You’re so off-base it’s ridiculous. This is NOT a version of compatibilism
It’s not me that’s not getting it, it’s you! I have always agreed that nothing is free from causality, but the word cause is misleading for it implies that something other than you yourself is forcing a choice upon you in advance. That is called a modal fallacy. This may help a little even though this professor believes that because we’re not forced, we have free will. Lots of people are confused on this issue.
[i]Proposal Three: The truth of propositions does not ‘make’ events happen (occur).
Consider: My wearing a short-sleeved shirt today [Oct. 28] is what makes (the proposition expressed by) “Swartz is wearing a short-sleeved shirt on Oct. 28, 1997” true. It is not the other way round. Logical fatalism confuses the semantic (truth-making) order. It makes it appear that the truth of a proposition ‘causes’ an event to occur. It is, rather, that the event’s occurring tomorrow ‘makes’ (but does not cause) the proposition to be true today. This is not ‘backwards causation’: the relation between an event and the truth of the proposition describing that event is not a causal relation whatever. It is a semantic relation.
The logic of the preceding paragraph can perhaps be made apparent by switching the example to one of speaking about the past rather than the future.
John Lennon was shot and killed in 1980. Let’s suppose a group of ten persons is arguing about the year of his death. Alice says that it was 1976; Betty, that it was 1977; Cathy, that it was 1978; Denise, that it was 1979; Edith, that it was 1980; Freda, that it was 1981; etc.
Of the ten claims made, only Edith’s is true. The other nine are false. Now ask yourself: Does Edith’s making a true claim today (about the year of Lennon’s death) account for Lennon’s killing? Did Edith’s asserting a truth today about Lennon’s killing somehow or other ‘force’ Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon’s chest? Of course not. Now what if the year of the discussion were 1975? Alex says, “Lennon will be killed in 1976.” Bellamy says that it will happen in 1977. Charles, that it will happen in 1978. Damien, that it will happen in 1979. Eduardo, that it will happen in 1980. Frank, that it will happen in 1981. Graham, that it will happen in 1982. Etc. Of the ten discussants, one, namely Eduardo, gets it ‘right’; the other nine make false predictions. Does Eduardo’s true prediction (in 1975) somehow or other ‘force’ Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon’s chest five years later, in 1980? Of course not.
Similarly you and I can make all sorts of predictions – some true, some false, some on the basis of excellent evidence (“There will be a lunar eclipse on Sept. 19, 2499”), some on the basis of no evidence whatever (“Simon Fraser University will remove all tuition fees in 1999”) – but those that are true do not ‘force’ the predicted events to occur.
sfu.ca/~swartz/freewill1.htm#part2[/i]
Ambiguous keeps saying the laws of matter made him repeat his comments. These laws don’t have the power to do that unless he desires to repeat his comments in the direction of greater satisfaction, which is also beyond his control. His idea of autonomy takes him out of necessity, into contingency. But the interesting point here is that “greater satisfaction” is not based on a modal fallacy, therefore the distinction he is making between autonomy and the laws of matter are contrived based on an inaccurate definition. Our movement in the direction of satisfaction is part of our brain state, true, but the distinction I’m trying to make is that nothing other than OURSELVES (the “I” that distinguish us from others) can force us to make a particular choice…where the agent or self has no say. That is what the present definition of determinism implies. Once again, you can’t say nature forced me to make the choice therefore I’m not responsible. You are not responsible because you could not have chosen otherwise based on your heredity and environment. This is important because it has to do with who was responsible for making said choice, not morally responsible which goes back to the free will (or the “could have done otherwise”) that compatibilists use to justify blame and punishment.
That’s exactly right. Think about it this way: If you are not free to choose “y” because it gives you less satisfaction under the circumstances, you are not free to choose “x”. You 're correct that the word choice is misleading because it implies we can choose x or y equally, which cannot be done when we are comparing meaningful differences. This IS an invariable law.
