Making iambiguous's day

If you come on a philosophy board in order to ask us to demonstrate that our decisions are “the right decisions” only to get a negative response in the form of “we don’t know what you want us to do” isn’t it natural, provided you still want us to do whatever you want us to do, to help us, and thus get closer to achieving your goal, by explaining in more detail what you want us to do?

I have absolutely no idea what you want me to do. As far as I am concerned, you are merely bombarding me with words.

He craves external stimulation. Instead of being in control of the environment, he wants to be controlled by the environment. But in a positive, i.e. pleasant, way. He wants someone to come along and to “take his breath away”. In plain terms, to be impressed. Because he’s impressionable. The only problem is he’s old and the old drugs no longer work on him. He needs something stronger.

I can assure you, I mean something by those words; there is definitely a thought in my mind which I’m trying to convey with those words. You might say I have the wrong thought, or that I’ve misread Biggy. You might say the thought I have in my head is incoherent or riddle with paradox, but there’s definitely something there.

It’s true that we learn the words from others–that’s how language is learned–but the phrase we are discussing–“choosing the morally correct side”–is a phrase I whipped up myself–I didn’t borrow it from anyone. That’s not to say I’m the first person to say it, but I can guarantee I didn’t go to them first to get the phrase–I just put a handful of words together in order to express what I wanted to say. ← That’s how speach works.

And let’s be honest: the phrase isn’t really that cryptic–“choosing the morally correct side”–is patently clear in its meaning. It’s not like learning a new expression in a foreign language. What I suspect you’re getting at is not whether I understand the meaning of the phrase but whether I understand the nature of morality. The phrase “choosing the morally correct side” does indeed hint at an objectivist point of view–as if there will always be a correct side, objectively, to any moral controversy–and that does seem naive to me, and I would expect others like yourself to question it. Again, however, I must stress that this is what Biggy seems to be after, not me–I’m a subjectivist, I don’t believe in an ultimate objectively correct moral position, but I can certainly understand the idea, and I can certainly convey the idea using a phrase such as “choosing the morally correct side”.

You could construe it that way, but it was intended to give a picture of what the “morally correct choice” looks like–it looks like the decision you’re compelled to make when one option out of many stands out as obviously the right choice. It doesn’t have to be the right choice objectively, but what Biggy is looking for is something that looks just like that coupled with a method for proving whether it really is objectively right or not.

I think you’re thinking of this too narrowly–you’re thinking of this only in the context of the example I gave–it was meant to be generalized. I could come up with another scenario: a man is being attacked by a wild dog. You have a gun. What do you do? For any example I come up with, the answer to the question: what is the “morally correct thing to do” is what they all have in common. Which I’m saying is an intuitive feeling that X is the right thing to do rather than Y.

It’s true that different people may have different intuitive feelings on any moral scenario, but that, to me, is the nature of the beast–the nature of morality. I don’t think of morality as a set of overarching rules that all men and women are obliged to follow. I think of it as a personal calling, something one has to decide for one’s self, the voice of one’s inner conscience. What may be morally right for one person may be a terrible transgression for another.

Sure, and this is roughly the same criticism I’m leveling against Biggy. I’m arguing, among other things, that Biggy needs to at least understand what an “objective/rational demonstration of the morally correct thing to do” is before he can expect to be persuaded by it should someone actually follow through with his challenge. Right now, it seems to me, the only thing one can offer Biggy in response to this challenge is something which would only qualify as what Biggy calls an “existential contraption”.

In short: I know what I mean by the “morally correct choice” or the “morally correct side”, but I agree with you that such a notion is incoherent unless one is able to clearly define what it is for such a choice or such a side to be objectively correct (i.e. something above and beyond an existential contraption). ← But that’s something I’m charging Biggy with, not something I’m guilty of myself.

Well, not always. It sometimes feels comfortable, but other times it’s a really gruelling decision to make. For me, morality is always the voice of the conscience, which is to be distinguished from what feels good in the moment, and also from rationalizations (for example, the way a nihilist might rationalize that morality doesn’t exist though he might have to fight feelings of guilt and remorse over harming others).

