Determinism

[Serendipper]

I gave this as an example as to how schizophrenic this becomes when scientists use the idea that neuronal impulses are making choices before we consciously make them. The motivation for a choice that may be hidden in the subconscious mind does not remove the conscious mind from the equation because the choice is still up to the agent or the "I" that the brain is contained in. It takes the conscious mind to say "yes" to an action even if there is a gap of 7 seconds where the brain has already made a decision. The agent can veto that decision if within those 7 seconds something changes the mind of the agent where he chooses not to act on that impulse. I don't know if there ever will be a time that scientists will know exactly what choice you will make before you make it having a 7 second delay. More importantly, it wouldn't matter what choice was made if the choice hurt no one. What scientists are trying to work on is determining if a person is a high risk, thus the intervention by scientists would be employed to identify those people and quarantine them. But this would be unnecessary if we knew that we could never desire to hurt anyone as a preferable choice under changed conditions of the new world.

But something engenders the conscious mind like an illusion. The conscious mind can't be its own cause.

[iambiguous]

"Compatibilism"

Craig Ross in Philosophy Now magazine

...as individuals when we undertake an action from some motive we imagine that in the exactly the same circumstances we could have chosen to do something else. We do not think we act of necessity. But, as Hume notes, if we try to prove our absolute liberty by doing something ‘unpredictable’ then we are still acting from a straightforward motive: our motive is the desire not to be seen to be acting from predictable motives. When we look at other people and fail to predict their behaviour, particularly someone we know well, then we assume that we are ignorant about some fact, and that their behaviour is in principle intelligible and predictable, rather than that the person has suddenly become incomprehensible. For Hume and other compatibilists, liberty means being free to act as we will, but this does not mean that our actions come from nowhere: our passions, motives and desires provide us with the impulse which our reason (prudence) tries to satisfy. To be at liberty cannot mean acting without a motive, because that’s the definition of madness.

Here is [once again] where I get stuck.

If our "passions, motives and desires" do not come out of nowhere but are integral to a brain/mind wholly in sync with the laws of matter, how is what we "will" not just another manifestation of that in turn? Always wholly in sync as well with our "reason [prudence]" to produce choices/behaviors that could only ever have been what they were, are and will be?

Dennett defends this broad thesis of motivated freedom with a range of interesting arguments. Consider for example the difference between a human being and the Sphex wasp. If this wasp is repeatedly disturbed during its egg laying it will simply continue its instinctive behaviour, apparently unaware of the source of the interruption or the likely futility of continuing with the egg laying. Yet humans can respond flexibly and imaginatively to equivalent difficulties, which indicates that we have a kind of freedom that a simple creature like the wasp does not have.

Okay, the wasp is at a point in the evolution of life on earth where its brain is not nearly as sophisticated as our own. It is not "self-conscious" in the manner that we are. There are no historical or cultural or experiential memes complicating what is basically instinctual behavior. Biological imperatives propel it from moment to moment.

But how can we pin down definitively whether our own brain has evolved to the point where biological imperatives give way to an "I" actually able to will behaviors freely, autonomously?

To call that a "kind of freedom" is one thing. But it may well be just a complex "psychological freedom" that our brain has somehow come to trick us into believing is the real thing.

[iambiguous]

"Compatibilism"

Craig Ross in Philosophy Now magazine

For Dennett there is also a meaningful distinction between determinism and inevitability. The Earth, for example, has undergone a recent explosion of ‘evitability’. Once it might have been in evitable that the Earth should be struck by an asteroid. But the planet has, perhaps deterministically, evolved human beings, who may conceivably destroy an incoming rock. It is no longer inevitable, so it is evitable. In the same way it is not inevitable that those disposed to heart disease will go on to develop it. We have, perhaps deterministically, produced an understanding of the causes of heart disease, and we can modify our behaviour on this basis. Again, what was once inevitable is no longer so.

This is interesting. Had matter not evolved into life evolving into mammals evolving into self-conscious human beings, it seemingly was inevitable that the Big One would smash into earth precipitating another extinction event for all other life forms.

But instead it did evolve into us and we are matter able to actually attempt to avoid that collision.

And while it seems that sooner or later an asteroid big enough to wipe us out is inevitable there may be strikes that we can prevent.

But how do we wrap our minds around that? Besides, whether we do or do not put a dent in the inevitable part with any particular asteroid, that would not seem to change the fact that, in a wholly determined universe, what does unfold could only ever have unfolded as it did.

Isn't that inevitable?

Same with heart disease. We may one day all but eliminate it. But only because nature "willed" that to be only as it could be. We just don't know if there is any measure of teleology "behind" nature itself. God or No God.

So we may not have what Dennett calls ‘behavioural choice’, the absolute and unimpeded God-like ability to choose out of nothing – but we can flexibly respond to and change our environment, an environment that among other things contains knowledge of how other people have acted and thought.

How flexible can any response be that can only be the embodiment of inflexible laws of matter.

If these laws are inflexible. And how do we determine that? By choosing freely among alternatives or not?

[peacegirl]

Scientists can be aware of your choices before you are and by a margin of 7 seconds !

So if you ve made your decision before you even knew it then how could you be in control of making it ?

The sub conscious mind that makes decisions is still part of you and in that respect you are still in control of them

Agreed.

The mistake is to assume all major decisions are made by the conscious mind simply because that is the only one we actually experience

There may be subconscious factors involved, but the conscious mind has the ultimate say as to whether an action is to be performed or not. In fact, all major decisions involve the conscious mind in order to give permission for an action to be performed (based on that decision) or else someone could easily say, "I didn't make that choice, my unconscious mind did." Not only is that false, but how would that fly in a court of law?

Because having laws is what helps determine the behavior of people and if it "flew in court" it would undermine the deterrent. I think the legal system holds its nose and looks the other way on this.

That is true, and that's why Daniel Dennett doesn't think a slap on the wrist would be advantageous because the deterrent would be undermined. That's what he means when he says: "a free will worth wanting." That's where we're at right now in our development as a species.

The Brain on Trial

DOES THE DISCOVERY of Charles Whitman’s brain tumor modify your feelings about the senseless murders he committed? Does it affect the sentence you would find appropriate for him, had he survived that day? Does the tumor change the degree to which you consider the killings “his fault”? Couldn’t you just as easily be unlucky enough to develop a tumor and lose control of your behavior?

On the other hand, wouldn’t it be dangerous to conclude that people with a tumor are free of guilt, and that they should be let off the hook for their crimes?

As our understanding of the human brain improves, juries are increasingly challenged with these sorts of questions. When a criminal stands in front of the judge’s bench today, the legal system wants to know whether he is blameworthy. Was it his fault, or his biology’s fault?

http://www.dailytexanonline.com/2016/07 ... rain-tumor

Free will may exist (it may simply be beyond our current science), but one thing seems clear: if free will does exist, it has little room in which to operate. It can at best be a small factor riding on top of vast neural networks shaped by genes and environment. In fact, free will may end up being so small that we eventually think about bad decision-making in the same way we think about any physical process, such as diabetes or lung disease.[/i] https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar ... al/308520/

Once we understand that what we do is not of our own free will, then we cannot separate a person who is not guilty due to a tumor from a person who is guilty because he killed without a tumor. Both are not free.

[peacegirl]

For those of you who may have recently found this thread, here are the first three chapters. This should give you enough information to know whether you find this knowledge compelling.

http://www.declineandfallofallevil.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Decline-and-Fall-of-All-Evil-2-13-2019-THREE-CHAPTERS.pdf

[iambiguous]

"Compatibilism"

Craig Ross in Philosophy Now magazine

Why Compatibilism Is Mistaken.

There are some major difficulties in compatibilism, which I think damage it irreparably.

Take Hobbes’ claim, largely accepted by Hume, that freedom is to act at will while coercion is to be compelled to act by others. This does not give us a sure reason to choose this ‘freedom’.

Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?

This is precisely the sort of speculation I am not able to grapple with effectively. In other words, in a way that allows me to grasp what the compatibilists are telling us about the alleged "freedom" emobodied in fact that while rocks don't choose to tumble down a mountain in a landslide, human beings do choose to ski down a mountain.

Just as the rocks could not not tumble down the mountain in a landslide, skiers could not not choose to go down the slope.

In either context, different configurations of matter are doing only that which matter obeying immutable laws [if this is the case] could have done.

No other human being coerced you to choose to ski but your "will" to choose is merely another inherent manifestation of nature.

With God the coercion would seem to revolve around that fact that nothing you will ever do is not already known by God. The only question that pops into my mind here is that, in a wholly determined universe, could God Himself have ever not placed you on Earth? Is God in turn inherently capricious? And thus only seemingly capricious in an existence where everything that even He does is only as it ever could have been.

Unless, of course, there is some crucial factor here that I keep missing.

[peacegirl]

"Compatibilism"

Craig Ross in Philosophy Now magazine

Why Compatibilism Is Mistaken.

There are some major difficulties in compatibilism, which I think damage it irreparably.

Take Hobbes’ claim, largely accepted by Hume, that freedom is to act at will while coercion is to be compelled to act by others. This does not give us a sure reason to choose this ‘freedom’.

All Hobbes' and Hume did was differentiate between physical coercion and having a choice without physical coercion. The latter is what most people consider to be free will, and that is where compatibilism tries but fails to reconcile. Just because we have choices without physical constraint does not mean our choices are free. It's all an illusion since we can only go in one direction, the direction of that offers us the greater satisfaction (or the most preferable choice based on our particular circumstances) when two or more alternatives are being compared.

Before I show how it is possible to resolve the implications (i.e., the
impasse of blame), it is necessary to repeat that I will proceed in a step
by step manner. This dragon has been guarding an invisible key and door
for many years, and this could never be made visible except for someone
who saw these undeniable relations. If, therefore, you would like to learn
that Man Does Not Stand Alone as Morrison understood from his scientific
observations; that God, this Supreme Intelligence, is a mathematical
reality of infinite wisdom, then what do you say we begin our voyage
that will literally change the entire world. We are not interested in
opinions and theories regardless of where they originate, just in the
truth, so let’s proceed to the next step and prove conclusively, beyond
a shadow of doubt, that what we do of our own free will (of our own
desire because we want to) is done absolutely and positively not of our
own free will. Remember, by proving that determinism, as the
opposite of free will, is true, we also establish undeniable proof that
free will is false.”

<snip>

The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I
shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which
only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words
have deceived everyone?

“You must be kidding? Here you are in the process of
demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath
you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free
to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he
considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he
prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this
action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural
compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the
expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in
any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true man has
to make choices he must always prefer that which he considers good
not evil for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?

