As it stands, the latter part of Spinoza’s The Ethics strikes me as common sense explained in elaborate logical language that, at times, seems to obscure the issues involved. It seems almost too mundane to add to the philosophical process of anyone who might read it –including Deleuze. At the same time, I thought the same thing about Rawls’ Laws of the Peoples while now finding myself recognizing some value in it. So I defer judgment.
On the other hand, as I find myself going back (in my study points (to Part 1 on the nature of God as Substance, I’m starting to see that one of Deleuze’s main attraction to him may have lain in the mind-bending logic of it, that which Deleuze revised by translating substance to a more secular understanding. For instance:
“PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. Proof.— If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.).
“If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications— as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),— it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,— that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 43-49). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.
I would start my fumblings by pointing out that Substance (being an uncaused cause (would precede all attributions (that which knows the essence: that which without it could not be what it is: of a thing (and modifications. This creates a kind of paradox in that we have to ask how substance can precede the attribute and still be defined by an attribute. What we’re basically looking at here is a set of all sets type situation.
At the same time, I can’t help but agree with Spinoza’s conclusion that there can only be one substance in that (perhaps because of it being an uncaused cause (since attributions and modifications are somehow separate from substance, there could not be any attributions and moderations to separate one substance from the other. At least to me that seems to be the more blue collar to approach Spinoza’s point.
We could also see this as how Substance, Attributes, and Modifications are intimately intertwined (while Substance is given privilege (and the source of Deleuze’s notorious obscurity and the headache I’m experiencing while writing this, a headache that the beer and Jager is doing little to appease. And I can’t help but throw this out there in the hope it will make a solid connection:
I can’t help but feel this mish-mash is the source of Deleuze’s explorations in Difference and Repetition. All one would have to do is translate Spinoza’s god into Being and you stand a chance of getting it if the headache doesn’t kill you.