Let me give you an example from my own life; I have a nephew who was born with a kidney defect. The doctor’s said his kidneys only had a 25% chance of developping normally, and that if they were not developping normally by age 2, he would need a transplant. Neither his mother nor his father could do it because they were too genetically similar. This got me thinking: the kid will need a kidney from someone not immediately related to him. I’m his uncle so maybe I’d be a better candidate. I don’t see anyone else stepping up to the plate. Therefore, I’m in a position to do the morally right thing. ← I felt I was faced with a choice, and I recognized it as one of those moments when one’s morality is put to the test. So I offered to donate one of my kidneys. It’s not something I wanted to do–I like my kidneys and I’d rather keep them–and I certainly wouldn’t feel comfortable giving them up (although I guess I would feel comfortable knowing that I did the right thing, but that at an extremely high cost, a cost that does not make me feel comfortable). But I knew that if I wanted to consider myself a moral person, The choice was clear: offer to donate one of your kidneys. Luckily, my nephew grew to be 2 years old and his kedneys are doing surprisingly well. They aren’t 100% and he will always need medical attention, but the doctors finally said that he was not in need of a transplant. So I get to keep my kidneys! Yeay! :smiley: ← Getting off the hook is what feels most comfortable to me, but I know that at the time, I was committed. I was ready to give up one of my kidneys, and it was a decision I was not looking forward to.

^ The point is, that’s what morality is. It’s listening to your inner voice speak of “right” and “wrong”, not “comfort” or “discomfort”, not “I came up with a good argument” or “I failed to come up with a good argument”, but “right” and “wrong” whether you like it or not.

I think Biggy’s question is more of a rhetorical one. I think he knows that people can’t delivery on a demand for something that doesn’t make sense or is incoherent (what you’re probably calling “meaningless”), and hence his inquiries are more of a challenge than a genuine request for answers.

Biggy, I’ll respond to your post later…

Yep.

Good conscience is nothing other than absence of discomfort – tension, stiffness, etc – within the body.

Discomfort is created when some impulses are over-expressed and others are under-expressed. It is resolved by weakening the over-expressed impulses and strengthening the under-expressed ones.

The path towards good conscience can be uncomfortable – not because it is what we want, but quite simply because the path itself is rocky, making it very likely for us to stumble into discomfort – but the conscience itself when it is clean is comfortable, far more than bad conscience can ever be.

Also, when you “feel good” about something that does not mean there is no discomfort inside your body. Hedonism refers to this kind of pleasure. This is why it is considered “dirty” and “guilty”.

Do “intellectual contraptions” ever end?

Let’s say that a man is taken away in the middle of the night by the secret police. He is tortured, killed and his body is “dumped”.

Is it an intellectual contraption if he thinks that his treatment is immoral?

If he was a loyal “party member” would be believe that his torture and death are morally correct?

Ought he be concerned that he cannot demonstrate the immorality of his torture to the sociopath who is torturing him?

It seems that at some point the “intellectual contraptions” are no longer just “intellectual contraptions”.

Huh? So if I do what’s right according to my conscience, I will be free of bodily pain? If I take a bullet in a war, feeling that I’m serving my country, the wound won’t hurt? If I’m dying of cancer and I bequeath my estate to my children in my will, the pain from the cancer will no longer hurt?

I can buy that. A good conscience comes with the feeling of “I’m a good person” or “everything is right with the world”, and it’s true that the road there can be painful, but I don’t think the good feeling that comes from a clean conscience wipes away all pain a person could feel. Doing the right thing often requires sacrifice, and that sacrifice doesn’t always go away once you’re satisfied that you’ve done the right thing.

Conscience” is the sense of (whether delusion or not) innocence or guilt (aka “right or wrong”).

The sense of guilt can, and often does, bring with it a feeling of discomfort (threat of retribution). But “conscience” is not about the discomfort but rather about the awareness of innocence or guilt.

You won’t be free of pain for the simple reason that noone has total control over the universe.

Pain is an unwanted consequence. It’s what happens but what we never want to happen.

To tolerate pain, for example, does not mean to feel pain. It means to be comfortable with what used to be uncomfortable.

