The Will to Might.

[Epoche75]

It is an attempt to catch in words that which is beyond words.

You are denying the possibility of epistemology at a metaphysical expense. You are saying that the "unit" is not a real entity because it is a construct of a "logos". I'm pointing out that if this is so, the truth of your statement could not be about anything "real", since it too is a construct of a logos.

It is self-referential, which means that you are referring to the conclusion with the premise...but the conclusion is that no conclusions can be made. This is impossible. The premise would become retroactively nonexistent immediately after the proposition were proved true. I don't like paradoxes, Sauwelios, and I prefer to handle concepts where they are absent.

Thank you and good day.

[Epoche75]

You are denying the possibility of epistemology at a metaphysical expense.

This should be:

You are inventing the truth of a metaphysics at the expense of the truth of epistemology, which is what first makes "truth" possible.

[Sauwelios]

You are denying the possibility of epistemology at a metaphysical expense.

This should be:

You are inventing the truth of a metaphysics at the expense of the truth of epistemology, which is what first makes "truth" possible.

No, it is what makes knowledge possible:

"We may regard rational apprehension as a projection of Truth in dualistic form; so that he who possesses any given Truth has only to symbolise its image in the form of Knowledge."
http://www.hermetic.com/crowley/littlee ... ledge.html

Or are you suggesting there is no evidence of anything beyond words?

[Epoche75]

Sauwelister:

I am weary of any man who says "magic" at least once in every other sentence. I'm sure Crowley is a fun guy and all but I can't make myself read all that stuff.

[Sauwelios]

You're weary of this, you don't like that - so what?

[Sauwelios]

I will provide my translation of this passage of Nietzsche's Nachlass again, for détrop's sake. Included are my footnotes.

"Fundamental certainty.--
[this is the title of the passage]

"I imagine", therefore there is a Being: cogito, ergo est.--
[I have to explain this.
1. "I imagine" is ich stelle vor in German, literally "I put forward".
2. "A Being" is ein Sein in German: so "Being" here means something that is, not an entity (as in "a human being"): that would be ein Wesen. So the imagining essence is a way of Being, not an entity.
3. Cogito, ergo est is Latin and means "I think, therefore there is something", or "I think, therefore it is." It is a correction of Descartes' cogito, ergo sum, "I think, therefore I am." The explanation follows.]

That I am this imagining Being, that imagining is an activity of the ego, is no longer certain: just as little is everything that I imagine.--
[So it is not necessarily the "I" which is putting these images forward, into the mind; both the "I" (the subject) and the objects or content of consciousness may be imaginary.]

The only Being that we know is the imagining Being. When we accurately describe it, then it must contain the predicates of Being. (When we regard imagination itself as an object of imagination, however, is it not tinctured, falsified, made indefinite?--)
[When we think about this imagining essence, we regard it as a "thing"; but this "thing" is only an image of the imagining essence; we can never see it as it is, as "seeing" is itself imagining, and it is not we, but the imagining essence which imagines (puts these images in our mind, in our consciousness).]

Characteristic of imagination is change, not motion: passing away and coming to be, and in imagining anything persistent is lacking.
[Change, not motion, because existence as a whole is changing, and existence as a whole has nothing to move in. That imagination is changing is a fact of experience.]

On the other hand, it posits two persisting things, it believes in the persistence of 1. an ego, 2. a content; this belief in persistence, in substance, i.e. in the remaining identical thereof with itself, is a contradiction with the imagination process itself.
[As the imagination process is a process of change.]

(Even when I, like here, talk completely generally of imagination, I make a persisting thing out of it.)
[As I said above: when we think about this imagining essence, we regard it as a "thing", that is, as something which remains identical with itself.]

Inherently clear, however, is that imagination is nothing resting, nothing identical-with-itself, unchangeable: the Being therefore, which alone is guaranteed to us, is changing, not-identical-with itself, has correlations (conditions, thinking must have a content, in order to be thinking).--
[These conditions are the belief in the two persisting things mentioned above: 1. an ego, 2. a content.]

This is the fundamental certainty about Being. But imagining postulates precisely the opposite of Being!
[Namely, persisting, substantial things.]

But that does not mean that it is true!
[I.e., that such things exist.]

