All Causality is Teleological

[Guide]

Human meaning is nomological in the sense that whatever one encounters already seems to be something; i.e., to have meaning (to be intelligible). In the extreme case one encounters a thing that is only there so far as it is available to be examined under the rubric "What is it?".

Since the human being never encounters anything that is not already there for them in the way described above, this too is true of time. Time is always what is already as what came from "what has been", and what is already as what "is not yet". Time is always a stage-like development. The formal or empty structure of time accounts in advance for each detail, i.e., birth-youth-maturity-old age-death, seed-sprouting plant-green sapling-tree-old tree-desiccation and return to the earth, or, the cycles of the moon, day and night, etc. Time is prefigured as teleological.

Ergo, physics, practiced by living beings, is always teleological (in great contradistinction to what one always hears in the marketplace and from physicists who set themselves up as ideologists and public mouthpieces). It is not teleological only as a formal rule or idealized abstraction: ergo only as Science as an Idea abstracted from the lives of the humans who do the game called science.

[encode_decode]

Guide

Your thoughts are interesting enough to me, however I can not say that I entirely agree with everything that you are saying. It seems to me that you are trying to wrap everything up into a nice neat package forgetting that reality from the point of view of a human being is not so neat.

Human meaning is nomological in the sense that whatever one encounters already seems to be something; i.e., to have meaning (to be intelligible).

If I am reading you right then I mostly agree - everything is/becomes discovered - what is there seems to be understandable. Still we are talking about perception as opposed to reality and perception is a part of reality. Meaning is derived from reality(more precisely is built into reality) and is often perceived with some error.

In the extreme case one encounters a thing that is only there so far as it is available to be examined under the rubric "What is it?".

That is right although we tend to ask the same question of an animal(as an example) that we have never seen before knowing that it is at least an animal - we will ask what something is even when we partially know the answer ahead of time.

Since the human being never encounters anything that is not already there for them in the way described above, this too is true of time. Time is always what is already as what came from "what has been", and what is already as what "is not yet". Time is always a stage-like development. The formal or empty structure of time accounts in advance for each detail, i.e., birth-youth-maturity-old age-death, seed-sprouting plant-green sapling-tree-old tree-desiccation and return to the earth, or, the cycles of the moon, day and night, etc. Time is prefigured as teleological.

Adjusting our perception to constantly be at the effect however is nearly impossible as we travel through the moments from "what has been" toward what "is not yet". What "is not yet" is still inevitable and not completely impossible to perceive and yet difficult to predict with absolute certainty.

Ergo, physics, practiced by living beings, is always teleological (in great contradistinction to what one always hears in the marketplace and from physicists who set themselves up as ideologists and public mouthpieces). It is not teleological only as a formal rule or idealized abstraction: ergo only as Science as an Idea abstracted from the lives of the humans who do the game called science.

1) Science takes a practical approach not a perfect approach. 2) It seems to me that physics as it currently stands is not always teleological.

It took me a while to decipher what you had written so with a bit of luck I am making myself clear.

[Meno_]

Formal argument is unfathomable here, but if doesent mean it has to be completely eliminated.
The age old argument about the 'thingness' of a thing, (failing all else)
has 3 points of essential ideas criss crossing each other, for most is the cogito ergo sum.

Its placed in the middle between the Idea of the Platonic essential Idea of what the relationship is between universal and particular 'things' and the post modern subacription to things consisting of energy particles.

Descartes needs to fix existence in absolute terms, and his cure consists of thought-mind as the guarantor of being. For I'd that dis not exist, even the mind would be lost in a myriad of only possibilities. There for , in order for anything to exist, there needs to be a thought, which is a thought of some 'thing'.

The mind goes about classifying them, in order of a achema. This schema is then what is defined as teleological.

This is why Descarte at once is the fulcrum upon which both are balanced , as a mode of unifocation of both the the root and the outgrowth of meaning


That science was too quick to dismiss Decartes, is obvious and it took Leibnitz to try to quantify wjat has been just previously a Kantian categorical bypass.

The historical revisions spinned off jumped existentially leaving behind the carefully schematized prior state of Being, and intentionality was borne out of essentialism, to form support.