When I put my hand in a tub full of hot water my aim isn’t to feel pain – what would be the point of that? – but to make sure that I do not pull my hand out of it. In order to do so, I must desensitize myself, which is to say, I must switch off impulses that are unnecessary, that distract from what I want to do. This process makes the experience, not more uncomfortable, but less.

Pain is always avoided. The only question is how. You can avoid it by evading the external stimulus (e.g. pulling your hand out of hot water) or by desensitizing yourself (e.g. restraining your impulses.)

Conscience is not about discomfort, I would agree with James, but what is often referred to as “intuitive right and wrong” is.

You mean, acceptance of pain.

So you’re talking about desensitzation to pain by acceptance. This is a real phenomenon. Acceptance of pain can have the effect of lessening the pain, at least psychologically, and maybe even physically.

So can listening to the voice of your conscience. The discomfort of doing what’s right can be much less than it would if you were forced to do it. However, the most comfortable thing to do can often be to ignore your conscience–even if you have to endure the guilt, that pain can be less than the sacrifice you’d have to make if you followed through with your conscience.

I don’t understand the difference. In what sense is intuitive right and wrong about causing greater discomfort to one’s self whereas conscience, in the same situation, would be about lessening discomfort (through desensitization ← I presume that’s what you’re talking about).

It’s not accurate to say that you’re accepting pain. What is accepted is the mediate cause of pain, such as contact between your hand and hot water, but the immediate cause of pain, which is hyper-activity that takes place within your nervous system, is actively rejected.

Both techniques can give you comfort. You can evade or destroy the mediate cause of pain (e.g. the man whipping you) or you can simply destroy hyper-activity within your nervous system (e.g. reactions that arise in response to whipping.) Both preserve or restore your comfort but there is a notable difference between the two. Namely, the former has an advantage of being able to preserve possessions other than comfort (e.g. your body and by extension your life) but it has a disadvantage in that it is a stress on your nervous system. This means it can create discomfort.

Thus, it often happens that a person, who attempts, and perhaps even manages, to evade or destroy the mediate cause of discomfort, ends up causing discomfort to himself with his own actions. This is, for example, what happens to people who over-work, over-exercise, over-think and otherwise over-act.

Discomfort makes you weak. It’s a lot more difficult to concentrate when you’re in pain than when you’re not. It acts like a gravitational force that keeps pulling you down sabotaging any activity you might be trying to engage in.Thus, if you want to be strong, you must preserve your comfort above everything else.

There is no such a thing as “too much comfort”. The problem is that people confuse inner peace (what I refer to as comfort here) with outer peace (what I do not recognize as comfort here.) There is indeed such a thing as “too much outer peace” but there is no such a thing as “too much inner peace”. It’s pretty evident that in times of great outer peace, when there are no external threats in the form of wars, that people start degenerating. But this is only because such a peace creates inner discomfort, in the form of boredom, that is very difficult to resolve.

It is my personal opinion that the fundamental decision making process of every organism with a nervous system consists in making sure that one’s nervous activation remains within the limits of comfort. Good refers to actions that are within the comfort zone and bad refers to actions that are outside of it. It does not matter what these actions are. They can be anything.

When people speak of “conscience” I immediately think of “inner peace”. And when they speak of “intuition” I immediately think of “emotional regulation”. Not that the two are the same, mind you, but I think that these people, more than anything, are speaking of these phenomena rather than what they think they are speaking of.

I didn’t say it’s about causing discomfort.

My point is that “intuitive right and wrong” often refers to nothing other than right and wrong in terms of emotional quality. When emotions are regulated, then we say whatever we are doing is right. When they are not, then we say whatever we are doing is wrong.

Imabiguous is awesome and epic and great and has a major super big cock and is intellectual as hell!!! I’m like uber-super fanboy of his! I shall now proceed to lick his ass crack and call him sugar!

Well, you’re right that moral intuition (the way I’m defining it) is highly connected to emotion. I wouldn’t say it requires emotion, but it’s definitely there. For example, in the scenario above, the one where you find a child wounded in the ditch, I don’t think it has to stir a lot of emotion just to intuit that the right thing to do is to help the child. But if you were there, if it were really happening, you might feel inspired to help or guilty if you just walk on by (I consider inspiration and guilt the two main emotions that are tied to moral intuition). But I don’t think moral intuition is just the emotions we feel in that scenario, but a sense of knowing right and wrong which can trigger certain strong emotional reactions.

