All this makes good sense to me. Just keep in mind that we sometimes have to move into tangents and talk about the purely abstract non-demonstrable stuff just to get clarity on each other’s meanings.
Well, political freedom has to do with laws and government, so it has absolutely nothing to do with batteries or car parts. Psychological freedom might have to do with, I don’t know, a state the car engine might be in?
Yeah, I know, that’s all you’re concerned about. But for someone who feels so strongly that these discussions should be brought into the world of real men and woman struggling for political power and (what was it?) conflicting goods, you sure seem to be barking up the wrong tree. If you want to deal with the majority of people in their day-to-day struggles in the world of politics, economics, religioun, etc., I’d highly recommend adopting the “psychological” definition of freedom. That’s what most people understand and will be most receptive to.
(Even if you could get them to understand and believe in metaphysical freedom, or the lack thereof, they wouldn’t care about it.)
Then why do you speak as though determinism is a given?
The irony is that the quote you sited supports the indeterminism of quantum mechanics and throws out the hard determinism of classical mechanics.
If that is my assumption, it is only because I could not not have that assumption.
(^ I’ve been waiting for an opportunity to use that. )
You only said that, Biggy, because you were never going to not say that.
If it’s not obvious, it’s only because it was never not going to be not obvious.
Hey Biggy, you know what I just realized? Check it out: you only think that because you were never going to not think that. <— Now that’s deep, eh bro?
We need not infer freedom of choice. I am just saying that you’re not special. Other people do it all the time, and whether they do it because the laws of matter forced them to or they really did make a free choice to do it, you’re human like the rest of us, and there is no reason you, at some future time, can’t make a similar switch.
I would very much like an answer to my question: do you think that in order to have a subjective experience, one must be able to choose that subjective experience (this was the example about choosing to see a banana as blue).
I mean that I ask you questions in order to get clarity on your points. This, to me, would be a great help in moving the discussion forward. So when you avoid answering them, this to me stifles the discussion.
I would think Nietzsche would be amongst the top reads in your repertoire of philosophical material. He was a moral philosopher of the highest grade, and spoke numerously on free will and determinism.
But that’s not why I bring him up. He also taught how to see through the logic of people’s arguments to their motives. He taught to question not what people were saying but why they were saying it. People, he said, argue philosophies and other intellectual points, not to uncover and disseminate the truth, but to gain power. The existence of God is irrelevant to the preacher, only that his flock be made believers, for in that case he gains power over them. Now, in your case, Biggy, I don’t think you’re trying to gain power, but to avoid weakness. In avoiding my questions with the tactic: it’s futile to answer your questions, gib, because whatever answer I give you, it will be the only answer I was ever able to give you—you avoid exposing weaknesses in your arguments. That’s why I can agree with your point—it probably would be the only answer you could give to my question—but like the existence of God to the preacher, that is irrelevant to your true motive, which is to avoid exposing a weak spot in your argument.
I imagine the problem for you, Biggy, is more than just that there is a gap, but a paradox. The way you argue your points comes across as though you think that in a world of pure materialism and unyielding physical laws, of cold lifeless matter and accidental events, there cannot be free will, consciousness, mind, and meaning. While I acknowledge that there is a gap between what I think I know and all that I would need to know (in order to finally know “the truth”), I am able to entertain certain possibilities—ways in which there might be free will, consciousness, mind, and meaning—so the gap isn’t paradoxical to me. <— This is enough to allow me to live with the unknown with some measure of peace.
I guess you could say it’s like a scientist who suddenly comes upon a theory for some unexplained anomaly that he and his peers have been studying. His peers are mystified by it—they can’t explain it—it flies in the face of everything they know about science. But this one scientist has a theory that allows him to make sense out of it even though, at present, it is only an intellectual contraption in his mind. He can readily admit that he doesn’t know if the theory is true—it hasn’t been tested yet—and so the anomaly is, strictly speaking, still unexplained, but it doesn’t bother him nearly as much as it seems to bother his peers.
“A meaning has been concocted”… meaning what? A meaning for “choice”? <— That’s exactly what compatibilism is: a concocting of a new meaning for words like “choice”, “freedom”, “will”… such that they become compatible with determinism.
^ That’s what I’ve been trying to explain. “Freedom” doesn’t mean “freedom from physical laws” anymore (never did, really). It means freedom from external forces (or sometimes internal) trying to make your life difficult—people trying to force you against your will… or natural forces like gravity forcing you to stay on the ground despite your best efforts to fly. But to make yourself a cheese and ham sandwich? There’s no external forces stopping you there, so you are free to make yourself a cheese and ham sandwich.
^ Essentially, compatibilism is getting back to grass roots, the layman’s understanding of freedom. It asks the question: what does the layman think he is free to do? What does he want freedom from? And the answer is very rarely: the laws of nature. So long as he is free from this or that (thugs, gravity, corrupt government), the compatibilist will take that definition of freedom and focus his philosophy around it.