We have been given certain genetics (as per your example) which then combines with our environment to make us who we are. This is not coercion in the sense that most people think of it. We are not being coerced in the compatibilist sense (such as having a gun to our head). And we are not free in in Hobbe's sense just because we are acting at will. This is a false dichotomy which is causing lots of confusion in this longstanding debate. Definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless it reflects the real world.

This is precisely the sort of speculation I am not able to grapple with effectively. In other words, in a way that allows me to grasp what the compatibilists are telling us about the alleged "freedom" embodied in fact that while rocks don't choose to tumble down a mountain in a landslide, human beings do choose to ski down a mountain.

Just as the rocks could not not tumble down the mountain in a landslide, skiers could not not choose to go down the slope.

In either context, different configurations of matter are doing only that which matter obeying immutable laws [if this is the case] could have done.

True, but rocks cannot contemplate therefore the configuration is different as you mentioned, thus people think of free will as having choices. Once again, having choices does not grant us freedom of the will. It just gives the appearance of giving us free will and what most lay people think free will is. "I can choose, therefore I have free will."

No other human being coerced you to choose to ski but your "will" to choose is merely another inherent manifestation of nature.

It is just merely another inherent manifestation of nature. But the truth of determinism in and of itself is not going to better our world. We have to extend this knowledge to see where it leads.

With God the coercion would seem to revolve around that fact that nothing you will ever do is not already known by God. The only question that pops into my mind here is that, in a wholly determined universe, could God Himself have ever not placed you on Earth? Is God in turn inherently capricious? And thus only seemingly capricious in an existence where everything that even He does is only as it ever could have been.

Unless, of course, there is some crucial factor here that I keep missing.

Whether God is inherently capricious or controlled by natural law begins with the assumption that God is a thinking being like humans. Isn't this called anthropomorphism? In the book, Decline and Fall of All Evil, the author personalized the word God to make the writing less dry, but he clarified that God only means the laws that govern our universe. To speculate beyond that is counter-productive IMO as far as this discussion goes because it's a distraction.

[iambiguous]

All Hobbes' and Hume did was differentiate between physical coercion and having a choice without physical coercion. The latter is what most people consider to be free will, and that is where compatibilism tries but fails to reconcile.

Indeed, and what could be construed more as "physical coercion" than in being compelled to choose as but one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws?

And even if we choose because others coerce us to choose are they not in turn coerced by natural laws to coerce us?

Just because we have choices without physical constraint does not mean our choices are free. It's all an illusion since we can only go in one direction, the direction of that offers us the greater satisfaction (or the most preferable choice based on our particular circumstances) when two or more alternatives are being compared.

But is not the satisfaction that we feel but one more aspect of what could only ever be?

The expression, ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’

But you could not have desired otherwise in a wholly determined universe. Or, rather, that's how I think about it. I could never have not wanted to do the things that I think, feel, say or do.

This part:

This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?

Again: In a wholly determined unverse how could they have not been deceived by these words? Like those folks could have freely choosen to grasp the words such that they were not deceived by them.

This part:

“You must be kidding? Here you are in the process of demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true man has to make choices he must always prefer that which he considers good not evil for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

Some may construe this as a "clarification" but I'm not one of them. To me, this is but one more "general description" encompassed in a "world of words" defining and defending each other. How does this assessment "work" for all practical purposes when the discussion shifts to actual human interactions in a particular context.

For example, of late the news here in America has been splattered with accounts of Trump's national emergency aimed at building a wall on the border with Mexico.

Given the assessment above what are the players in this political conflict actually choosing autonomously [freely] to think, feel, say or do.

Is this all unfolding necessarily per nature's immutable laws or can minds be changed and new policies pursued. Me, I situate human interactions of this sort in my own understanding of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. Out in a No God world in which I take my leap to some measure of autonomy.

Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?

We have been given certain genetics (as per your example) which then combines with our environment to make us who we are. This is not coercion in the sense that most people think of it. We are not being coerced in the compatibilist sense (such as having a gun to our head). And we are not free in in Hobbe's sense just because we are acting at will. This is a false dichotomy which is causing lots of confusion in this longstanding debate. Definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless it reflects the real world.

Over and over again: if you are only able to "choose" to make this point on this thread, then it is but one more necessary component of a real world subsumed in a wholly determined universe. No one posting here, no one following the exchange was ever really free to not do so.

Or, rather, that is still how I have come to understand it "here and now".

Then...

This is precisely the sort of speculation I am not able to grapple with effectively. In other words, in a way that allows me to grasp what the compatibilists are telling us about the alleged "freedom" embodied in the fact that while rocks don't choose to tumble down a mountain in a landslide, human beings do choose to ski down a mountain.

Just as the rocks could not not tumble down the mountain in a landslide, skiers could not not choose to go down the slope.

In either context, different configurations of matter are doing only that which matter obeying immutable laws [if this is the case] could have done.

True, but rocks cannot contemplate therefore the configuration is different as you mentioned, thus people think of free will as having choices.

But if what we do contemplate is only that which we were ever able to contemplate, how are we not but rocks with brains?

Then back again to understanding how [given an understanding of the existence of existence itself] matter evolves into brains evolving in minds evolving into points of view able to dispute whether they were freely concocted.

Once again, having choices does not grant us freedom of the will. It just gives the appearance of giving us free will and what most lay people think free will is. "I can choose, therefore I have free will."

Yeah, in a determined universe, that's what I think too. But clearly we are thinking about it differently.

No other human being coerced you to choose to ski but your "will" to choose is merely another inherent manifestation of nature.

It is just merely another inherent manifestation of nature. But the truth of determinism in and of itself is not going to better our world. We have to extend this knowledge to see where it leads.

But: how is choosing to extend this knowledge not in turn just another inherent manifestation of nature?

With God the coercion would seem to revolve around that fact that nothing you will ever do is not already known by God. The only question that pops into my mind here is that, in a wholly determined universe, could God Himself have ever not placed you on Earth? Is God in turn inherently capricious? And thus only seemingly capricious in an existence where everything that even He does is only as it ever could have been.

Unless, of course, there is some crucial factor here that I keep missing.

Whether God is inherently capricious or controlled by natural law begins with the assumption that God is a thinking being like humans.

God's thinking [in however He manages to think] is either autonomous or determined. Just as with those who equate God with the universe [the pantheists]: this intertwining either has some element of volition in it or it doesn't.

And for those who convince themselves that they are freely choosing to believe in God, He is anything but a distraction.

[peacegirl]

All Hobbes' and Hume did was differentiate between physical coercion and having a choice without physical coercion. The latter is what most people consider to be free will, and that is where compatibilism tries but fails to reconcile.

Indeed, and what could be construed more as "physical coercion" than in being compelled to choose as but one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws?

And even if we choose because others coerce us to choose are they not in turn coerced by natural laws to coerce us?

Again iambiguous, no one is debating that everyone is compelled to do what they do as one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws. The problem though is the fact that most lay people believe that having a choice IS free will. They do not consider choice without physical constraint as being unfree.

Just because we have choices without physical constraint does not mean our choices are free. It's all an illusion since we can only go in one direction, the direction of that offers us the greater satisfaction (or the most preferable choice based on our particular circumstances) when two or more alternatives are being compared.

But is not the satisfaction that we feel but one more aspect of what could only ever be?

Yes, that is true. Choice is part of natural law because only one choice is possible (i.e., the choice that offers greater satisfaction) at any given moment in time, which is one more aspect of what could ever be. The significance of this understanding becomes apparent in Chapter Two.

The expression, ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’

But you could not have desired otherwise in a wholly determined universe.

That is true.

Or, rather, that's how I think about it. I could never have not wanted to do the things that I think, feel, say or do.

True, but again the significance of this becomes clear as it is shown how desire changes (i.e., the desire to strike a first blow of hurt) when the conditions of the environment change --- as part of what could ever be.

This part:

This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?

Again: In a wholly determined universe how could they have not been deceived by these words? Like those folks could have freely chosen to grasp the words such that they were not deceived by them.

They couldn't. No one is saying they could have. That's why it is being explained in a way that will help them understand these words [in a wholly determined universe].

This part:

“You must be kidding? Here you are in the process of demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true man has to make choices he must always prefer that which he considers good not evil for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

Some may construe this as a "clarification" but I'm not one of them. To me, this is but one more "general description" encompassed in a "world of words" defining and defending each other. How does this assessment "work" for all practical purposes when the discussion shifts to actual human interactions in a particular context.

This was anything but a general description encompassed in a world of words. This is not about defense. He was clarifying that saying "I did something of my own free will" is correct when it means "I did something of my own desire because I wanted to. It does not mean I did something because I was compelled to do it based on previous events that forced me to do it against my will. That is an important point because determinism, as it's presently defined, implies that we are forced, against our will, to do what we do based on antecedent factors, when NOTHING has the power to make us to anything against our will. We have absolute control over this.

The expression ‘I did it of my own
free will’ has been seriously misunderstood for although it is
impossible to do anything of one’s own free will, HE DOES
EVERYTHING BECAUSE HE WANTS TO since absolutely
nothing can make him do what he doesn’t want to. Think about this
once again. Was it humanly possible to make Gandhi and his
followers do what they did not want to do when unafraid of death
which was judged, according to their circumstances, the lesser of two
evils? In their eyes, death was the better choice if the alternative was
to lose their freedom. Many people are confused over this one point.
Just because no one on this earth can make you do anything against
your will does not mean your will is free. Gandhi wanted freedom for
his people and it was against his will to stop his nonviolent movement
even though he constantly faced the possibility of death, but this
doesn’t mean his will was free; it just means that it gave him greater
satisfaction to face death than to forego his fight for freedom.

Consequently, when any person says he was compelled to do what he
did against his will, that he really didn’t want to but had to because he
was being tortured, he is obviously confused and unconsciously
dishonest with himself and others because he could die before being
forced to do something against his will. What he actually means was
that he didn’t like being tortured because the pain was unbearable so
rather than continue suffering this way he preferred, as the lesser of
two evils, to tell his captors what they wanted to know, but he did this
because he wanted to not because some external force made him do
this against his will. If by talking he would know that someone he
loved would be instantly killed, pain and death might have been judged
the lesser of two evils. This is an extremely crucial point because
though it is true that will is not free, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING
ON THIS EARTH CAN MAKE MAN DO ANYTHING
AGAINST HIS WILL. He might not like what he did — but he
wanted to do it because the alternative gave him no free or better
choice. It is extremely important that you clear this up in your mind
before proceeding.

For example, of late the news here in America has been splattered with accounts of Trump's national emergency aimed at building a wall on the border with Mexico.

Given the assessment above what are the players in this political conflict actually choosing autonomously [freely] to think, feel, say or do.

