The Will to Might.

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Postby Dionysus » Mon Oct 22, 2007 1:18 am

Impious wrote:
Dionysus wrote:
Impious wrote:
Sauwelios wrote:
altd&s wrote:
Nietzsche was not alive during the time of the science of quantum physics, so he could not have known what "particles consist of", much less that there are even things called particles.

This is where you are mistaken. Nietzsche's philosophy is quantum mechanics avant la lettre. Philosophy need not follow science; rather, it can reason out things that science will only confirm later.


Nietzsche had no conception of quantum uncertainty. He thought it possible that an all-seeing eye could know everything about the universe (scientifically speaking). I am referring to the passage about the waterfall.


And yet he rejected just this premise in the passage I provided above.


No he didn't.


"Necessity" not in the shape of an overreaching, dominating total force, or that of a prime mover; even less as a necessary condition for something valuable. To this end it is necessary to deny a total consciousness of becoming, a "God," to avoid bringing all events under the aegis of a being who feels and knows but does not will: "God" is useless if he does not want anything, and moreover this means positing a total value of "becoming." Fortunately such a summarizing power is missing (- a suffering and all-seeing God, a "total sensorium" and "cosmic spirit", would be the greatest objection to being)."


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Postby Sauwelios » Mon Oct 22, 2007 9:36 am

Impious wrote:
Sauwelios wrote:
altd&s wrote:
Nietzsche was not alive during the time of the science of quantum physics, so he could not have known what "particles consist of", much less that there are even things called particles.

This is where you are mistaken. Nietzsche's philosophy is quantum mechanics avant la lettre. Philosophy need not follow science; rather, it can reason out things that science will only confirm later.


Nietzsche had no conception of quantum uncertainty. He thought it possible that an all-seeing eye could know everything about the universe (scientifically speaking). I am referring to the passage about the waterfall.

I can't recall that passage. But Dionysus is right: Nietzsche only thought that if such an eye could exist (which he didn't think possible, of course), it could know everything about the universe.

The so-called "uncertainty principle" arises from the attempt to define that which is indefinite. As I said, I can reason out that no definite quanta can exist. I think Nietzsche may have seen this, too, aware as he was of the "soul superstition" as he called it.

I cannot at this point make myself any clearer than by saying that force is finite, yet not definite. A "quantum" (amount) has no definite bounds, yet that does not make it an infinite amount. In fact, I think that the words "infinite" and "unlimited" have been perverted precisely by their use in combination with words like "amount", "number", etc. Infinity is not a number; likewise, an amount is by definition a definite amount. Logic and language (note the etymology of logos) are simplifications (in the literal, etymological sense, as well). Fact is that without the idea of a "soul" or its equivalent, there can be no consciousness (hence Jung calls the subsumation of consciousness by the unconscious "loss of soul").

The quantum is the new soul concept.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Impious » Mon Oct 22, 2007 1:16 pm

Dionysus wrote:
"Necessity" not in the shape of an overreaching, dominating total force, or that of a prime mover; even less as a necessary condition for something valuable. To this end it is necessary to deny a total consciousness of becoming, a "God," to avoid bringing all events under the aegis of a being who feels and knows but does not will: "God" is useless if he does not want anything, and moreover this means positing a total value of "becoming." Fortunately such a summarizing power is missing (- a suffering and all-seeing God, a "total sensorium" and "cosmic spirit", would be the greatest objection to being)."


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Postby Impious » Mon Oct 22, 2007 1:30 pm

Sauwelios wrote:
Impious wrote:Nietzsche had no conception of quantum uncertainty. He thought it possible that an all-seeing eye could know everything about the universe (scientifically speaking). I am referring to the passage about the waterfall.

I can't recall that passage.


Upon The Waterfall
When we look at a waterfall, we may think that we can see free will and choice in the innumerable turnings, meanderings, and breaking of the waves; but, on the contrary, everything is necessary, and it is possible to calculate every movement mathematically. And it is just the same with human actions. If one were omniscient, one would find it simple to calculate every single action in advance, every advancing step on the pathways to knowledge, every error, every act of malice. The acting man is entrapped in his illusion of volition. If the wheel of the world were to stop turning for a second and an all-knowing, calculating mind existed to take advantage of this hiatus, he would be able to plunge deep into the most distant future of all beings, and be able to describe every rut burrowed across the path of the wheel. This self-delusion of the acting man, this assumption that there is such a thing as free will, is also part of the calculable mechanism. - Human, All Too Human.

Thus, Nietzsche is suggesting that one can have precise knowledge of both the location and momentum of an electron, for example, or that such knowledge is inconsequential in terms of predicting future events. But I don't think he would have made this second assertion.

But Dionysus is right: Nietzsche only thought that if such an eye could exist (which he didn't think possible, of course), it could know everything about the universe.


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Postby Sauwelios » Mon Oct 22, 2007 2:10 pm

Impious wrote:
Sauwelios wrote:
Impious wrote:Nietzsche had no conception of quantum uncertainty. He thought it possible that an all-seeing eye could know everything about the universe (scientifically speaking). I am referring to the passage about the waterfall.

I can't recall that passage.


Upon The Waterfall
When we look at a waterfall, we may think that we can see free will and choice in the innumerable turnings, meanderings, and breaking of the waves; but, on the contrary, everything is necessary, and it is possible to calculate every movement mathematically. And it is just the same with human actions. If one were omniscient, one would find it simple to calculate every single action in advance, every advancing step on the pathways to knowledge, every error, every act of malice. The acting man is entrapped in his illusion of volition. If the wheel of the world were to stop turning for a second and an all-knowing, calculating mind existed to take advantage of this hiatus, he would be able to plunge deep into the most distant future of all beings, and be able to describe every rut burrowed across the path of the wheel. This self-delusion of the acting man, this assumption that there is such a thing as free will, is also part of the calculable mechanism. - Human, All Too Human.

Thus, Nietzsche is suggesting that one can have precise knowledge of both the location and momentum of an electron, for example, or that such knowledge is inconsequential in terms of predicting future events. But I don't think he would have made this second assertion.

