Giftedness Exists

[Pedro I Rengel]

Which God is philosophy of? Zeus doesn't care about philosophy. What is allowed to the Ox is not allowed to Jupiter.

[Pedro I Rengel]

Zeus chases tail. Tail chases Dionisus.

[Pedro I Rengel]

Unless of course it is in chains.

[Pedro I Rengel]

Who is liberty of? Zeus doesn't mind one way or another.

Dionisus gives it.

[Pedro I Rengel]

That's obviously what is terrifying about Diunisus.

To those who have been chained, the unpredictability of freedom makes them think of an unpredictable master. Which is horrifying. When master is predictable, one can at least establish an economy of suffering.

[Pedro I Rengel]

But after a while, it becomes difficult to talk about Gods.

Better to talk about humans and figure it out on our own. Even if it is about humans talking about Gods.

Suffice it to know that they are there.

[Pedro I Rengel]

Yes, I think Dionisus is very comfortable with Zeus and leaving him in power. The bovi also does not really want what is of Iovi.

Or how do I put this? In a world ruled by Zeus, tail chases Dionisus.

Btw it just hit me that you said this: any man that needs the question answered why not to rape women needs to be put down.

The only real question is why they were raped in the first place? Like I said, fear got the best of them.

[Guide]

lacking in philosophic sense.
Groups often deplore suggestions that their approach, whether habitual or newly prized or...., might be improved. The group has engaged in prejudiced responses itself and may not like when this is mirrored and here has perhaps turned away from what it does not understand or perhaps what seems to be a threat to its sense of its role.

The group appreciates the introduction of collective third person response.
The group thinks this adds something.
The group feels no need for this to change.
The group however learns more from the blend of abstraction and the concrete/particular.
That is where gifts shine or do not.

From this quarter, or neighborhood, as it were, of the group a wrestler comes forward, demanding to know what point is supposed to be streng verbotten, strictly disallowed, by reason of "abstraction"? A general outcry "abstraction", is so abstract as to be unanswerable, or, at least, to fall under suspicion of disingenuous conduct of polemic kind.

[Guide]

"Groups are the plain's best defence against philosophy or any challenge.

"There are no philosophies, only philosophers" - N

Meaning there is at this point only me."

However, the group does not, perhaps, adequately consider Nietzsche's radical undermining of the "I", even though, and moreso because, he often spoke of the ipsissimosity, the-most-being-like, expression of the characteristic of "himself", of his dear early work: "Morgenröte," however, the only book he himself published, was "Beyond Good and Evil," a book which resembled the style of Plato, and also denounced Plato more than his other works.

[Fixed Cross]

That's obviously what is terrifying about Diunisus.

To those who have been chained, the unpredictability of freedom makes them think of an unpredictable master. Which is horrifying. When master is predictable, one can at least establish an economy of suffering.

I guess this is true. But to me this only speaks for Dionysos. I have always been horrified by the idea of predictables from above.

What should come from above is rain and lightening, and no weather man will ever be able to accurately predict these.

Ok - the Sun, moon and other celestials are predictable in their movements above. But they don't come down to us like some intrusive bookkeeper-god.

Also Zeus is even less predictable than Dionysos. No god could ever predict what he would do next, except that probably it would result in another demigod birth. That is his autarky with respect to his father, Kronos.

[Fixed Cross]

"Groups are the plain's best defence against philosophy or any challenge.

"There are no philosophies, only philosophers" - N

Meaning there is at this point only me."

However, the group does not, perhaps, adequately consider Nietzsche's radical undermining of the "I", even though, and moreso because, he often spoke of the ipsissimosity, the-most-being-like, expression of the characteristic of "himself", of his dear early work: "Morgenröte," however, the only book he himself published, was "Beyond Good and Evil," a book which resembled the style of Plato, and also denounced Plato more than his other works.

BGE is monological, intensely concentrated, aphoristic.
Plato speaks in drawn out, purely contextual dialogues.

N questioned the "I" as a fixed entity, not as agent.
In other words: we don't exist, except in our agency.
In yet other words: this world is will power.

[Pedro I Rengel]

That's obviously what is terrifying about Diunisus.

To those who have been chained, the unpredictability of freedom makes them think of an unpredictable master. Which is horrifying. When master is predictable, one can at least establish an economy of suffering.

I guess this is true. But to me this only speaks for Dionysos. I have always been horrified by the idea of predictables from above.