That its still ongoing is again borne out of the utility found in older states of reasoning as they can be adapted to current situations.

To put forward a hypothetical that 'all casualty is teleological' is to reduce primal logic into the nothingness from which it has evolved , doubling down into being , as nothingness.

That this existence as nothingness is interpreted as giving rise to the need for causality as an absolute, bears witness to Sartre's need to input the cogito into sum -a necessary given.

This may be not a necessary feedback from the view of teleology from Your point of view, and contingency may be used to place the onus of the argument sans the substantial historical analysis You are using, but it is essential to tie them together, as Kant tried.

So in fact, there may not be an exit, and we are stuck instead of the cogito argument into the esse est percipi.

And please note: this does not serve as an absolute either, only calculates casualty on the Leibnitz paradigm.

It is circular and create a standard linear systems on the level of esse eat percipii.

Anything can be argued, even the the thought of such contraptions being useful, but they can not be done away with, since structurally they have been built into the argument


There for I will be resistant to the thought that lack of utility is prima facea proof of inconsistency with this argument, because it is of absolute necessity that 'it' be shown to be what 'It' is.

If one does not supply the tools with which the pragmatic can be sewn out of the contemplative transcendent, then formal argument can not stand.

[Guide]

“Your thoughts are interesting enough to me, however I can not say that I entirely agree with everything that you are saying. It seems to me that you are trying to wrap everything up into a nice neat package forgetting that reality from the point of view of a human being is not so neat.”

However, though naturally one agrees, the region of determination, of bounding things as a field is bound by stream and hillside, is still extended to humans. Without this, what should one do, in order to make a means for getting to what matters most in what is at issue collectively in the conversation, which is founded on such statements?

“Meaning is derived from reality(more precisely is built into reality) and is often perceived with some error.”

This is nowhere demonstrated. How could it be, considering one doesn't know what reality means? What could it be founded on but what seems to be? In order to speak of reality on needs a determination. The mighty Richard Feynman says, rigour in science is the number of decimal places in the measurement. Ergo, reality in decimal places. That is an example of saying what reality means. And, it does mean. So, reality too is this meaning you place under those ever observed frowning clouds of error.

“That is right although we tend to ask the same question of an animal(as an example) that we have never seen before knowing that it is at least an animal - we will ask what something is even when we partially know the answer ahead of time.”

Exacto! Pure Platonism. One is in-between. However, for Plato, there is the seeking of reality. What justifies this seeking to deceive oneself?

“Adjusting our perception to constantly be at the effect however is nearly impossible as we travel through the moments from "what has been" toward what "is not yet". What "is not yet" is still inevitable and not completely impossible to perceive and yet difficult to predict with absolute certainty.”

This is all only possible because the reach of the idea of time extends to human beings. What you say fills in the needs of a being already in that uncanny region.

“1) Science takes a practical approach not a perfect approach. 2) It seems to me that physics as it currently stands is not always teleological.”

Humans live in time. Science as math done in the mind is teleological, but functional as Science under a theory of science. I.e., the test relies on meaning, that provided by daily life which happens in time, but as scientific result, it is given in maths which take no causal inflection whatsoever. This is confused by the popular way of speaking about science as dealing with “instrumental cause”, which is rather like the issue of scientists being unable to distinguish between scientific results, and expert opinions (given by scientists) about diverse subject matter.

[Guide]

"Formal argument is unfathomable here, but if doesent mean it has to be completely eliminated."

No. It is all perfectly compatible with the laws of thought. As is, indeed, absolutely everything.

You have a difficulty which you don't own, which is that one is unable to say where one does not understand, and where the thing said is beyond understanding.

[Meno_]

"Formal argument is unfathomable here, but if doesent mean it has to be completely eliminated."

No. It is all perfectly compatible with the laws of thought. As is, indeed, absolutely everything.

You have a difficulty which you don't own, which is that one is unable to say where one does not understand, and where the thing said is beyond understanding.

The laws of thought? What are they?
The a-priori synthetic? Effects of Universals as they interact with sets and boundaries?

Of so or something like it, then ok. But if nothing of the Sort, then there can be no laws, except transitional ones.