First, let us note that this was Human, All Too Human, which was written in 1878, I believe. As you can see in The Will to Power (especially book III), most of his epistemology is from well after 1883 (and this, the necessity of some form of the soul superstition for consciousness, is an epistemological issue).

Secondly, I think Nietzsche would understand - this is simple Newtonian physics - that if the "wheel of the world" would stand still, that is, if we could make a recording of any one "moment" in the (r)evolution of the universe, there would be no momentum at all: for momentum is a product of (mass and) velocity, and velocity is traveled distance divided by elapsed time. Elapsed time means the time elapsed between two moments. If there is only one moment, i.e., if the elapsed time between the two moments is zero, this means we have to divide the traveled distance (it does not matter that this is also zero) by zero, which is meaningless.

The point is that, at any one moment, there is no velocity, because there is no motion (recall Zeno's Paradox).

And of course, when recording the (r)evolution of the universe between two "moments", there is no one location. So even with Newtonian physics, we cannot know both the location and the momentum of a particle at the same time.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby altd&s » Mon Oct 22, 2007 6:51 pm

Gentlemen, unless "quanta" refers to a scientifically verifiable entity, an "observable" object, it is a metaphysical concept. If it is a metaphysical concept, it is only postulation in an overall theory- if it is just a theory- then it is possible that it is wrong- if it could be wrong- "quanta" might not mean anything.

This is one problem with metaphysics. Consider Leibniz's "monad". Or Spinoza's "sybstance". What is it? It is a theoretical entity in a larger model of metaphysics. Nietzsche has done the same with his idea of "quanta".

EITHER what each describe as a real "thing" can be verified through obervationable science, or each thing is no more than an arbitrary concept.

If all three are using those terms to re-describe "physical" being, they are simply describing one aspect of what out modern physicists call "light". Therefore, the concept is no longer theirs...but belongs again where it could have only began...in physics. These philosophers are all conceptualizing what can only qualify as "real" through the verification of the scieitific method.

The reason why "quanta" works so well in Nietzsche's theory is because it is a word that compliments any and all possible uses of it, such that it would almost be impossible to use it incorrectly. Give me an example of what is not "quanta"...or better, something quanta cannot do. Chances are you arrive at what is already the last quantum theory available to observational science: light behaves as particle and waves. And I got news for ya....none of that stuff is chaotic. Everything in nature is determined and necessary. Just because you can only calculate what is probable, doesn't mean that what will happened is not determined.

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Postby Sauwelios » Mon Oct 22, 2007 7:35 pm

altd&s wrote:Gentlemen, unless "quanta" refers to a scientifically verifiable entity, an "observable" object, it is a metaphysical concept.

The whole concept of an "entity" or "object" is metaphysical. "Observation" is already interpretation: you can only contemplate your image of the observed, never the observed itself (supposing there even is an observed apart from your observation, and the image is not a figment of your imagination).

This is ILovePhilosophy, by the way; not ILoveScience. I would like to invoke Heidegger's statement here that "science does not think", which he has explained in a television interview:

"Science does not move in the dimension of philosophy; it is, however, unwittingly dependent on this dimension. For instance, physics moves in the domain of space and time and motion. What motion, what space, what time is, science as science cannot determine. Science thus does not think, i.e., it cannot even think in that sense with its methods. I cannot, for instance, physically or by physical methods say what physics is; what physics is, I can only say thinking, philosophising."
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BHvdTZomK8
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby altd&s » Mon Oct 22, 2007 9:16 pm

The whole concept of an "entity" or "object" is metaphysical.


Yes and no. The "language" we use to describe experience is metaphysical because it is a reference and not a thing. The things experienced are not metaphysical, they are material, and the reality of the things which allow us to describe things with language is certain. That is, it is real without description. Hence, your using both terms "entity" and "object" to describe a category called "metaphysical". As of yet, nobody has been able to demonstrate the "metaphysical".....it remains a construct in language.

We are essentially arguing the "meaning" of term used in language. I do not so much wonder what language "means" as I wonder what it "verifies". I may say that despite your ability to demonstrate exactly what either of the concepts are, you are no less describing something, and that "somethingness" is not in language. The terminology in language is contingent.

"Observation" is already interpretation: you can only contemplate your image of the observed, never the observed itself (supposing there even is an observed apart from your observation, and the image is not a figment of your imagination).


This is Kantian representationalism and I don't follow it. There is nothing beyond the object that is observed. It is, as Sartre put it, the totality of the phenomena in profile. When I see a "tree", I am seeing "the seeing of treeness", and if I then see the atoms of the "tree", I am seeing the "seeing the atomness of the treeness". None of these compositional parts refer to anything behind them, such as a noumenal reality beyond interpretation. What you inevitably face is proving that the universe must be percieved by a "final eye" in order for you to exist in it, perceiving parts of it yourself, which would not exist without your observing them.

You theory there is hard idealism, Berkelean in a sense.

The quote from Heidegger. There is a difference between doing and thinking, in the "philosophical" sense. Philosophy is speculation in language, not experimentation and practice, so philosophy must always be about scientific findings and theories- not vice-versa.

I don't mean to be trying to get the last word here, Saully, and I am being honest in my disagreements. I'm not arguing for arguments sake.
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Postby Sauwelios » Mon Oct 22, 2007 9:55 pm

altd&s wrote:
The whole concept of an "entity" or "object" is metaphysical.


Yes and no. The "language" we use to describe experience is metaphysical because it is a reference and not a thing. The things experienced are not metaphysical, they are material

That's a mere assertion.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Fent » Tue Oct 23, 2007 12:46 am

Sauwelios wrote:The point is that, in the latest passage I quoted from Nietzsche's Nachlass, Being gives rise to the will to power, arouses the pathos (passion) that is the will to power. And "power" is here understood as Becoming, as "constant transformation and change". And this will to power is indeed the will to might, the will to make, as it manifests itself as "continuous creation". Thus Heidegger says about it:

"[B]eing is in its very ground perpetual creation (Becoming), while as creation it needs what is fixed. Creation needs what is fixed, first, in order to overcome it, and second, in order to have something that has yet to be fixated, something that enables the creative to advance beyond itself and be transfigured."

