I think a choice is less dimensional than that. Choices need to be redacted , except to the one which is in conflict from one person to the other.
Lets say my choices regarding a certain course of action is either to do or avoid doing it.
Basically, I can either go outside or stay in of it rains. There is no two ways about it. If, we so not surmise choice as a problem of duality, but start with innumerable choices relating to many courses of action , then the problem becomes prevy to the objection, that since so many choices abound, the will to do something as opposed to another will be a matter of finding the most preferable course, where preference seeks to clarify as to why such course is preferred.
The being/nothingness of human action does not gear up to preferential choices, it confirms to necessary ones, relating to such choices which determine the actual status of the choice itself. The why is not determinate once the choice is made preferentially.
If it rains I choose not to go out.
This needs no further explanation. , because it speaks for itself. Everyone most likely would understand why , as opposed to another example and choose accordingly.
Going into a confectionery, a young lady is asked to choose between types of chocolates, candy, cakes and cookies. There is a whole array of choices and the question as to how free she is to choose, depend on her own taste, that of whomever she is with, and after suggesting this or that particular choice, the girl even at this point can not choose anything at all, since the conditional of her choice has not been as of yet confirmed. Her mom or her companion may say that she has not the the money to buy, as she first thought, or the girl may change her mind about finding a preferred choice.
There may not be the suggested conflict of choice, as of yet, because the necessity of making a choice has not been as of yet been intended.
If, it is proposed that a person stays in or goes out in spite of the rain, the intention has been ascertained , and that person can not at that point say I will do neither, since, there is no other choice.
The plentitude of choices will never intersect with other’s in this example , it will always be an individual choice necessitated by the only person who must make it, since he made it.
It would lead the analyst into the absurd proposition, like ‘i love strawberries but I don’t eat them’ into the manifold problem of further qualifications, which usually not necessary in a sensible world.
Wouldn’t it be more sensible for a person who will not eat strawberries to qualify why not, by expressing a health problem associated with eating them in the first place?, or , being out of season hence unaffordable, or some such, become a primary expressed qualifier?
I don’t see conflict on an inquiry into the analysis of qualifiers, as that which exist in a dualistic system where doing it or not manifests a necessity , where doing it or not has no contingent measures to enable its performance.
Another more close to home example is abortion. If not performing an abortion on a woman has a good chance to risk her life, the choices are no longer qualifiable by such , as.: her familie’s attitudes about abortion, or the view of a bias in a doctor or hospital with religious preferences.
There is no conflict here relating the necessity of aborting or not based on conflicting qualifiers.
If such way of.argument should bear different results, then , the argument is clothes in inauthentic forms, and becomes fallacious.
The authenticity of argument becomes a primary qualifier,
leaving the existential problem unsolved. The so called conflict in values is always formed as a secondary derivative , not primarily of necessity, but contingency.
A contingent conflict is more of a.rationalization to avoid doing something or not. Its a.way to postpone or deny authentic choice.