Here we are clearly stuck. If the things I think, feel and do are all intertwined necessarily in a brain intertwined necessarily in the laws of matters, what is the point of making such a distinction? Other than because “I” was never able not to make it?
Human emotional and psychological reactions occur in dreams as well. But how are they not entirely determined by brain matter? And how can we determine that, with the brain awake, it’s different?
But if feeling forced is the only option the brain is equipped to create, you are bascially forced to feel forced. The larger animal and the thief would be no less compelled to think and feel and act as they do in a wholly determined universe.
I just don’t grasp this “psychological freedom” the way you do.
I mean, sure, there it is, this feeling that I am freely choosing to type these words here and not others. But how can it be demonstrated to me that this sense of autonomy is the real deal?
Why is is not reasonable to argue that the brain parts interact only as matter must there in creating the car parts that interact only as matter must in the engine?
The car parts as mindless matter are not conscious of making choices of course but that’s the mystery of mind: matter able to convince itself that the choosing is autonomous.
Thus…
My point here however is that I am conflicted. I am of “two minds”. A part of me is convinced that any autonomy we do possess in the is/ought world is circumscribed by the manner in which I construe the components of my own moral philosophy. But another part of me is not even convinced that we possess autonomy in the either/or world.
There is no wrong tree here for me. There is only this: not being able to pin down the extent which “I” am in fact in possession of any capacity to determine my own life.
Again, the presumption here [from my frame of mind] is that if I do adopt this definition, it is only becasue I could not have chosen not to.
But I have no way [here and now] in which to know this beyond all doubt. And neither do you.
Unless of course your take on all of this is in fact the most rational way in which to assess it. But if that were the case you would still have to devise an argument such that it can be demonstrated in turn that all rational men and women are obligated to embrace it in turn.
But: were they ever able to care about it?
If I thought like that, I would never pursue my other aim here: groping with the existential parameters of this: How ought one to live?
Instead, with respect to “free will”, I am drawn and quartered by arguments that make at least some sense from both sides.
Well, I thought its main point revolved around the extent to which even scientists gropping to comprehend the either/or world can ever really be certain that what they think they understand now will be sustained for long into the future.
Yes, that’s what we are attempting to come to grips with here: the extent to which any reactions from any of us were/are within our capacity to have been other than what they were/are instead.
How deep though? Is it in fact true…going all the way back to whatever it is that explains the existence of existence itself?
I am only suggesting that not only do I not know how deep it is, but that neither do you. There are only those who actually do think that their own TOE here and now either encompasses it or comes closer than anyone else.
The objectivists in other words. And whether with respect to the either/or world or the is/ought, their main aim is, in my view, to attain and then to sustain a psychological frame of mind that, to whatever degree, comforts and consoles them.
Then it comes down to whether or not they were ever able to not do this.
But then we’re still stuck with trying to figure out what it means to be human in a world in which none of us can really know for sure if what we do figure out is only that which we were ever only able to figure out. And even then we don’t know how wide the gap is between “in our head” and “all there is to know about existence itself.”
But how does this not immediately take us on to the next question: do you think that what you do think here is something that you chose to think “of your own free will”?
The banana is blue because someone painted it blue, or because you have taken LSD, or because your brain is diseased, or because you are dreaming it is blue.
It still comes down to whether with respect to any of these contexts there is an element of autonomy present.
Automobile mechanics asking questions to gain clarity regarding an engine that isn’t working…how is that the same or different from philosophers and scientists asking questions to gain clarity regarding the choices that they make in fixing it? What particular questions would pin down once and for all if these choices could have been otherwise?
In other words, with some questions, there is only so much clarity to be had. We reach points in the discussions where one person’s clear thinking is anything but that to others.
And the “free will” antinomy is certainly one of those.
Given the sheer complexity embedded in the psychological parameters of any particular one of us, this may or may not be an accurate asessment of my own motivations and intentions here.
On the other hand, from my frame of mind here and now, I – “I” – am convinced that on this side of the grave we live in an essentially meaningless world and that on the other side of it I – “I” – is obliterated for all time to come.
So, to the extent that anyone is able to point out the weaknesses of this assessment, I can only be grateful.
On the other other hand, to the extent that we do in fact live in a wholly determined universe, I can only assume that this asessment was the only one I was ever going to make. At least up until now. I may well be “destined” to change my mind down the road.
So, how “weak” or “strong” is that assumption?
What can be exchanged here clearly?
And I suspect that the peace of mind that you and “most others” are able to sustain here is embedded in a psychological defense mechinism that revolves around one or another rendition of this: viewtopic.php?f=15&t=185296
But how on earth can any of us know for sure?
Maybe.