What should come from above is rain and lightening, and no weather man will ever be able to accurately predict these.

Ok - the Sun, moon and other celestials are predictable in their movements above. But they don't come down to us like some intrusive bookkeeper-god.

Also Zeus is even less predictable than Dionysos. No god could ever predict what he would do next, except that probably it would result in another demigod birth. That is his autarky with respect to his father, Kronos.

Das right. Das right. These two are eminently compatible Gods. That's why out of the plethore, of the twelve, the Romans still decided to have both in their final most developped stages. Baccus is in the Bible as much as Jupiter. Will Baccus always want more? Sure. How could he be terrifying otherwise? Does this shake Jupiter? No.

Fine words on Nietzsche as well. Like Dionisus doesn't mind Zeus's reign, Nietzsche seems not to mind your categorization. This one time, so far.

You get angry at that I dislike your banal phenomenology of will to power. But clarity is very, wery wery important in philosophy. This is the first instance of it. And I like it. Prolly cause it is a writing that seems never to have touched such a foul thing as "instead of nothing."

Why can't clear categorical thinking be for its own sake, in the sense of the "I," instead of the oh so fake and deluded "out of nothing?" Even out of Nyx is not out of nothinh!

Anyway, thank you for those words. Philosophy suits you!

[Fixed Cross]

Im pleased to notice we still have our solid common ground.

What Id ask you to stop doing is insinuating, like here:

"You get angry at that I dislike your banal phenomenology of will to power."

This insinuates that it is an agreed upon fact that my phenomenology of the wtp is banal, but that I find that you should like the banal.
Any one worth is his salt here has been endlessly trolled with such insinuations, very tiresome to correct them, very painful to let them slide.

This all aside from the fact that I have always been absolutely clear that nothing can come out of nothing, that existence has always existed -- but that you think I said such nonsense is less insulting than that you insinuate that I think of my own thoughts as banal. That I don't even have these thoughts you find banal is less of an issue.

To be clear: it is first of all accuracy and honesty that I demand of anyone I talk to about philosophy. The exact same principle as looking for hard ground when you plan to build a temple.

[Fixed Cross]

Because you think that I think "out of nothing" means anything at all, I do suspect that you attribute this error to Heidegger as well. Thus, I think you may be taking Heidegger for the very thing he destroyed.

Heidegger is the best thing to read on weed. There is nothing funnier than how he cruelly and gleefully deconstructs language until only the bones lie in a circle.

[Guide]

BGE is monological, intensely concentrated, aphoristic.
Plato speaks in drawn out, purely contextual dialogues.

N questioned the "I" as a fixed entity, not as agent.
In other words: we don't exist, except in our agency.
In yet other words: this world is will power.

The will takes over the role of eros. Socrates is "monological" insofar as he always presses one point (and at bottom is never influenced by his interlocutors who are always manifestly inferior to him, in all but one case). The contrast is between the Rausch or symbol-rich unconscious when read through Jung of the Zarathustra, and the sheer philosophizing (reasoning) of Beyond Good and Evil. Where the issue is a Platonic-style discourse concerning the relative power of religion and philosophy split by a series of aphorisms, rather than the ancient subject of (local: i.e., in each city do what is done there) politics and (universal, i.e, concerned with wisdom) philosophy. This is because in our own time politics is universalized ("in each city" has no sense, one hears news of the furthest regions constantly), rather than local. Which means the ancient form of analysis no longer holds: cf. Schmitt's Concept of the Political.

[Fixed Cross]

BGE is monological, intensely concentrated, aphoristic.
Plato speaks in drawn out, purely contextual dialogues.

N questioned the "I" as a fixed entity, not as agent.
In other words: we don't exist, except in our agency.
In yet other words: this world is will power.

The will takes over the role of eros. Socrates is "monological" insofar as he always presses one point (and at bottom is never influenced by his interlocutors who are always manifestly inferior to him, in all but one case).

Precisely where Nietzsche is multifarious, rich; N doesn't bother with pressing points to inferior people, he opens curtains to superior ones.
He writes above himself, Socrates seeks for those on whom he can look down, to make their folly suggest his wisdom.
It is not a surprise that the political Plato scrapped every piece of Greek culture that shows Socrates for what he is. Ill do you the respect of not making what I mean here explicit.

