To iambiguous

Iambiguous is not a complicated person to me.

This sums up iambiguous:

“Everyone! I don’t exist! BUT I feel like I’m not being heard or understood by anyone!”

Seriously, it’s like, iambiguous, they were able to make someone in 1984 say 2+2=6, as the ultimate assertion of dominance, and why do men use contradictions (self refutations) as ornaments? Because that’s the ONLY thing women will have sex with. Iambiguous is not in some great existential crisis … he’s trying to use his ego to assert social dominance through contradiction, to get laid, which requires zero intellectual work!! He’s like a guy who sweeps everything under the rug, and someone’s like “wow, you did all that work in 2 seconds?!”

I’m on to you iambiguous.

Wait, it gets even better!!

“I don’t exist!! But everyone listen to me, unless I agree with an argument about morality, it’s not reasonable”

Says the guy who says he doesn’t exist as a preface to everything!!!

Ha!

Seriously?!

Oh, and iambiguous…

In case you haven’t figured it out, none of this shit we see around us would exist if people were moral, including us … people don’t like that thought, so they disagree…

Who here can argue that it’s moral to have a child without prior building another house they can live in and own and provide their food for life? Nobody. It’s perfectly logical. That’s just one example.

Iambiguous is appealing morally to peoples ego that they should have been born, that they should be who they are, butterfly effect and all… and then calling everything good!

I hear this shit everyday!

“Nice day huh?” Operant conditioning. Psychoneurolinguistic programming.

I’ll even go a step further with iambiguous, he’s telling us that we all can’t handle the truth that he doesn’t exist…

I have a MUCH deeper hole… nothing we see around us should exist including us…

I also have a much more difficult problem than conflicting goods…

Give everyone everything they want without hurting anyone…

You call me the “kid”. You’re still in diapers !!

My interest in a discussion of this sort revolves less around what I construe to be “general descriptions” of human interactions in a world bursting at the seams with moral and political conflgrations, and more around the manner in which folks like Kant or Mill might have offered assessments regarding particular historical conflicts that have raged down through the centuries

Again:

[b]Let’s take “general description” assessments out into the world of moral conflicts most here will be familiar with.

How might those on either side of the conflict [immigration, abortion, animal rights, drug use, gun control etc] react to this argument insofar as they might find it useful in furthering their own political agenda?[/b]

In other words, in the course of living their lives from day to day to day.

Sure, there are those philosophers who argue that we can’t go there until we first establish a precise definition and meaning of the words used in the assessments.

And that’s certainly not an unreasonable point of view. But sooner or later these definitions embedded in a world of words have to make contact with the world we actually live and interact with.

Then what?

What are the limits [if any] of philosophy here?

In other words, while Wittgenstein once suggested that “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”, that just simply isn’t practical in a world where value judgments will ever and always clash.

We must speak of them. But what are the limits of that which we might say? Again if any.

It is almost axiomatic , that the general schema can not be separated from their applications, because the issues can not be delineated in terms of relevance to their meaning ,withoit retroactively posing as definite and.unlimited standards.

As structural basis is concerned, there need be certainty on the level of contradiction , at the level of jurisdiction, as it applies to law: is it a preponderance of evidential certainty which gives rise in a consensus to form an objective opinion.

I think , an absolute objectivism is missing from the formula, conflicting a relative objective.(s)

The more we travel from the ideal classical world to the Post modern world, the less such idealism becomes possible.

Holdouts are to be commended , they are the ones who will be noted first for their persostence on a passing era, amd as tables turn as they always do, clarity will return .

In real applicable terms, the concept of the reasonable man is an interesting application to the problem, which would bring in relevance in the field of law. It took Kant various voluminous writings in his critiques (pure reason, judgement and practical reason to bring this forth. Distilled to a few concepts, he never permits himself to consider man who can reason his way out from under the obligation to find , by pure reason, what objectivity should be, .(Critique of Practical Reason) Therefore , he vests a moral obligation , as the standard of a pure understanding, of what man Should Do, on basis of what is undeniably good and right.

But the naturalistic fallacy, bars him in the practical critique.The Reasonable Man, changed from an oblogation of
what isbexpected of him to know. how he would act. The reasonable man is one who would act in a way, consistent with how other men of reason would act under similar circumstances.

That there is no absolute way of finding out if even two people would or could think exactly the same way how to judge the correct rightness or wrongness of a judgement upon which their actions are based on, b the only judge of reasonableness lays on their own understanding.

Even in law, the act of how reasonable people would act , is found sufficient , as opposed to how they should act, a gain in deference to a variance.