That does bring in time as You brought it into the argument (essentially) and all consequentiality, related to intentionality.

[Guide]

"Formal argument is unfathomable here, but if doesent mean it has to be completely eliminated."


No. It is all perfectly compatible with the laws of thought. As is, indeed, absolutely everything.

You have a difficulty which you don't own, which is that one is unable to say where one does not understand, and where the thing said is beyond understanding.



The laws of thought? What are they?
The a-priori synthetic? Effects of Universals as they interact with sets and boundaries?

Of so or something like it, then ok. But if nothing of the Sort, then there can be no laws, except transitional ones.

That does bring in time as You brought it into the argument (essentially) and all consequentiality, related to intentionality.

One can’t get to the subject matter of Kant without discussion… even if only with oneself, such is the means...

That, "Laws of Thought", is the traditional name for (what one presumes you to know already) identity, contradiction and excluded middle, stemming from Aristotle. With Leibniz one begins to include sufficient reason, which, correspondingly (to its relative youth, so to say) is less widely accepted as genuine.

The subject matter is: rules of discussion. This, as one may know, is already called “logic” is Aristotle, in connection with the syllogistic logic, but if one thinks of Plato’s dialogues one can see the ground from which it rises as “guard” against misunderstanding. However, the Praetorian Guard turned against the emperors: meaning: one must watch over one’s guards closely to see that they don’t become the enemy one was guarding against.

[Meno_]

"Formal argument is unfathomable here, but if doesent mean it has to be completely eliminated."


No. It is all perfectly compatible with the laws of thought. As is, indeed, absolutely everything.

You have a difficulty which you don't own, which is that one is unable to say where one does not understand, and where the thing said is beyond understanding.



The laws of thought? What are they?
The a-priori synthetic? Effects of Universals as they interact with sets and boundaries?

Of so or something like it, then ok. But if nothing of the Sort, then there can be no laws, except transitional ones.

That does bring in time as You brought it into the argument (essentially) and all consequentiality, related to intentionality.

One can’t get to the subject matter of Kant without discussion… even if only with oneself, such is the means...

That, "Laws of Thought", is the traditional name for (what one presumes you to know already) identity, contradiction and excluded middle, stemming from Aristotle. With Leibniz one begins to include sufficient reason, which, correspondingly (to its relative youth, so to say) is less widely accepted as genuine.

The subject matter is: rules of discussion. This, as one may know, is already called “logic” is Aristotle, in connection with the syllogistic logic, but if one thinks of Plato’s dialogues one can see the ground from which it rises as “guard” against misunderstanding. However, the Praetorian guard turned against the empopers: meaning: one must watch over one’s guards closely to see that they don’t become the enemy one was guarding against.

I see no contradiction here, leaving Aristotle out was not a mistake, but an assumptive guess as to the implication of succeeding forms tantamount to expressing the same.

There is a logical connection between Leibnitz and Kant, so as to assure that there is more to it then the sufficiency of reason would involve. The ground would not serve well metaphysically , because if that were case, language would precede logic. For some, that schema suffices , but leaves the matter wide open a-priori.

Presumptions do not serve well, in any case, sans a judgement (of sufficient reason) , having been done, but that too has holes. That is why I prefer the less contemporary Leibnitz, not by much, merely a few decades at most, but that Leibnitz was comprehended well by Kant, there is little doubt.

Simply, Leibnitz's sufficient reason based on an a-priori apprehension may in general become useful as categorically synthesized, but modern science , with its need for more than sufficient approximations, it does not suffice.

It is not that of the two one is right and the other is wrong, but the question swirls around sufficiency of what reasonable is.(here they are grappling with dualism)

That the obvious then becomes an argument over semantic meanings, as a sensible outcome.

[Meno_]

Well I will not post in the succeeding 3 below forums, but I may counter in this forum(since I have not yet been excluded) with the opinion that You are stuck in a positivist frame, and as such , suffer a consequent lack of logical development, and the depth of either the sense or sensibility of philosophical issues. You lack what you think you may paper over with irrelevant distractions.

Thank You for the indulgence so far.

[Guide]

“I see no contradiction here, leaving Aristotle out was not a mistake, but an assumptive guess as to the implication of succeeding forms tantamount to expressing the same.”