Though it is only a translation, the word "transformation" explains why creation needs what is fixed: it needs forms to make and to unmake. It goes from one form to the next, and must always regard the next form as a "thing", a Being. This is why Nietzsche says that the "redemption" of this "God" is both "temporary" and "at-every-moment-attained": it is temporary because it consists in the transformation process between one form and the next; and it is attained at every moment, because at any time this God is busy creating a new form. He always needs something new to create, a new form to imagine and strive to realise.


I've always had a bit of a problem understanding how to stamp 'Being on the world of Becoming' while at the same time embracing the world as Becoming. If Nietzsche says that 'the highest will to power is to stamp Being on Becoming', how does one continually create? Wouldn't continual creation totally disregard Being?
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Postby Sauwelios » Tue Oct 23, 2007 1:49 am

Fent wrote:
Sauwelios wrote:The point is that, in the latest passage I quoted from Nietzsche's Nachlass, Being gives rise to the will to power, arouses the pathos (passion) that is the will to power. And "power" is here understood as Becoming, as "constant transformation and change". And this will to power is indeed the will to might, the will to make, as it manifests itself as "continuous creation". Thus Heidegger says about it:

"[b]eing is in its very ground perpetual creation (Becoming), while as creation it needs what is fixed. Creation needs what is fixed, first, in order to overcome it, and second, in order to have something that has yet to be fixated, something that enables the creative to advance beyond itself and be transfigured."

Though it is only a translation, the word "transformation" explains why creation needs what is fixed: it needs forms to make and to unmake. It goes from one form to the next, and must always regard the next form as a "thing", a Being. This is why Nietzsche says that the "redemption" of this "God" is both "temporary" and "at-every-moment-attained": it is temporary because it consists in the transformation process between one form and the next; and it is attained at every moment, because at any time this God is busy creating a new form. He always needs something new to create, a new form to imagine and strive to realise.


I've always had a bit of a problem understanding how to stamp 'Being on the world of Becoming' while at the same time embracing the world as Becoming. If Nietzsche says that 'the highest will to power is to stamp Being on Becoming', how does one continually create? Wouldn't continual creation totally disregard Being?

As I have said above (but then this is perhaps the most complex idea of this thread):

"Becoming can be conscious of itself, understand itself, as a Being in the process of being destroyed or created (depending on its perspective). So even if it is shattering illusion, it can only understand itself as an illusion being shattered: for there is only consciousness of Being, not of Becoming. Thus Becoming stamps the character of Being on itself even in the very destruction of (the illusion of) this Being. This is its transfiguration."
http://ilovephilosophy.com/phpbb/viewto ... 79#1913979

Struggle/Becoming always "seeks [German will] to preserve itself, to grow, and to be conscious of itself". All is struggle, and struggle is will to power. Indeed, struggle/Becoming is the result of the will to become Being, which is the will to power. Still more accurately: struggle/Becoming is Willing to become Being. It wills to become Being; that is its struggling. It - Becoming/struggle - seeks to be conscious of itself as Being (for as I've said before, all consciousness is consciousness of Being (however illusionary this Being may be)).

The embracing of Becoming requires a double transfiguration: first, the redemption from Becoming in Being; secondly, the redemption from this (illusion of) Being in its destruction.

Becoming transfigures itself in its own martyrdom:

"[T]he peculiar blending of emotions in the heart of the Dionysian reveler—his ambiguity if you will—seems still to hark back (as the medicinal drug harks back to the deadly poison) to the days when the infliction of pain was experienced as joy while a sense of supreme triumph elicited cries of anguish from the heart. For now in every exuberant joy there is heard an undertone of terror, or else a wistful lament over an irrecoverable loss. It is as though in these Greek festivals a sentimental trait of nature were coming to the fore, as though nature were bemoaning the fact of her fragmentation, her decomposition into separate individuals."
[Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 2, with added emphasis.]

The first transfiguration is precisely this fragmentation, this decomposition, the illusion of individuation. The second transfiguration consists in nature's redemption from this decomposition: in the destruction of (the illusion of) individuality. But nature can only be conscious of this double transfiguration by means of an organic being, most notably man. The first transfiguration is Apollinian; the second, Dionysian. Without the first transfiguration, Becoming would be Titanic. It is only because of (Greek) Apollinianism that Becoming can be experienced Dionysian:

"[I]n the place of the Babylonian Sacaea, with their throwback of men to the condition of apes and tigers, we now [looking at the Greeks] see entirely new rites celebrated: rites of universal redemption, of glorious transfiguration. Only now has it become possible to speak of nature's celebrating an aesthetic triumph; only now has the abrogation of the principium individuationis become an aesthetic event."
[ibid.]
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Sauwelios » Tue Oct 23, 2007 5:34 pm

Phusis kruptesthai philei, says Heraclitus - "Nature loves to conceal itself". If we latinise the first two words, English-speakers may recognise all three: physis cryptesthai philei, "the physical world loves to be cryptic about itself". Now Heidegger translates phusis as das Walten, literally "the exercise of force" (compare the expression "force of nature"). I, however, will translate it as "Becoming" here. For the termination -sis denotes a process, -ing in English. And as for the phu part: this is actually cognate with to be:

"The modern verb ["to be"] represents the merger of two once-distinct verbs, the "b-root" represented by be and the am/was verb, which was itself a conglomerate. The "b-root" is from PIE base *bheu-, *bhu- "grow, come into being, become,"".
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=be

Now "to grow" is precisely the standard translation of the Greek verb phuein. So we may translate phusis as "Growing, Coming-into-Being, Becoming".