But what still works best for me is the rather simple understanding that whether or not I have free will, it doesn’t make food taste any less delicious or music sound any less exhilarating or films enchant me any less intensely…
…or in regard to all of the other things that I do which bring me enormous satisfaction and fulfillment. That’s the part I fall back on. All of the distractions available to us to take us out of our more debilitating frames of mind.
As with the scientist and his new theory. The thoughts and the feelings that he or she experiences “in the moment” are such that “free will” is the last thing that is likely to come to mind.
Still, with oblivion [free will or not] they’re all gone too.
Still, the part that “spoils” it for folks like me, is in imagining that all of this chooing, all of these new meanings given, were not as a result of me actually freely accomplishing this but only as the result of all the dominoes in my head toppling over onto each other as they only ever could have.
The experience is still there, but only because it could never have not been there.
In other words, this seems to work for you…
…in a way that really doesn’t make much sense to me. I’m simply not free to make a ham and cheese sandwich if I was always ever going to make it. If thinking that I am free is in turn the only way I was ever able to think about it, then this feeling of “compatibilism” is in turn illusory.
So, this part…
…is just another intellectual contraption that your brain was determined to concoct in order to sustain the illusion that a part of you – the psychological “I” – might have chosen something different.
Sure you do. You just don’t like. So you block it out.
I haven’t quite grasped what you’re ultimate aim in pursuing this all-encompassing determinism is, but given your interest in bringing the topic to the lives and struggles of human beings competing with each other and making moral judgement on each other, I’m going to guess that you want to prove to the world that no one is at fault for anything… ever… and thereby undermine all moral judgements. And here I come with my proposal of alternate meanings of freedom and ruin everything. How can no one be at fault for anything if yet another form of freedom rears its ugly head, a form by which we can continue to make moral judgements?
^ That’s your motive, I believe, and so the only form of freedom you’ll accept is the impossible kind.
I think you like it that way.
Prove it to me. The next time you remind us that you do or say or think X because you could never have not done or said or thought X, try coupling that with a statement underscoring what you would do if free will were real. You can begin with “On the other hand…” But I’ll bet my children’s education fund, I’ll never see you say it.
Ah, but… are we attempting to come to grips with this because we are freely choosing to? Or is it because we could never have not attempted to come to grips with it?
And BTW, why are you agreeing with me? What happened to the gap between what you think you know “in your head” and all that would be needed to know in order to say for sure what we are attempting to come to grips with?
If my answer to that question is the only answer I was ever able to give, what would be the point in giving it?
Not really.
We’re all human, Biggy, and I think we’d all take comfort in knowing that we’ll be taken care of by a benevolent God after we die, but there are some things we cling to more than hope in a blissful afterlife. Stakes in an argument, for example. You’ve clung to your nihilistic position for so long, and spoke in defence of it so many times, I think at this point, you’d prefer to be right despite knowing the implications that has for your “I”.
A lot more than you’re allowing for.
That doesn’t sound too peaceful. If I may suggest, maybe it’s just not having to be confused by how the world works. I have an understanding of how the world works on a fundamental metaphysical level. I may be right, I may be wrong. But once engraved into my mind, how can I undo this understanding? And why would I? Just for the sake of taking the hard road? Of being tormented by confusion and existential angst? ← No thanks.
Not if you understand what it’s saying.
And again, the feeling of freedom is no more an illusion than a dark room is the illusion of emptiness.
The advantage of compatibilism is that you actually can say that. You phrase it: “I could have chosen different, if I wanted to.”–the catch being that your wanting to is the determining force that decides your choosing one way or another. That we were destined to choose one way over another is neither here nor there with compatibilism.
With your sense of freedom, there is no way to distinguish between a man in his kitchen ready to make a sandwich and a starving prisoner begging a cruel guard for something to eat. In your view, they are both equally unfree to do anything. To everyone else, this makes all the difference in the world.
Tell you what… Biggy, do you like psychoanalyzing me? I like psychoanalyzing you. If we both agree to accept each other’s psychoanalyzations (because it’s fun), can we continue?
phyllo…
Some very profound questions there. I prefer to feel in control of my life. Even as a determinist (which I’m not sure I am), one can feel in control of one’s life. The only sense in which determinism entails no control over one’s life is if one believes all the determining factors controlling one’s self are outside one’s self (or not one’s self). But you can still say: it was me who did it, and yet think of yourself as just a cog in a wheel. You can still identify yourself as a link in the chain of cause and effect, and therefore any effect you have on the events that follow from your action comes from you. You can say: I made that happen, I was in control of it. What you can’t say with determinism is: I could have done otherwise.
But it’s true that if you believe you could not have done otherwise, you don’t really bear any responsibility for your actions, and so the determinist may be free of that.
You’re overlooking something critically important here.
You cannot say “I could have done otherwise” but you can say something much more damning if you were to add one or more conditions.
