These “particles” remain hypothetical. But even by definition lol
What was Elegant about Einstein os that he only did maths once he had somewhere for rhe maths to go
The cruciap thing to understand is that light is not as complicated as most would have us believe. “Is it a ray? Is it a wave?” is a false freak-out.
The obvious answer is: it’s too fast to be either.
And most of these tests giving these “paradoxes” involve measurements so indirect as to make any allegation of knowing even what exactly is being measured disingenuous.
Fuck it, I’ll go a step further: I think QM is a con.
In as far as its maths do not work with Relativity it must be wrong because Relativity is proven - I suspect I have overestimated the discretion of QM.
The uncertainty principle is not a prinviple of subatomic scale, it is a principle of the measurment techniques of quantum mechanics.
Quanta.
Quantifications.
Quantity, not of, but as.
Quantum state is not a state of being, but a state of measurment.
It doesn’t work with relativity because they lie about what they consider matter to be.
Well they don’t necessarily have a conception of matter, rather of information.
But indeed this is at the best pointless and at worst misleading.
Values are very discreet but not categorical.
Insofar as it can make accurate calculations with very complicated numbers and very tiny timespans, I still believe it can and will make excellent computers.
But a much more effective and even faster computer would be built if someone bothered to endeaver to figure out what is there at the subatomic level.
A lot like astronomy got easier when gravity was understood and thus eliptical orbits.
That’s exactly right. To compare a conception of information to a conception of matter is so disgusting… That only a postmodernest could endeavour it.
The reason they lie about it is that it sounds way less cool to say you figured out some really cool information analysis techniques than that you proved Einstein wrong.
Anyway, what I was trying to say is that The Extended Phenotype and mirror neurons pointed to a new direction science would have taken if not for one of the most horrible unexpected comebacks in history: the global take-over of the Temperance Movement. The fucking old hags, the puritans, the people who are disgusted by their own shit, as Garcia Marquez put it, the prissy old ladies. That’s you by the way, Zoot Allures, you are the prissy old ladies. John fucking McCain. IS THIS REALLY HOW YOU WANTED TO WIN? YOU DISGUST ME.
Lol I… I promise that’s not where I wanted it to go.
Until you secure the execution of George W. Bush, I will not take you seriously.
There is a lot of subatomic physics that is perfectly hard; to name and example, electron spin is hard physics, discovered by Goudsmit who was a friend of my family as well as of Einstein, this led to a vast array of powers, such as the power to discern hydrogen in the cosmos and thus to the power to discern the structure of our galaxy. My father worked at such a project.
The key is here that if the spin in a hydrogen atom, which has only one electron, flips, a radio wave with a particular wavelength of 21 centimetre is released. They then built a large radio-telescope configured specifically to receive these 21 cm waves. With this telescope the first great studies of the galaxy were performed and much of what we now know was mapped using this method.
William Alston was an American Episcopalian who came into contact with philosophy when playing clarinet and bass drum in an army band during World War 2. He got interested in the epistemology of religious experiences and as such in foundationalism, and sought to forge philosophic arguments to sustain faith; to find grounds for the epistemic justification of beliefs based on personal mystic experience, which he struggles to provide with some objective status at which he seems to have predictably failed even before he started, as he did not recognize any philosophic criteria to begin with. In his later work “Perceiving God” He writes:
“Although in this book I am centrally concerned with the epistemological value of mystical perception, I certainly don’t want to suggest either that this is its only theoretical interest, or that this is its main importance for the religious life. I certainly don’t think that God presents Himself to our experience primarily to render certain beliefs justified. On the contrary, according to the Christian tradition the main significance of mystical perception is that it is an integral part of that personal relationship with God that is the fundamental aim and consummation of human life. Without God and me being aware of each other in a way that, on my side, is properly called ‘perception’, there could be no intimate relationship of love, devotion, and dialogue that, according to Christianity, constitutes our highest good.”
How he figured that a man could verify whether or not God was aware of him is not clarified. This is just one example of how the man rants and rambles on and on and on without ever getting close to a will to question his and his congregations basic assumptions.
Alston also helped found the journal “Faith and Philosophy” and in general did things Heidegger would not very much approve of, being an excellent example of how “a Christian philosophy is like a wooden iron”.
Again:
“In mystical perception one can learn what God is doing vis-a-vis oneself at the moment, reproving, forgiving, instructing, guiding, comforting, just being present; and one can learn what God’s will is for oneself in particular. We can’t get any of this out of natural theology and general revelation.”
