“In particular, we should follow Davidson rather than (as Hesse does) Black in our account of metaphor. For, by putting metaphor outside the pale of semantics, insisting that a metaphorical sentence has no meaning other than its literal one, Davidson lets us see metaphors on the model of unfamiliar events in the natural world – causes of changing beliefs and desires – rather than on the model of representations of unfamiliar worlds, worlds which are ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘natural’. He lets us see the metaphors which make possible novel scientific theories as causes of our ability to know more about the world, rather than expressions of such knowledge. He thereby makes it possible to see other metaphors as causes of our ability to do lots of other things – e.g., be more sophisticated and interesting people, emancipate ourselves from tradition, transvalue our values, gain or lose religious faith – without having to interpret these latter abilities as functions of increased cognitive ability. Not the least of the advantages of Davidson’s view, I shall be arguing, is that it gives us a better account of the role played in our lives by metaphorical expressions which are not sentences – scraps of poetry which send shivers down our spine, non-sentential phrases which reverberate endlessly, change our selves and our patterns of action, without ever coming to express belief or desires.” -Rorty, Richard. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (p. 163). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
Throughout this particular immersion in Rorty (I still have one more book to go), one of the things I have sadly neglected is the import Rorty puts on Metaphor in the intellectual/philosophical process –even the scientific as I will try to go into later. And that seems strange to me as (in a clear, vulgar even, deferment to an appeal to authority (he kind of confirms what I have always suspected: the important role that resonance and seduction can play in an intellectual (as well as creative –go figure (process.
First of all, I would ask the reader to consider the possibility that the term “metaphor” is pretty much interchangeable with the term “model”. I mean think about it: when we present a model, it is as if we are basically saying: it is as if…… And it is all over philosophy. For instance, Sartre’s model of the relationship between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. And we can see, yet again, the pragmatic overlap in Deleuze and Guatarri’s de-centered rhizomatic network. And even as early as Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, it was clear that the creative act was never that far from Deleuze’s mind. Nor Guatarri’s for that matter given The Anti-Oedipus Papers. It’s no wonder they hooked up.
And we see as much in science. Take, for instance, the models offered by microphysics: atoms and molecules and the ways in which they interact. We see drawn pictures of them. Yet, we can only assume they exist from inference and the fact that those inferences seem to work, those models and metaphors. We do as much with energy.
And by “seem to work”, I mean that those models and metaphors resonate and seduce through their continued usefulness in dealing with our reality, that which seems to me a kind of evolutionary mandate.