I believe you have used the phrase value to society. That must entail deontological ideas.
You cannot evaluate the consequences without apriori deontological values. You have no criteria to work with. This health care proposal leads to X. X is bad because Y. Ask enough questions and you get down to deontology. Or it is not morals. It is simply an analysis between results and there is no way to argue that results set X is better than Y. It could do that in terms of say, goal A. But then we must argue why goal A is better, and again we turn to deontological criteria and rules.
The money issue does not create this problem for consequentialism. It is not a special case. It is inherent in consquentialism.
Even if, say, you do not want to argue that killing a neighbor’s baby is apriori immoral and when brought to that point while being questioned you say instead: well, here’s what happens when you allow people to just up and kill other people’s babies, you will then be describing, for example, things like loss of social cohesion, chaos, feuds, rampant revenge killings, and either justify these as negative in terms of new sets of consequences, keeping your Socratic interlocuter working as long as you can till you finally admit some deontological root, or accidently slip and simply present, for ex, societal chaos as an obvious bad, for example.
Otherwise consequentialism is not part of ethics or morality and you are talking about something like science.
It is working out the probable effects of a phenomenon. Like metereological science say.
To call it consequentialism is heavily implying that it is not mere prediction in statistics of effects, but includes value judgments and at root these will have deontological evaluations like: unnecessary suffering should be avoided, life is precious or has value, if people can get along this is better than if they do not. Not simply becasue of what these LEAD TO but because of that they are.
A consequentialist - a misleading term if considered distinct from deontologists I would say - tend to have more flexibility than the classic Abrahamist deontologist. Well, I might do that if it led to good effects or less bad ones. Less things prohibited apriori.
But actually the consequentialist is really just another deontologist, just one with, more abstract deontological values, which he or she uses to evaluate consequences. But those base values will not come into question. They will be seen as givens. Most open deontologists will still evaluate consequences. And if they are not traditional religious deontologists, they may even do this as much as those who identify as consequentialists. But even Abrahamists will look at effects and argue in meetings about why policy Y leads to bad stuff. Given that this latter group tends to have more specific deontologies, they may also argue from the root more often, but this is not inherent in deontology, since, well, consequentialists are all, I would argue, deontologists.
If they are not, then they are not actually consequentialists in the philosopical sense. They are predictors, with no way to justify why anyone, includning themselves, should choose one set of outcomes over another.
Unless they want to argue from preference. And that then puts them in another category and another branch of philosophy and they should probably call themselves something else.