's obscurity.

I mean think about it, brother: we believe in things like afterlifes, higher powers, and higher principals. But our point A to point B is pretty much a given. So why shouldn't we just play with what our minds and brains can do? And given that the results of that can only be of import to the individual experiencing them, why would it matter who happened to be having the superior experience?

It's just a jam, man.

And it would be a goddamn shitty jam if you were worrying more about what I'm doing than what you are doing. Just find your flow. Anything else would be a block to the flow of energy.

If you worry too much about doing something wrong, you'll never get anything important right.

?:isn't that our main issues with the analytics

[d63]

D63: my starter is with differentiated planes. The way I would start to understand topically the problems, I would start with Deleuze's epistemology and work backward into ontology. Its the very reversal I have been seeking, the beginning seems simple::let's reverse ontology , choosing as the pont of departure the probable (multiplicity) and declare that the unity (at least 2 observers-sartre claims this is as solipsisitic as the 1). I am just laying down the ground rules,and not going into any judgment calls here) so it's an de-i differentiation, 5iffering from an integration--since it has already been differentiated) how this measures up with repetition--can be later explored.

(Repetition was kierkegaard's idea--was this borrowed? If so what is the significance for deleuze)$


If Oedipus is derivative, anti Oedipus is anti derivative--(de-differentiated).

Oedipus, maybe an asset to narcissism, is an anomalous structure combining context (perspective) bit displaced from the focus (or center of consciousness and projected as the other) as in the myth, of an aligned myth of narcissus, ((and seek a connection between oedipus and narcissus)

Narcissus as phenomenological ly de-differentiated as an anomalous cognitive structure of not being able to differentiate between the subject and the object.

The de-differentiation involves a cognitive/Phenomenological reduction into less complex levels of symbolic concepts, a sort of regression.

Here the lower levels of consciousness are as an "underworld" make their appearance.


At this level, the ideal shifts into the center as either inflated or deflated.

Take the example of a convex/concave visual apparatus, placed into a cognitively central position, where visual (self images) are anomalous with the concepts of the self. Here central magnification produce visual singular points or reference both to the singular (subjective point of view, and the one of manifold points. The connections are seen as increasingly complex toward the center, and increasingly simple from multiple points of view.

I think optical analogy is a good starting point, because on this level on consciousness it's safe to say, the ideal structures can be at once constructed and de constructed, making way for the cognitive---structural pre suppositions to be built, (as in the development of differentiation of the figurative from the cognitive. The cognitive is effected by some kind of surplus value (a marx ian term) which de constructed will become the symbol for the surplus.

In capitalism, too (the literal representation of surplus value) some kind or de-differentiation into an anomalies of the body, and the organs--as I understand this dissection.

So these are some of the dis sections (above) that this way of thinking can be approached.

Modern views of schizophrenia distinguish a schizoid, continuum, where types are determined, rather then the other way around, and the continuum seems to be related to functional determinants, so the older "atypical" categorical interpretation, of categorical classifications have outlived their usefulness. Why? Because of advances in pharmacology, of de constructing the myth of strict causality (freud) and of course the search into the lowest type of consciousness (Archetypes)

It is useful, to propose an epistomologically naïve thesis , as a starting point, because this is what anti determinism requires, a wiping of the sleigh! Not by erasing everything, but taking an essentially built up construct and reversing it, not linearly (freud) but de constructing it pehomenologically,b using the baggage that it has come to add, and using that, to arrive at the origin of the transcendental ideal. I believe deleuze spell that out in the beginning of his ontology.

So let's start with self image as the displacement of self concept, (that becoming a referentially preconceived, a privileged position through which, the role and function of the Object become fetishized, cut off). The re assemblage of these parts, become the existential project.

I do not wish to say that these are either original re creations, or aphoristic disassembliges, but perhaps, repetitious processes of both. (I believe he wrote sense and nonsense, and I use that as also a very general defensive way of basing this as redundantly as possible, since ultimately entropy is a de construction of redundant ways of communication.)

I don't know, brother. Reading this, and not understanding a thing you're saying, while recognizing that you are clearly comfortable with the terminology, I'm not so sure you're not further down the path of schizoanalysis than I am.

I may not understand it. But you certainly seem to.

[d63]

I, myself, find I'm drawn to French concepts while being equally drawn to the American method of exposition.

[Orbie]

D63: my starter is with differentiated planes. The way I would start to understand topically the problems, I would start with Deleuze's epistemology and work backward into ontology. Its the very reversal I have been seeking, the beginning seems simple::let's reverse ontology , choosing as the pont of departure the probable (multiplicity) and declare that the unity (at least 2 observers-sartre claims this is as solipsisitic as the 1). I am just laying down the ground rules,and not going into any judgment calls here) so it's an de-i differentiation, 5iffering from an integration--since it has already been differentiated) how this measures up with repetition--can be later explored.