Is this all unfolding necessarily per nature's immutable laws or can minds be changed and new policies pursued.

Of course new policies can be changed per nature's immutable laws. Once again, you are using a definition of determinism that isn't accurate because being within the laws of our nature doesn't mean our choices are fixed in advance without our consent. This is why the above clarification is so important.

Me, I situate human interactions of this sort in my own understanding of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. Out in a No God world in which I take my leap to some measure of autonomy.

Having this type of autonomy does not step outside of natural law.

Imagine that you were a free-floating spirit, equal to God in your capacity to choose. God gives you the unwelcome news that shortly you are to be placed on Earth, and that you will be endowed with a range of fundamental passions, chosen entirely at the caprice of God. Would you choose to be free, in Hobbes’sense of acting at will, or might you consent to being coerced?

We have been given certain genetics (as per your example) which then combines with our environment to make us who we are. This is not coercion in the sense that most people think of it. We are not being coerced in the compatibilist sense (such as having a gun to our head). And we are not free in in Hobbe's sense just because we are acting at will. This is a false dichotomy which is causing lots of confusion in this longstanding debate. Definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless it reflects the real world.

Over and over again: if you are only able to "choose" to make this point on this thread, then it is but one more necessary component of a real world subsumed in a wholly determined universe. No one posting here, no one following the exchange was ever really free to not do so.

True, but we're not dominoes. My telling you that you keep making the same point may alter your next choice, as part of your consideration. You seem to think that there's no point to discuss anything because it's already fated. That's not what I'm saying at all because part of how fate turns out is dependent on our choices from moment to moment. We are co-creators, so to speak. We are not passive recipients to whatever takes place, even though what ends up taking place is beyond our ultimate control.

Or, rather, that is still how I have come to understand it "here and now".

Then...

This is precisely the sort of speculation I am not able to grapple with effectively. In other words, in a way that allows me to grasp what the compatibilists are telling us about the alleged "freedom" embodied in the fact that while rocks don't choose to tumble down a mountain in a landslide, human beings do choose to ski down a mountain.

Just as the rocks could not not tumble down the mountain in a landslide, skiers could not not choose to go down the slope.

In either context, different configurations of matter are doing only that which matter obeying immutable laws [if this is the case] could have done.

True, but rocks cannot contemplate therefore the configuration is different as you mentioned, thus people think of free will as having choices.

But if what we do contemplate is only that which we were ever able to contemplate, how are we not but rocks with brains?

Then back again to understanding how [given an understanding of the existence of existence itself] matter evolves into brains evolving in minds evolving into points of view able to dispute whether they were freely concocted.

This is all true, but humans have the capacity to think, contemplate (rocks cannot) and progress as we develop as a species. In so doing, we can create a better world yet all within the framework of natural law.

Once again, having choices does not grant us freedom of the will. It just gives the appearance of giving us free will and what most lay people think free will is. "I can choose, therefore I have free will."

Yeah, in a determined universe, that's what I think too. But clearly we are thinking about it differently.

You are thinking that all choices are preprogrammed. We are not puppets on a string where we cannot do what we desire, but as I said earlier, what we will desire when the conditions of the environment are changed, changes the trajectory of where our world is headed yet still within a deterministic framework.

No other human being coerced you to choose to ski but your "will" to choose is merely another inherent manifestation of nature.

It is just merely another inherent manifestation of nature. But the truth of determinism in and of itself is not going to better our world. We have to extend this knowledge to see where it leads.

But: how is choosing to extend this knowledge not in turn just another inherent manifestation of nature?

Who said it wasn't another inherent manifestation of nature? Whatever choice is made is what could never not have been made.

With God the coercion would seem to revolve around that fact that nothing you will ever do is not already known by God. The only question that pops into my mind here is that, in a wholly determined universe, could God Himself have ever not placed you on Earth? Is God in turn inherently capricious? And thus only seemingly capricious in an existence where everything that even He does is only as it ever could have been.

Unless, of course, there is some crucial factor here that I keep missing.

Whether God is inherently capricious or controlled by natural law begins with the assumption that God is a thinking being like humans.

God's thinking [in however He manages to think] is either autonomous or determined. Just as with those who equate God with the universe [the pantheists]: this intertwining either has some element of volition in it or it doesn't.

Volition is something we as humans have, but this does not grant us free will. I hope you're really listening to what I'm saying because people often half listen just so they can respond with their ideas without ever taking the necessary time to understand the other person's perspective.

And for those who convince themselves that they are freely choosing to believe in God, He is anything but a distraction.

That is true. I am only saying for the purposes of this discussion because oftentimes a discussion gets sidetracked. I didn't want that to happen.

[promethean75]

i haven't read the book because i don't believe anything more can be said on the matter. the metaphysical subject of freewill was resolved centuries ago, and since then philosophers have only restated the matter in their own unique way... though none of this was really necessary. a quicker way would be to point those interested toward classic philosophers like hume, spinoza and nietzsche... and more modern philosophers like wittgenstein, chisholm, taylor and frankfurt. of course one can write their own book, and i don't doubt that it would sell somewhere, but there's really nothing new to be said in this matter, fortunately or unfortunately (whichever you prefer).

That is an important point because determinism, as it's presently defined, implies that we are forced, against our will, to do what we do based on antecedent factors, when NOTHING has the power to make us to anything against our will. We have absolute control over this.

if i may point out here, forms of compatibilism or 'soft determinism' usually get their currency from distorting and/or importing into otherwise ordinary terms certain hidden premises which aren't made explicit. in the above instance, you're implying that the 'will' and the 'we' are somehow free from the causal constraints that the body is subject to. this would be to introduce a cartesian substance that is not subject to the same natural processes that the body, in which it exists, is subject to. your version of compatibilism dissolves when you realize that there is no such agency that is causally exempt from the forces that order everything else in nature. once you realize there is no 'we' in the sense of there being an 'I' that acts upon the body rather than through it - or i should say 'as it' -, whether or not a 'we' has 'absolute control' is a nonsensical question. there are not two separate entities working together here; it's not the 'self' and the self's 'body'. it's not the agency and the thing the agency acts upon. rather there is a single ontological substance, if you will, acting simpliciter.

and yet, we cannot get around the problem of having to decide in praxis. built into this causal chain of events is that peculiar situation involving our neurology... that lapse of time in which manifold processes are not brought to the foreground in consciousness. it's this peculiar detail in nature that gives rise to the illusion. you all know this already.

but now let's be clear. even though there is no freewill, we'd be mistaken to use the word 'determine' as an alternative. as you'll see (in the below quote), the meaning of this word in the various ways we've learned to use it and make sense out of it, cannot be counted on to describe the process without yielding confusions. we are finally forced to say that things 'just happen', and continue living and interacting with people as if we really did have freewill. what then is the function of the lie of freewill? i call it the most recent form of moral subterfuge; it serves no other purpose than as a means for giving praise or placing blame, depending on whether or not we find a person agreeable or not. in this way it is a form of control and/or manipulation. it solicits admiration from those who we favor with praise, and fear/guilt from those who we reprimand with blame. you could even say that the degree with which a person uses these means is proportionate to their power and understanding. the weaker and more confused a person is, the more they rely on these means to understand their valuing of others. one who truly understood the truth (a spinoza, for instance... an almost impossible height) would have nothing but praise for everything, since they recognize the perfect order of nature in its totality; that things must happen as they do and could not happen any other way. this of course does not render one into a passive stoic who resigns into quietism. one still 'wills', only they no longer blame, no longer dread, no longer fear. as i said, an almost impossible 'level' of wisdom to reach. what spinoza said was 'as difficult as it was rare.'

...

Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.

[I will however be publishing an essay specifically about this in the next few years, where I will substantiate what I have to say below far more fully.]

This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.

To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.

And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.

[peacegirl]

Determinism
Mon Feb 18, 2019 1:43 pm

promethean75 wrote:
i haven't read the book because i don't believe anything more can be said on the matter.

Just because you believe nothing more can be said on the matter doesn't make it so. Why sell yourself short?

promethean75 wrote:
... the metaphysical subject of freewill was resolved centuries ago,

No it wasn't. It has yet to be resolved.

promethean75 wrote:
... and since then philosophers have only restated the matter in their own unique way... though none of this was really necessary. a quicker way would be to point those interested toward classic philosophers like hume, spinoza and nietzsche... and more modern philosophers like wittgenstein, chisholm, taylor and frankfurt. of course one can write their own book, and i don't doubt that it would sell somewhere, but there's really nothing new to be said in this matter, fortunately or unfortunately (whichever you prefer).

So you believe these philosophers had the last word on the subject?

Determinism, as it's presently defined, implies that we are forced, against our will, to do what we do based on antecedent events, when NOTHING has the power to make us to anything against our will. We have absolute control over this.

promethean75 wrote:
if i may point out here, forms of compatibilism or 'soft determinism' usually get their currency from distorting and/or importing into otherwise ordinary terms certain hidden premises which aren't made explicit. in the above instance, you're implying that the 'will' and the 'we' are somehow free from the causal constraints that the body is subject to.

That's not what I said. I said most lay people, when they think of free will, believe that's what they have if there are no external constraints (such as a gun to their head). This is how compatibilists define free will also.

promethean75 wrote:
this would be to introduce a cartesian substance that is not subject to the same natural processes that the body, in which it exists, is subject to. your version of compatibilism dissolves when you realize that there is no such agency that is causally exempt from the forces that order everything else in nature.

Compatibilism doesn't dissolve because there's no agency; it dissolves because it's contradictory. It's a semantic shift in order to justify the dishing out of just desert. You could not have read what I posted because I never said that we are causally exempt from the forces that order everything in nature. What I did say is that nothing can make us do anything against our will, if we don't want to do something. Conversely, I said that our choices can only go in one direction, which is WHY will is not free. If it was free, we could choose either/or, but that would make a mockery of contemplation, which is for the sole purpose of deciding which choice, under our particular circumstances, is preferable.

promethean75 wrote:
once you realize there is no 'we' in the sense of there being an 'I' that acts upon the body rather than through it - or i should say 'as it' -, whether or not a 'we' has 'absolute control' is a nonsensical quest.

It is anything but a nonsensical quest. It is the most important quest of all time because it has the power to prevent from coming back that for which blame and punishment were previously necessary, as part of our development. At this juncture, it is important to clarify what is meant by responsibility. With your reasoning someone could say "I wasn't responsible for shooting that person because there is no "I";, ontologically speaking, I'm just part of a causal chain. Nature did what it wanted through me, but not of my own accord. Do you see a problem with this reasoning? Regardless of the reason for my pulling the trigger, the responsibility for making the choice (not the moral responsibility which invokes blame) was mine because nothing has the power to force me to do what I prefer not to do. Can you please sit with this for a moment before telling me I'm wrong? You have no conception at this point why this distinction is important.

promethean75 wrote:
there are not two separate entities working together here; it's not the 'self' and the self's 'body'. it's not the agency and the thing the agency acts upon. rather there is a single ontological substance, if you will, acting simpliciter.