So now the saying reads: "Becoming loves to conceal itself". How alone may Becoming conceal itself? By creating the illusion of Being. (What I here mean by "Being", by the way, is Being in the Parmenidean sense, not the Heraclitean sense (Becoming). It is the s-root rather than the b-root:

"Until the distinction broke down 13c., *es-*wes- tended to express "existence," with beon meaning something closer to "come to be""
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=am)

So phusis kruptesthai philei may be interpreted as "Becoming seeks (wills) to resemble Being". In its highest instance, this will is the will to stamp Becoming with the character of Being, that is, to equate the two. For the closest one might resemble something is to look exactly like it: it would be madness if one were to say, "I want to look as much like Elvis as possible, but not exactly the same as him". Only in mathematics is infinitesimal distinct from zero.

Now Heidegger presents as the antithesis of kruptein in Greek, legein - "to speak" (whence logos); and he derives this antithesis from another of Heraclitus' sayings:

Ho anax, hou to manteion esti to en Delphois, oute legei oute kruptei alla semainei.

"The lord, whose oracle it is in Delphi, neither speaks nor conceals but gives a sign."

Heidegger also looks at another Greek word, alethe(i)a, usually translated as "truth". The expression alethea legein, also used by Heraclitus, means "to speak the truth". But a-letheia literally means "un-concealment". So Heidegger interpreted legein, as the opposite of kruptein, as "revealing by speaking out". And this, the revealing of Becoming (phusis) from behind the veils of Being, is what Nietzsche presents as the activity or will of the Dionysian artist:

"In an eccentric way one might say of Apollo what Schopenhauer says, in the first part of The World as Will and Representation [I:1, 3], of man caught in the veil of Maya: "Even as on an immense, raging sea, assailed by huge wave crests, a man sits in a little rowboat trusting his frail craft, so, amidst the furious torments of this world, the individual sits tranquilly, supported by the principium individuationis [principle of individuation] and relying on it." [The World as Will and Representation, I:4, 63] One might say that the unshakable confidence in that principium has received its most magnificent expression in Apollo, and that Apollo himself may be regarded as the marvelous divine image of the principium individuationis, whose looks and gestures radiate the full delight, wisdom, and beauty of "illusion.""
[Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 1.]

As we have seen, this Apollinianism is only the first transfiguration of Becoming: the transfiguration of Becoming into Being, by way of the tyrannical will of the Apollinian Greek. The second transfiguration lies precisely in the abrogation of the principle of individuation - in the destruction of the beautiful illusion of Being.

"Poetry does not lie outside the world as a fantastic impossibility begotten of the poet's brain; it seeks to be the exact opposite, an unvarnished expression of truth, and for this reason must cast away the trumpery garments worn by the supposed reality of civilized man. The contrast between this truth of nature and the pretentious lie of civilization is quite similar to that between the eternal core of things and the entire phenomenal world. Even as tragedy, with its metaphysical solace, points to the eternity of true being surviving every phenomenal change, so does the symbolism of the satyr chorus express analogically the primordial relation between the thing in itself and appearance. The idyllic shepherd of modern man is but a replica of the sum of cultural illusions which he mistakes for nature. The Dionysian Greek, desiring truth and nature at their highest power—he sees himself metamorphosed into the satyr."
[Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, chapter 8.]

Nietzsche is being very Platonic (Kantian) here. We must remember that this is his first philosophical work, of which he later wrote:

"How I regret now that in those days I still lacked the courage (or immodesty?) to permit myself in every way an individual language of my own for such individual views and hazards—and that instead I tried laboriously to express by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas strange and new valuations which were basically at odds with Kant's and Schopenhauer's spirit and taste!"
[Attempt at a Self-Criticism, section 6.]

We must therefore revalue Nietzsche's Platonic expressions:

"Poetry does not lie outside the world as a fantastic impossibility begotten of the poet's brain; it seeks [will] to be the exact opposite, an unvarnished expression of truth [aletheia], and for this reason must cast away the trumpery garments worn by the supposed reality of civilized man. The contrast between this truth of nature [phusis] and the pretentious lie of civilization is quite similar to that between the eternal core of things and the entire phenomenal world. Even as tragedy, with its metaphysical solace, points to the eternity of true being [Becoming] surviving every phenomenal change, so does the symbolism of the satyr chorus express analogically the primordial relation between the thing in itself and appearance."

It is not an opposition between the eternity of true Being (in the Parmenidean sense) and phenomenal change; it is not change which is merely apparent (Greek phainomenos), but Being. The eternity of true being is perpetual change, eternal Becoming; what is merely apparent is the illusion of Being. Poetry (from the Greek poiein, "to do, make, create") seeks (wills) to be an unvarnished expression of truth (alethe). This means it must express, that is, reveal by speaking out, the phusis that is concealed.

"In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to strain his symbolic faculties to the utmost; something quite unheard of is now clamoring to be heard: the desire to tear asunder the veil of Maya, to sink back into the original oneness of nature; the desire to express the very essence of nature symbolically."
[Nietzsche, BT 2.]

Symbolically. Here we see the reconciliation of revealing (legein) and concealing (kruptein): for we might translate semainein as "to symbolise". The lord, whose oracle it is in Delphi, neither reveals nor conceals, but symbolises. Heraclitus does not say that this lord is Apollo;

"Dionysus himself shared Delphi with Apollo to the point of sometimes appearing to be the real master of the sanctuary, it being claimed that he even preceded Apollo there."
[Elizabeth Chalier, The apollonian Vishnu and the Dionysian Bhairava.]

We may take this "lord" to be the Apollinian (that is, the Greek) Dionysus - as opposed to the Titanic Dionysus. The Apollinian Dionysus represents the reconciliation between the Titanic Dionysus - Becoming - and Apollo - Being. He is himself the symbol of the reconciliation between the concealment of Becoming - in Being - and its revelation.
Last edited by Sauwelios on Mon Oct 29, 2007 3:47 am, edited 2 times in total.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Lollipop King » Tue Oct 23, 2007 6:34 pm

Note:
So now the saying reads: "Becoming loves to conceal itself". How alone may Becoming conceal itself? By creating the illusion of Being. (What I here mean by "Being", by the way, is Being in the Parmenidean sense, not the Heraclitean sense (Becoming).
There's no intent at concealment.
There is only error or weakness in the observer, who is not a completed observer but a observer in the process, a becoming observer.