I’m not sure I conceive your meaning rightly. Does this refer to something you did just now, or the philosophers of the past?

“The ground would not serve well metaphysically , because if that were case, language would precede logic.”

Not sure what “logic” means here. If logic names rules for speaking, for logos, that’s hard to understand. For instance, in ordinary life, if someone says, I was downtown yesterday, and then they say, I was at home all day yesterday, if their home is not downtown one suspects a rat. From that arises the loose daily sense of contradiction which is almost the same as a lie. This kind of “logic” is already in Socrates, but not distinctly legislated as First Philosophy (as in Aristotle).

“Simply, Leibnitz's sufficient reason based on an a-priori apprehension may in general become useful as categorically synthesized, but modern science , with its need for more than sufficient approximations, it does not suffice.”

“It is not that of the two one is right and the other is wrong, but the question swirls around sufficiency of what reasonable is.(here they are grappling with dualism)” said in another way:

It’s a different standard. Feynman says the rigour of physics is the amount of decimal point one can get in a measurement. However, when one says, why is their water on the ground?, it is because the house was sprayed in the house, this is not lacking in “rigour”. It is measured by a different standard of rigour: that of vague daily dealings.

That the obvious then becomes an argument over semantic meanings, as a sensible outcome.

You sound like (dirty!) old man Searle...

The question about what should be rather than how it happens can’t be kept to. I.e., one asks how does it happen: how, e.g., a stone displaces liquid in a container. Pure description which can only remain so in the mind, as numbers. No one ever lived in math, or, put another way: No one ever had math for a first language. One asks, what is describing? There is an ostensive meaning, one points to the describer as what can be pictured. What is the mere description. Why do humans have already the possibility of the power to know what is said when one speaks of describing. Being extends that powerful realm. It is not semantic nor what one points to. In other words, that split can’t hold up. It swirls about being.

[Meno_]

Will think about the above and reply in do fashion time permitting.

May I add again, I see merit in positivism in all of its connotations, and will hazard to continue at Your pleasure , as time permits. Later.

[Guide]

"merit"

Of course, one must see that "merit" is a so-called value judgment. Ergo, "Why Science?".

[Meno_]

"merit"

Of course, one must see that "merit" is a so-called value judgment. Ergo, "Why Science?".

Removed-Wrong answer

[Meno_]

“I see no contradiction here, leaving Aristotle out was not a mistake, but an assumptive guess as to the implication of succeeding forms tantamount to expressing the same.”

I’m not sure I conceive your meaning rightly. Does this refer to something you did just now, or the philosophers of the past?

“The ground would not serve well metaphysically , because if that were case, language would precede logic.”

Not sure what “logic” means here. If logic names rules for speaking, for logos, that’s hard to understand. For instance, in ordinary life, if someone says, I was downtown yesterday, and then they say, I was at home all day yesterday, if their home is not downtown one suspects a rat. From that arises the loose daily sense of contradiction which is almost the same as a lie. This kind of “logic” is already in Socrates, but not distinctly legislated as First Philosophy (as in Aristotle).

“Simply, Leibnitz's sufficient reason based on an a-priori apprehension may in general become useful as categorically synthesized, but modern science , with its need for more than sufficient approximations, it does not suffice.”

“It is not that of the two one is right and the other is wrong, but the question swirls around sufficiency of what reasonable is.(here they are grappling with dualism)” said in another way:

It’s a different standard. Feynman says the rigour of physics is the amount of decimal point one can get in a measurement. However, when one says, why is their water on the ground?, it is because the house was sprayed in the house, this is not lacking in “rigour”. It is measured by a different standard of rigour: that of vague daily dealings.

That the obvious then becomes an argument over semantic meanings, as a sensible outcome.

You sound like (dirty!) old man Searle...

The question about what should be rather than how it happens can’t be kept to. I.e., one asks how does it happen: how, e.g., a stone displaces liquid in a container. Pure description which can only remain so in the mind, as numbers. No one ever lived in math, or, put another way: No one ever had math for a first language. One asks, what is describing? There is an ostensive meaning, one points to the describer as what can be pictured. What is the mere description. Why do humans have already the possibility of the power to know what is said when one speaks of describing. Being extends that powerful realm. It is not semantic nor what one points to. In other words, that split can’t hold up. It swirls about being.