Mill’s consequentialism is separated, but retroactively incorporated by merely changing the language from ‘should’ to ‘would’ in acting. under various conditions.

You are absolutely right in claiming no absolute criteria to determine objectivity , by necessity ,to view consensus by statistical analysis of what a reasonable man would d o under such and such of conditions.

done and redifined , because there needs a judgement, even in the absence of an absolute standard covering all sotiations.

So how can abortion and the issue around it be solved? Good question .

The Kennedy resignation (pressurized or not politically) may overturn Roe vs Wade, on the basis of a political leaning, and if it does it shows how judgement can return toward less reliance on the moral public opinion , and more on ethical imperative. Politics plays into altering what ostensibly is reasonable as to how a man acts…while. exposing anyone who claims they are absolutely free.

This freedom , based on the ability and the need to make individual decisions is limited, Society will disallow any action which it considers harmful, even to one’s self. Can the idea that suicide is illegal be demonstrated? Sure, a non voluntary commitment can be argued for persons who may harm themselves others.

In a perfect world , anyone could take their own life, a Karkorian need not argue for cases where illness determines the criteria of what is considered as having a certain quality of life. To be a perfectionist is one, who probably has the best available and arguably, the closest practice, education and moral preparation to determine the right action in regard to issues , which, need not need an ethical and a moral separation. Their record is near spotless in coming through with the right thing to do. Who’d be the judge? Themselves and others who had dealings with him.

That would place law as the final arbiter, showing how practical reason has prompted pure reason, by the notion of the judgement Itself.

The Judgement of Solomon comes to mind here, and how real and deceptive judgement can be discerned by the best of judges.

Thanks for the contribution but this is really not the sort of exchange that I am aiming for. I just don’t approach philosophy in the is/ought world from this…direction.

I seek to take basically academic analyses of this sort and introduce them to actual conflicting goods out in a particular context out in a particular world.

For all practical purposes as it were.

Some, of course, see this “the problem”. And, sure, it may well be. But, really, I advise them to move on to others here more interested in “technical” discussions of this sort.

Here you come closer to the sort of discussion that interests me.

Are there in fact “ethical imperatives” that those on either end of the moral/political spectrum are able to demonstrate as in fact obligatory points of view [sets of behaviors] for all rational men and women?

Are the Justices on the Supreme Court able to argue that while their own particular value judgments here are rooted existentially in the lives that they have lived [as daseins], there is a way in which to argue that, as a Constitutional issue, the “original intent” of the framers of that document revolved around either permitting or not permitting abortions to be legal?

And, then, once you go beyond the law and consider abortion as a moral issue, is there a way to transcend dasein here in turn? Are rational and virtuous men and women able to know – to know objectively – that abortion is either ethical or unethical?

If so then, okay, let’s here the arguments.

From my frame of mind, the relationship here between “I” [the individual] and “we” [society] will, in any particular human community, be embedded in actual existing historical, cultural and experiential contexts.

Now, there are those who argue that despite this one can still use God or Reason or Ideology or Nature etc., to determine what men and women are obligated to do if they wish to be thought of as virtuous. Or if they wish not to be punished for doing the wrong/bad thing.

Thus any particular society will have laws aimed at either prescribing or proscribing behaviors that revolve around suicide. Or, for that matter, infanticide, genocide, genital mutilation, slavery etc. But to what extent are they able to demonstrate that the laws themselves exist only because they are in fact in sync [morally] with the right thing to do?

Very early exporation into imaginary communities as they connect between ancient moral standards regarding particular stances on abortion , and some legal disagreements pending Rowe vs. Wade , and lastly the embodiment You introduced , as a conceptual term; finally, philosophycal underpinnings in Polanyi’s conceptual underpinnings and his followers in defining the term (embodiment) . His followers develop the concept further minus the Persian mystical train, adopting that as being able to arrive to a non objectionist view .

I post this , because its a work in progress , primarily instigated by You, and one thing i do remember a few years ago, which is really of not much importance , that i had an audio dream of Polanyi, the content of which i dont really remember.

The point i’m trying to.make is, that using value ontology, the meanig shift appears to be on Your side, but for foundamental differences that can arise, when introducing recent research into aspects which were previously of antic,-quasi mystical sources and attributes.

Ill try to come up with something soon but only as a general.framework , if You’re interested in such an approach.

The political manifest noted below,and how they might relate to imaginary communities, would be the next step in com-promising how moral imperatives sustain themselves without recourse to any pre-existing or a-priori ideas.