The conventional definition implies that we are puppets on a string where we are forced to do what the software program (or natural law) tells us we must. But this is a false conception because the software program cannot make us do anything we don't want to do since the agent (the "I", the self) must give consent before an action takes place. The fact that there's agency and the thing the agency acts upon does not mean two separate entities exist. It just means that the agent is not a passive recipient to whatever unfolds without any say in the matter. But ...(and here it is again) the choice of the agent not to perform an action is also part of our alignment with nature's law because this is an inherent attribute of man. We have absolute control to say no to an action (nothing can make us do anything against our will; you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink), and no control over what we find preferable since we are compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction, and only one choice is possible at any given moment in time.

prometheus75 wrote:
and yet, we cannot get around the problem of having to decide in praxis. built into this causal chain of events is that peculiar situation involving our neurology... that lapse of time in which manifold processes are not brought to the foreground in consciousness. it's this peculiar detail in nature that gives rise to the illusion. you all know this already.

Even though neuroscience tells us that things are going on below our conscious awareness, the choices we make (even if we're not sure of all the underlying reasons that we choose something) are done with our conscious awareness. Exceptions could be deep hypnosis where one is being controlled by another person's suggestion, but even here, I wonder if one would do something egregious and against his moral underpinnings.

prometheus75 wrote:
but now let's be clear. even though there is no freewill, we'd be mistaken to use the word 'determine' as an alternative. as you'll see (in the below quote), the meaning of this word in the various ways we've learned to use it and make sense out of it, cannot be counted on to describe the process without yielding confusions. we are finally forced to say that things 'just happen', and continue living and interacting with people as if we really did have freewill. what then is the function of the lie of freewill? i call it the most recent form of moral subterfuge; it serves no other purpose than as a means for giving praise or placing blame, depending on whether or not we find a person agreeable or not.

Very true. Blame and praise are opposite sides of the coin.

prometheus75 wrote:
in this way it is a form of control and/or manipulation. it solicits admiration from those who we favor with praise, and fear/guilt from those who we reprimand with blame. you could even say that the degree with which a person uses these means is proportionate to their power and understanding. the weaker and more confused a person is, the more they rely on these means to understand their valuing of others. one who truly understood the truth (a spinoza, for instance... an almost impossible height) would have nothing but praise for everything, since they recognize the perfect order of nature in its totality; that things must happen as they do and could not happen any other way. this of course does not render one into a passive stoic who resigns into quietism. one still 'wills', only they no longer blame, no longer dread, no longer fear. as i said, an almost impossible 'level' of wisdom to reach. what spinoza said was 'as difficult as it was rare.'

Because Spinoza was dissatisfied with theology’s explanation of
good and evil, he opened the door of determinism and looked around
quite a bit but did not know how to slay the fiery dragon (the great
impasse of blame), so he pretended it wasn’t even there. He stated,
“We are men, not God. Evil is really not evil when seen in total
perspective,” and he rejected the principle of an eye for an eye. Will
Durant, not at all satisfied with this aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy,
although he loved him dearly, could not understand how it was
humanly possible to turn the other cheek in this kind of world. He
also went in and looked around very thoroughly and, he too, saw the
fiery dragon but unlike Spinoza he made no pretense of its
non-existence. He just didn’t know how to overcome the beast but
refused to agree with what common sense told him to deny.

The
implications really need no further clarification as to why free will is
in power. Nobody, including Spinoza and other philosophers, ever
discovered what it meant that man’s will is not free because they never
unlocked the second door which leads to my discovery. The belief in
free will was compelled to remain in power until the present time
because no one had conclusive proof that determinism was true, nor
could anyone slay the fiery dragon which seemed like an impossible
feat. Is it any wonder that Johnston didn’t want to get into this
matter any further? Is it any wonder Durant never went beyond the
vestibule? Are you beginning to recognize why it has been so difficult
to get this knowledge thoroughly investigated?

Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.

[I will however be publishing an essay specifically about this in the next few years, where I will substantiate what I have to say below far more fully.]

This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.

To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.

And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.

It is true that confusion arises due to definition only. There can be no meeting of the minds when everyone has a different definition of what determinism and free will mean. Definitions mean nothing where reality is concerned unless they reflect accurately what is going on in reality. For example, we are not denied a will in determinism. Moreover, the knowledge I am presenting is not prescriptive. It does not say we must choose so and so because determinism prescribed that this must be so. It is descriptive ONLY. It is also not anthropomorphic because we're not attributing man made characteristics to laws of nature; we are part of the laws of nature. I'm not sure if my response will satisfy Rosa's take on the misuse of words because that is the crux of the problem but not in the way she's describing. I'm hoping that people will be interested in a more accurate definition of determinism. This correct definition, and the corollary that follows, reconciles determinism with moral responsibility. Will is not denied us, it's just not a free will. By keeping the will intact, it removes the alienating nature of traditional thought that has confused the free will/determinism debate up until the present day.

[iambiguous]

Indeed, and what could be construed more as "physical coercion" than in being compelled to choose as but one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws?

And even if we choose because others coerce us to choose are they not in turn coerced by natural laws to coerce us?

Again iambiguous, no one is debating that everyone is compelled to do what they do as one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws. The problem though is the fact that most lay people believe that having a choice IS free will. They do not consider choice without physical constraint as being unfree.

Yes, but in a wholly determined universe, these lay people believe only that which they were ever able to believe. That is where we always seem to get stuck. Why? Because we were never able to not get stuck. If everything is "unfree" that would certainly include this exchange.

Again, unless there is another way to think about all this that I keep missing.

This part:

But is not the satisfaction that we feel but one more aspect of what could only ever be?

Yes, that is true. Choice is part of natural law because only one choice is possible (i.e., the choice that offers greater satisfaction) at any given moment in time, which is one more aspect of what could ever be.

When you speak of greater satisfaction here it is [to me] as one who believes in autonomy thinks of it. I chose this because in weighing what would bring me greater satisfaction, I freely picked that instead of something else. You speak of desires changing as though they change as they do of our own volition. From my frame of mind, however, thinking and feeling are interchangable in a wholly determined universe.

This part:

This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?

Again: In a wholly determined universe how could they have not been deceived by these words? Like those folks could have freely chosen to grasp the words such that they were not deceived by them.

They couldn't. No one is saying they could have. That's why it is being explained in a way that will help them understand these words [in a wholly determined universe].

It is being explained to them in the only way it was ever going to be explained to them. And they react to the explanation in the only way they were ever sble too. It's not like they were ever free to grasp your explanation if they do not grasp it.

In other words, everything that we think, feel, say and do is inherently intertwined of necessity in the unfolding material universe.

EVERYthing.

He was clarifying that saying "I did something of my own free will" is correct when it means "I did something of my own desire because I wanted to.

But if you could never not want to...?

It does not mean I did something because I was compelled to do it based on previous events that forced me to do it against my will. That is an important point because determinism, as it's presently defined, implies that we are forced, against our will, to do what we do based on antecedent factors, when NOTHING has the power to make us to anything against our will. We have absolute control over this.

And if our "will" is but one more of nature's dominoes toppling over [necessarily] into the choices we make in any particular context...?

And, from my frame of mind, even given some measure of autonomy, the "will" is embedded in the existential contraption that intertwines dasein, conflicting goods and political economy in the is/ought world. A world where value judgments collide all the time.

Think about this once again. Was it humanly possible to make Gandhi and his followers do what they did not want to do when unafraid of death which was judged, according to their circumstances, the lesser of two evils? In their eyes, death was the better choice if the alternative was to lose their freedom. Many people are confused over this one point. Just because no one on this earth can make you do anything against your will does not mean your will is free. Gandhi wanted freedom for his people and it was against his will to stop his nonviolent movement even though he constantly faced the possibility of death, but this doesn’t mean his will was free; it just means that it gave him greater satisfaction to face death than to forego his fight for freedom.

This makes sense to him, to you. To me though [in a wholly determined universe] it does not.

Either Ghandi's choices in the world back then might have been other than what they were...and history been changed...or they were always going to be what they were and history unfolded only as it ever could have.

Consequently, when any person says he was compelled to do what he did against his will, that he really didn’t want to but had to because he was being tortured, he is obviously confused and unconsciously dishonest with himself and others because he could die before being forced to do something against his will. What he actually means was that he didn’t like being tortured because the pain was unbearable so rather than continue suffering this way he preferred, as the lesser of two evils, to tell his captors what they wanted to know, but he did this because he wanted to not because some external force made him do this against his will. If by talking he would know that someone he loved would be instantly killed, pain and death might have been judged the lesser of two evils. This is an extremely crucial point because though it is true that will is not free, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ON THIS EARTH CAN MAKE MAN DO ANYTHING AGAINST HIS WILL. He might not like what he did — but he wanted to do it because the alternative gave him no free or better choice. It is extremely important that you clear this up in your mind before proceeding.[/i]

Admittedly, I may well be unable to grasp this point, but like the point above, it makes no sense to me in a wholly determined universe. Either the folks here -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghrai ... oner_abuse -- were choosing and behaving of their own volition and history may well have been different, or there was never a way in which history here could have unfolded other than the way it did.

What we want to do under torture would seem [to me] to be no less what we could only ever have wanted to do if "I" here is embedded in a wholly determined universe. Just as the one inflicting the torture could not have chosen not to inflict it.

What freaks people out about this is the idea that no one can ever be held morally responsible for something they could never have not done. But they are, in turn, freaked out only because they could never have not been freaked out.

...of late the news here in America has been splattered with accounts of Trump's national emergency aimed at building a wall on the border with Mexico.

Given the assessment above what are the players in this political conflict actually choosing autonomously [freely] to think, feel, say or do.

Is this all unfolding necessarily per nature's immutable laws or can minds be changed and new policies pursued.

Of course new policies can be changed per nature's immutable laws. Once again, you are using a definition of determinism that isn't accurate because being within the laws of our nature doesn't mean our choices are fixed in advance without our consent. This is why the above clarification is so important.

I'm less keen on definitions then on the extent to which any particular definition is brought down to earth. Our consent [regarding anything we think, feel, say, do] is either embedded in some measure of autonomy, volition, free will etc., or it is wholly in sync with a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

Me, I situate human interactions of this sort in my own understanding of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. Out in a No God world in which I take my leap to some measure of autonomy.

Having this type of autonomy does not step outside of natural law.

