Yes, this is a serious problem. If heās so obviously wrong about a philosopher you know quite a bit about, who knows how wrong he is about those you know less about? This is why itās paramount to know at least one philosopher pretty well before you take secondary sources at face valueāwhich is a serious objection against our educational system.
Well, I must say thereās something to be said for this claim, and this is supported by the fact that you apparently feel you have to explain why it may seem to be true. For example, near the end of the eleventh section of the first treatise of On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche poses the rhetorical question:
āOne may have all the right in the world if one cannot get rid of oneās fear before the blond beast at the bottom of all noble races and is cautious before it: but who would not a hundred times rather fear if he can at the same time admire, than not fear but therewith not be able to get rid of the disgusting sight of the failed, the diminished, the stunted, the poisoned?ā
Note: āa hundred times ratherā. This need not mean that one has to fear if one is to admire. Thus Zarathustra ridicules those who are afraid of his Ćbermensch:
ā[Zarathustra] says it was precisely insight into the good, the ābestā, which caused him horror before man in general; from this ill will did he grow wings with which āto soar away into distant futuresā,āhe does not hide the fact that his type of man, a relatively superhuman type, is superhuman precisely in relation to the good, that the good and just would call his Superman Devilā¦
[size=95]Ye highest human beings whom mine eye has encountered, this is my doubt of you and my secret laughter: I divine that you would call my SupermanāDevil!
So foreign are ye with your soul to what is great, that the Superman would be fearsome to you in his goodnessā¦[/size]
At this point, and nowhere else, one must begin to understand what Zarathustra wants: this kind of human being he conceives, conceives reality as it is: it is strong enough for thatā, it is not estranged from reality, not engrossed in something other than reality, it even contains within itself all that is fearsome and questionable about reality, only with this can man possess greatnessā¦ā (Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, āWhy I Am a Destinyā, section 5; quoting somewhat loosely from Thus Spake Zarathustra, āOf Human Prudenceā.)
The thing is that what is required in order not to be afraid of the blond beast at the bottom of all noble races, and of the chaos at the bottom of reality for that matter (cf. Zarathustraās Prologue, section 5), is to be aware of this beast, this chaos, at oneās own bottomā¦ More about this below.
Well, his critique of post-Napoleonic nationalism is not tantamount to a critique of nobility. His representative of his Ćbermensch was, after all, Napoleon rather than Bismarck (see GM I 16, and cf. TI āSkirmishesā 48). Napoleon is a better example of the āproblem of the noble ideal in itselfā because he is more obviously a āsynthesis of beast and Supermanā¦ā (GM I 16; cf. WP 1027, including Kaufmannās footnote.) Again, more on this below.
Well,āit has always seemed to me that, in GM I 16-17, Nietzsche deliberately implied a return to Good vs. Bad: beyond Good and Evil, but not beyond Good and Bad. He also uses the phrases āwhat I wantā there (compare āwhat Zarathustra wantsā above). It seems that what he wants is āthe unconditional rule of aristocratic values, of Roman valuesā (GM I 16). But what then of the fact that āthere is today perhaps no more decisive mark of āthe higher natureā, the more spiritual natureā than still being a battleground for the opposition of the values āgood and badā and āgood and evilā? Iāve offered a solution for this paradox in my āaristocratic radicalisationā OP:
āI now completely reject the value āgood and evilā, i.e., the value āgoodā as opposed to āevilā. I can do so without the danger of thereby becoming a ālower natureā, a less spiritual nature, for as the word ānatureā already implies, that value is deeply ingrained in me.ā (http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2447939#p2447939)
Nietzsche knew that we cannot go back (see for example TI āSkirmishesā 43). He did not advocate the rule of backward, boorish natures like those so prevalent among American conservatives:
But of course he also didnāt advocate the rule of goody-goodies like John Oliver. Still, his point is that the whole natural history of morality must be traversed in due course if the self-overcoming of morality is to mean all that it can:
āHaving beheld the ultimate vision, we must turn again toward becoming āgood neighbors of the nearest things.ā What are the next steps for one whom this dream has possessed? Nietzsche would not have him broken by the tension between distant ideal and sordid reality; there is no sense in being āinsanely impatient for the superman,ā for āall actions have acquired meaning, as path and means to that.ā To one whose life has attained such focus there comes a sense of reposeāthe ārepose of the great streamāāand the immense future spreads out before him like an unrippled sea. There should be no haste, no jumps; every intervening stage must be brought to perfection in due season, every least detail finished with the dedication of a true artist to his task. The abiding mood is āluminousness, peace, no exaggerated longing, joy in the rightly employed, eternized moment!ā
[size=95]AMOR FATI[/size]ā (George Morgan, What Nietzsche Means, Epilogue, entire.)
