“Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible”
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
From Philosophy Now magazine.
From my frame of mind, the “objectivist concept of truth” seems reasonably in sync with the manner in which I have come to understand the either/or world. In other words, among other things, the laws of nature carry on with or without us.
Just as the facts able to be established relating to a context in which value judgments come into conflict do not change because someone embraces what they construe to be their own set of facts – facts that are in fact at odds with clearly established facts.
But when this “objectivist concept of truth” is ascribed instead to clearly subjective assessments of right and wrong behavior, where is this truth independent of subjective thoughts?
Then [of course] for some it’s straight back up into the clouds that are the abstract “general descriptions” of this predicament.
What concept of truth relating to what actual relations? What statement is being assessed as true regarding what behaviors in conflict over moral narratives at odds?
Something either is or is not gold. But who is to say whether it is right or wrong for a government to forbid its citizens to own gold?
Consider:
…in 1933, Executive Order 6102 had made it a criminal offense for U.S. citizens to own or trade gold anywhere in the world, with exceptions for some jewelry and collector’s coins…By 1975 Americans could again freely own and trade gold. wiki
Objective facts and subjective value judgments. Seeming truths and actual truths.
From my frame of mind, this turns everything upside down. If what you believe about morality takes precedence over what you can in fact demonstrate to be moral or immoral behavior, it is the belief itself that matters more than the proof that the belief reflects an objective truth value. The trivial pursuit [for me] revolves around substituting a world of words [as a philosopher] for the world as it actually is [a cauldron of conflicting goods].
I must be misunderstanding his point.
A classic example in my view of a “general description” of human interactions relating to value judgments.
Note to those who share his assessment:
Relating to a specific context in which value judgments do come into conflict, what is he attempting to convey here regarding “triviality”, “the argument of disagreement” and moral “claims”.