The movement is a towards the unknown or yet to be determined.
The becoming has no goal but constructs them along the way, as signposts.

The concept of being is a product of understanding, which requires order so as to know and to store experience into memory which coalesces a unity into a self-becoming.

Being is a human creation which makes the experience of becoming, of existing, comprehensible.
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Addendum.

Postby Sauwelios » Tue Oct 23, 2007 6:51 pm

In regard to " the desire to express the very essence of nature symbolically", Nietzsche continues:

"Thus an entirely new set of symbols springs into being. First, all the symbols pertaining to physical features: mouth, face, the spoken word, the dance movement which coordinates the limbs and bends them to its rhythm. Then suddenly all the rest of the symbolic forces—music and rhythm as such, dynamics, harmony—assert themselves with great energy."
[Nietzsche, BT 2.]

In summa: man is released, i.e., breaks out of, the bounds of civilisation:

"The Dionysian Greek, desiring truth and nature at their highest power—he sees himself metamorphosed into the satyr."
[BT 8.]

"Here archetypal man was cleansed of the illusion of culture, and what revealed itself was authentic man, the bearded satyr jubilantly greeting his god."
[ibid.]

What we have here is the honest expression of the microcosm - man -, which (microcosm) may be regarded as "an image and isolated example of existence in general" [Nietzsche, The Will to Power, section 417] - i.e., of the macrocosm. But the satyr is merely the votary of the god. Where is the god, the Apollinian Dionysus?

"In this enchantment the Dionysian reveler sees himself as satyr, and as satyr, in turn, he sees the god—that is, in his transformation he sees a new vision, which is the Apollinian completion of his state."
[BT 8.]

Thus, originally, rather than being merely an illusion of Being stamped on the underlying flux of Becoming, the god Dionysus was a complete hallucination of Being.

"But, notwithstanding its subordination to the god, the chorus remains the highest expression of nature, and, like nature, utters in its enthusiasm oracular words of wisdom. Being compassionate as well as wise, it proclaims a truth that issues from the heart of the world. Thus we see how that fantastic and at first sight embarrassing figure arises, the wise and enthusiastic satyr who is at the same time the "simpleton" as opposed to the god. The satyr is a replica of nature in its strongest tendencies and at the same time, a herald of its wisdom and art. He combines in his person the roles of musician, poet, dancer and visionary."
[ibid.]

The hallucinated god Dionysus is merely the image (German Vorstellung) the will needs to will to become Being; it is an image of Being which arouses the will to might - it is the tele (goal) of the satyr's passion. And this need for a tele, this need to hallucinate a Being, does itself express the nature of phusis:

"That lies are necessary in order to live is itself part of the terrifying and questionable character of existence."
[Nietzsche, WP 853.]

The highest man, according to Nietzsche, is the man who acknowledges this truth, and acts accordingly:

"[T]his type of man that he [Zarathustra] conceives [i.e., the Übermensch], conceives reality as it is: it is strong enough for it—, it is not estranged or removed from it, it is reality itself and exemplifies all that is terrible and questionable in it, only in that way can man attain greatness..."
[Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Destiny, 5.]
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Sauwelios » Wed Oct 24, 2007 1:38 am

Satyr wrote:Note:
So now the saying reads: "Becoming loves to conceal itself". How alone may Becoming conceal itself? By creating the illusion of Being. (What I here mean by "Being", by the way, is Being in the Parmenidean sense, not the Heraclitean sense (Becoming).
There's no intent at concealment.
There is only error or weakness in the observer, who is not a completed observer but a observer in the process, a becoming observer.

If the illusion of being is only due to the weakness of the (becoming) observer in the process, then the rise of consciousness within the process is a consequence of weakness. If you think this is so, can you explain more about it?


The movement is a towards the unknown or yet to be determined.
The becoming has no goal but constructs them along the way, as signposts.

But is this construction an act of weakness? If so, how? Does it not presuppose some strength to construct anything? Indeed, is not weakness relative? Relative strength, in fact?


The concept of being is a product of understanding, which requires order so as to know and to store experience into memory which coalesces a unity into a self-becoming.

I don't quite follow. What coalesces a unity into a self-becoming? And is "self-becoming" one word?


Being is a human creation which makes the experience of becoming, of existing, comprehensible.

But if (the illusion of) Being is a human creation, and human beings are really human becomings (beings in the process, becoming beings), is not the will or need to make becoming comprehensible - by means of the creation of (the illusion of) Being - intrinsic to the process, to Becoming?
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Lollipop King » Wed Oct 24, 2007 2:51 am

Sauwelios wrote:
Satyr wrote:Note:
So now the saying reads: "Becoming loves to conceal itself". How alone may Becoming conceal itself? By creating the illusion of Being. (What I here mean by "Being", by the way, is Being in the Parmenidean sense, not the Heraclitean sense (Becoming).
There's no intent at concealment.
There is only error or weakness in the observer, who is not a completed observer but a observer in the process, a becoming observer.

If the illusion of being is only due to the weakness of the (becoming) observer in the process, then the rise of consciousness within the process is a consequence of weakness. If you think this is so, can you explain more about it?
The way I see it is that there is something which appears, a phenomenon, the apparent.
This appearance, for me, is a temporal manifestation or a product of an absence.
Now the apparent is perceived by another phenomenon, the observer, as an object. The observer interprets the apparent in accordance with his relationship or comparison with the apparent and in accordance with its perceptive abilities.

A flower appears differently to a bee and differently to a dog.
It is the same phenomenon perceived at different levels of acuity.
The reason the flower as it is perceived by both bee and dog is similar is because both dog and bee share a temporal speed because they are both products of the same ecosystem.

Whether either perceives the flower totally is not due to the flowers concealment but to the evolved sensual awareness and acuity of each emerging unity/organism.

For instance two individuals may share in the experience of a movie but will perceive it on different levels, not because the movie hid its meanings or its imagery to either one, but because each individual has a different level of perception.
They are not equal observers nor are they perfect observers.

The movement is a towards the unknown or yet to be determined.
The becoming has no goal but constructs them along the way, as signposts.