This makes sense to me only to the extent that, in seeking greater satisfaction, I was able to choose not to think as I do. Because in thinking like this it brings me anything but a feeling of being satisfied.

Over and over again: if you are only able to "choose" to make this point on this thread, then it is but one more necessary component of a real world subsumed in a wholly determined universe. No one posting here, no one following the exchange was ever really free to not do so.

True, but we're not dominoes.

Our brains would appear to be [up to now] matter able to become conscious of itself as matter having evolved over time given the evolution of life on earth. Life somehow having evolved from mindless matter. How then is mindful matter different from mindless matter? That's always been the gist of it here. Are human brains able to choose differently from those acts of nature that appear to be completely mindless?

Well, we don't fully grasp that. But, in the interim, dominoes topple over only as they were ever able to and we think, feel, say and do things only as we were/are/will ever be able to.

Here, however, you make a distinction that I am not able to grasp given the assumption that we are in turn necessarily embedded in a wholly determined universe.

My telling you that you keep making the same point may alter your next choice, as part of your consideration.

But: Could you have ever chosen not to tell me this point? Could I ever reacted to it [over and over again] other than as I did/do/will?

You seem to think that there's no point to discuss anything because it's already fated. That's not what I'm saying at all because part of how fate turns out is dependent on our choices from moment to moment. We are co-creators, so to speak. We are not passive recipients to whatever takes place, even though what ends up taking place is beyond our ultimate control.

Ultimate control? Or any control at all?

Then...

...rocks cannot contemplate therefore the configuration is different as you mentioned, thus people think of free will as having choices.

But if what we do contemplate is only that which we were ever able to contemplate, how are we not but rocks with brains?

This is all true, but humans have the capacity to think, contemplate (rocks cannot) and progress as we develop as a species. In so doing, we can create a better world yet all within the framework of natural law.

Rocks don't think. We do. But, as with the rocks, we are on a trek into the future only as it is ever able to be.

Our capacity to think generates [psychologically] the illusion of freedom. That rocks don't have this capacity distinguishes them from us. But our brain is no less "choosing" to ski down the mountain than a rock is "choosing" to tumble down it in a landslide.

In a determined universe.

How then are we not "for all practical purposes" the equivalent of nature's dominoes/puppets? We think ourselves into believing that we are choosing freely to ski down the mountain. But nature knows better.

Thus...

...how is choosing to extend this knowledge not in turn just another inherent manifestation of nature?

Who said it wasn't another inherent manifestation of nature? Whatever choice is made is what could never not have been made.

Sorry, but I'm still completely lost here in regard to what you are trying to convey. Either you are free to make another attempt to explain it, and I am free to get it this time, or "whatever choice [either of us selects]...is what could never not have been made".

God's thinking [in however He manages to think] is either autonomous or determined. Just as with those who equate God with the universe [the pantheists]: this intertwining either has some element of volition in it or it doesn't.

Volition is something we as humans have, but this does not grant us free will. I hope you're really listening to what I'm saying because people often half listen just so they can respond with their ideas without ever taking the necessary time to understand the other person's perspective.

volition: the faculty or power of using one's will.

So, is that "faculty and power" autonomous or not?

And, as for "really listening" to what you're saying, there are some folks who tell you this, but what they mean is, "if you were really listening to me, you would agree with me."

[peacegirl]

Indeed, and what could be construed more as "physical coercion" than in being compelled to choose as but one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws?

It's all about the language. Ask any compatibilist what the difference is in his view, and you will see he makes a distinction between physical coercion and being compelled to choose. I don't make that distinction because, like you said, both involve compulsion.

co·er·cionDictionary result for coercion
/kōˈərZHən,kōˈərSHən/Submit
noun
the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats.
synonyms: force, compulsion, constraint, duress, oppression, enforcement, harassment, intimidation, threats, insistence, demand, arm-twisting, pressure, pressurization, influence

And even if we choose because others coerce us to choose are they not in turn coerced by natural laws to coerce us?

There's no question that every human being is compelled by the law of greater satisfaction.

Again iambiguous, no one is debating that everyone is compelled to do what they do as one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws. The problem though is the fact that most lay people believe that having a choice IS free will. They do not consider choice without physical constraint as being unfree.

Yes, but in a wholly determined universe, these lay people believe only that which they were ever able to believe. That is where we always seem to get stuck. Why? Because we were never able to not get stuck. If everything is "unfree" that would certainly include this exchange.

Again, unless there is another way to think about all this that I keep missing.

This part:

But is not the satisfaction that we feel but one more aspect of what could only ever be?

You keep missing something because we haven't gotten there. You just want to keep repeating what has already been stated.

Yes, that is true. Choice is part of natural law because only one choice is possible (i.e., the choice that offers greater satisfaction) at any given moment in time, which is one more aspect of what could ever be.

When you speak of greater satisfaction here it is [to me] as one who believes in autonomy thinks of it. I chose this because in weighing what would bring me greater satisfaction, I freely picked that instead of something else. You speak of desires changing as though they change as they do of our own volition. From my frame of mind, however, thinking and feeling are interchangable in a wholly determined universe.

This part:

This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?

Exactly, but being able to choose [freely] doesn't make will free in a wholly determined universe. It just means he did something of his own volition or desire. Please reread this again:

Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost
impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment
caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the
opposite, that man was not caused or compelled, ‘he did it of his own
accord; he wanted to do it, he didn’t have to.’ The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I
shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which
only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words
have deceived everyone?

“You must be kidding? Here you are in the process of
demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath
you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free
to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he
considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he
prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this
action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural
compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the
expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in
any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true man has
to make choices he must always prefer that which he considers good
not evil for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

Again: In a wholly determined universe how could they have not been deceived by these words? Like those folks could have freely chosen to grasp the words such that they were not deceived by them.

They could not not have been deceived by words, but now with a more careful clarification hopefully this will help them grasp what they could not have grasped before.

They couldn't. No one is saying they could have. That's why it is being explained in a way that will help them understand these words [in a wholly determined universe].

It is being explained to them in the only way it was ever going to be explained to them. And they react to the explanation in the only way they were ever sble too. It's not like they were ever free to grasp your explanation if they do not grasp it.

This is a given iambiguous. Your words are correct but they are repetitive. I know I know, you can't not say what you're saying. I'm hoping you will continue to listen so we can move forward rather than backtracking by saying this is the only way it could have ever have been. That's A GIVEN!

In other words, everything that we think, feel, say and do is inherently intertwined of necessity in the unfolding material universe.

EVERYthing.

Very true. From moment to moment every movement is controlled by a law we have no control over because we are always moving from a position of dissatisfaction to a place of greater satisfaction, from point A to point B. If we were satisfied in remaining at point A, we would never move to another position, which is death.

to be cont...

He was clarifying that saying "I did something of my own free will" is correct when it means "I did something of my own desire because I wanted to.

But if you could never not want to...?

It does not mean I did something because I was compelled to do it based on previous events that forced me to do it against my will. That is an important point because determinism, as it's presently defined, implies that we are forced, against our will, to do what we do based on antecedent factors, when NOTHING has the power to make us to anything against our will. We have absolute control over this.

And if our "will" is but one more of nature's dominoes toppling over [necessarily] into the choices we make in any particular context...?

And, from my frame of mind, even given some measure of autonomy, the "will" is embedded in the existential contraption that intertwines dasein, conflicting goods and political economy in the is/ought world. A world where value judgments collide all the time.

Think about this once again. Was it humanly possible to make Gandhi and his followers do what they did not want to do when unafraid of death which was judged, according to their circumstances, the lesser of two evils? In their eyes, death was the better choice if the alternative was to lose their freedom. Many people are confused over this one point. Just because no one on this earth can make you do anything against your will does not mean your will is free. Gandhi wanted freedom for his people and it was against his will to stop his nonviolent movement even though he constantly faced the possibility of death, but this doesn’t mean his will was free; it just means that it gave him greater satisfaction to face death than to forego his fight for freedom.

This makes sense to him, to you. To me though [in a wholly determined universe] it does not.

Either Ghandi's choices in the world back then might have been other than what they were...and history been changed...or they were always going to be what they were and history unfolded only as it ever could have.

Consequently, when any person says he was compelled to do what he did against his will, that he really didn’t want to but had to because he was being tortured, he is obviously confused and unconsciously dishonest with himself and others because he could die before being forced to do something against his will. What he actually means was that he didn’t like being tortured because the pain was unbearable so rather than continue suffering this way he preferred, as the lesser of two evils, to tell his captors what they wanted to know, but he did this because he wanted to not because some external force made him do this against his will. If by talking he would know that someone he loved would be instantly killed, pain and death might have been judged the lesser of two evils. This is an extremely crucial point because though it is true that will is not free, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ON THIS EARTH CAN MAKE MAN DO ANYTHING AGAINST HIS WILL. He might not like what he did — but he wanted to do it because the alternative gave him no free or better choice. It is extremely important that you clear this up in your mind before proceeding.[/i]

Admittedly, I may well be unable to grasp this point, but like the point above, it makes no sense to me in a wholly determined universe. Either the folks here -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghrai ... oner_abuse -- were choosing and behaving of their own volition and history may well have been different, or there was never a way in which history here could have unfolded other than the way it did.

What we want to do under torture would seem [to me] to be no less what we could only ever have wanted to do if "I" here is embedded in a wholly determined universe. Just as the one inflicting the torture could not have chosen not to inflict it.

What freaks people out about this is the idea that no one can ever be held morally responsible for something they could never have not done. But they are, in turn, freaked out only because they could never have not been freaked out.

...of late the news here in America has been splattered with accounts of Trump's national emergency aimed at building a wall on the border with Mexico.

Given the assessment above what are the players in this political conflict actually choosing autonomously [freely] to think, feel, say or do.

Is this all unfolding necessarily per nature's immutable laws or can minds be changed and new policies pursued.

Of course new policies can be changed per nature's immutable laws. Once again, you are using a definition of determinism that isn't accurate because being within the laws of our nature doesn't mean our choices are fixed in advance without our consent. This is why the above clarification is so important.

I'm less keen on definitions then on the extent to which any particular definition is brought down to earth. Our consent [regarding anything we think, feel, say, do] is either embedded in some measure of autonomy, volition, free will etc., or it is wholly in sync with a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

Me, I situate human interactions of this sort in my own understanding of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. Out in a No God world in which I take my leap to some measure of autonomy.

Having this type of autonomy does not step outside of natural law.

This makes sense to me only to the extent that, in seeking greater satisfaction, I was able to choose not to think as I do. Because in thinking like this it brings me anything but a feeling of being satisfied.