But maybe this postulation of the opposite is only a condition of the existence of this kind of Being, of the imagining kind! That is to say: thinking would be impossible, if it did not fundamentally mistake the essence of esse [esse means "Being" in Latin]: it must postulate substance and that which is identical, because a cognition [knowing] of the completely fluent [flowing] is impossible, it must poetically ascribe properties to Being in order to exist. There need not be a subject or an object for imagination to be possible, but imagination must believe in both. In short: that which thinking [thought] conceives and must conceive as the real, may be the antithesis of Being!"
[You may have noticed that Nietzsche more or less uses thinking and imagination as synonyms. This is because in Latin, cogitare means both "to think" and "to imagine". Even the English word "to think" means "to cause to appear to oneself" (it's the causative form of the Old English thyncan, which meant "to seem"). So what Nietzsche says is that "I think" does not mean that "I" cause something to appear to myself, but that the imagining Being (or essence) causes it to appear to "me" (and also causes the idea of "me" to appear).]

You wanted epistemology? You got it.

Metaphysics, or First Philosophy, asks about Being. From the above it follows that at least this "imagining Being" exists: even if all our "perceptions" are really hallucinations (and do therefore not reflect an - objectively existing - perceived), then still a hallucinating Being exists, which puts forward "us" as well as "our perceptions". As at least this one Being, the imagining Being, must exist (that is, as there must be at least one Being, and if there is only one Being it must be an imagining Being), it is as well to start with this. This imagining Being is the flux I mentioned, from which arises the idea of "things" (the logos). It thus exists prior to the logos, and is therefore the proper object of philosophic inquiry. Indeed, we need not postulate anything besides it. It suffices: we may equate this Being with phusis. Science occupies itself with what may well be imaginary phenomena; Philosophy occupies itself with the ground of these phenomena. This, it seems to me now, is the difference between Science and Philosophy.

[Epoche75]

I don't know what to say to that, Sauwelios. We are not on the same page, as usual.

[Epoche75]

What do you think of these passages, Sauwelios? This man announced that philosophy was over, and did a damn fine job proving it, I think. "Metaphysics" is useless garbage and only makes sense to those who lack the capacity to logically track their own statements. A metaphysician is like a guy who has a disease...but cannot become aware of the disease because he has it. The point is not that "certain ideas need metaphysics" in order to be clarified. The point is that certain ideas, themselves, are nonsense...and cannot be clarified.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tractatus_ ... losophicus

The subsidiaries of 6. contain more philosophical reflections on logic, connecting to ideas of knowledge, thought, and the a priori and transcendental. The final passages argue that logic and mathematics express only tautologies and are transcendental, i.e. they lie outside of the metaphysical subject’s world. In turn, a logically "ideal" language cannot supply meaning, it can only reflect the world, and so, sentences in a logical language cannot remain meaningful if they are not merely reflections of the facts.

In the final pages Wittgenstein veers towards what might be seen as religious considerations. This is founded on the gap between propositions 6.3 and 6.4. A logical positivist might accept the propositions of Tractatus before 6.4. But 6.41 and the succeeding propositions argue that ethics is also transcendental, and thus we cannot examine it with language, as it is a form of aesthetics and cannot be expressed. He begins talking of the will, life after death, and God. In his examination of these issues he argues that all discussion of them is a misuse of logic. Specifically, since logical language can only reflect the world, any discussion of the mystical, that which lies outside of the metaphysical subject's world, is meaningless. This suggests that many of the traditional domains of philosophy, e.g. ethics and metaphysics, cannot in fact be discussed meaningfully. Any attempt to discuss them immediately loses all sense. This also suggests that his own project of trying to explain language is impossible for exactly these reasons. He suggests that the project of philosophy must ultimately be abandoned for those logical practices which attempt to reflect the world, not what is outside of it. The natural sciences are just such a practice, he suggests.

The ending of the book is a bit surprising, and comes to some rather drastic conclusions regarding philosophy. Specifically, it suggests that any discussion of metaphysics lies outside the realm of sense, and that it can only be shown, and not spoken of beyond the limits of language.

[Sauwelios]

I don't really care about Wittgenstein. I think it is a matter of taste. I don't find his "propositions" (the whole word reeks of systemisation) in any way impressive. And as Nietzsche says, whoever understands himself in the word "Dionysian" does not need refutations of such systems; he smells the decomposition.