Which is exactly what taking responsibility demands we do anyway…
I not only could but WOULD have done otherwise, If only I were stronger, if only I were better educated, if only I placed more value on it… etc
If that is not an imperative toward self-improvement and responsibility, then nothing is.
That assumes that the determinist is identifying an ‘I’ or ‘self’. That’s not necessarily the case. Does a billiard ball, a rock or a cog have a ‘self’? No.
He can say that there is no one in control.
And even if he does identify a ‘self’, he can still say that his actions are entirely due to outside forces - forces which created him as he is (the properties of the rock or ‘self’) and forces currently acting on him (the present environment).
You’re the best Mags… but I have a feeling Biggy will reject this enticing offer, or just ignore it. Until then, no psychoanalyzing!
Yes, that’s why I left that part out. To be free in the incompatible sense is to say “I could have done otherwise,” period. Not if this was the case, or that condition was met, etc.
That is correct, phyllo.
This is why I was trying to say that there can be two types of determinists–those who think we are participants in the chain of cause and effect and those who think we (or “we”) are outside the system all together. Biggy keeps putting quotes around “I” so I think it’s fair to say he’s of the latter variety (plus he’s out right said so on numerous occasions).
I think the “I” is just what it feels like to be the cog in the wheel; sure, we’re nothing more than a system of neurons and chemicals processing information about the world, but that’s just what we look like from the outside, as a third person, but it’s still like something to be a system of neurons and chemicals, and that’s just our thoughts, emotions, and inner experiences–the view from the inside.
I’m going to assume you’ve lost sight of the context… though I do not know how.
So put into context… what you say above does NOT hold true at all because of this fairly critical oversight. The determinist cannot escape responsibility by recourse to “I could not have done otherwise”
In the context of responsibility, I would argue the “I could have done otherwise” is a weaker claim.
The implication is I could have done otherwise AS I AM… no correction required, no flaw, nor excellence… no cause at all is recognized.
I have to comment on this confused mess…
Seriously Phyllo, Gib…
Do not mistake one person’s failure to use language effectively with a variant of determinism, please.
What qualifies as “I” is a semantic issue, not a variant of determinism.
I could define identity in such a way to make it impossible outside of strict determinism… say something along the lines of anything that is not directly caused by my physical body’s interacting with the environment is not “mine” or is “outside of me”, thus making free will incompatible with the existence of an “I”
Though the classic conception is that there is a duality and in many cases (as a result) “I” is defined as the spirit or soul or otherwise immaterial entity that is in possession of the body, a body which is subject to this spirit’s will…
But these are definitions that are custom designed to fit a particular conception. If you use the “wrong” definition while applying a different conception, you will be left without the ability to identify an “I”
Agreed… but perhaps agency would be a better term than “choice”
You could make the same observation about a machine “selecting” how to steer down a hill…
A rudimentary version might be to simply detect and steer toward the most even topography within a short distance… but in order to implement any agency it requires certain conditions. It needs to be oriented such that it’s wheels touch the ground and the camera faces forward etc.
You might not consider that a “choice” but I would argue that’s a matter of definition… selecting a path based on a preference, no matter how predictable, is no less a selection.
Sure. You could say that a human being is a very sophisticated ‘machine’. It’s a machine making decisions based on a huge number of inputs and stored memory. Some of those inputs are far removed from the physical terrain of the hill. For example, a recommendation heard about which path to take, avoiding stepping on plants and animals for ethical reasons, mistaken assessments of situation or danger involved, fear in general, etc.
This is significantly removed from a rock or even a simple machine doing down hill. Or at least, I choose to think so.
Therefore, I would talk about human decisions in a particular way.
That is what I imagine we all elect to do… for strictly pragmatic reason if nothing else.
It’s way easier to model a goal seeking agent in our heads than a complex web of neural and chemical reactions as a result of stimuli past and present that ultimately result in something approximating said agent.
But I worry we’ve lost sight of any disagreement or topic at this point.
I was primarily interested in challenging your and Gib’s agreement about the implications a deterministic view has on individual responsibility.
Your original claim seemed to make the mistake of conflating determinism with fatalism given your conclusions but I could be wrong.
Gib then boiled it down to well you can find some measure of escape by recourse to “I could not have done differently” which I believe I have countered quite strongly.
See I find these intuitions people have about the implications of determinism on personal responsibility distressing.
I don’t think they have any logical basis, hence why I call them intuitions.
This is a view I encounter often as a determinist, and I don’t know if it’s caused by confusing determinism and fatalism or something else.
Granted I do not have a particularly strong attachment to determinism, it’s a view I hold entirely for pragmatic reasons and do not regard at all as conclusively true or false…
Yet on this topic I find I am often faced with a failure of logic for some inexplicable reason… and I lack a good explanation for why it occurs.
)