Hello again. Instead of paraphrasing, I will instead number Your own parphrases by numbering. So starting where You questioned if it was mine philosophers of the past or I that did that. I will number #1

#1. I did the thinking to differentiate the backward logic . (induction) using the general framework of logical rediction, albeit backwards, using the historical progression , but reversely.

--------------
Since phenomenology really took off around that( time-) order, logic obviously preceded it, and phenomena qua. interpretation was bracketed at a logical point in time. Prior to that( linear-nominal) and parallel logic was mostly used consequently , teleologically for the most part.

Its true that the Hume-Kant-Berkely controversy( he woke me up from my dogmatic slumbers) was .the beginning of the parting of the sea as it were, but it was a change in the logical sequence that was broken.

I accede to other thinkers joining in the bandwagon, from then on.

#2 I absolutely agree with Feynman , that is no contest, my own comments would add nothing.(simply one of a qualifying /quantifying differential)

#3.I completely agree no one has lived in math, may be with the exception of intuitive math, which is a perfectly respectable branch of mathematics.(ibid-anti functional common sense)

The other points You are making are worth looking into, and if anything here in the above makes sense, then Searle can be approached as part of the analysis of language and mind.

My comments are very basic , but reflect a seemingly unquenchable thirst for understanding.

After all philosophy is a search for meaning whatever from different sources and taking different forms and interpretations.

Hope to hear from You.

[Guide]

Since phenomenology really took off around that time, logic obviously preceded it, and phenomena qua. interpretation was bracketed at a logical point in time. Prior to that linear and parallel logic was mostly used consequently , teleologically for the most part.

Not sure what this has to do with the price of coal in Newcastle. What “time”? No idea whence the group's ire means to refer. “linear logic” The group doesn’t know that this means other than simply: math, i.e., a set of arbitrary, or, said another way, abstract, rules. Closer to the opposite of a human discussion based on what people think, and the rules made to aid it. “phenomena qua. interpretation” is an interesting notion, this reaches the ergon of Husserl, pertaining to the group’s pervading and perpetual reflecting over howsofar the phenomenology of the office includes Husserl philosophizing.


---

“Hume-Kant controversy”

What is the controversy supposed to mean to the group? Hume says all the world is fictive, ergo, the “folk” world is meant to be everywhere. Kant says, in the coarse strokes, the same thing.

“#2 I absolutely agree with Feynman , that is no contest, my own comments would add nothing.”

The group is still a lagard in thinking. Since it doesn’t face the face of the difficulty of defining reality as that which is quantifiable. It means: as a fact of experience the group holds that view (or, professes earnestly so to do). Ergo, the fact value distinction is almost powerless here. However, one can say it this way: what causes one to affirm this view? A particular past event? One could as well be moved to hold another view pertaining to what reality is. Much would follow concerning the group existence. Can one ever justify the “fact” (this indicate that fact becomes a difficulty, it only means, the testable thing which never guides as does the view about the testable thing’s status, whether it is real and worthy to seek more findings in its region)? The group moves closer to being moved by the extended power of genuine Historicism which is guided without knowing why, but knowing that it could as well be guided by some other conviction or profession of faith concerning what is real (i.e., on what everything depends on).


#3.I completely agree no one has lived in math, may be with the exception of intuitive math, which is a perfectly respectable branch of mathematics.

It seems to follow from this that Feynman’s thesis leaves one in the lurch. Since, what he is calling reality is not where one lives. Here, everything is guided by the human. Hume says, human reason goes together with causal reasoning, both are the same, both are fundamentally mysterious. Ergo, the notion that speaking of determination (rather than freedom or a human choice or conventional act) is a mistake. Husserl says: a hidden motivation lives in all the phenomena, it unfolds and one can see its guiding string from the early Greeks and their “logic”, e.g., First Philosophy, to today.

[Meno_]

Will take another look You have some points and worth another look .

[Serendipper]

Human meaning is nomological in the sense that whatever one encounters already seems to be something; i.e., to have meaning (to be intelligible). In the extreme case one encounters a thing that is only there so far as it is available to be examined under the rubric "What is it?".

