There are a number of things that happen when one interacts with people, but I would like to stress a contrast between ‘assertions of what is the case’ and what the dynamic asserts is the case. If Iamb encounters someone who is not depressed, he tends to presume that they have a contraption. His depression, he assumes, is caused by facing all he (and all rational people) cannot know. So anyone lacking his depression, must have contraptions. This is in a general context where he will say that the issue of solving conflicting goods (or more recently determinism) is the most important issue. Yes, he will express this via incredulty: what could be more important? he asks, putting the onus on others to make a counter claim. But it is a claim he makes in that dynamic sense I mention above: dynamic in relation to others.
If we do not think that one should engage in vast efforts to find solutions to conflicting goods, we must have a contraption. His dilemma is presumed, by him, not to caused by contraptions, it is caused by a lack of contraptions. He does not feel any need to demonstrate this.
He has long used ‘objectivist’ as a pejorative term. Yet, his own philosophy makes this implicit, and sometimes explicit, claim one he cannot make and be consistant.
IOW he presents himself as the default. His states, emotional and attitudinal, are the norm that most deviate from via not recognizing what issues we should all consider most important, and by, theoretically, finding some concept to make us feel better. To put it another way: it should be the norm, but since people have contraptions, it isn’t. They soothe themselves, he doesn’t. Since he is unsoothed, he has less contraptions. Depression is the default norm he exemplifies and others cannot face. He puts the onus on others, but does not recognize the onus of his own position, nor the implicit claims about why he is despressed. He thinks that by often saying he cannot be sure, he is evading the implicit claims he consistantly makes. And these implicit positions are obviously emotionally based, with the often habitual assumtion humans make that they must be right about what is important, what we need to do, and right to feel the way they do.
For some on the right, it is pathological to accept diversity. We should all be outraged. They consider themselves the default norm.
For Iamb, it is pathological, to be an objectivist, but also to not be depressed and also to not be striving to solve the problem of conflicting goods or determinism or ‘what can we know’. One could not possibly be not depressed in the face of conflicting goods, unless one has some philosophically unsustainable concept one worships. He like right (and left wing) idealogues considers himself the default norm.
I could go into the assumptions about what language is - his is a kind of correspondance theory of language, which many have. Language contains truth that mirror reality. He never justified this, nor do I think he even knows that he has a particular position on truth and what language is doing. And this is convenient. Because it allows him, and you, to think he is not asserting much. Assertions, in that philosophy are only verbal assertions in sentences. What one does dynamically, in relation to other people, is not, in that philosophy, claims of truth.
That his occasional claims to not be sure, means he is not doing what objectivists do. Memea can be like viruses. He thinks his memes are default, but like other memes his are are trying to take root in other minds.
And look, It’s not that I think there are objective morals. It is his presumption of being the one good man, that permeates his communication, and the denial of his hatred of anyone who is not depressed like he is that make him a kind of dead end trying to spread a dead end, in the guise of finding a rational positiont on morality that all rational humans must agree with. What is a person doing when he tells people that should be their goal, that nothing could be more important? What is person doing when they tacitly tell everyone that the only truths are those that every rational person should agree with, a vague and untestable criterion?
And that if we are not engaged in these probjects and are not depressed we must have a contraption, which he considers a pathological state, and the having of which shows we are not as brave as him, since these comfort us.
He has, it seems, no onus to demontrate that everyone who is not depressed like him has a contraption that is comforting them. He just states this or implies it ad infinitum, without demonstration. If the issue comes up, the other person has the onus to prove they do nto have a contraption. He never bears an onus.
Not despressed like him, we are comforting ourselves with lies. That must be the case and we, somehow, have the onus to prove otherwise.
If emotions were not driving his dynamic with others, he would notice all the onuses he bears.
The way he interacts with people meets all the criteria of an antiprocess. Even if from a correspondance theory of langage and truth, it may seem like he avoids making assertions - though he does this also via ‘comfort’ accusations - and is an epistemological nihilist. But his dynamic is riddled with assertions and riddled with the antiproccess. A depressing person labelling everyone who is not depressed pathological. It shouldn’t take a moment’s mulling to notice the kinds of denial mechanisms underlying that dynamic. The likely fears of noticing any cognitive dissonence around his assumptions there. And what unpalatable truths are being avoided. His depression is not contingent, it is default in his mind. The pure homo sapien, bravely not comforting himself.
And now he has a fan, but the fan does not feel like he is in the pit of depression and one wonders when he will be called to the Tribunal, given the onus and implicitly considered pathological for his lack of depression.
Ah, but that would require Iamb to consider his own antiprocess.