Blasted irregular verbs! Thanks for the catch, I’ll correct it.
Again, I’d ask if this is true of the vanilla trolley problem, and if not, what is the distinction?
There are two separate questions here:
- Are there certain goods that can’t be weighed against each other? So, we might say that the vanilla trolley problem can’t be answered, because lives are special and can’t be compared, and (x) lives are always worth the same as (y) lives, no matter what values we put in (x) and (y).
- Is there a special moral calculus for mediating such comparisons through money, i.e. if it’s OK to cause (a) harm for (b) benefit, is it OK to be paid to do (a) harm if the money is used to buy (b) benefit? To me, this does not seem like a different case: if I can barter (a) for (b), I can sell (a) to buy (b).
KT, You make an interesting point here, although I think you and I may use the term “price” differently. I don’t see any contradiction in different people having different prices for things, and I don’t think “(x) is the price of (a)” is a normative claim, but an empirical one that is dependent on who the buyer and seller are.
A Ferrari might sell for $200k on the open market, but to me it’s worth the resale value because I have no use for a supercar; if I can’t resell it or scrap it for parts, it has negative value: I would pay to avoid owning a Ferrari that can only be used as a car. But that’s just saying that, knowing what money is and what it can buy, knowing what a Ferrari is and how it would function in my life, I would prefer a world where I have less money and no Ferrari to a world where I have more money and a Ferrari shaped ball-and-chain.
But that claim isn’t deontological, because it’s not about what people should value. My particular live circumstances make a Ferrari very low value to me (I live in a crowded city, parking is expensive and crime is high, etc.).
But I do think this hypothetical betrays an instinctual deontology in most consequentialists. If you accept that consequences make the morals, and you agree that World A is better than world B, then the question is easy. But comparing money and morals feels like crossing some line that we have a duty not to cross. And in rejecting that, I am swallowing what I recognize to be a bitter pill of consequentialism.
I answered your question obliquely, by pointing out that putting “you and your kid” on either side of the equation changes the question. Killing a random person is different from killing your kid; saving a random person is different from saving your kid. I don’t deny that I value my kid differently. But putting your kid on either side in the vanilla trolley problem changes that question too.
But as I said to Phyllo above, it’s not about erasing the guilt but of making the guilt worthwhile. Ask the same question with other forms of suffering: if you were going to have excruciating pain for the rest of your life, and in exchange saved the lives of a million orphans, is it worth it? To me, it seems selfish (if understandable) to let many others suffer or die to avoid suffering myself.
Unless you want to argue that moral suffering (guilt) is somehow different form other forms of suffering (e.g. pain), that avoiding moral suffering is not just a selfish desire but a altruistic good. I don’t buy it, but I’m interested to see the case.
See my response to Ecmandu above. Really valuing life infinitely creates weird consequences that aren’t followed in real life. It might be that you believe that and just aren’t living up to your beliefs, but I think it’s more likely that you’re failing to distinguish between ‘really really large value’ and ‘infinite value’.
So too here: you can either commit one murder, or allow millions to die of malaria. That’s the hypo. Death is inevitable.
But it seems like your answer is that you just can’t compare between two lives. That introduces a ton of practical problems, and just seems like ostrich-ing in a way that, if applied consistently, leaves the world worse off in a ton of real world scenarios (triage? self-defense? child-birth complications? flight 93?).