I also avoid relationships regardless of whether they are yes - no or yes - yes relationships because I have precisely no interest in any of them
Mother Nature is working hard on trying to kill me on the physical plane of existence which is not only feasible but is actually going to happen
You may not have taken my post to mean you were infantile or an infant, but to be clear, that is NOT what I was suggesting.
Sure, though I was thinking more about ongoing interaction with people.
it seems like he has done more than that: mocked, insulted, pretend responded, and perhaps responded to some degree. But in context with my post to you, is it a good idea to interact with people who will do the former things? Is there a limit? If so, what is it? Can it be harmful to you to continue?
Stop calling others out and labelling us and repeat-posting your concept in irrelevant threads. Thank you.
Iambiguous is ten times worse at this than me. The only reason it seems that I post on this so much is because I’m following iambiguous around, who posts at least ten times more than me on this topic. If I had the time, I’d do this for every thread he enters. I happen to have chose this one instead.
I’ve had to acquire a very thick skin in a world where the mundanity of evil is so ever present.
My adaptive strategy? Live in truth.
You do not have a choice in the matter… if you cannot move a discussion along, then leave the discussion.
Why the double standard, for someone everyone on ILP considers a worse offender of your charge against me than me?
That’s moving a conversation along. I’m curious why the double standard.
Really? You really have to ask? Re-read yesterday’s posts… they hold the answer.
Well, as they say, don’t mess with moderators or bartenders.
I think the reason for the double standard is that I’m speaking the truth, truth is radical.
Nobody believes iambiguous, his posts aren’t radical
“Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible”
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
From Philosophy Now magazine.
Well, if you really want to know of one possible meaning for morality being thought of as relative, just follow the news from day to day.
For all practical purposes, conflicting goods come tumbling down out of every newscast. And while moral nihilists such as myself have concocted an intellectual contraption to explain one possible reason for this, where is the argument able to explain why none of this tumult is really necessary at all?
Even with regard to moral relativism itself different folks have different strokes. Philosophical, political, religious. What it “means” is merely another aspect of the fundamental problem embedded in a No God world.
My own point is precisely that existentially the evidence is all around us if one wishes to conclude that moral nihilism is a reasonable point of view.
All I have ever required here myself is that we settle on a particular context in which value judgments precipitate conflicting behaviors that precipitate all manner of consequences embraced by some and rejected by others.
Tell us your own rendition of the “moral truth” here and defend it by providing us with the evidence it takes to convince all rational men and women to embrace it in turn.
“Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible”
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
From Philosophy Now magazine.
Sure, going back to a definitive explanation for everything, conflciting goods may well be on par with physics and human biology.
No one is able to demonstrate that this is not the case.
Just as no one is able to demonstrate that conflicting goods are not merely the biological imperatives of a brain able to generate the illusion of free will.
But to equate the objective biological imperatives embedded in autism with an alleged objective argument that determines if autistic fetuses ought or ought not to be aborted is, in my view, the difference between a “truth value” in the either/or world and one in the is/ought world.
Exactly. Or has there been an argument constructed that does in fact pin down whether, given a diagnosis of autism in the unborn, rational parents are obligated either to abort it or give birth to it.
All this suggests is that while answers to questions like these are ever and always being debated, we should [in the interim] just take leap of faith to one side or the other. As though the leap itself need be as far as we go. We can’t definitively substantiate, prove and establish the answer, but, here and now, my answer is the one I am sticking with.
In other words, Beillard starts with one set of assumptions and claims them as a “truth value”, while Prinz starts with a conflicting set and claims them instead.
So, you tell me: what has actually been demonstrated here to be the truth value?
On the one hand, in relation to autism as a medical condition given a set of biological imperatives, and, on the other hand, in relation to aborting autistic fetuses given a set of moral imperatives.
“The Moral Case For Nihilism”
By Shane Fraser in Aero magazine
Yeah, this pretty much sums it up in the broadest sense. No God means no foundation, no underlying knowledge that we can turn to in order to establish the optimal answers to questions derived from conflicting value judgments…or from out on the very end of the metaphysical limb.
It doesn’t dispense with meaning and purpose altogether, it merely concludes that in a No God world, both are cobbled together existentially given the choices we make in the act of actually living out lives.
Here’s the thing though. If it is decided that nihilism is a reasonable manner in which to understand the “human condition”, how then do you make arguments of this sort go away?
Well, you can’t, can you? So, as with God, it may well be that even if “objective morality” does not exist, it is “for all practical purposes” necessary to act as though it did exist.