It's all one, silly!

How can you ask what the thing you've encountered is, if thing you encountered is part of the same thing that is you?

There are no "things", but arbitrary aspects of the whole.

[Guide]

"How can you ask what the thing you've encountered is, if thing you encountered is part of the same thing that is you?

There are no "things", but arbitrary aspects of the whole."

The group believes that one spontaneously separates a diverse number of things, for instance, each of these words, and the words form the background, and so the "How can you ask " becomes possible only because one does do that.

[Serendipper]

"How can you ask what the thing you've encountered is, if thing you encountered is part of the same thing that is you?

There are no "things", but arbitrary aspects of the whole."

The group believes that one spontaneously separates a diverse number of things, for instance, each of these words, and the words form the background, and so the "How can you ask " becomes possible only because one does do that.

So it's illusion then. But you were asking about actuality.

[Guide]

The group says:

"So it's illusion then. But you were asking about actuality."

How, wonders the group, does "actuality" come to mean anything? The group knows of ostensive definitions, i.e., pointing at things one can see. And, on the other hand, of making shit up, i.e., concepts. Surely "actuality", here, is the latter. Since it is said in contradistinction to everything in life, the folk or human or anthropomorphic "illusion". As something that happens in the mind, concepts are part of the illusion, are they not? The group is perplexed. Perhaps this "actuality" is a name for the illusion as a whole, though, one can not point to the whole, which is a kind of ideal.

[Meno_]

Withdrawn

[Serendipper]

The group says:

"So it's illusion then. But you were asking about actuality."

How, wonders the group, does "actuality" come to mean anything? The group knows of ostensive definitions, i.e., pointing at things one can see.

The things pointed to are not things, but arbitrary delineations forming a pattern with meaning specific to and codependent with the observer, like the words against the background. The words are not separate from the background, but codependent with the background since neither could exist without the other. We couldn't have a background without a contrast to manifest the blankness and conversely there could be no words without the background. Divisional boundaries do not separate, but join in a continuity.

The only reason there are words at all is there are eyes to see them. Words don't exist in "actuality" because there are no eyes to see them nor a brain to give them meaning. Actuality is probably just a bubbling soup of "whatever" and you make what you make out of the randomness.

Why is a pattern, a pattern? If you dump some toothpicks and spot a pattern, is that a special event? The pattern isn't inherently meaningful, but the meaning requires an observer.

And, on the other hand, of making shit up, i.e., concepts. Surely "actuality", here, is the latter.

No division between a thing (concept) and anything else.

As something that happens in the mind, concepts are part of the illusion, are they not?

What is the mind?

If there are no separate things, then the brain is continuous with everything else. Your mind is in your head and your head is in your mind.

The group is perplexed.

Otherwise it wouldn't be life

Perhaps this "actuality" is a name for the illusion as a whole, though, one can not point to the whole, which is a kind of ideal.

Right, part of the whole cannot point to the whole. There is no objectivity because all observation is in the eyes of the beholder.

[Guide]

Guide wrote:The group says:
"So it's illusion then. But you were asking about actuality."

How, wonders the group, does "actuality" come to mean anything? The group knows of ostensive definitions, i.e., pointing at things one can see.

The things pointed to are not things, but arbitrary delineations forming a pattern with meaning specific to and codependent with the observer, like the words against the background. The words are not separate from the background, but codependent with the background since neither could exist without the other. We couldn't have a background without a contrast to manifest the blankness and conversely there could be no words without the background. Divisional boundaries do not separate, but join in a continuity.

The only reason there are words at all is there are eyes to see them. Words don't exist in "actuality" because there are no eyes to see them nor a brain to give them meaning. Actuality is probably just a bubbling soup of "whatever" and you make what you make out of the randomness.

Why is a pattern, a pattern? If you dump some toothpicks and spot a pattern, is that a special event? The pattern isn't inherently meaningful, but the meaning requires an observer.

The group says, only through the “non-actuality”, did the group get to speculating about the”bubbling” that “probably is going on. the group doesn't find this derivative hyper-remote actuality very actual.