Over and over again: if you are only able to "choose" to make this point on this thread, then it is but one more necessary component of a real world subsumed in a wholly determined universe. No one posting here, no one following the exchange was ever really free to not do so.

True, but we're not dominoes.

Our brains would appear to be [up to now] matter able to become conscious of itself as matter having evolved over time given the evolution of life on earth. Life somehow having evolved from mindless matter. How then is mindful matter different from mindless matter? That's always been the gist of it here. Are human brains able to choose differently from those acts of nature that appear to be completely mindless?

Well, we don't fully grasp that. But, in the interim, dominoes topple over only as they were ever able to and we think, feel, say and do things only as we were/are/will ever be able to.

Here, however, you make a distinction that I am not able to grasp given the assumption that we are in turn necessarily embedded in a wholly determined universe.

My telling you that you keep making the same point may alter your next choice, as part of your consideration.

But: Could you have ever chosen not to tell me this point? Could I ever reacted to it [over and over again] other than as I did/do/will?

You seem to think that there's no point to discuss anything because it's already fated. That's not what I'm saying at all because part of how fate turns out is dependent on our choices from moment to moment. We are co-creators, so to speak. We are not passive recipients to whatever takes place, even though what ends up taking place is beyond our ultimate control.

Ultimate control? Or any control at all?

Then...

...rocks cannot contemplate therefore the configuration is different as you mentioned, thus people think of free will as having choices.

But if what we do contemplate is only that which we were ever able to contemplate, how are we not but rocks with brains?

This is all true, but humans have the capacity to think, contemplate (rocks cannot) and progress as we develop as a species. In so doing, we can create a better world yet all within the framework of natural law.

Rocks don't think. We do. But, as with the rocks, we are on a trek into the future only as it is ever able to be.

Our capacity to think generates [psychologically] the illusion of freedom. That rocks don't have this capacity distinguishes them from us. But our brain is no less "choosing" to ski down the mountain than a rock is "choosing" to tumble down it in a landslide.

In a determined universe.

How then are we not "for all practical purposes" the equivalent of nature's dominoes/puppets? We think ourselves into believing that we are choosing freely to ski down the mountain. But nature knows better.

Thus...

...how is choosing to extend this knowledge not in turn just another inherent manifestation of nature?

Who said it wasn't another inherent manifestation of nature? Whatever choice is made is what could never not have been made.

Sorry, but I'm still completely lost here in regard to what you are trying to convey. Either you are free to make another attempt to explain it, and I am free to get it this time, or "whatever choice [either of us selects]...is what could never not have been made".

God's thinking [in however He manages to think] is either autonomous or determined. Just as with those who equate God with the universe [the pantheists]: this intertwining either has some element of volition in it or it doesn't.

Volition is something we as humans have, but this does not grant us free will. I hope you're really listening to what I'm saying because people often half listen just so they can respond with their ideas without ever taking the necessary time to understand the other person's perspective.

volition: the faculty or power of using one's will.

So, is that "faculty and power" autonomous or not?

And, as for "really listening" to what you're saying, there are some folks who tell you this, but what they mean is, "if you were really listening to me, you would agree with me."

[promethean75]

Because Spinoza was dissatisfied with theology’s explanation of
good and evil, he opened the door of determinism and looked around
quite a bit but did not know how to slay the fiery dragon (the great
impasse of blame), so he pretended it wasn’t even there. He stated,
“We are men, not God. Evil is really not evil when seen in total
perspective,” and he rejected the principle of an eye for an eye. Will
Durant, not at all satisfied with this aspect of Spinoza’s philosophy,
although he loved him dearly, could not understand how it was
humanly possible to turn the other cheek in this kind of world. He
also went in and looked around very thoroughly and, he too, saw the
fiery dragon but unlike Spinoza he made no pretense of its
non-existence. He just didn’t know how to overcome the beast but
refused to agree with what common sense told him to deny.

yeeeeah, i dunno about all that. i think rather that because whoever wrote that was personally terrified of the consequences morality was exposed to by the truth of determinism, that they thought spinoza came to the conclusion of determinism because he wanted to free us from blame, rather than vice-versa. spinoza did not set out to prove determinism because he found blame unsettling. rather he came logically to the conslusion of determinism and then noticed that this conclusion removes blame.

in a way spinoza stands frozen before this great epihany just like biggy does... who keeps pressing the point that you're not going to squeeze in there any 'free volition', no matter how sophisticated your argument appears.

now whether or not you know it, you (peacegirl) are on to something extraordinary... something that is a precursor to a major shift in world politics. we agreed elsewhere (indirectly and across forums) that the abolishment of the freewill illusion in fact makes man more responsible in that he has to take responsibility for his environment as an externalist; someone who recognizes more clearly than ever before in history, that people are entirely conditioned by their environments. this kind of concession would radically change the basis of positive law, especially, because in dismissing mental states and processes as irrelevant - as behaviorism rightly does - it places focus on the operant conditioning that contributes to criminal behavior. this would literally be like a renaissance in the social sciences and would change everything.

but this step is centuries down the road. today the courts are still arguing such nonsense as 'yeah but he knew what he did was wrong.' but what do they mean 'wrong'? 'illegal', or 'wrong' in an imperative sense? the world today still believes in morality because it believes in freewill, and it believes in freewill because of philosophy. as long as these illusions still exist, those in power will make no effort to accept responsibility for controlling environments and instead continue to exploit the opportunity to make a business out of the criminal justice system.

i may have said too much or not enough here, i'm not sure. but you can get a feel for what i'm implying with something along the lines of what lenin said: capitalism deserves every bit of the crime it gets. what he means is that the excessive nature of the freedoms in a capitalist/consumerism, coupled with that nonsensical doctrine of freewill, produces an environment in which those who do not take responsibility for controlling such excessive freedoms, end up turning around and blaming the criminals that result from their negligence to do so. but the sinister genius of capitalism turns even this into an advantage. it produces its criminals and then makes a business out of its criminal justice systems. it creates a problem it can then make money off of; a strong market for the state and privately owned prison systems. reason #254 why capitalism is a joke.

[Jakob]

Hi promethean
Then Lenin and you are opposed. He says Capitalism "deserves" - is culpable for causing - the crime it gets.

Or is it that man has no free will but Capitalism, as some kind of entity, does?

The notion of guilt and culpability increases in strength under your words.

[Jakob]

But what is gratifyingly made clear is the meaning of "free will". It is, in your discourse, the ability to attribute value judgments.
Per you, such judgments are per definition untrue. As there is no free will.

Your judgments of Capitalism as being wrong are your free will. And thus dont exist.

Which is interesting and believable.

On the other hand let's keep space open for the notion that the power to make value judgments does exist, as a prerequisite for life.

These persectives can then decide between them which one is right.

[Meno_]

And such culpable problems, are the kind pitting categorical authority against Hegel's notion of the Absolute.
This is exactly why the commies outlawed religion In favor for the control of the state. After that presumptive synthetic unity, before the judgement, or populous cohesive agreement, the so called national will became the slavery by masters.
Who wouldn't be unhappy to share a return to a new paternity?

Of course Lenin was Russian, not English, for whom Marx' formula was intended.

[Meno_]

And such culpable problems, are the kind pitting categorical authority against Hegel's notion of the Absolute.
This is exactly why the commies outlawed religion In favor for the control of the state by the state . After that presumptive synthetic unity, before the judgement, of populous cohesive agreement, the so called national will became the slavery by masters.
Who wouldn't be unhappy to share a return to such a new paternity?

Sorry duplicate

[Meno_]

Sorry duplicate

[Meno_]

Here is Ambiguous citing Strawson in this forum:

"Strawson himself was optimistic that compatibilism could reconcile determinism with moral obligation and responsibility." He accepted the facts of determinism. He felt that determinism was true. But he was concerned to salvage the reality of our attitudes even for libertarians, whom he described as pessimists about determinism."

May be there'in lies hidden poignancy.

[peacegirl]

Indeed, and what could be construed more as "physical coercion" than in being compelled to choose as but one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws?

It's all about the language. Ask any compatibilist what the difference is in his view, and you will see he makes a distinction between physical coercion and being compelled to choose. I don't make that distinction because, like you said, both involve compulsion.

co·er·cionDictionary result for coercion
/kōˈərZHən,kōˈərSHən/Submit
noun
the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats.
synonyms: force, compulsion, constraint, duress, oppression, enforcement, harassment, intimidation, threats, insistence, demand, arm-twisting, pressure, pressurization, influence

And even if we choose because others coerce us to choose are they not in turn coerced by natural laws to coerce us?

There's no question that every human being is compelled by the law of greater satisfaction.

Again iambiguous, no one is debating that everyone is compelled to do what they do as one more inherent component of nature's material/phenomenal laws. The problem though is the fact that most lay people believe that having a choice IS free will. They do not consider choice without physical constraint as being unfree.

Yes, but in a wholly determined universe, these lay people believe only that which they were ever able to believe. That is where we always seem to get stuck. Why? Because we were never able to not get stuck. If everything is "unfree" that would certainly include this exchange.

Again, unless there is another way to think about all this that I keep missing.

This part:

But is not the satisfaction that we feel but one more aspect of what could only ever be?

You keep missing something because we haven't gotten there. You just want to keep repeating what has already been stated.

Yes, that is true. Choice is part of natural law because only one choice is possible (i.e., the choice that offers greater satisfaction) at any given moment in time, which is one more aspect of what could ever be.

When you speak of greater satisfaction here it is [to me] as one who believes in autonomy thinks of it. I chose this because in weighing what would bring me greater satisfaction, I freely picked that instead of something else. You speak of desires changing as though they change as they do of our own volition. From my frame of mind, however, thinking and feeling are interchangable in a wholly determined universe.

Thinking and feeling are part and parcel of everything that happens to us in a wholly determined universe. There is nothing that rests outside of this natural law that we are part of.

This part:

This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words have deceived everyone?

Exactly, but being able to choose [freely] doesn't make will free in a wholly determined universe. It just means he did something of his own volition or desire. Please reread this again:

Consequently, determinism was faced with an almost
impossible task because it assumed that heredity and environment
caused man to choose evil, and the proponents of free will believed the
opposite, that man was not caused or compelled, ‘he did it of his own
accord; he wanted to do it, he didn’t have to.’ The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact I
shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which
only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words
have deceived everyone?

“You must be kidding? Here you are in the process of
demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath
you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free
to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he
considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he
prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this
action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural
compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the
expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in
any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true man has
to make choices he must always prefer that which he considers good
not evil for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

Again: In a wholly determined universe how could they have not been deceived by these words? Like those folks could have freely chosen to grasp the words such that they were not deceived by them.

They could not NOT have been deceived by words, but hopefully with greater clarification this will help them NOT to be deceived by those same words.