The only thing that has given me a sense of haste is climate change. I will therefore vote for my countryās GreenLeft party, as I think the Left will have to overcome itself (becoming so left itās right again) only in due time. Losing our cool does not become us.
Yes, this is nonsense, as Nietzsche knew hardly any English, and using the French word ressentiment in German is only more pretentious than using the English word āresentmentā inasmuch as French is more prestigious than English.
I once made a little study of the word ressentiment in Nietzscheās writings, by the way:
(0mpious once criticised my work for āplodding alongā in my Human_Superhuman Yahoo group.)
Most of these claims 4-8 (you forgot # 3, by the way) are obviously wrong, so I will just comment on a couple of things and then wrap this up. The dichotomy ācontinental vs. analyticā is a funny one, since itās not a very āanalyticā dichotomy at all (that would rather be something like āsynthetic vs. analyticā). āContinentalā is basically just an amalgamation for ānot analyicā. Your professor evidently looks at Nietzsche from an analytic standpoint (hence his point about aphorismsā not being arguments, etc.). The most āanalyticā school of Nietzsche interpretation is my own āLampertian-Straussianā school, and this is certainly not analytic (a major handbook of this school is Pichtās Nietzsche, which precisely makes the case for the superiority of the aphoristic and poetic style).
Now as for the distinction between āevilā and ābadā. āGood and evilā is not just an inversion of āgood and badā, but in the first place a moralisation. āBadā is not actually a moral concept; those called ābadā are not morally reprehended for being weak, they canāt help it. But the real point, and the reason why Nietzsche can be said to endorse master morality in a way, is the following. What is good as opposed to bad, and evil as opposed to good, is the will to power. The slaves morally reprehend the masters for acting on their will to power. But the will to power may be lacking, but is not absent in the slaves themselvesāan important distinction. Absolute weakness would be nothing; the slaves are still relatively strong, i.e., driven by the will to power. What is good about slave morality is that it itself constitutes a refinement (spiritualisation, sublimation) of the will to power. It has enabled the beast itself to soar to ever greater heights, chaos itself to form ever more intricate orders. What Nietzsche does is, he forces moralists to acknowledge their own immorality, their own will to power. This is why the will to power is the archĆŖ, the Heraclitean fire, of Nietzscheās philosophy, and may only be further analysed in terms of self-valuing after, and while always retaining, the insight and insistence on the priority of this Nietzschean concept.
My guess, judging by age, between 1960-75. His area of interest is philosophy of mind, philosophy of affect, epistemology, and Plato. I am still not sure as to whether this misinterpretation can be blamed on his reading of Nietzsche or the curriculum he is given, I deduce the former. We were required to use a Clark & Swenson translation of the Genealogy of Morality as reference, I used my Kaufmann collection instead (including a copy of Genealogy, Beyond Good and Evil, Portable Nietzsche and Will to Power), fuck em.
I agree. I feel like I was cheated out of an adequate understanding of the Pre-Socratics and a credible critique of Millās Utilitarianism. Hume was messy and the time spent dissecting Meno gave absolutely no new insights. It is also a question of whether he was given a strict or loose curriculum to follow, and whether he sincerely misunderstands Nietzsche. I can only claim to know a couple philosophers very well, but its enough to assess the validity of hearsay.