The contrast is between the Rausch or symbol-rich unconscious when read through Jung of the Zarathustra, and the sheer philosophizing (reasoning) of Beyond Good and Evil.
Where the issue is a Platonic-style discourse concerning the relative power of religion and philosophy split by a series of aphorisms, rather than the ancient subject of (local: i.e., in each city do what is done there) politics and (universal, i.e, concerned with wisdom) philosophy. This is because in our own time politics is universalized ("in each city" has no sense, one hears news of the furthest regions constantly), rather than local. Which means the ancient form of analysis no longer holds: cf. Schmitt's Concept of the Political.

Interesting take.
I do not agree that any of it is Platonic, but its easy to concede that what you mean by Platonic is probably the western tradition of going lengths to explain things via logical arguments of varying qualities and integrities.

Your distinction is of strong political significance in a time when localism and tribalism are being re-established by the failure of universalist rationalism and the indifference of the rationalists to these failures; in short, by the unmasking of rationality as the fundamental ideological soil, and the identifying of the "tribal totem", the inscrutable object of very particular collective passions, as the true ground of argument.

[Pedro I Rengel]

What I have read of Heidegger suggests the very opposite. That he hightens words beyond their truth, to a poetic fancy that convinces itself it is from a place more real and even anterior to truth. The result is worse than corny because cornyness has no illusions about what it is.

It is self-dellusion aggrandized to the point where it can no longer trace itself back to the fact that it is dellusion, dellusion always being a cover for weakness. Weakness can be made strong, dellusion cannot. This is why he, as well as all dellusionists of the modern age, takes aim at Nietzsche, evidently the strongest thinker possible, fails to even say anything about him and then claims he went beyond him, that Nietzsche was at bottom somehow a fool, an enlightened fool. Like Derrida saying he liked Nietzsche only when he was an angry teenager, that that is the only reason anyone would. It's more than pathetic: it is crushing proof of Nietzsche's assertion that nothing fertile can come from the last man.

[Pedro I Rengel]

Why is Baudrillard saved from this list? Because the very few times he touches Nietzsche, always very obliquely, it is always in frank and stunned admiration. He accepted he would never surpass him and simply did what he could to honor philosophy, almost in his name.

[Pedro I Rengel]

To make sure the torch was passed.

[Fixed Cross]

"What I have read of Heidegger suggests the very opposite. That he hightens words beyond their truth, to a poetic fancy that convinces itself it is from a place more real and even anterior to truth."

Rather, the poetic fancy is taken as the ground to the whole project of philosophy. Grammar is hung from a tree and skinned, dissected for its organs which are relished as a curiosity.
In as far as it is alive during this, it is also the one with the knife. It is a very gruelling process, which only a German would undertake - and not a decent one.
I Agree Degger is not a pale shadow of N qua decency, but thats not what it took to further the task. It took a deluded nazi. Hahaha..
Dafuq.
I can see why you hate him.
But I can't. He's too efficient at what had to be done. Maybe the fucker was the only useful nazi, the reason why nazism had to exist. So that Heidegger could walk around his little hut undisturbed by utilitarian thoughts or any common sense whatsoever.

[Pedro I Rengel]

Tell me, what was it that had to be done?

I see no meat.

Only farts.

[Pedro I Rengel]

"Rather, the poetic fancy is taken as the ground to the whole project of philosophy."

Right, exactly, he's an idiot.

This is just the way of saying by a man whose pride won't let him see the truth the following:

"...that convinces itself it is from a place more real and even anterior to truth."

Mistakes in philosophy are not a matter for embarassment. They are a privilege.

[Pedro I Rengel]

You can afford yourself this privilege because you, with the possible only company of Baudrillard and me, understand the dignity of Nietzsche.

What you cannot afford yourself is dellusion. Not in war.

[Pedro I Rengel]

And is any human ever not in war?

Are even the dead not in war?

Why do you think after a while great Greeks had themselves burnt instead of stored in mausoleums or mounds? Or even towers to be eaten by vultures where bones would remain?

[Pedro I Rengel]

I agree about the Japanese and the absolute. Which is why they belong in the past. The absoluteness of honor was so intennable that they needed Buda. But the real result was... was... well I would like to die and be reborn there.

War is a child's idea of a good time, because it is real. Nothing else is.

Fertility, sex, these show us that war is not all about hurting and causing pain. War is the footing on which life exists. Life! In all its unimaginable vastness.