They couldn't. No one is saying they could have. That's why it is being explained in a way that will help them understand these words [in a wholly determined universe].

It is being explained to them in the only way it was ever going to be explained to them. And they react to the explanation in the only way they were ever sble too. It's not like they were ever free to grasp your explanation if they do not grasp it.

This is a given iambiguous. Your words are correct but they are repetitive. I know I know, you can't not say what you're saying. I'm hoping you will continue to listen so we can move forward rather than backtracking by saying this is the only way it could have ever been. That's A GIVEN!

In other words, everything that we think, feel, say and do is inherently intertwined of necessity in the unfolding material universe.

EVERYthing.

Very true. From moment to moment we are controlled by a law that we have no control over because we are always moving from a position of dissatisfaction to a position of greater satisfaction, or from point A to point B. This does not mean we are always satisfied, but we are more satisfied in this new position than what the previous position offered. That's all it means. If we were satisfied in remaining at point A, we would never have desired to move to point B, which is life or movement.

He was clarifying that saying "I did something of my own free will" is correct when it means "I did something of my own desire because I wanted to.

But if you could never not want to...?

Correct!!!!!!!!!! There is no choice that could have been made but the choice that WAS made. Why are you trying to convince me when I know this is true?

It does not mean I did something because I was compelled to do it based on previous events that forced me to do it against my will. That is an important point because determinism, as it's presently defined, implies that we are forced, against our will, to do what we do based on antecedent factors, when NOTHING has the power to make us to anything against our will. We have absolute control over this.

And if our "will" is but one more of nature's dominoes toppling over [necessarily] into the choices we make in any particular context...?

The domino analogy is problematic because it presupposes the agent is nonexistent.

And, from my frame of mind, even given some measure of autonomy, the "will" is embedded in the existential contraption that intertwines dasein, conflicting goods and political economy in the is/ought world. A world where value judgments collide all the time.

The reason you're having a problem is because you are relinquishing the agent altogether, are you not? I don't think you think you are, but actually I think you are not taking into consideration that choices are made not by antecedent events that force a chess move; they are choices made in the present based on what a person is considering.

Think about this once again. Was it humanly possible to make Gandhi and his followers do what they did not want to do when unafraid of death which was judged, according to their circumstances, the lesser of two evils? In their eyes, death was the better choice if the alternative was to lose their freedom. Many people are confused over this one point. Just because no one on this earth can make you do anything against your will does not mean your will is free. Gandhi wanted freedom for his people and it was against his will to stop his nonviolent movement even though he constantly faced the possibility of death, but this doesn’t mean his will was free; it just means that it gave him greater satisfaction to face death than to forego his fight for freedom.

This makes sense to him, to you. To me though [in a wholly determined universe] it does not.

Obviously Gandhi's choice was wholly determined, so where is your disagreement? He chose [in the direction of what gave him greater satisfaction among the alternatives available to him] to be killed rather than to give up his fight for freedom. Where does any of this comment dispute "a wholly determined universe?"

Either Ghandi's choices in the world back then might have been other than what they were...and history been changed...or they were always going to be what they were and history unfolded only as it ever could have.

We either have free will or we don't. Just because our world is developing and different choices are made at different times in history that are different from what we would choose now, does not alter the FACT that we are moving in the direction of greater satisfaction every moment of our lives. I will state one last time, who is arguing with you iambiguous that everything unfolds as it could only ever be?

Consequently, when any person says he was compelled to do what he did against his will, that he really didn’t want to but had to because he was being tortured, he is obviously confused and unconsciously dishonest with himself and others because he could die before being forced to do something against his will. What he actually means was that he didn’t like being tortured because the pain was unbearable so rather than continue suffering this way he preferred, as the lesser of two evils, to tell his captors what they wanted to know, but he did this because he wanted to not because some external force made him do this against his will. If by talking he would know that someone he loved would be instantly killed, pain and death might have been judged the lesser of two evils. This is an extremely crucial point because though it is true that will is not free, ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ON THIS EARTH CAN MAKE MAN DO ANYTHING AGAINST HIS WILL. He might not like what he did — but he wanted to do it because the alternative gave him no free or better choice. It is extremely important that you clear this up in your mind before proceeding.[/i]

Admittedly, I may well be unable to grasp this point, but like the point above, it makes no sense to me in a wholly determined universe. Either the folks here -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Ghrai ... oner_abuse -- were choosing and behaving of their own volition and history may well have been different, or there was never a way in which history here could have unfolded other than the way it did.

History is what it is. It could not have been any different. The problem you're having is you're belief that I'm trying to change what could never be. That's not what I'm doing. I'm just stating a simple comment that if a person doesn't want to do something, nothing but nothing can make him do it. That's it. Please take in what I'm saying because it doesn't conflict with anything you're saying, but it's an important point as you will see if we get to move forward.

What we want to do under torture would seem [to me] to be no less what we could only ever have wanted to do if "I" here is embedded in a wholly determined universe. Just as the one inflicting the torture could not have chosen not to inflict it.

Yes, you're right. The author said this in Chapter One, which you didn't read because you don't think it's worth your time.

The government holds each person responsible to obey the laws
and then punishes those who do not while absolving itself of all
responsibility; but how is it possible for someone to obey that which
under certain conditions appears to him worse? It is quite obvious
that a person does not have to steal if he doesn’t want to, but under
certain conditions he wants to, and it is also obvious that those who
enforce the laws do not have to punish if they don’t want to, but both
sides want to do what they consider better for themselves under the
circumstances. The Russians didn’t have to start a communistic
revolution against the tyranny that prevailed; they were not compelled
to do this; they wanted to. The Japanese didn’t have to attack us at
Pearl Harbor; they wanted to. We didn’t have to drop an atomic
bomb among their people, we wanted to. It is an undeniable
observation that man does not have to commit a crime or hurt
another in any way, if he doesn’t want to. The most severe tortures,
even the threat of death, cannot compel or cause him to do what he
makes up his mind not to do. Since this observation is
mathematically undeniable, the expression ‘free will,’ which has come
to signify this aspect, is absolutely true in this context because it
symbolizes what the perception of this relation cannot deny, and here
lies in part the unconscious source of all the dogmatism and
confusion since MAN IS NOT CAUSED OR COMPELLED TO
DO TO ANOTHER WHAT HE MAKES UP HIS MIND NOT
TO DO — but that does not make his will free.
In other words, if someone were to say — “I didn’t really want to
hurt that person but couldn’t help myself under the circumstances,”
which demonstrates that though he believes in freedom of the will he
admits he was not free to act otherwise; that he was forced by his
environment to do what he really didn’t want to do, or should he make
any effort to shift his responsibility for this hurt to heredity, God, his
parents, the fact that his will is not free, or something else as the
cause, he is obviously lying to others and being dishonest with himself
because absolutely nothing is forcing him against his will to do what
he doesn’t want to do, for over this, as was just shown, he has
mathematical control.

What freaks people out about this is the idea that no one can ever be held morally responsible for something they could never have not done. But they are, in turn, freaked out only because they could never have not been freaked out.

I agree. They had to be freaked out but that doesn't mean they have to continue to be freaked out out once they understand the true meaning of determinism and the amazing knowledge that lies behind that heremetically sealed door.

...of late the news here in America has been splattered with accounts of Trump's national emergency aimed at building a wall on the border with Mexico.

Given the assessment above what are the players in this political conflict actually choosing autonomously [freely] to think, feel, say or do.

Is this all unfolding necessarily per nature's immutable laws or can minds be changed and new policies pursued.

Of course minds can change according to new information. That being said, everything is being played out as it has to be, but that doesn't mean war has to continue, hate has to continue, poverty has to continue, crime has to continue, once we are given the knowledge how to prevent these occurrences from continuing.

War seems
to be an inescapable feature of the human condition which can only
be subdued, not eradicated. But we must insert a question mark
between the empirical fact that a feature is characteristic of human
life as we know it, and the empirical claim that this feature is a
sociological inevitability. Another reason that war is viewed as an
unfortunate and intractable aspect of human existence is due to
suffering itself, which sadly robs its victims of the ability to dream or
have the breadth of vision to even contemplate the possibility of peace.
The evil in the world has so constricted man’s imagination that his
mind has become hardened, and he shows contempt for anyone who
dares to offer a solution because such claims appear ludicrous and
unfounded.

Of course new policies can be changed per nature's immutable laws. Once again, you are using a definition of determinism that isn't accurate because being within the laws of our nature doesn't mean our choices are fixed in advance without our consent. This is why the above clarification is so important.

I'm less keen on definitions then on the extent to which any particular definition is brought down to earth. Our consent [regarding anything we think, feel, say, do] is either embedded in some measure of autonomy, volition, free will etc., or it is wholly in sync with a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter.

No conflict here.

Me, I situate human interactions of this sort in my own understanding of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. Out in a No God world in which I take my leap to some measure of autonomy.

Having this type of autonomy does not step outside of natural law.

This makes sense to me only to the extent that, in seeking greater satisfaction, I was able to choose not to think as I do. Because in thinking like this it brings me anything but a feeling of being satisfied.

You are satisfied to be here otherwise you wouldn't be here. You are able to choose not to answer me, not to engage, not to argue, not to debate, etc. You have absolute control over walking away, and there is nothing I could do to convince you otherwise, if your mind is made up. Nothing has the power to make you do what you don't want to do, for over this you have absolute control, but this does not make your will free. I don't know if you grasp this or not.

Over and over again: if you are only able to "choose" to make this point on this thread, then it is but one more necessary component of a real world subsumed in a wholly determined universe. No one posting here, no one following the exchange was ever really free to not do so.

True, but we're not dominoes.

Our brains would appear to be [up to now] matter able to become conscious of itself as matter having evolved over time given the evolution of life on earth. Life somehow having evolved from mindless matter. How then is mindful matter different from mindless matter? That's always been the gist of it here. Are human brains able to choose differently from those acts of nature that appear to be completely mindless?

Humans are able to think and ponder and ruminate. In this respect humans differ from other species. Call it whatever you want. Bottom line: We are developing and we are progressing as we have always done from the beginning of time. Eventually this new world is going to become a reality not because of anything I'm saying, but because this is the law of our nature.

Well, we don't fully grasp that. But, in the interim, dominoes topple over only as they were ever able to and we think, feel, say and do things only as we were/are/will ever be able to.

Just don't leave out the agent.

Here, however, you make a distinction that I am not able to grasp given the assumption that we are in turn necessarily embedded in a wholly determined universe.

The word "embedded" is misleading for it assumes, ONCE AGAIN, we, as agents have no say in what we choose.

My telling you that you keep making the same point may alter your next choice, as part of your consideration.