Or, again, to suppose that, given the reality of nihilism in a No God world, the “best of all possible worlds” is probably going to revolve around one or another rendition of the “democracy and the rule of law”.
Arguments like this will go back and forth…probably forever. Yes, nihilism can be used to rationalize/justify any and all behaviors, however appalling they are seen to be by those who reject nihilism. It just comes down to how sophisticated the arguments are.
“Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible”
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
From Philosophy Now magazine.
In my view, this is a classic example of a philosopher exploring moral relativism up in the clouds. Are there objective moral truths able to be encompassed in examining, say, the political policies of President Trump in regard to immigration and the building of a wall along the border with Mexico?
Okay, what are the “intelligible concepts of truth” and the “unintelligible concepts of truth” we can all agree on when it comes to actual behaviors that we ourselves choose in becoming politically active with regard to his policies?
And while there may well be no “intelligible concept of truth that can be used to frame the thesis that moral truth is relative to the standards or beliefs of a given society”, when you move from the thesis to an actual description of human interactions down through the ages there are any number of examples of this. Both historical and cultural.
Okay, okay, technically this may or may not be true. But what does it really have to do “for all practical purposes” with the distinction between “John committed suicide while wearing blue socks” and “whatever the color of the socks John wore, committing suicide is immoral?”
What the hell am I missing here in his argument?
Santa’s niece?!
A little help with that please.
“Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible”
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
From Philosophy Now magazine.
From my frame of mind, the “objectivist concept of truth” seems reasonably in sync with the manner in which I have come to understand the either/or world. In other words, among other things, the laws of nature carry on with or without us.
Just as the facts able to be established relating to a context in which value judgments come into conflict do not change because someone embraces what they construe to be their own set of facts – facts that are in fact at odds with clearly established facts.
But when this “objectivist concept of truth” is ascribed instead to clearly subjective assessments of right and wrong behavior, where is this truth independent of subjective thoughts?
Then [of course] for some it’s straight back up into the clouds that are the abstract “general descriptions” of this predicament.
What concept of truth relating to what actual relations? What statement is being assessed as true regarding what behaviors in conflict over moral narratives at odds?
Something either is or is not gold. But who is to say whether it is right or wrong for a government to forbid its citizens to own gold?
Consider:
…in 1933, Executive Order 6102 had made it a criminal offense for U.S. citizens to own or trade gold anywhere in the world, with exceptions for some jewelry and collector’s coins…By 1975 Americans could again freely own and trade gold. wiki
Objective facts and subjective value judgments. Seeming truths and actual truths.
From my frame of mind, this turns everything upside down. If what you believe about morality takes precedence over what you can in fact demonstrate to be moral or immoral behavior, it is the belief itself that matters more than the proof that the belief reflects an objective truth value. The trivial pursuit [for me] revolves around substituting a world of words [as a philosopher] for the world as it actually is [a cauldron of conflicting goods].
I must be misunderstanding his point.
A classic example in my view of a “general description” of human interactions relating to value judgments.
Note to those who share his assessment:
Relating to a specific context in which value judgments do come into conflict, what is he attempting to convey here regarding “triviality”, “the argument of disagreement” and moral “claims”.
First of all, all is not reduced to a question of morality. Think about your day to day interactions with others. How many times do you stop and think, “is this the right thing to do?” Most of what we do revolves around behaviors that allow us to pursue those things we want and need. And here the question “for all practical purposes” comes down to this: how do I attain them? It is strictly a collection of more or less rational choices that lead us to our accomplishing the tasks in the shortest amount of time. It’s life unfolding in the either/or world.
Only when what we want and need results in a conflict with others, does the “is/ought” world come into play. You want or need something that others insist that you ought not to want or need. Drugs, for example. You want to get high. And you are able to choose behaviors that result in your getting high or not. But when you get high there are consequences. And sometimes those consequences rub others the wrong way. They want you to stop. They think and feel that it is wrong that you get high. They give you their reasons. You give them your reasons why you think and feel you have the right to get high.
Okay, which “emotionally self-serving components” here are most in sync with “the right thing to do”? Such that the interactions between the parties will result in the least “corrupted” relationship?
No, there are any number of factors – facts – clearly shown to be in sync with the objective world. There are things that we do and consequences that result from the things that we do that all reasonable people can agree with.
