[b]Robert Macfarlane
My sense, I say to Christopher, is that the search for dark matter has produced an elaborate, delicate edifice of presuppositions, and a network of worship sites, also known as laboratories, all dedicated to the search for an invisible universal entity which refuses to reveal itself. It seems to resemble what we call religion rather more than what we call science.[/b]
My guess: that’s debatable?
Something I heard an archaeologist say in Oslo about deep time returns to me: Time isn’t deep, it is always already all around us. The past ghosts us, lies all about us less as layers, more as drift. Here that seems right, I think. We ghost the past, we are its eerie.
Let’s imagine the deepest time of all.
…to understand light you need first to have been buried in the deep-down dark.
You go first.
For deep time is measured in units that humble the human instant: millennia, epochs and aeons, instead of minutes, months and years. Deep time is kept by rock, ice, stalactites, seabed sediments and the drift of tectonic plates. Seen in deep time, things come alive that seemed inert. New responsibilities declare themselves. Ice breathes. Rock has tides. Mountains rise and fall. We live on a restless Earth.
And then the deepest time of all: oblivion.
…perceive no opposition between precision and mystery, or between naming and not-knowing.
Of course that will never catch on. Nor should it, he insisted.
From my heel to my toe is a measured space of 29.7 centimetres or 11.7 inches. This is a unit of progress and it is also a unit of thought. ‘I can only meditate when I am walking,’ wrote Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the fourth book of his ‘Confessions’, ‘when I stop I cease to think; my mind only works with my legs.’ Søren Kierkegaard speculated that the mind might function optimally at the pedestrian pace of three miles per hour, and in a journal entry describes going out for a wander and finding himself ‘so overwhelmed with ideas’ that he ‘could scarcely walk’. Christopher Morley wrote of Wordsworth as ‘employ[ing] his legs as an instrument of philosophy’ and Wordsworth of his own ‘feeling intellect’. Nietzsche was typically absolute on the subject - ‘Only those thoughts which come from ‘walking’ have a value’ - and Wallace Stevens typically tentative: ‘Perhaps / The truth depends on a walk around the lake.’ In all of these accounts, walking is not the action by which one arrives at knowledge; it is itself the means of knowing.
On the other hand, knowing what?