But I’d like to know what the “inner peace” of what you are calling the conscience is. It must have something to do with morality. Otherwise, why call it the conscience?

Inner peace means that whatever actions you’re performing, if you’re performing any at all, that they are within the limits of comfort.

In other words, it means that you’re comfortable with what you’re doing.

Inner peace is a necessary condition for good conscience but it is not a sufficient condition. This is because conscience refers to moral decisions whereas inner peace refers to actions of any kind. Thus, good conscience is not merely inner peace but inner peace in moral decisions.

Ah, then that would be like deciding to help the child in the ditch (at least for me). Bad conscience, I suppose, would be to endure the guilt from a decision to leave the child there. We could say then that good conscience is being inspired to do good, or feeling inspired that you have done good, and bad conscience would be to feel guilt.

Most of us no doubt have reached this point. For months [sometimes years] we make the attempt to explain to others how we think about things like human interactions that come into conflict over value judgments.

This particular thread also includes attempts to connect the dots between conflicting human behaviors [embedded in moral and political narratives/agendas] as this relates in turn to human consciousness itself.

Which inevitably will get around to the question of autonomy, volition, will.

Yet we all no doubt marvel at just how mangled our point can become in the minds of others. Still! Even after countless exchanges!!

Indeed, we can’t help but ponder what that tells us about, among other things, the limitations of human language, logic, reason.

I’m not asking others to demonstrate that their behaviors are the right ones. I’m asking them to discuss the manner in which they have come to defend their own behaviors. Behaviors that engender conflicts with others relating precisely to the manner in which they have come to understand the relationship [out in the world existentially] between identity, values and political power

In other words…

1] what particular goals do they have?
2] how did they come to acquire them given the actual trajectory of their own unique life?
3] how have they come to deal with conflicting goods?
4] how are all of these interactions related historically, culturally and experientially to the manner in which Karl Marx and others coined the expression “political economy”?

All I then ask is that, in probing these relationships “out in the world”, we focus the discussion on particular conflicts that we are all familiar with.

In other words, I focus the discussion not on what we want others to do, but on the extent to which this can actually be grasped [philosophically or otherwise] when in fact others want us to do something else instead.

No, I am proposing this: that to the extent it is possible [given the nature of internet exchanges], we connect the dots between our words and the worlds that we actually live in: insofar as the words attempt to describe the conflicts that we ourselves have with others.

My values [vis a vis others] are embedded in my dilemma above. So, how are the values of others [translated into behaviors] not?

They will either take their words there or they will not.

Chance, contingency and change . . . and yet, you are the most inflexible and repetitive person on this forum.

Actually, my distinction [as always] is between ascribing a particular definition and meaning to the words “objective/rational demonstration of the morally correct thing to do”, and coming up with an actual experience embedded in a particular existential context whereby empirically “out in the world of actual conflicted human behaviors” such a demonstration is wholly illustrated.

What is the methodology by which we can take those words out into the world and test them?

Here of course that can only be described with words. But the words are either able to be illustrated “out in the world” such that all rational men and women are obligated to share their definition and meaning or they are not.

After all, if the definition of abortion is “the deliberate termination of a human pregnancy, most often performed during the first 28 weeks of pregnancy,” one is either talking about an abortion or one is not.

Similarly regarding the definition of morality: “principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behavior.”

One is either discussing the morality of abortion or one is not.

Indeed, how difficult is it to wholly illustrate that?

But then after we all agree on that, we reach the part where it is to be decided if the morality of this particular abortion encompasses/embodies a right behavior or a wrong behavior.

All I ask here is for an argument that would in fact be able to establish this in the same manner in which it can in fact be established that we are discussing the morality of this particular abortion.

I’m not saying the argument doesn’t exist, only that from my own frame of mind [here and now] such an argument is entangled in my dilemma.

Then: How are you not entangled in it yourself?

I’d buy you a prostitute, but I can’t even afford one myself. I can sense your sexual frustration from here.