That is the problem that be and the pre occupation of various forums that St.James and others concerned ourselves with, I.e.that of the problem of set theory, of limits with the infinite set, and the paradoxical infinite set that. contains all sets including Its self .
Now being a life long Kantian, my initial solution has a synthetic middle which diffuses the problem of inclusion or exclusion, (and in my case , preclusion) by virtue simply of categorically truism.
Not by defining reality as an excluded transcendental reality, by virtue of how reality cuts or is transcended by an ideal world, or how modern philosophy tends to reduce the way that reality, which is used in contextual schema, but how logically reality preconceives the various contexts including their totality.
So I am unfortunately in a position of being in the middle of an argument of a no win win type.
The man in the middle is indefinable except categorically
The reason I landed there is beyond my total
comprehension , but it has to do with the implausabilituy of reducing both: a phenomenological and eidectic method to contravert meaning so that a negation may entail a total qualitative and quantitative re presentation.
There is always a diferance. a remainder between an absolute and a relative set.
I am expressing basic set theory in terms of the language of philosophy , a language inadequate for a total signification. of meaning.
The idea that there is always a gap . an exclusion of partial sets, is simply not what absolute idealism is meant. to Be (for an idealist or conceived.)
For this reason, separating absolutes on real basis , -idealism into a realism of objective ideals from the claim for absolutely real ideals, does not work.(For me)
$chematic points of view( and the use of 'point of view’generally, in a reduced phenomenological sense) of the existentially present, being the starting point, may presuppose a total contradiction.( of values)
And with that, the fly trap analogy works.
But which it is is relative to the type , as here is the full appreciation of how the paradox works, that which occupied both Cantor and Russel -were so concerned with.
The reason I am elaborating, is because both Russell and Eyer’s arguments lands them into infinite regress.
They work , but they are anchored in limited and pragmatic realities, and it can be said of realities . as well, that there are different realities.
The closer a multi functional reality becomes useful, the less credible an absolute idealism becomes.
This schema in terms of absolute contradiction is preferable and Kant becomes a better solution.
Here I point to a regress in Kant as well, for in the naturalistic fallacy in in the use of the categorical imperative -why the ’ should" instead of the ‘is’ the’ because 'becomes another should.
Hegel-Kant-Hobbes are a linear progression to the problem of universals, and the problem consists of the inability to reduce one end to the other end because the idea is not a one dimensional progression of interwoven conceptual links . The sum of partial sums will differ toward a minimum, but it always remains.
Now I am sure that the above is full of holes, but the general framework is fairly consistent with the idea…
Here I should not make a call, and yet the trap is obvious and yet, it becomes paradoxical on a closer look.
I know that on a previous occasion You implied that Lambigious will never go there, -a fair middle- and absolute idealism is only very minimally motivational position to get out of nihilistic stasis, but thinking categorically , it is as problematic
Idealism needs no compromise, and it’s appeal is mostly due to a reactive point of view to the existential problem that. conflicting values throw one into the world.
This is true with certainty because modernity diminishes traditional values, that any such values mark as useless. Man is more alone now, then at any other time in human history.
You are right in the relative sense of realitive absolute, but minimize the sense of a real absolute , not merely transcendental , but preconsceptual.