(Repetition was kierkegaard's idea--was this borrowed? If so what is the significance for deleuze)$


If Oedipus is derivative, anti Oedipus is anti derivative--(de-differentiated).

Oedipus, maybe an asset to narcissism, is an anomalous structure combining context (perspective) bit displaced from the focus (or center of consciousness and projected as the other) as in the myth, of an aligned myth of narcissus, ((and seek a connection between oedipus and narcissus)

Narcissus as phenomenological ly de-differentiated as an anomalous cognitive structure of not being able to differentiate between the subject and the object.

The de-differentiation involves a cognitive/Phenomenological reduction into less complex levels of symbolic concepts, a sort of regression.

Here the lower levels of consciousness are as an "underworld" make their appearance.


At this level, the ideal shifts into the center as either inflated or deflated.

Take the example of a convex/concave visual apparatus, placed into a cognitively central position, where visual (self images) are anomalous with the concepts of the self. Here central magnification produce visual singular points or reference both to the singular (subjective point of view, and the one of manifold points. The connections are seen as increasingly complex toward the center, and increasingly simple from multiple points of view.

I think optical analogy is a good starting point, because on this level on consciousness it's safe to say, the ideal structures can be at once constructed and de constructed, making way for the cognitive---structural pre suppositions to be built, (as in the development of differentiation of the figurative from the cognitive. The cognitive is effected by some kind of surplus value (a marx ian term) which de constructed will become the symbol for the surplus.

In capitalism, too (the literal representation of surplus value) some kind or de-differentiation into an anomalies of the body, and the organs--as I understand this dissection.

So these are some of the dis sections (above) that this way of thinking can be approached.

Modern views of schizophrenia distinguish a schizoid, continuum, where types are determined, rather then the other way around, and the continuum seems to be related to functional determinants, so the older "atypical" categorical interpretation, of categorical classifications have outlived their usefulness. Why? Because of advances in pharmacology, of de constructing the myth of strict causality (freud) and of course the search into the lowest type of consciousness (Archetypes)

It is useful, to propose an epistomologically naïve thesis , as a starting point, because this is what anti determinism requires, a wiping of the sleigh! Not by erasing everything, but taking an essentially built up construct and reversing it, not linearly (freud) but de constructing it pehomenologically,b using the baggage that it has come to add, and using that, to arrive at the origin of the transcendental ideal. I believe deleuze spell that out in the beginning of his ontology.

So let's start with self image as the displacement of self concept, (that becoming a referentially preconceived, a privileged position through which, the role and function of the Object become fetishized, cut off). The re assemblage of these parts, become the existential project.

I do not wish to say that these are either original re creations, or aphoristic disassembled, but perhaps, repetitious processes of both. (I believe he wrote sense and nonsense, and I use that as also a very general defensive way of basing this as redundantly as possible, since ultimately entropy is a de construction of redundant ways of communication.)

I don't know, brother. Reading this, and not understanding a thing you're saying, while recognizing that you are clearly comfortable with the terminology, I'm not so sure you're not further down the path of schizoanalysis than I am.

I may not understand it. But you certainly seem to.

Well, I was just in the middle of trying to understand your reply to kyle, so again let's start by omitting that part.

Simply put, the path of schizoanalysis, and I feel I am compressing a lot in this, creates an anti anomalies, as with schizophrenic/hebrephrenia, the affect is an anomaly between affect and cognitive structures. An anti anomalies, (and I am not too familiar with Binswanger's works), there is a correlation between an eidectic reductive pehenomological "bracketing"(no judgment ) and the regression itself, as experienced by schizophrenics. Namely, there is a social/individual correspondence, between attempts at constructive reality of the individual: and a de constructive/philosophical/social simplification. The two processes, one social the other individual are the same essentially, but different, inasmuch society seems fearful of the implications of such people as Szasz and Laing. One seeks enrichment, the other a trend toward meaninglessness, impoverishment (of the soul)
I can't go further then this, since I do have to read to adequately respond especially the kyle material

I have never really read any Derrida, but to at least afford justice to your OP, I can in all honesty offer a street wise correspondence, from which I hope to at least learn, however I need to at least expose my self to snippets of "serious" philosophy. (Your words)

The French stuff is great, and I believe, the whole 60's experience /, I once had the pleasure of talking to Timothy Leary, and I think he agreed me that the french symbols were the raison d'etre of the 60's experience/ ----so here comes the tie in with corporate America's using this expression of artistic merit, as a subliated anti-thesis, to perhaps neuralise the overt objections? Maybe. Paranoid/authorativen are the only channels available in this mode, since it's impossible to go reaaly to go beyond media as the message at this point.