But is this construction an act of weakness? If so, how? Does it not presuppose some strength to construct anything? Indeed, is not weakness relative? Relative strength, in fact?
All existence is reactive.

I grow strong by how I react to my own weakness within a given environment.
I create or construct because I lack and because I am weak.

And yes all evaluations are relationships and comparisons.
Since all is lacking, in that the Absolute is absent, therefore all judgments are based on comparisons and degrees of an imagined hypothetical Absolute.

The concept of being is a product of understanding, which requires order so as to know and to store experience into memory which coalesces a unity into a self-becoming.

I don't quite follow. What coalesces a unity into a self-becoming? And is "self-becoming" one word?
Self is never completed and that's why it is a Becoming.

What holds this unity together is experience/information, stored in memory or in the genes.
I, as an individual, am not the same as I was at birth nor a year ago.
What holds me together as a singular becoming is the temporal flow stored in memory as snapshots.
I am the same person I was yesterday because of this continuity of thought stored as memory and I am my past and my heritage because of the continuity stored as history or genetic code.

Being is a human creation which makes the experience of becoming, of existing, comprehensible.

But if (the illusion of) Being is a human creation, and human beings are really human becomings (beings in the process, becoming beings), is not the will or need to make becoming comprehensible - by means of the creation of (the illusion of) Being - intrinsic to the process, to Becoming?
Yes.

For me the concept of Will may erroneously imply a free-will which it is not.
If the Will is determined and limited in its range of choices, never reaching omnipotence, then is driven by a need or a lack or an absence. It is active, willing, because it lacks and knows not what.

It is this search for fulfillment that is life, and because life mirrors its source, defines the universe and existence.
The words are merely conscious labels denoting an indefinable absence.
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Postby Fent » Wed Oct 24, 2007 11:57 am

Sauwelious wrote
"Becoming can be conscious of itself, understand itself, as a Being in the process of being destroyed or created (depending on its perspective). So even if it is shattering illusion, it can only understand itself as an illusion being shattered: for there is only consciousness of Being, not of Becoming. Thus Becoming stamps the character of Being on itself even in the very destruction of (the illusion of) this Being. This is its transfiguration."


Ok. Very nicely explained. Cheers.
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Postby Sauwelios » Mon Oct 29, 2007 4:17 am

Sauwelios wrote:"How does the perspectival sphere, and error, come into existence? In so far as, by means of an organic being [Wesen], not a being, but struggle itself seeks to preserve itself, to grow, and to be conscious of itself."
[Nietzsche, Nachlass.]

To be conscious of itself, the struggle - Becoming - needs the illusion of Being (peace, harmony - the latter word being the usual translation of sattva). Only in destroying Being (relative persistence) and the illusion of Being (absolute persistence) can Becoming be conscious of itself and celebrate itself.

"Happiness at Becoming is only possible in the destruction of the real, of "existence", of beautiful appearance, in the pessimistic shattering of illusion: - in the destruction of even the most beautiful appearance does Dionysian happiness reach its summit."
[ibid.]

The real will of Becoming is the will to be conscious of itself. To do this it must first disguise itself as its opposite, Being. Consciousness can only be consciousness of Being; but the will of Becoming is not to be conscious of Being, but of itself. Therefore, it must not only create the illusion of Being, but must subsequently destroy it. Only in the destruction of the illusion of Being can Becoming experience itself, as a Being being destroyed - which does not mean that the (organic) being, with a small 'b', needs to be destroyed: for this "being" is itself a Becoming, as Satyr has said. The organic "being" must experience itself as a Being being destroyed. That experience is the summit of Dionysian happiness: the attained goal of the will of Becoming, which is the will to affirm itself - the will's will to will its eternal willing.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Impious » Mon Oct 29, 2007 7:46 am

Sauwelios wrote:Secondly, I think Nietzsche would understand - this is simple Newtonian physics - that if the "wheel of the world" would stand still, that is, if we could make a recording of any one "moment" in the (r)evolution of the universe, there would be no momentum at all:


True. It's a matter of whether or not that information is vital in being able to predict future events. Nietzsche seems to say it's not. I'm not sure myself - haven't thought about it enough.
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Postby Ed3 » Fri Nov 02, 2007 4:45 am

Hi Sauwelios,

My responses here primarily pertain to your exchange with altd&s and in general with Kant’s view on space, time and phenomena. I do not claim to be knowledgeable on Nietzsche or for that matter most of the other topics cover here. There are three items here and I have number them to make the reading easier.

(1) Your definition of velocity is incorrect. And unfortunately virtually everything that you wrote on that matter is actually false. This all springs from the fact that the definitions of velocity and acceleration are rooted in calculus which requires the use of limits.

In order to show what this means, I will consider the simple one dimensional case of constant velocity generally used in the Zeno arrow “paradox”.

If a particle is traveling at a constant velocity of s in the positive x direction we know that the displacement function is st. (Here I am omitting the unit vector in the x direction as it is superfluous at this point). This is because the distance traveled, divided by the time that it takes to travel it, is (st - st0) / (t - t0) = s(t -t0) / (t -t0) = s. The question in the Zeno paradox is what happens when t = t0. The answer can be determined, in terms Newtonian Physics, once we realize that the velocity is defined as a limit.

Oops! I forgot the limit term - s. I will write the edited copy in red

Therefore, we are looking at the limit as t approaches t0 of (st - st0) / (t - t0). For this limit to exist we will need to show that if |t - t0| < delta (depending on epsilon) then |((st - st0)/(t -t0)) - s| < epsilon. Since (st -st0)/(t -t0) = s(t - t0)/(t - t0) and (t - t0)/ (t - t0) = 1, we get |(st - st0)/(t - t0) - s| = 0. Therefore, |(st - st0)/(t - t0) - s| < epsilon in all cases where t is not equal to t0.

By definition, the velocity at t0 (limit as t approaches t0 of (st - st0)/(t - t0) ) is NOT 0/0 but, instead, s. (Just as any normal person might assume.)

