dude, you’re still equivocating ‘freewill’ with physical movement, ability and complexity. none of these quantifiable values change the quality of what the ‘will’ would be if it existed. you merely have an increase in the expression of the ‘will’… not a change in the quality or nature of the ‘will’. this means that a living organism does not possess a different kind of ‘will’ which governs it’s behavior, than the kind of ‘will’ that governs the behavior of rocks and trees and shit. of course, a living organism has more freedom of movement, but this fact in no way means some other kind of ‘will’ is responsible for it, or that it is ‘free’.
and ‘desire’ is hardly a point of origination of this new kind of ‘will’ you think exists, for the same kind of forces responsible for the movement of those rocks and shit are responsible for the physiological processes and states in your body that produce such desire. i’m not talking about the intentionality of the thinking and anticipating and planning and foresight involved in the commission of a desired behavior, either. these things are the last stages in a series of physical events in your body that you have no control over, much less any knowledge of - except for correlating mental events with physical events as a neurologist might do when observing regional activity in the brain.
i don’t know, but based on the evidence i’m making the reasonable inference. we’re at a stalemate, if you haven’t noticed. only i’ve got more pieces on the board than you do, so i scored more points. you’ve got a queen, bishop and five pawns left. i’ve still got a queen, both rooks and a knight.
hell will freeze over before you convince me that anything is random or chaotic in nature. random in that you can’t perceive any pattern or order, or chaotic in that you can’t predict any future state… but these are problems of observation, not nature. verily, i say ‘indeterminacy’ simply can’t exist.
but this isn’t what your arguing… or rather you’re arguing it accidentally by implying there is no causation. in fact, you need causation in order to present an argument for ‘freewill’ because freewill is not a theory of indeterminism. your problem, which has already been pointed out to you by sil and myself weeks ago, is that you are relying on a kind of substance dualism in order to define your ‘agency’ here, because you insist that what causes joe to go to the neil young concert is something different than what causes an earthquake. 'course i don’t know why joe would want to go to a neil young concert. after the dissolution of crosby, stills, nash and young (or who i like to call ‘crosby stole the hash and neil sang’), neil young became an incredible bore.