[Orbie]

Again later: in compressed form: un seriously, -not the reversal, as not coincidental, is deleuze pushing the envelope? To correlate two different processes: a psychological and a social/political?

Psychoanalysis, is an attempt to see forces lurking behind events, so we get the psychoanalysis of the singular personality like Stalin, who is for saying : it's easier to kill millions of people then one. To reduce social forces to the level of singular yet unconscious ones, then because this type of determinism failed, to ideology, there is a turn around: there are traits shown rather than types, resemblance because of common traits, in families;;;;;such that is 2 members have similar traits, they belong to the same family, ; rather than 2 member belong to the same type (let's say ideal) therefore they are identical (logically)::::what is the significance of this turn around? The logical type is a reduction of the approximate trait.

Merleau ponty says that the difference between "acts of thought" and. "Intentional objects of thought" do not constitute an irreducible ground" implying the ground is reducible. (From the intentional object to their acts.) In other words, --the thought (as thinking) and what is being thought about, is analogous to the thought and it's content (as what is being thought about qua a physical content---and actual representation of what is thought about).

This is a higher level process which does not deal with the type of collapse that Ayer and Russell dealt with. Here, thought of a representation, is analogous to a representation.

In a psychological regression, a similar analogy can be made to a Phenomenological reduction, both seem to "bracket" phenomenologically the "situation" of the given, without judging it, and this is the interesting idea of looking at the "ontological" turnaround of --disassociation-.

Logical association seems to be one of necessity, one pointing toward ideal models.(As categorical identity)

Process,use, and identity show a focus of trends in an approximation of identity as a function of it's utility. Meaning: continental rationalism has been trumped by a utilitarian, non modeled sense of presentation ourselves.

Why? If nietzche was still around, would he approve of a political/map like in Ayer? Is it just a sleigh of hand matter or is ontology dismissed because of expediency?

Terrible and weighty questions, and the only credible solution is yes, it's both.

Both: political/epistemological and psychological/ontological.

We see in kierkegaard a way to see the split adhered over by an aesthetic band aid, where life imitates art, including God.

The divided man, somehow sees this, and the utilitarian objection, that existentialism tries to do this from both ends is, though valid, and politically incorrect, but the evaluation is not fixed, but a based on a map in flux, where both types , as complementary processes, with shifting topical values,changing boundaries constantly, are keener to appreciate these changes, and are able to incorporate them by the "bracketed" situations, as if they were pigeonholed and static, but yet, they are fluid and dynamic processes always like a film sliced into frames seeking exact definitions.

[Orbie]

In the opposition of a Marxian and Capitalistic view of surplus value, for instance, both systems seem to utilize this, marxism literally by the use of uniformity, by seeing the ideal man (the worker) as qualitatively, a spiritual dialectical result of a spiritual/materialist conclusion of a logical process. The surplus in this process is the unfit, the misfit, the berogoasie.

Capitalism drains the actual profit of in a literal marketplace, where there machine exludes the man in an anti-descartes type of desription, where the man is not in the machine, since the man is the machine. This is why behaviorism is the starting point as in Ayer, of any inquiery.

The dialectic can not in any sense be a part of this process, since there is no connection to the subjective because there is only objective proximal certainty.

Strange, in marx, there is a hidden ideal , the spirit working through body, the material, and freedom is based on social necessity, whereas in the utalitarian point of view, freedom is seen as based structly on exchange value.

This whole ambiguous ideology turns on the definition of "freedom" and it is this confusion, which inclines to see poliical and psychological processes as intertwined.

The unanswered but necessary question is, how this ambiguity be solved?

I tend to think a neo kantianism as has implications on both fronts.

[Orbie]

The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthetic analysis.

You probably don't even know what analytical and synthetic means.

Further you're just begging the question that: "The definitional methodology changes, from analytical to a synthetic analysis." Prove it

It's a reversal of using probable value ---instead of certain.

Don't understand

Language is too limited to include the experience.

I think you mean language does not faithfully describe experience. True, but irrelevant to this discussion.

Kyle's counter arguments are taking the exact point of view that counter-argumants consist of, the language of interpretation/analysis, takes center point in his ontology, and creates the very blocks into the very things argued: relevancy (in case of the determinants of language over experience, synthetic/analytic differentiation as a definitional problem, and so on. His is unable to make existential/intuitive jumps, because he has limited the inquiry to undefined, and unknown capacities of experience. Therefore a phenomenological reduction as excluded by reason of definitional logic. This type of argument is a pseudo complex counter argument. But the basics of husserl-Heidegger are relinquished to the basic positivist objection.