It simply never occurred to this man to even ask the first question. “What constitutes knowledge?”
A failure.
Johannes Althusius was a German Calvinist who argued for the right of a people to remove a ruler that breaks his pledges, that is to say who wavers from his purpose of serving the commonwealth and its people. He discerned natural law from positive (posited) law but claimed that natural law includes “common” or “moral” law.
Louis Althusser, a Marxist ideologue who frequently fell into insanity, killed his wife and sought, as we must conclude with great success, to defend Marxism from influences which could harm it such as notably empiricism, writes about ideology:
“What seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am ideological.'”
QED.
Why am I so bothered by William Alston? Because I have a lot of mystic experience myself, and yet never occurs to me to want to quantify this or make a case for it in science. Rather I consider it a deeply private affair, even or especially when it is shared. It forms a communion, for lack of a better world. Its empirical nature is wholly alive, and it is distasteful to make life serve a rhetorical point to, especially when one fails at giving the proof.
Robert Alyngton lived in a time when the seeds of protestantism by John Wycliffe, a first instinctive skepticism before the Image, had been sown and the Aristotelean categories and substances had begun to lose their immediate compelling power. Something was needed behind the image, behind the category; substance could no longer be defined merely in terms of categorical inclusions and exclusions. Alyngtons work signifies a transfer of power that was going on between Objectivism and Subjectivism. Iconoclasm means foremost a breaking of categories.
===The Theory of Substance
Alyngton lists seven opinions about the nature and mode of being of substance, the last of which he supports.
According to the first one, proper to grammarians, substance is what the term ‘substance’ refers to when utilized in a broad sense, that is, the quiddity (quidditas) or essence (essentia) of anything. In this case, substance is not a category, since the items which fulfil this description do not share any common nature (In Cat., cap. de substantia, p. 263).
The second opinion is that of Avicenna, who affirms that any entity which does not inhere in something else is a substance (cf. Liber de philosophia prima, tr. 8, cap. 4, S. Van Riet ed., 2 vols., Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1977–80, vol. 2, pp. 403–404). According to this view, God, substantial differences, and negative truths can be said to be substances, even though only in an analogical way (In Cat., cap. de substantia, pp. 263–264).
A third meaning of the term ‘substance’ can be drawn from the use (of that term) proper to common people and theologians: everything which plays the role of foundation (fundamentum) in relation to something else is a substance. In this sense, the surface is the foundation (and therefore the substance) of the whiteness (In Cat., cap. de substantia, p. 264).
The fourth opinion seems to be the same as the anonymous one discussed and partially criticized by Burley in his last commentary on the Categories (C.E. 1337, cap. de substantia, ed. Venetiis 1509, fol. 22rb–va). Substance would be (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is naturally apt to play the role of subject in relation to absolute accidents (that is, quantities and qualities). According to this view, matter, form, the composite made up of matter and form, and the angelic intelligences are substances, whereas substantial differences and negative truths are not, since the former do not satisfy the third requisite, nor the latter the first one (In Cat., cap. de substantia, p. 264).
The fifth opinion is that of Boethius (cf. In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor, PL, vol. 64, 184A–B), according to whom substance is (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is a compound of matter and form (In Cat., cap. de substantia, p. 264).
The sixth opinion is that of Burley (cf. Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis, cap. de substantia, fol. 24ra.), to whom Alyngton refers by the expression ‘moderni logici’. According to Burley, (i) not being in a subject, (ii) having an essence, (iii) autonomy and independent existence, and (iv) the capacity of underlying accidental forms are the main aspect of substances. This means that primary substances alone are substances properly speaking, while matter and form, and substantial differences are not (In Cat., cap. de substantia, p. 265).
The last opinion is that of Wyclif (cf. De ente praedicamentali, cap. 5, pp. 36–39), quoted extensively and almost verbatim. Alyngton claims that it is superior to the preceding ones (septima est expositio metaphysica et altior ad intelligendum quam praenominatae). According to this view, the constitutive principle of the substance is not the capacity of underlying absolute accidents, but it is the capacity of underlying potency and act[, which are its inner foundations—the capacity of underlying accidents being only a derivative property (In Cat., cap. de substantia, p. 267).===
Newton and Nietzsche can both be traced back to this crossroads.