I know you haven’t read it by what you’re saying, so how can you be so sure that there is nothing new here? I can promise you this is groundbreaking and it has nothing to do with compatibilism. Compatibilism tries to have its cake and eat it too by defining the word “free” in a way that does not grant us free will at all. It’s just their way of defining a word to make it seem compatible, but it is anything but. It states that the person who was not under duress was free not to do what he did, which is absolutely false. This is the antithesis of everything the book is demonstrating to be true . To repeat: Just because we do not have anything constraining our choice externally (like a gun to our head) or internally (like having OCD), does not in any way give us the freedom of choice that would justify blame and just desert. It is true that when we have a gun to our head, it appears that we don’t have a choice because one choice (to do what the person wants and not get shot) is so superior than the alternative (getting shot) that no hesitation is required to decide which choice is preferable, whereas other choices need a more careful consideration. But this does not take away from the fact that in both cases we have a choice, although never a free one.
[i]The government holds each person responsible to obey the laws
and then punishes those who do not while absolving itself of all
responsibility; but how is it possible for someone to obey that which
under certain conditions appears to him worse? It is quite obvious
that a person does not have to steal if he doesn’t want to, but under
certain conditions he wants to, and it is also obvious that those who
enforce the laws do not have to punish if they don’t want to, but both
sides want to do what they consider better for themselves under the
circumstances.
The Russians didn’t have to start a communistic
revolution against the tyranny that prevailed; they were not compelled
to do this; they wanted to. The Japanese didn’t have to attack us at
Pearl Harbor; they wanted to. We didn’t have to drop an atomic
bomb among their people, we wanted to. It is an undeniable
observation that man does not have to commit a crime or hurt
another in any way, if he doesn’t want to. The most severe tortures,
even the threat of death, cannot compel or cause him to do what he
makes up his mind not to do. Since this observation is
mathematically undeniable, the expression ‘free will,’ which has come
to signify this aspect, is absolutely true in this context because it
symbolizes what the perception of this relation cannot deny, and here
lies in part the unconscious source of all the dogmatism and
confusion since MAN IS NOT CAUSED OR COMPELLED TO
DO TO ANOTHER WHAT HE MAKES UP HIS MIND NOT
TO DO — but that does not make his will free.
In other words, if someone were to say — “I didn’t really want to
hurt that person but couldn’t help myself under the circumstances,”
which demonstrates that though he believes in freedom of the will he
admits he was not free to act otherwise; that he was forced by his
environment to do what he really didn’t want to do, or should he make
any effort to shift his responsibility for this hurt to heredity, God, his
parents, the fact that his will is not free, or something else as the
cause, he is obviously lying to others and being dishonest with himself
because absolutely nothing is forcing him against his will to do what
he doesn’t want to do, for over this, as was just shown, he has
mathematical control.
“It’s amazing, all my life I have believed man’s will is free but for
the first time I can actually see that his will is not free.”
Another friend commented: “You may be satisfied but I’m not.
The definition of determinism is the philosophical and ethical
doctrine that man’s choices, decisions and actions are decided by
antecedent causes, inherited or environmental, acting upon his
character. According to this definition we are not given a choice
because we are being caused to do what we do by a previous event or
circumstance. But I know for a fact that nothing can make me do
what I make up my mind not to do — as you just mentioned a
moment ago. If I don’t want to do something, nothing, not
environment, heredity, or anything else you care to throw in can make
me do it because over this I have absolute control. Since I can’t be
made to do anything against my will, doesn’t this make my will free?
And isn’t it a contradiction to say that man’s will is not free yet
nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to do?”
“How about that, he brought out something I never would have
thought of.”
All he said was that you can lead a horse to water but you can’t
make him drink, which is undeniable, however, though it is a
mathematical law that nothing can compel man to do to another what
he makes up his mind not to do — this is an extremely crucial point
— he is nevertheless under a compulsion during every moment of his
existence to do everything he does. This reveals, as your friend just
pointed out, that man has absolute control over the former but
absolutely none over the latter because he must constantly move in
the direction of greater satisfaction.
It is true that nothing in the past
can cause what occurs in the present, for all we ever have is the
present; the past and future are only words that describe a deceptive
relation. Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost
impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment
caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the
opposite, that man was not caused or compelled, ‘he did it of his own
accord; he wanted to do it, he didn’t have to.’ The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I
shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which
only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words
have deceived everyone?[/i]
What do you think I’m trying to do promethean? I’m trying to demonstrate how the world will look when we apply this principle. Why are you being so premature in your judgment, the very thing this author urged people not to do?