This is a fantastic explanation, thank you. Nietzscheās conception of the eternal recurrence is an important addition to the will to power as a base for all other valuing. By the way, I corrected the numbering. To use the Genealogy as a point of reference, I should add that earlier in the same treatise, Nietzsche hints at the idea that the Jews (or the man of ressentiment) is admirable, using words as āintenseā, ācomplexā, and āprofoundā to characterize their hatred and moral inversion. I still believe Nietzsche intended the slave revolt as an inversion of the āGood vs. Badā, but because Evil was primarily posited it was a moralization of āBadā, but this does not mean that prior to this āBadā was a moral concept. Nietzsche must have interpreted the nobleās ābadā as holding some truth-value to contrast their self-valuing of āGoodā. This was inverted because the slaveās āGoodā was resemblant of nothingness, a will to nothingness and death and singularity. As a moral concept, those who went about denying life had not existed before that moralization, because as you said, they couldnāt because something was lacking. Nietzsche wanted us to become life-affirmers, not men of nobility, although we must accept the beast as inevitable. This is why it is impossible to revert back to Master morality because accepting and understanding it has a life-affirming quality but implies the understanding of its antithesis after Nietzsche has purported his enterprise. The awareness of both, with partiality towards the natural elements of Master morality, is life-affirming but wholly transcendent and forward moving, away from both moral systems.
Another thing that may have been my third point originally, the lecturer told us all that Nietzsche was a nihilistā¦that he rejected all moral systems because they were only sets of temporary values with only etymological implications. Which books of Nietzscheās has this guy missed out on?
My personal reading and experience with Nietzsche has been profound, some times terrifying, some times surprisingly spiritual. The academy has taken the personality and depth out his writingā¦
a good deal of the professorās complaints have been around so long,
that Kaufman answered them in his book, what 50 years agoā¦
and I think this is part the problemā¦ that the old complaints are
still around even though they have been refuted again and again and
againā¦ it is easy to dredge up old complaints instead of doing actual
understanding of the materialā¦ it is laziness that drives this clownā¦
why really understand what Nietzsche really said, when you can just
dredge up old crap that wasnāt true in the first place and in doing so,
no real need to do any actual research or understandingā¦ just repeat the
lies and be done with itā¦plus the fact is, if Nietzsche is properly understood,
it creates confusion in the minds of the young as to what is actually philosophy
and god forbid, we confuse the youngā¦what the professor is teaching
is Nietzsche liteā¦ by taking out or explaining away the dangerous aspects
of Nietzsche teachingsā¦it is the university equivalent of, nothing to see here,
move along, move alongā¦in hopes the kids take up more ārespectableā
philosophy like the logical 20th century types like Russellā¦ they are āsafeā
philosophersā¦it is really gutless philosophy teachingā¦ make like
the generic stuff is the philosophy is the real stuff and the real
radical stuff like Nietzsche doesnāt exist and there is no need to look for itā¦
Itās a first year survey course. Most of the students donāt care about philosophy. They are only there because they need a credit, or it fits their schedule or they donāt know what they want to do in life.
If someone actually has a interest in philosophy, then they will take more focused courses in the future and they will do independent reading.
Preventing the discovery of anything does have a negative impact. Nietzscheās thought would be more meaningful for our society if we tried to better understand him better by suspending our initial judgments of his writings and look for the deeper meanings behind them, taking Nietzsche at face value initially will lead you to believe that either:
Heās a nihilist and moral relativist
Heās an aggressive anti-Christian maverick who rejects all metaphysics
His writing is purposely offensive and racist
His writing holds less value because it is more poetic than structural
Would it not be better to teach younger intellectuals to analyze the poetics of such works?
K: and first year survey course on astronomy where they teach the earth is the center
of the universe and everything revolves around the earth and there is a
magic compound between the stars called etherā¦most of the students donāt
care about astronomyā¦ they are only there because they need a credit, or it fits their
schedule or they donāt know what they want to do in lifeā¦ if someone actually has an
interest in astronomy, then they will take more focused courses in the future and they
will do independent readingā¦ not the end of the worldā¦ right?
false knowledge is still false knowledge regardless of why its taughtā¦
Since the universe has no observed center, any point can be taken as the center. The Earth can be considered stationary and therefore all objects do move around it. Thatās not just true in relativity, it was already true under Newtonian mechanics.
Aether theories have lost popularity but they are not discredited. Since science is open to continuous revision, aether may make a comeback.
Read this carefully:
There will always be many interpretations of writings and sayings due to the flexibility and ambiguity of language. Not to mention the problems produced by translating from one language to another.
