These are not universal truths...

No no iambiguous. It is not whether:

It is whether you want me to tell you the story of the bald chicken?

It’s a nice ass though don’t it?

I like how she took the time to paint her fingernails before shooting the video.

oh it’s a phenomenal ass. the two give-aways are; in every video she’s wearing skin tight britches. never something baggier. not even once. and two, she mounts the motorcycle cam behind her so we see her ass as she rides. her channel should be called ‘TWAAA’ (two wheels and an ass) instead of to wheels and a ponytail.

and how did a young girl in her late twenties get enough money to have a place like that, and what, five motorcycles? i dunno maybe i’m wrong. maybe she’s got some character and some work ethic and has actually earned those things. i’m just going with my gut feeling in the first impression. i wanna say daddy or husband or insurance settlement or inheritance and not a legitimate job. but hey, for all i know she might be a frickin orthodontist.

Who cares man?

I only watched the one video though lol. It was given to me by youtube and by me to you.

i care, because it’s about…

“the honest person inside all of that cover.” - pedro I rengel

besides, when i see a fellow female bike enthusiast, i wanna be able to say ‘yo i could ride with her’ and not just ‘yo i’d let her ride me’.

Lol I don’t even think she qualifies as a bike enthusiast. She just… has a bike.

no she’s the real McCoy. races and pops wheelies and everything. even replaced her own clutch plates. sigh

HAHAHAHAHAHA

I think you gotta go to Italy.

Or maybe you can’t legaly. But I’m sure there is some Eastern European state with laxer rules.

Fucking Kids, right?

Only why must they bring their act to the philosophy boards?! #-o

Where’s only_humean when you need him!! :wink:

No Iam. It’s not

It’s: do you want me to tell you the story of the bald chicken?

There is what we call “objective reality.” Reality and truth have been confounded for centuries. See Hegel on this matter. I know there are people here who think this does not matter. I know they think I’m just playing language games. I also know that there are a lot of people here who can’t think their way out of a paper bag, because they believe that technique is not required for philosophy.

You can have all the feeling in the world for music, but if you don’t know how to make a C major chord, please don’t pick up a guitar.

So you’re admitting there are indeed universal truths like the need of oxygen then? :sunglasses:

If so, how do you establish what is universal truth and what isn’t?

I am admitting no such thing.

I am contrasting reality and truth.

“Objective reality” is in most senses redundant. But it’s useful when we are describing reality “outside” ourselves. Of course, we are in any case inside each other’s reality. In the end, there is what we call reality. Except we differ on what exactly that is.

As I have stated, “truth” does not sensibly apply to oxygen, but only to statements.

Nice try.

I don’t think you are playing language games. I think that you are misunderstanding the intent of the language.

I admit understanding objective truth [universal truth] in a social context is a lot harder objectively than measuring gravity or oxygen but I would also argue that it still is objectively possible. Certainly concerning social contexts there is much up to debate because not all human beings think alike, it is that differentiation of human thoughts or minds that makes articulating objective truth within the social context extremely difficult.

“Language game” is not unlike most things. You can define it and/or encompass it in an assessment such as this: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_game_(philosophy

But there is still the part where you bring this down out of the technical clouds and take them out into the world in order to discuss them more substantively given a particular context.

In other words, how is the language actually used to describe a specific set of circumstances? How is it used to judge the descriptions of others? How is it determined which words make the most rational sense in regard to these descriptions and judgments?

Here the technical components can become more or less complex. And the gap between what we think the words mean and what others think they mean instead gets more or less convoluted given the extent to which the language needs to bridge the gap between the either/or and the is/ought world.

But eventually we will need an actual “situation” if we wish to address these conflicts more substantially.

you don’t really have this problem while playing language games in non-philosophical contexts, though. these problems only occur when philosophical language becomes essentialistic and looks behind the use-meaning of a word for some kind of definition that stands in a superfluous relationship to the sense we gather from its use-meaning. here’s an example of what i mean:

in that last paragraph you’re seeing what is meant by the position ‘anti-essentialist’, which allows for different kinds of meaning to be given/found in a variety of language games in which one of these words is used. now check this out; if you found a kantian epistemologist arguing with a humean epistemologist (these two would disagree about the nature of knowledge in many respects), you’d still retain the implicit understanding of the word ‘knowledge’ in its use-meaning despite what either of them said about it philosophically.

you could ask; what are the consequences of being wrong, for both the kantian and the humean, regarding their theory of knowledge. and of course the answer would be; various statements would conflict with other statements in their supporting arguments. but that’s it. still nothing of consequences is observed here. but, what would the consequences of being wrong be like for someone who thought they had knowledge of the right answers, and was wrong? they’d fail the test. or being wrong about the knowledge of how long it would take to get to the airport. they’d miss the plane.

in the former language game, the efficacy of ‘being true or not’ is of no consequence other than perhaps being in violation, or not, of previously accepted rules for the language game being played. you might find a conflict of premises occur between the kantian and the humean - a priori synthetic reasoning is impossible for the humean, and not for the kantian - and insofar as the two agree on the definitions provided in the supporting arguments, they are playing a real language game in which statements can be true or false. but these revolve around abstract and/or essentialistic conceptions of the word in question - ‘knowledge’ - and produce no actual consequences in being incorrect or not.

another problem that becomes increasingly complex in the typical philosophical language game is that for every premise, the number of incidental other meanings that can result becomes incredibly large.

now replace the sentence ‘moses did not exist’ with the sentence ‘experience is subjective’. now this doesn’t mean anything until philosophers get a’hold of it… and watch what happens. that sentence can mean ‘the qualia of experience cannot exist for anyone but the first-person,’ to which the other philosopher replies ‘but if everyone experiences qualia, the fact that qualia is experienced universally makes a certain characteristic of experience objective.’ so which one of these dudes is right?

within the parameters of the philosophical language game, so many tacit understandings are available without any one of them yielding real consequences if they were wrong, that there is nothing against which to test a thesis. on the other hand, ‘moses did not exist’, while being able to mean many things, can be tested in each case. any possible context in which that statement can make sense will reach a terminus… while the making of the sense in the statement ‘experience is subjective’ cannot do so. by the virtue of its essentialistic nature, understanding it would involve an infinite regress of ‘deferral of meaning’, as derrida put it, in an effort to reach a single feature of the meaning that requires no further defining.

and this is only a problem for philosophers who take language out of its use-meaning environment and put it into a game where the rules govern an activity of abstraction… rather than an activity in which a tacit and implicit understanding proceeds directly from a use context.

we’d never need to know if kant or hume were right when we consider whether or not ‘bob knows it will rain’ is true or not. we observe the essence of that ‘knowing’ not in a series of metaphysical statements, but in a series of behaviors that make sense of it; bob doesn’t plan a game of golf, brings the car into the garage, and turns off the water sprinklers, etc.