I wanted to address something else you said:

I do not understand the difference between "within nature" and "nature as a whole". I do not think of "nature" as something that "holds contents" or can have the characteristic of "wholeness". Rather, I think that the term is used philosophically to generalize anything that exists. It is a very, very ambiguous term, like "God".

When you start modeling the concept of "nature" as a kind of geometric entity...something which has shape, form, and presence, you will be expected to start talking about it as if can be distinguished from things that are unnatural (which is impossible), and from things which are "outside" it (which is impossible), and from things which define it...such as "ontological essence" (which is impossible).

I have been thinking about thinking about nature as a "whole". I was reminded of the following by what you said:

"One might also posit that the more an object demonstrates the *Hailagaz energy (wholeness) the more it will also demonstrate *Wihaz energy (individuality) - as that which is whole and integrated is also that which is more self-contained and individuated. Likewise in order for something to be *Hailagaz (whole or integrated) there must also be a sense in which it is first *Wihaz (individuated or separate)."
http://www.runegild.org/pq_tyr_odhinn.html

The explanation is in the "more". Within nature, there is relative wholeness and relative separateness. But nature as a whole would be absolutely whole. Such absolute integration would only be possible if there was nothing that might disintegrate it - that is, nothing besides the absolutely integrated "object". Therefore, absolute wholeness means the absolute lack of separateness. Metaphysics means the question as to the whole arises from out of a part of that whole - an only relatively integrated and separate being that is absolutely integrated and inseparable from it. "Logical" thought (in the sense of pertaining to the logos) falsifies (simplifies) relatively integrated and separate beings to "absolutely integrated and separate" beings - which is a self-contradiction.

[Epoche75]

Now see Saully you had to go and say something derogatory, didn't you.

This:

as Nietzsche says, whoever understands himself in the word "Dionysian" does not need refutations of such systems; he smells the decomposition.

...wouldn't even make it to Wittgenstein's desk. He certainly wouldn't bother with of any of it, and your claim would amount to little more than a Sauwelister moment, unique in narrative but devoid of any logical sense.

Everybody knows you can't compare Nietzsche with Wittgenstein. They are completely different breeds of writer and philosopher. W has training that N would have to try well and devote much time to acquire. There is a great difference in philosophy and the study of logic and mathematics, regardless of any "metaphysical" argument against logical and mathematical facts in the world. The apparent problem is that metaphysics denies the possibility of real epistemology but uses some kind of axiomology to make its argument sensible.

As Wittgenstein says, you cannot violate the language you use to make sensible statements. There cannot be a "private" meaning that cannot be made public by some kind of rules. These rules are inherent in intersubjective meaning.

If all truths are sensible, they must also be absolutely true, true despite what any belief or opinion would have otherwise.

All I suggest is that some things cannot be "said", such as your metaphysical descriptions of "being" and "imagining". Because if what you say is intelligible, it cannot be a negation of the structures present in the making of the meaning of the statement and/or word. There are no such things as "nihilistic statements", even in an epistemological sense. No "deconstructionism" possible here.

[Epoche75]

That ontology you were doing in your last post is interesting but wouldn't you agree that it is essentially useless if it does not address what should be believed in philosophy?

A pure "nihilistic epistemology" which claims the universe, or "all being", in a state of "flux", is not accomplishing anything for psychology, politics, or science in general. It is a purely metaphysical speculative, hypothetical "scenerio".

There are millions of them....more on the page you got that material from, I'm sure.

Ontology should be very simple because it is making ambiguous generalities about simple terms which, otherwise in ordinary language, are basic "indexicals", used to verify identity and nothing more. "Being" is a reference to one of these indexes: "here" has a being, "it" has a being, "there" has a being, and these references are nothing more than adjective. They are also the fundamental categories for experience- they designate the possibility for meaning. So an ontology really isn't doing anything but restating only an obvious rule in epistemology; that there "is isness".

Ontology then is a philosophy about a function in language, because the use of the term in language is as these indexical rules. Ontology is a horrible complication of something hardly worth the time and effort to try to explain it.

A theory of ontology does not support or deny any possibly political theory because pure ontology is not ethical. It does not support any kind of ethical, moral, evaluative statement. "is", "becoming", "being", "became", all are basic existential signifiers. That's about it.