There is an other route, as described above, concerning the representative lean on ethical issues. That creates an illusion, as if, any adjudication would solve the divide between them.

If, for instance, Row v Wade is overturned, the difference may become practically void for all effective purposes, and descent into objectivity is elimimated, for practically, questions of legitemate representation~ (objetive) opinión becomes mute. Once done, the Supreme Court’s opinión is beyond reproach, and the same goes for what’s happening now, when the possibility of an overturn becomes a possibility.

It skirts the foundamental ontological judgememt by relying on Kant where his critique of judgement corresponds to the judgement of the Supreme Court’s viability. Reducing the objetive moral ethical difference by the representative by the Will of the people, makes further appeals to reason
Irrelevant until its overturned. (Practical v Reasonable) Critique.

The consequentialism implicit in Trump’s loaded intentionality (by a possble packed Court) , can forgo inquiery into rhetoric as indication of intent, as well.

This is another way to get out of the conflict by political manifest.

Well, one thing seems rather certain: we’re going nowhere fast.

You have your philosophical agenda here and I have mine. Let’s just leave it at that.

Ok but can we? If we are to get out from down under, we must return to at least a reproachment of sorts and by that I don’t intend to return to some kind of social synthetic . other people read this rag, supposedly , and they may be equally disappointed by us .giving up so easy. Lambigious I absolutely no way no how have an agenda to speak of , and I am quite sure You do not have one either.
Maybe there is ONE but I am leaning toward the many, and to choose is the way to go.

I would like to think there is a bright light at the end of this tunnel.

Depends, I suppose, on how one feels about suicide. Not a bright light perhaps but the consolation at least of knowing that there is an end that one can opt for.

But again , there is a grain (or a mountain ) of uncertainty whether suicide IS the end; which leaves it only a quasi option.

Well, let’s go back to the OP:

When contemplating suicide “I” either takes into account the part about “after ‘I’ die” or “I” doesn’t.

But my “I” here doesn’t exist as an entity able to grasp the “real me” able to in fact close the gap between what “I” think I know about all of this here and now and all that I would need to know ontologically/teleologically about the very nature of Existence itself.

Instead, “my suicide” is construed by me to be an existential contraption rooted in dasein, rooted in conflicting arguments regarding whether it is the right or the wrong thing to do out in a particular world where those in power prescribe and proscribe particular behaviors regarding either taking your own life or in assisting others in taking theirs.

Grain or mountian, the uncertainty here appears to be built right into the human condition. Perceived options here appear to be largely existential contraptions.

In fact, the one certainty we can all come to agree on seems to revolve around whether or not someone actually does commit suicide. Though even here it might actually be a staged suicide set up in order to cover up a murder.

The bottom line [mine] being that only the existence of God – an omniscient/omnipotent vantage point – allows for the sort of certainty the objectivists cling to. And they cling to it [in my view] in order to sustain some measure of psychological comfort and consolation.

And the “serious philosophers” here seem no more better equipped to pin it all down than the rest of us. In fact I suspect that, like all the rest of us, they too are all over the map [morally and politically] when it comes to voicing opinions about suicide and options.

Contraption or not? If Darwin was right on, why is that animals have no fear? If there was some something to the realization of time, as a human contraption , then minus that , animals should exhibit some instinctual end of time, as it were. But they do not seem to.

Would not the contraption of time then, not evident in Sun- genera, still have some sort of instinctual undertow?

The fact that generation goes on in spite of contraption of time, and on the contrary, appear to function in am instinctual world of timelessness., indicate the othwrwordliness of natural phenomenon?

If so , it defeats the idea of. Contraption as anti-natural.

Bergson, Rousaseau, James, and others are with this idea , as well as Nietzche, the philosopher par excellence working from analogous depths .

Again, our “contraptions” here are clearly out of sync.

Iambiguous true troll comes to bare…

“You can’t be an objectivist unless God exists”

And it’s subtle too “I don’t believe in God therefor there are no morals”

Iambiguous is a bible thumper.

There are 4 possibilities here iambiguous.

There is no God and no afterlife.
There is no god and an afterlife.
There is a god and no afterlife.
There is a god and an afterlife
There is no god and an afterlife.

Iambiguous trickily says that unless there is a god there can be no afterlife, and to make the trick stick, he says there is no god.

All of us are supposed to be like “well if I’m an objectivist, then god must exist”.

This is iambiguous’ wet dream.

Iambiguous is not a rational agent as they are called, for the spirit of honest inquiry – he has an agenda.

If you can’t see that he’s a bible thumping troll, you’re not reading him close enough

Above post was edited

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Unless of course I’m wrong.