well you can’t ‘blame’ the cosmos because the cosmos isn’t an intentional director or determiner of events. you can, however, allocate various causes to specific features about the cosmos, but none of this can be understood in the anthropomorphic terms we use in our language.
the difficult part is extracting out of the language about causation, the anthropomorphic concepts we’ve imported into it after centuries of developing and practicing the conceptual confusions produced by the theory of freewill that we employ in our practical discourse. words like ‘blame’, ‘fault’, ‘responsibility’, are packed with connotations that are erroneously applied to an indifferent causality. and if you aren’t careful, you’ll start to not only ‘blame’ the cosmos like you would a neighbor who broke your gas grill when he borrowed it, but also call the cosmos ‘unfair’ as well, like the neighbor who refuses to fix the grill.
it’s the confusions inherent to the illest-freewillist’s language that leads him to be only able to understand the determinist’s ideas about causality in the same way he understands the moral language he uses to describe the behaviors of people.
if and when you come to understand that belief in causality, and lack of belief in an immaterial, cartesian model that defines the self as a causal agency, are results of reason alone and not some ill-advised emotional attempt to avoid culpability, will it begin to make sense to you. until then, you will only be able to understand the determinist as someone who attributes to the cosmos those erroneous terms you attribute to what you perceive is the free agent. ergo; when a determinist denies freewill, he must be trying to dodge responsibility. he couldn’t possibly deny freewill only because it makes no sense.
now as obvious as this is, the freewillist can’t afford to admit it. he will by any means necessary hold on to his argument to avoid facing his own confusion.