The counter argument excludes any type having to identify transcendental reduction.

Even wittgenstein did not rule out such a possibility, only he felt the language was unable to define it.

Not satisfied with the "seriousness" of his argument, I need to express a dissatisfaction based simply his idea of what he thinks of my capacity to understand basic notions of synthetic and analytic.

Even if, I was still a student in an academic setting, taking graduate courses from notable speakers, I would not delimit my quest to understand in terms of what other's understanding is of my interpretation.

And this with a view of having had years' long student/teacher associations.

I would like to continue this thread, with possibly a new angle: a polany-Heidegger of relatedness of "in the world" or polanyi's "tacit understanding" as a social basis of communication, if the theme can be turned around to afford that type of possibility.

[d63]

Obe, you’ve given me a lot to work with here. And you seem comfortable with a form of exposition similar to that of the French. So the best I can do here is skim through and respond to what I understand.

I would like to continue this thread, with possibly a new angle: a polany-Heidegger of relatedness of "in the world" or polanyi's "tacit understanding" as a social basis of communication, if the theme can be turned around to afford that type of possibility.

You can do whatever you want with it. As I said in the beginning: it’s up to me to keep it on topic. And we can be certain that Heidegger participated in laying out a foundation for Deleuze –much as I’m almost certain Sartre did.

In fact, if you think about it, Delueze seems to be waging his own personal war against bad faith. He seems to have recognized that there is no way we’re going to find some all purpose system that will make everything click along like some fine-tuned machine. I assume this was the source of his opposition to Hegel’s notion of the dialectic –that which was behind his writing of Difference and Repetition .

But, yeah, the theme doesn’t need to be turned around. Bring in whoever you want. I, myself, always found Heidegger a little too stern to put at the top of my reading wish list. But what you have to say about him here may change my mind.

I think (in reference to kyle’s complaint about obscurity to some extent) that one could as easily read Rorty and arrive at similar conclusions as those of Deleuze. In fact, I would argue that Deleuze would be a fine example of Rorty’s ironist. Take, for instance, an interpretation of Deleuze by Claire Colebrook (yeah, I bought a cheater in the Routledge Guide –just wanted to make sure I had something to respond to) :

True freedom lies in affirming the chance of events, not being deluded that we are ‘masters’ or that the world is nothing more than the limited perceptions we have of it. Freedom demands taking thinking, constantly, beyond itself.

Or:

Art is allowing the anarchy of experience to free itself from forms and methods.

Colebrook, Claire (2002-12-07). Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers) (p. 46). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.

Now the ironist, according to Rorty, can be described as:

I shall define an "ironist" as someone who fulfills three conditions: (i) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. Ironists who are inclined to philosophize see the choice between vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight one's way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against the old.
Richard Rorty. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Kindle Locations 1050-1054). Kindle Edition.

But what is more important here is the recognization of the importance of art in the process of understanding. Deleuze puts much importance on the distinction between Philosophy, Science, and Art. Philosophy is about the creation of concepts. Science is about the creation of what Searle calls “brute facts”. Art, as I interpret it, is about seeing what resonates with the mind and its physiological infrastructure then figuring out what concepts it connects with. This is why every time I go to make art, I have to forget I know anything about philosophy. We could do as much with dreams. As Colebrook puts it:

Art is allowing the anarchy of experience to free itself from forms and methods.

Colebrook, Claire (2002-12-07). Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers) (p. 46). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.

Now would it seem that surprising that someone like Kyle would prefer the classical hierarchy of an end? An end that would allow them a sense of superiority over those who had not climbed that same ladder? And how much of a corporate bitch do you have to be to think that?

In fact, come to think of it, it was the classicism of Plato that Deleuze was arguing against as well.

Not satisfied with the "seriousness" of his argument, I need to express a dissatisfaction based simply his idea of what he thinks of my capacity to understand basic notions of synthetic and analytic.

Yeah! But isn’t that what analytics do: act like they’re the only ones who know anything about Kant?

As Umberto Eco pointed out in an interview: the difference is that analytics seem to have a strict tradition from which they are working; continentals, on the other hand, try to say the same old things in such a different way that you could almost believe they were saying something totally revolutionary.

So would it be any wonder that analytics tend to act as if this were little more than a pissing contest on who knew more about any given philosopher?

I mean Kyle acted like he knew more about Deleuze than the 2 people that admired him.