The group says, patter is a pattern. The word is, patterns one can point to are, and so are oak trees, with their dear leaves bunched at the far edge of the branches, growing dirty green with age.

And, on the other hand, of making shit up, i.e., concepts. Surely "actuality", here, is the latter.

No division between a thing (concept) and anything else.

The group says, this thesis is supposed to be different from other claims about what is. The group says, boring and vacant.

As something that happens in the mind, concepts are part of the illusion, are they not?

What is the mind?

If there are no separate things, then the brain is continuous with everything else. Your mind is in your head and your head is in your mind.

The group says, obviously. The group says, this specific notion is lame. The group holds, this must be reached, not just prattled about as dogma.

The group is perplexed.

Otherwise it wouldn't be life

The group says, this violates the groups thesis that all is the same. Since It speaks of life and perplexion and, tacitly, oneness.

Perhaps this "actuality" is a name for the illusion as a whole, though, one can not point to the whole, which is a kind of ideal.

Right, part of the whole cannot point to the whole. There is no objectivity because all observation is in the eyes of the beholder.

The group says, how can the group deny objectivity without knowing what it is denying through that thing existing for the group? What is objectivity claiming?

[Serendipper]

The group says, patter is a pattern. The word is, patterns one can point to are, and so are oak trees, with their dear leaves bunched at the far edge of the branches, growing dirty green with age.

Dirty green only exists as a pattern because the sun exists as a pattern. They relate to each other and neither one is an objective pattern with inherent meaningfulness.

A tree has branches only because there is an atmosphere. Branches have no meaning without an atmosphere.

The group says, how can the group deny objectivity without knowing what it is denying through that thing existing for the group? What is objectivity claiming?

Objectivity is an observerless observation. If there is an observer, then it's subjectivity and not objectivity.

If you are separate from the universe, then how can you observe it?
If you are part of the universe, then how can you observe it?

[Guide]

“Objectivity is an observerless observation. If there is an observer, then it's subjectivity and not objectivity.”

The group thinks this sounds like a so-called subject reading a computer readout. Ergo, the so-called “observation”, if one spell it out plainly, is a measurement by a machine. And it reaches only the assumed to be “subject”, none other.

“If you are separate from the universe, then how can you observe it?
If you are part of the universe, then how can you observe it?”

So far as the group understands this, it generally and vaguely agrees. Though, it would be better to reach a closer sensing of what this says. Not sure how the group can speak of subjectivity under such a saying, as is in these two statements or sentences.

Is a blue spine of a book seen? Or, rather, is it simply being. Is it seen, is it there, or is it a being. This points to three different undeveloped determinations. To be there, still there when the human closes its eyes. To be seen, seen when the human sees it. To be, this is difficult.

“Guide wrote:The group says, patter is a pattern. The word is, patterns one can point to are, and so are oak trees, with their dear leaves bunched at the far edge of the branches, growing dirty green with age.

Dirty green only exists as a pattern because the sun exists as a pattern. They relate to each other and neither one is an objective pattern with inherent meaningfulness.

A tree has branches only because there is an atmosphere. Branches have no meaning without an atmosphere.”

Branches have no meaning without an atmosphere.”

That is not true, since there is no atmosphere in dreams and imagination and memory. The being of the pattern comes prior to any examination about what causes it. Otherwise, how would one ask? One asks, what is the cause of the green, not, what is the cause of the, as it were, nothing? It is not obvious that the green does not come first ultimitly, literally or historically, it did come first.

Other thoughts of the group on this subject matter:
This is all not quite true, or not simply true. The group even would say it is only a secondary matter. Since, if there were no green, their could never be green leaves. It’s not evident what it means for green to exist. For instance, if there were no eyes, one could never get to it, even if it had an independent existence. More subtle, if it were not noticed as green, even by eyes that took in the color, it would never be reached.

In other words, one needs the lens of the eyes to see, and yet, they do not see, seeing is being aware. Dogs never, in this sense, see oak trees, they don’t distinguish in that sense. The group is saying, is it simply and obviously so that green is from the sun? Only because we have green, do we ask about the cause of it. And, moreover, we have it also in dreams. We even know what green means in some vague way.