(2) altd&s wrote that he rejected Kantian representationalism and that the "language" we use to describe experience is metaphysical because it is a reference and not a thing. The things experienced are not metaphysical, they are material.

To which you responded: “ That's a mere assertion”

I am some what surprised that he did not in symmetrical fashion characterize Kantian assertions about space time and phenomena. From my reading the general characterization would be: discredited.

Obvious problems include:

Contrary to much public experience and virtually all instrumentally enhanced public experiences, Kant’s Reality varies from person to person. (If ten people were looking through a telescope at Mars and the all saw its’ two moons, Kant would regard that as a coincidence.)

Kant’s method of dealing which the geometry associated with space was to pretend that if one was living on or in the space, then they could not determine its geometry. This is categorically false because the sum of the angles in the triangles will vary from less the 180 degrees to more than 180 degrees depending on the particular geometry and similarly the area of a rectangle will vary from less than length times width to more than length times width again depending on the geometry.

Finally there are technical problems in dealing with the relationship between the noumenon and the phenomenon. Reference:

http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/t ... ealism.htm

(3)Finally, I am going to actually go out on a limb and make an assertion of my own.

Philosophy is defined, by me, as the body of work done by Philosophers. A Philosopher is defined, by me, as a person that attempts to answer the question: “Who am I?” From my point of view this should be intensely personal.

Any effort to answer this question will inevitably engender secondary questions such as what reference system am I using to answer this question. Another way to view this statement is “What is the other? And how do I deal with it?

At least in part, that will require us to attempt to understand our environment.

Now you are a Scientist, and the body of work you do is Science.

My assessment of Heidegger’s quoted comments are that they are ignorant; and, in this particular case, he seems like a bully beating on a strawman.
Last edited by Ed3 on Sat Nov 03, 2007 11:59 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Postby Sauwelios » Fri Nov 02, 2007 1:08 pm

Ed3 wrote:Hi Sauwelios,

My responses here primarily pertain to your exchange with altd&s and in general with Kant’s view on space, time and phenomena. I do not claim to be knowledgeable on Nietzsche or for that matter most of the other topics cover here. There are three items here and I have number them to make the reading easier.

(1) Your definition of velocity is incorrect. And unfortunately virtually everything that you wrote on that matter is actually false. This all springs from the fact that the definitions of velocity and acceleration are rooted in calculus which requires the use of limits.

In order to show what this means, I will consider the simple one dimensional case of constant velocity generally used in the Zeno arrow “paradox”.

If a particle is traveling at a constant velocity of s in the positive x direction we know that the displacement function is st. (Here I am omitting the unit vector in the x direction as it is superfluous at this point). This is because the distance traveled, divided by the time that it takes to travel it, is (st - st0) / (t - t0) = s(t -t0) / (t -t0) = s. The question in the Zeno paradox is what happens when t = t0. The answer can be determined, in terms Newtonian Physics, once we realize that the velocity is defined as a limit.

Therefore, we are looking at the limit as t approaches t0 of (st - st0) / (t - t0). For this limit to exist we will need to show that if |t - t0| < delta (depending on epsilon) then |(st - st0)/(t -t0)|| < epsilon. By choosing delta = epsilon|t -t0|/s we get, by substitution, |t - t0| < epsilon|t -t0|/s. Multiplying by s/|t -t0| (a positive number) we get:
s|t - t0|/|t - t0| < epsilon. Since, s and |t - t0| is positive, we can write |(st - st0) /(t - t0)|< epsilon.

By definition, the velocity at t0 (limit as t approaches t0 of (st - st0)/(t - t0) ) is NOT 0/0 but, instead, s. (Just as any normal person might assume.)

Sorry, I don't speak Math. I don't know what epsilon is (apart from the fifth letter of the Greek alphabet), and I don't know what | signifies. But it seems to me you have replaced my t - t0 = 0 by t - t0 = infinitesimal (if there is a symbol for "infinitesimal" I do not know it). As I've already said, the difference between zero and infinitesimal exists only in mathematics; philosophically, "infinitesimal" is bullshit.


(2) altd&s wrote that he rejected Kantian representationalism and that the "language" we use to describe experience is metaphysical because it is a reference and not a thing. The things experienced are not metaphysical, they are material.

To which you responded: “ That's a mere assertion”

I am some what surprised that he did not in symmetrical fashion characterize Kantian assertions about space time and phenomena. From my reading the general characterization would be: discredited.

Obvious problems include:

Contrary to much public experience and virtually all instrumentally enhanced public experiences, Kant’s Reality varies from person to person. (If ten people were looking through a telescope at Mars and the all saw its’ two moons, Kant would regard that as a coincidence.)

Kant’s method of dealing which the geometry associated with space was to pretend that if one was living on or in the space, then they could not determine its geometry. This is categorically false because the sum of the angles in the triangles will vary from less the 180 degrees to more than 180 degrees depending on the particular geometry and similarly the area of a rectangle will vary from less than length times width to more than length times width again depending on the geometry.
1
Finally there are technical problems in dealing with the relationship between the noumenon and the phenomenon. Reference:

http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/t ... ealism.htm

What I meant was an "assertion" was the claim that there are physical (or "material") things at all, which is a metaphysical claim.


(3)Finally, I am going to actually go out on a limb and make an assertion of my own.

Philosophy is defined, by me, as the body of work done by Philosophers. A Philosopher is defined, by me, as a person that attempts to answer the question: “Who am I?” From my point of view this should be intensely personal.

The view that this should be intensely personal is intensely personal. I do not agree that a philosopher is a person that attempts to answer the question "Who am I?".


Any effort to answer this question will inevitably engender secondary questions such as what reference system am I using to answer this question. Another way to view this statement is “What is the other? And how do I deal with it?

At least in part, that will require us to attempt to understand our environment.

Now you are a Scientist, and the body of work you do is Science.

My assessment of Heidegger’s quoted comments are that they are ignorant; and, in this particular case, he seems like a bully beating on a strawman.

According to Heidegger, not only can physics not answer the question what physics is; it cannot even pose that question. Only philosophy can pose questions at all, that is: only philosophy can think. So philosophy can also pose the question "What is philosophy?". By posing this question, however, it also questions the question itself: "What is this question?".