But: What constitutes the “objective world” when two or more people disagree regarding the consequences of a particular set of behaviors? Thus entailing a discussion of moral narratives and political agendas that may or may not be in conflict.
“Moral Relativism Is Unintelligible”
Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.
From Philosophy Now magazine.
The first way. The second way. The third way.
You know, theoretically.
But this is only of interest to me given the extent to which these ponderous intellectual “ways” are intertwined in flesh and blood human interactions such that the “way” individual men and women think about morality results in behaviors that bring about actual consequences.
Yes, there are no doubt those moral relativists who argue that. But this moral relativist [me] does not deny the existence of objective morality, only that no one has been able to demonstrate [of late] that their own rendition of it is applicable to all rational and virtuous men and women.
And the only “other kind of moral truth”, that I aim to explore here is in discussing and debating the three components embedded in my own rendition of moral nihilism.
Again [so far] he doesn’t even seem to need an actual context in which to demonstrate his own point. It’s all “theoretical”.
It’s the argument that makes the most sense to me. But only given the assumption that we live in a No God world. We all come into the world with the same genetic code. And, as folks like Satyr like to point out, that is no small thing.
But we are the only species on this planet that, presuming some measure of free will, have, down through the ages, amassed an extraordinary accumulation of memetic variables in turn.
And while we can debate endlessly how the exact interaction of genes and memes works given any particular context, I merely “raise doubts” regarding any moral narrative – God or No God – that is not embedded in an actual context. And that does not take into account the “objective truth of any moral code” given the three components that are imprtant to me.
nah its not an ‘endless’ debate because its over pretty quickly. memes don’t interact with genes. they interact with gene carriers, but not the gene units themselves. which means, there is no code-script through which they can pass. furthermore, the manner in which they interact with carriers makes them extremely unstable… in the sense that because the meme unit is as idea, it is open to sudden and ambiguous change, unlike genes which are subject to relatively stable selection pressures.
so it’s rather inaccurate to speak of memes as replicating units synonymous to genes. there is replication in the form of behaviors that imitate, but imitation does not modify a physical gene and is in this context an epiphenomena; it has no causal effect on physical genes.
you gotta watch out when you see philostophers talk about genes and memes, man. better to stay in the sciences and consult a biologist.
Which would mean that the interact with genes via the carriers. Memes which lead the carriers to thrive, would affect the transmission of the genes of those carriers in that they would continue in future generations. I would bet that memes have epigenetic effects also, since they would affect stress levels, emotional reactions, coping patterns, which would then affect offspring and how genes are expressed, just as in other epigenetic factors.
Except where there are quick changes in environments, such as many species are experiencing now and at other junctures in the past.
which comes precisely before…
So, there is controversy and he is correct.
Analogous, not synonymous.
…who is not going to be an expert on memes. Nor are they going to be an expert on the interaction between ideas on the physiology of gene carriers, the survivability of gene carriers, the epigenetic effecs of memes and so on.
One should, basically, always watch out, regardless.
True, scientists who actually explore the human brain have not burrowed into one and discovered little genes interacting with little memes.
But over millions of years of life evolving on planet earth, the genetic material that became the human brain was able to invent [compelled or otherwise] countless number of memes given human interaction historically, culturally and interpersonally.
So “for all practical purposes” I think most folks will get my point about the connection.
On the other hand, if we do indeed live in a wholly determined universe, this part…
“the meme unit is as idea, it is open to sudden and ambiguous change, unlike genes which are subject to relatively stable selection pressures”
…is not actually the case at all. What appears to the human mind to be sudden and ambiguous change is merely but one more manifestation of the only possible reality.
The idea of the one and the many has had quite a long run. It has come to the point of realilizing that structural change is at dead center between current, remembered and forgotten lines , some more general some specific
The interconnectedness between general and specific connections uses available connections, the quantification of appropriate sets may not be validated in terms of qualifying the most appropriate set.
Whatever is uploadable in availability can form some kind of connection to recolle tion, be at close or remote to an original…
Stasis is maintained arou a fully compensative teleological and ontological l variables, but with AI be- coming the leading pole around which memes and genes organize. The parallel reality may fit this schema.
This goes hand in glove with a temporal/spatial-less reality, that leads to absolutely limited versions in a matrix.
This reductivity consists by inclusion of the moral imperative , to make sense of it, above all.The return to moral sense is always inadequate, but it infers a moral absolute.
I believe that moral absolutes are a form of midlife crisis, where either the beginnings or the endings of the moral compass experience sudden changes of the rates.of it’s change.