[Sauwelios]

That ontology you were doing in your last post is interesting but wouldn't you agree that it is essentially useless if it does not address what should be believed in philosophy?

A pure "nihilistic epistemology" which claims the universe, or "all being", in a state of "flux", is not accomplishing anything for psychology, politics, or science in general.

And why should it be? The value of philosophy does not lie in its use to something else.

[Epoche75]

I'm saying that all effort...the mere fact that you are an active body, is evidence that "use" is the reason for this action, since conscious behavior is intentional- toward an end. Philosophy, like language, is "done" for a reason. There is no such thing as indifferent knowledge.

Even though the human being is a multiplicity of causes, those causes and effects which are known by man are the only possible events which can influence his "knowing". Statements about things that are not for a reason do not exist. This is perhaps why a majority of philosophy is considered nonsense, and science is considered more "accurate", so to speak. A philosophy of science and the use of logic must correspond to ethical interests or it is idling. It is "metaphysics". Non-applicable to experimentation.

It doesn't use knowledge for ends, or, ends exist and must be ethical. Which ever you prefer.

[Sauwelios]

Philosophy is a form of the will to power. The power that is willed here is sophia, and the form this will takes is of philia. So the "use" (the purpose) is already implied in it. Moreover, this purpose is not even the end of it. The purpose may be understood as a means to make working toward it at all possible. As Nietzsche says,

"Ultimately one loves one's desires and not that which is desired."
[BGE 174 and 175.]

I love my philosophy.

[Epoche75]

I agree. The Will to Power is everything.

[promethean75]

"I once posted a picture of myself as a 3 year old looking at a sandpile I had constructed with my mother. I was holding a little shovel looking out while my mom did all the work."

jesus christ Jakob the fixed barbarian was an aspiring capitalist even at age 3!

[Jakob]

Notes to others. Notes to self. Galore.

"Big Brianed" (double platinum homie) just scored some big points for digging up this thread. Thanks trash.

(it be da bedda nauyhme for da wheeezy (=pale) homies)

[Jakob]

In section 617 of The Will to Power, Nietzsche says:

"To stamp the character of Being on Becoming - that is the highest will to power."

If this is the highest will to power, what is the will to power as such? Two sentences onward in the same passage, Nietzsche gives a clue as to the answer of this question:

"That everything returns [wiederkehrt] is the closest approximation of a world of Becoming to a world of Being: - summit of the meditation."

The word here translated as "meditation" is Betrachtung. This word contains the verb trachten, cognate with "try". So the summit of the attempt to think through a stamping of Becoming with the character of Being is not such an actual stamping, not a reconciliation of both said worlds, but only an approximation of the two. The summit is the closest approximation, which follows from the highest will to power - the will to actually reconcile the two. Nietzsche, the philosopher of will to power, embodied this highest will to power and expressed it in the doctrine of the eternal return of the same (which is really the same return of eternal Becoming, but nevermind that now).

If the highest will to power expresses itself as the closest possible approximation of a world of Becoming to a world of Being, then the will to power as such is the will to approximate Becoming to Being.

I will push this further, out of the realm of metaphysics and into politics; as the meditation itself remains an approximation, the results of this meditation, that is, actions undertaken by a subject who is engaged in this meditation, can produce, when consistently performed, being. That is to say, a consciousness which is condition to all (other) becoming and conditioned foremost by its own self-affirmation. An axis, by virtue of which becoming turns into a wheel.

(Nice: becoming becomes a wheel, becoming turns into a wheel)

I propose to translate Wille zur Macht ("will to power") as "will to might". For "might" (which is cognate with Macht) is related to "make", which etymologically signifies a "kneading". Thus the formless and only relatively solid material of Becoming is "kneaded" into forms, "made firm", by the will to might. This always seeks to approximate Becoming to Being, to create "something" (a "thing", a "being").

I think the word might is inadequate to this connotation of Macht - we can't truly translate it. Much like your experience of the primeval forest was given only by the German text, so it is probably in vain to try to get English to truly represent Nietzsche -

Perhaps only my own philosophy, which was conceived in English, opens up Nietzsche to the English speaking world; not in his aesthetics and sensibilities, but in his logic. That which he knew was necessary in order for this species to advance.