One of the first things I’m noting about Spinoza (that is as I scratch the surface of The Ethics (is how he seems to be using arguments similar to Anselm’s ontological proof of God, but towards clearly different ends. I mean even on a first run through (on the audio book even (you get a sense of what it was that got him in so much trouble. The most notable is his argument that God, as substance, by careful reasoning, cannot possess free will which must have seemed quite offensive to those who held a more conventional view of God.
And I can tell already, given how my filters are working, that this particular immersion will be primarily focused on the relationship between Deleuze and Spinoza and may well lead to a following immersion in Deleuze’s book on Spinoza –that is: just to see what happens. For instance:
“Proof.— If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications— as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),— it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,— that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.” -Baruch Spinoza (2013-09-01). Ethics (Kindle Locations 44-49). Heraklion Press. Kindle Edition.
(Now first of all, I’m hoping someone here (perhaps my German jam-mate, Harald (can help me on what “Q.E.D.” means as it is sprinkled throughout the book.)
That said, I can’t help but read the BwO into this. If I am getting Spinoza right, it is as if Substance is like a plane upon which various intensities (attributes and modes (can break into their various and individual nomadic flights (expansion (while still being attached to the BwO of Substance: contraction.
And I’m starting to see the connection between the BwO as described above and Deleuze and Guatarri’s sense of desiring production or the rhizomatic network of it –at least within Spinoza’s emphasis on the infinite as compared to the finite. And I would also note the possible foundation of Deleuze’s materialism in:
“That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.” -Ibid
And I, once again, have to approach this with the same provisional materialism I approach Deleuze with(as well as Rorty (for the sake of a workable model –that is in a pragmatic spirit. And I do so with full acknowledgement that this is the very same argument that hardcore materialists have been throwing at me over the years.
This, of course, has been wide swipes and the fumbling around of someone out their comfort zone. But as Deleuze tells us: we write at the edge of what we know. And we do that to hopefully zero in on the particulars. May I not waste my time and yours.