But itās good that you and the kids know the one true, correct interpretation of Nās work. Keep it safely locked up so that it never changes.
Seems that Iambigās dasein lesson had no impact on you.
PHyllo: Since the universe has no observed center, any point can be taken as the center. The Earth can be considered stationary and therefore all objects do move around it. Thatās not just true in relativity, it was already true under Newtonian mechanics.
K: this is beyond a first year survey course which touches upon general subject
mattersā¦
K: there is a magic compound between the stars called ether
P: Aether theories have lost popularity but they are not discredited. Since science is open to continuous revision, aether may make a comeback.
K: note what I said, a magic compound between the stars call ether/Aetherā¦
all the stuff you āborrowedā from wikiā¦ is beyond a first year survey courseā¦
a first year survey course simply hits the high points of the subject matter and
what if the high points are wrongā¦this the objection hereā¦this survey course
the high points of Nietzsche gives wrong information and gives a wrong
impression of what Nietzsche is aboutā¦ that is the objectionā¦
it is not a question of quibbling about details of eternal reoccurrence, this
meansā¦it is not even bringing up Nietzsche eternal reoccurrence,
as Nietzsche himself felt this one of his two main ideaās, this and the ubermenshā¦
this course give a completely wrong impression of Nietzsche and that is the objectionā¦
You missed the point. If they had talked about Earth as center of the universe and/or aether in a first year course, they would not be wrong.
Yet you suggest that they are wrong because there is only ONE correct teaching.
If anyone is still interested in astronomy after the first year, he/she can take a more detailed course or read up on his own. You learn the hardcore stuff in years 3 and 4. By that time, the dilettantes have been weeded out.
A first year philo course attempts to answer the question ā¦ Do you care about these sorts of problems and the way they are approached? If yes, then take another philo course. If no, then look at other subjects which may interest you more.
K: if the professor gives you the wrong answers and the wrong
questions, then how can you possible know or understand that there is
other possible interpretations if the professor says this is the problem
and this is the answer but he gives both the wrong problem and the wrong
answer!
So will misinterpretations of Nietzscheās work make a comeback too? Will he once again be known as an anti-Semitic misogynist with clumsy philosophical writing skills and a mental illness that negates the value of his works?
This is exactly the problemā¦their baiting us incorrectly. From the start, they create an idea of Nietzsche that sits uncomfortably with most students and will diminish the work put into him in upper years. How is someone who is totally new to Nietzsche, use this heinous picture painted of him, and then want to continue upper year study of his works and related schools of thought? Academic philosophy is analytic, compounded, over structured, soullessā¦its turned into esoteric garbage - no one can or wants to understand it deeply because they are not guided easily or openly into philosophers and different approaches to understanding their writing and questions. Foucault was not too far off by declaring the academic institution as another form of political deception where the subject has less power than they think they do with regards to what they can or cannot want to believe in.
You assume that you possess the one true interpretation of N and that all others are clearly false.
You assume that alternate interpretations will have a significant negative impact on the students.
You assume that the role of university is to fill empty minds with āfactsā.
You assume that the story as presented by Venture is true and correct. Actually we only have Ventureās side of the story. He may have misheard, misunderstood or misrepresented.
I know that you are in love but you need to step back and be a bit detached. N is one philosopher among many. N is not the messiah. The philosophy department is a small part of a university.
Academic philosophy is about getting paid to write papers for other academics to read and reading papers that other academics have written. The papers are about what old dead guys wrote. Beside that, there is lecturing to uninterested students and interested students who want to read and write about old dead guys.
(I actually Iām not that cynical about education in general and university in particular.
But the purpose of education is not to fill empty pots with juice. )
I canāt disagree with that. But I can argue against your āknowing the correct interpretationā claim, but thatās going to be loooooooooooooooot of work for you and I to tackle right now. Is this an epistemic issue? Is there some kind of false stigma around being a professional academic or life in University?
While I donāt ever want to defend misinterpretations of someoneās work, I do have to say that intellectually honest people should have no problem approaching Nietzsche and learning something from him regardless of how he is presented in some introductory course. If someone is put off by a thinker before ever reading said thinker than they are philosophically useless anyhow.