The question "What is this question?" symbolises the whole of philosophy, or rather, of "first philosophy" (prote philosophia), that is, metaphysics. For metaphysics asks about the being of the whole from out of a part of that whole. In the question "What is this question?", it is the word "what" that asks about the being ("what is") of the whole ("this") question. This is what first philosophy, or metaphysics, is, according to Heidegger: asking about the being of the whole of which the asker, the metaphysician himself, is a part. This does indeed include the question "Who [or: What] am I?"; but it is not identical with that question.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Ed3 » Sun Nov 04, 2007 12:02 am

Hi Sauwelios,

Regarding my past post, I forgot to put the limit term in my equations. They are redone in red. The epsilon and delta terms are arbitrary positive Real numbers. The positive characteristic is critical.

First I think that I should say that I personally have trouble identifying time with the Real number system and have said so in many previous posts. However, once we use Newtonian physics as a reference frame we are required to talk about the structure that it lays out.

The comments between Start Calculus and End Calculus will be assuming conventional calculus and Newtonian physics (other than the fact that I will be omitting its vector nature).

Start Calculus

With regard to the term infinitesimals, I am not certain about the terminology. However I will make some comments about the misuse of the limit concept.

If we let x = f(t), then we can write dx/dt for the derivative of f(t). This means that dx/dt is defined using the limit concept that I showed in the previous post. On a technical point, limits are only defined for a specific point, but in many cases that point is arbitrary and can be generalized over some specific domain.

So far everything is completely logical (I think). No dividing by 0 in any case.

Unfortunately, some people, Physicists generally, start using the terms dx and dt as real mathematical quantities. They don’t actually exist, and there are no definitions for them. None the less, people will write dx = g(t)dt where g(t) is taken to be the derivative of f(t). Logically we can not multiply and divide these terms.

I am speculating that by infinitesimals you are referring to the dx and dt terms.

Historically, neither Newton nor Leibnitz, used the limit terminology and their calculus would have yielded logical inconsistencies. It was not until Weierstrass (1815 - 1897) introduced this rigorous terminology that calculus was put on a rigorous logical foundation.

In fairness I should point out that some naughty children never get caught. The misuse of the dx and dt terms more frequently yields useable results than a pure mathematician would appreciate. After the fact, the conclusions of these misdeeds can frequently (but not always) be justified.

End Calculus

With regard to the question who am I?

I would like to acknowledge that there are many motivating factors to study things. One of the major motivators is intellectual curiosity.

Anecdotally, the question, of who am I, was important to me. Additionally, I have attended three meetings on gifted and talented children and have learned that there are two characteristics that are highly correlated to gifted and talented children. The highest correlating factor was that the children would self teach. The next highest factor was early existential questioning.

I don’t know if you asked these questions yourself, but from my readings of you, I would think so.
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Postby Sauwelios » Sun Nov 04, 2007 1:02 am

I still don't speak Math. I do have this to say, however.

If I'm not very much mistaken, a limit is a number that a function approaches infinitely, but never actually reaches. The difference between that number and the value of y (in the form "y = something with x") becomes infinitesimal as x increases or decreases. Now I don't know how you can define speed as a limit, but the question is not what the speed of a particle is in an "infinitesimal" timespan, but in the absence of a timespan (a "timespan" of zero). The answer is that a particle can have no velocity in the absence of a timespan, as velocity is distance traveled divided by the timespan. At any "moment" (mathematical point in time), or if the universe should be stood still by a God, there would be nothing to divide, and nothing to divide it by if there would have been anything to divide. To speak of velocity at a "moment", then, is meaningless. This is because in reality, there are no "moments", or any other mathematical points for that matter.
"Someone may object that the successful revolt against the universal and homogeneous state could have no other effect than that the identical historical process which has led from the primitive horde to the final state will be repeated. But would such a repetition of the process--a new lease of life for man's humanity--not be preferable to the indefinite continuation of the inhuman end? Do we not enjoy every spring although we know the cycle of the seasons, although we know that winter will come again?" (Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)
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Postby Ed3 » Mon Nov 05, 2007 3:40 am

Hi Sauwelios,

I’m sorry I haven’t responded. I am off to New England for about 5 days. When I get back I will try to put something together.

No guaranties on quality though.

Ed
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Postby Epoche75 » Sat Nov 10, 2007 6:15 pm

(2) altd&s wrote that he rejected Kantian representationalism and that the "language" we use to describe experience is metaphysical because it is a reference and not a thing. The things experienced are not metaphysical, they are material.

To which you responded: “ That's a mere assertion”

I am some what surprised that he did not in symmetrical fashion characterize Kantian assertions about space time and phenomena. From my reading the general characterization would be: discredited.


Eddie, when I say that language is metaphysical, I mean that the meaning in language is not of the same substance as the physical aspects of the language. The sound is sensible data- the meaning is not. For instance, a sound could be produced by a machine and heard by a person who was listening. The person, who had heard the sound, would respond to the sound as if it had been said by a human being...who would, of course, had intended the sound to convey a meaning. If the machine could induce a response in the listener, it must be that the meaning conveyed in the sound was strictly empirical....that is...it consisted of nothing more than sound waves of specific tones, syntactical structures, pitches, and other characteristics which the listener, after interpreting, responded to. So what we think is "meaning" in language is actually not anything supra-empirical...it is only a combination of physical stimulus that evokes a reaction in the listener.

Language is metaphysical in so far as it is believed to carry something other than empirical data. It cannot, because it is simply a manifestation of physical phenomena. If one wishes to say that empirical data is metaphysical....that the quality of the physical being of the sounds of language is something that cannot be comprehended by physics....one must in turn ask what is the being of language lying behind the metaphysical comprehension which reaches what physics cannot.

I believe that there are certain "a priori" structures to/for experience, like Kant, but I do not believe there is a metaphysical reality which exists that phenomena can only represent in experience. There is nothing behind experience...but there are specific necessities which must be in place for experience to occur.
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