But: Could you have ever chosen not to tell me this point? Could I ever reacted to it [over and over again] other than as I did/do/will?

Nothing up to this very instant could have been done differently.

You seem to think that there's no point to discuss anything because it's already fated. That's not what I'm saying at all because part of how fate turns out is dependent on our choices from moment to moment. We are co-creators, so to speak. We are not passive recipients to whatever takes place, even though what ends up taking place is beyond our ultimate control.

Ultimate control? Or any control at all?

We don't have ultimate control. We have control only in the sense that nothing prior to the present moment could force us to do anything against our will. No domino, so to speak, can force us to choose something we don't want to choose. Obviously in a situation where we were stuck on a train track and the train was coming, we would be hit like dominoes falling down one after the other. But that's not the same issue.

Then...

...rocks cannot contemplate therefore the configuration is different as you mentioned, thus people think of free will as having choices.

But if what we do contemplate is only that which we were ever able to contemplate, how are we not but rocks with brains?

This is all true, but humans have the capacity to think, contemplate (rocks cannot) and progress as we develop as a species. In so doing, we can create a better world yet all within the framework of natural law.

Rocks don't think. We do. But, as with the rocks, we are on a trek into the future only as it is ever able to be.

Our capacity to think generates [psychologically] the illusion of freedom. That rocks don't have this capacity distinguishes them from us. But our brain is no less "choosing" to ski down the mountain than a rock is "choosing" to tumble down it in a landslide.

In a determined universe.

How then are we not "for all practical purposes" the equivalent of nature's dominoes/puppets? We think ourselves into believing that we are choosing freely to ski down the mountain. But nature knows better.

I hope you realize by now that we do not choose freely, but we do choose. We were given the attribute of contemplate to decide whether a choice is good for us or not good for us, IN OUR EYES. Why would we be given an attribute if we couldn't use it?

Thus...

...how is choosing to extend this knowledge not in turn just another inherent manifestation of nature?

Who said it wasn't another inherent manifestation of nature? Whatever choice is made is what could never not have been made.

Sorry, but I'm still completely lost here in regard to what you are trying to convey. Either you are free to make another attempt to explain it, and I am free to get it this time, or "whatever choice [either of us selects]...is what could never not have been made".

God's thinking [in however He manages to think] is either autonomous or determined. Just as with those who equate God with the universe [the pantheists]: this intertwining either has some element of volition in it or it doesn't.

Volition is something we as humans have, but this does not grant us free will. I hope you're really listening to what I'm saying because people often half listen just so they can respond with their ideas without ever taking the necessary time to understand the other person's perspective.

volition: the faculty or power of using one's will.

So, is that "faculty and power" autonomous or not?

We are not constrained by anything but our inability to make only one choice at any given moment in time.

And, as for "really listening" to what you're saying, there are some folks who tell you this, but what they mean is, "if you were really listening to me, you would agree with me."

So is this about you're wanting to be right at all costs, or is this about trying to understand what this discovery has to offer before telling me I'm wrong?

The faculty of using one's will to make a choice from our present position that has grown uncomfortable to the next position we are now standing on does not in any way, shape, or form grant us freedom of the will where choice is free from our environment, genetics, and predispositions.

[peacegirl]

Here is Ambiguous citing Strawson in this forum:

"Strawson himself was optimistic that compatibilism could reconcile determinism with moral obligation and responsibility." He accepted the facts of determinism. He felt that determinism was true. But he was concerned to salvage the reality of our attitudes even for libertarians, whom he described as pessimists about determinism."

May be there'in lies hidden poignancy.

Compatibilism does not increase moral responsibility. It justifies blame and punishment which satisfies the status quo of our present penal and justice system. In so many words, it states that if a person is of sound mind, when given a choice that is not constrained by physical force, he can [freely] choose not to do harm to anyone. What I am presenting is not about reconciling free will with determinism, because there is no free will. Being able to say "no" to an action does not mean we have free will because the choice not to do it, is still within the purview of determinism.

The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free.

[Meno_]

Here is Ambiguous citing Strawson in this forum:

"Strawson himself was optimistic that compatibilism could reconcile determinism with moral obligation and responsibility." He accepted the facts of determinism. He felt that determinism was true. But he was concerned to salvage the reality of our attitudes even for libertarians, whom he described as pessimists about determinism."

May be there'in lies hidden poignancy.

Compatibilism does not increase moral responsibility. It justifies blame and punishment which satisfies the status quo of our present penal and justice system. In so many words, it states that if a person is of sound mind, when given a choice that is not constrained by physical force, he can [freely] choose not to do harm to anyone. What I am presenting is not about reconciling free will with determinism, because there is no free will. Being able to say "no" to an action does not mean we have free will because the choice not to do it, is still within the purview of determinism.

The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free.

If compatibility justified blame, rather then increase moral responsibility then
Strawson's paraphrased words here may be proper at this juncture:


In his landmark essay, ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ P. F. Strawson (1962) sets out to adjudicate the dispute between those compatibilists who hold a consequentialist view of responsibility and those incompatibilists who hold the merit-based view.[9] Both are wrong, Strawson believes, because they distort the concept of moral responsibility by sharing the prevailing assumption sketched above — the assumption that holding persons responsible rests upon a theoretical judgment of their being responsible. According to Strawson, the attitudes expressed in holding persons morally responsible are varieties of a wide range of attitudes deriving from our participation in personal relationships, e.g., resentment, indignation, hurt feelings, anger, gratitude, reciprocal love, and forgiveness. The function of these attitudes is to express “…how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people—and particularly some other people—reflect attitudes towards us of good will, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt,-.

Contemp may breed resentment, and this is the limit to where positivism can lead us.


On the other hand, the positivist approach lends to the judgement accorded thusly: and again return to him:


"sets out to adjudicate the dispute between those compatibilists who hold a consequentialist view of responsibility and those incompatibilists who hold the merit-based view.[9] Both are wrong, Strawson believes, because they distort the concept of moral responsibility by sharing the prevailing assumption sketched above — the assumption that holding persons responsible rests upon a theoretical judgment of their being responsible. "

The above justifies a positive approach, in some affinity with those, who are not in agreement with the idea that moral judgements can be settled on theoretical grounds, such as Kant, and even Marx. For if they were, then the famous synthesis would need to be based an a-priori synthetic base, (prior to the judgement)
This is cleverly denied by all positivist, and perhaps rightly so.

As a result, cupuld compatibility be excluded as manifested in resentment, or should they remain even as a contingent apparatus in measuring an assumeable degree of human will, to resist determination?

I'm not at all sure I'm making sense, but I'd be happy to rephrase if so desired.

[Jakob]

But what is gratifyingly made clear is the meaning of "free will". It is, in your discourse, the ability to attribute value judgments.
Per you, such judgments are per definition untrue. As there is no free will.

Your judgments of Capitalism as being wrong are your free will. And thus dont exist.

Which is interesting and believable.

On the other hand let's keep space open for the notion that the power to make value judgments does exist, as a prerequisite for life.

These persectives can then decide between them which one is right.

Ill bump this to be sure.

[promethean75]

Then Lenin and you are opposed. He says Capitalism "deserves" - is culpable for causing - the crime it gets.

Or is it that man has no free will but Capitalism, as some kind of entity, does?

ah i see what you're doing. you're asking how a determinist could blame a certain economic system for producing conflicts between people who don't have the freewill to not produce those conflicts. indeed, there is a bit of an impasse here so long as a critique attempts to proceed on moral grounds. the only way around this problem is to replace the premise with a kind of hedonistic imperative and evoke a utilitarian point of view on the matter; we say despite whether or not capitalism is 'right' or 'wrong' according to [insert favorite ethical theory], it produces a grossly disproportionate hedonic calculus in practice. and since 'pleasure' and 'pain' are states which are absolutely certain and free from the interrogating finger of philosophy - 'how can you be sure you're experiencing pleasure or pain' is a question only and idiot philosopher would ask - the degree to which these states exist is the thing that should be brought into question when examining an economic system. so because capitalism produces a hedonistic calculus which results in a greater amount of pain and suffering in a majority, in exchange for a proprotionately smaller amount of pleasure and success for a minority, one would have to set the premise that the pleasure of the few over the majority is justified. but how can one do that? such a justification would be a value statement, a moral statement, and have absolutely no grounds other than as a simple emotivistic expression; the capitalist says 'capitalism is good because X', and this only means 'i like it'. there is no quality 'goodness' out there in the world which would vindicate capitalism of its disproportionate calculus. and yet at the same time, one can neither say the majority should experience less pain and suffering, as that kind of claim would fall under the same terms.

it simply comes down to this simple question; why would a majority allow capitalism to persist when it creates this disproportion. again, we aren't attacking or defending capitalism on the merits of it's being either 'good' or 'bad' in principle. we are looking at its material affects. we are asking why there are more empty houses than there are homeless people. we are asking why so many people die every day when there is sufficient aid and resources to keep them alive. we are asking why people are starving when there is so much surplus of food in the world that half of it spoils before it is ever used. we are asking why we willingly allow the cyclic crashes of the market to occur every so many years because of the accumulation of dead capital made stagnant. we are asking why so much money is being spent on military expenditures for countries to defend themselves against neighboring countries... all of which will eventually end up becoming economically interdependent, any fucking way.

but you must understand that there will never be agreement between the two warring classes that are involved in this silly nonsense. the capitalist is not concerned with any of these problems, while the worker most certainly is. and it is up to the working classes to resolve these ridiculous matters and change the calculus.

you might say that my approach here is like an amoral utilitarianism founded on a hedonistic imperative. i have simplified the problem and brought it out of the philosophical sophistry and haze that has so clouded the world for centuries. the atheistic randian capitalist says 'there is nothing stopping me, nor can there be'... to which i reply 'there is nothing stopping me either, nor will there be. now what do we do, mr. galt?'

and with that, 2000 years of philosophy does an enormous u-turn and arrives right back at thrasymachus. might is right. philosophical 'reasons' come after the fact, apropos to whatever sophistry one employs to defend their place of power.

But what is gratifyingly made clear is the meaning of "free will". It is, in your discourse, the ability to attribute value judgments.
Per you, such judgments are per definition untrue. As there is no free will.

Your judgments of Capitalism as being wrong are your free will. And thus dont exist.

whether 'free' or not, the gravity of the values of the working classes is enough to set the movement in motion without needing to justify it on any moral or ethical grounds. this amounts to the working class saying to the capitalist; 'that you are not free to do otherwise is irrelevant, as you are still a big fucking hemorrhoid in the asshole of the world. we don't need to 'blame' you for anything. what is to 'blame' is neither here nor there and was never a question. the working classes don't do metaphysics. that's a philosopher's nonsense.