Making iambiguous's day

No worries. Glad to see others participating.

Fortunately [or unfortunately] I rarely engage with people anymore. Other than virtually. And even that has largely become just another distraction embedded in my own rendition of waiting for godot.

Mostly what I do here is to look for arguments that might poke a few holes in mine. I wonder: Have I finally talked myself into a philosophy of life that I can no longer talk myself out of?

After all, in the past I once subscribed to any number of philosophies that I [with the help of others] managed to talk myself out of. But this one has admittedly stuck around the longest.

Yes, but some arguments are more clearly applicable to all of us than others. That is always the distinction that I look for.

The difficulty I have revolves more or less around this: How can one have a “theory of consciousness” without [eventually] connecting the dots between human consciousness itself and the behaviors chosen by individual minds out in a particular world bursting at the seams with conflicting value judgments? One way or the other “consciousness” is involved.

Until I am able to get a better grip on how you situate/integrate dasein, conflicting goods and political economy into your “subjectivist” perspective, I can only note again that I don’t see your point here as anything other than another way of embracing what I do: moderation, negotiation and compromise in a democratic political context.

But: whether one set of behaviors is “healthier” than another is true [from my point of view] only to the extent that particular people in a particular context [here and now] can agree that they are. Whatever “works” in other words. But that’s not the same as demonstrating that they are “in fact” healthier.

There are still no moral values that can be demonstrated to reflect an optimal frame of mind.

Unless of course I’m wrong and there are.

My dilemma reflects the following assumptions:

1] that my moral/political values are derived subjectively from the life that I lived. Thus, for example, I support a woman’s right to choose an abortion because the aggregation of all of my actual experiences that I had predisposed me existentially to take that particular political leap.

2] Concommitantly, it does not appear possible for philosophers or scientists to either discover or to invent a set of values/behaviors said to reflect the obligation of a rational human being to either support or not to support abortion. And both sides have arguments that the other side’s argument don’t make go away.

3] Finally, whatever I might personally believe about the morality of abortion, out in the world with others what counts is the extent to which I am able to enforce my own values if they do come into conflict with others.

And then to others, I ask: How is this not the same for you?

Since my interactions with others has now more or less ground to a halt, I’m less concerned about these things than I am curious as to how others react to my dilemma. And thus in exploring how it is not deemed to be a dilemma in their own life.

And, yes, [b][u]I[/u][/b] is as substantial to me as it is to others. At least in the either/or world. Only with respect to my identity as a factor in the accumulation of value judgments — in the is/ought world — does “I” manifest itself.

Again, less concerned than curious. Curious to find out if I ever will come upon an objectivist agenda that strikes me less as a psychological contraption and more as a philosophical argument that really does give me pause. A frame of mind that actually succeeds in challenging my assumptions above.

Rationalizing a behavior because you believe that in a godless universe any behavior can be rationalized is a frame of mind that many, many, many individuals literally act out from day to day. And, in particular, when, first and foremost, you strive above all else to satisfy your own wants and needs.

How then does the philosopher come up with an argument able to demonstrate that this sort of reasoning is necessarily wrong?

Any reason at all will do. Or no reason at all. You need God here or the sociopath’s frame of mind would seem to fit snuggly into this: “in the absense of God, all things are permitted”.

Isn’t that why we invent Gods and all of the other secular objectivist contraptions: to make that go away?

If only “in your head”?

Over and again I have noted that in my own opinion a moral and political objectivist is someone who believes there is in fact a right way and a wrong way in which to behave with respect to conflicting value judgments; and that unless you are “one of us” and behave in a way deemed to be “rational” or “ideal” or “natural”, you are behaving badly.

Necessarily so, as it were.

And I suspect that I might come to know you considerably better if you ever do get around to noting particular behaviors of yours that have come into conflict with others [over value judgments] and then noting in turn the manner in which both philosophy and religion were pertinent to the behaviors that you did choose.

I disagree with your self-perception. Whenever you’re faced with serious philosophy, you retreat to the argument that “you’re actually only arguing against the fundamentalists and objectivists who claim that they are certainly right”. You’re not looking for a philosophy of life; you’re looking for the religious certainty you lost.

Of course, this is only my perception.

Given the extent to which I construe these discussions as embedded inextricably – perhaps ineffably – in the complexity of human psychology, sure, there might be some truth to this.

On the other hand, what do the serious philosophers [or the moral objectivists] really have to say here regarding the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy as pertinent to understanding the existential dynamics embedded in actual conflicting behaviors derived from conflicting value judgments.

How, philosophically, is this…

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

…a frame of mind either more or less applicable to your own behaviors?

What does the word objective mean?

The word objective means that the truth-value of some given proposition is determined by reality (what really is) rather than by mind (what one thinks is.)

In this sense, I am not only an objectivist, I am a total objectivist. Total objectivism is the philosophical position according to which there is no category of propositions that is not objective. What this means is that every proposition, no matter of what kind, is either reflective of reality (true) or not (false.) This means that I am a moral objectivist as well.

What I am not is a passive objectivist.

Passive objectivists are people who do not want to make an effort to perceive reality. They do not want to expand, to step out of, their perceptual horizon, instead demanding that reality makes itself apparent to them, by becoming visible within their own narrow perceptual horizons. Indeed, these people believe that true perception is effortless and that whatever cannot be perceived in this effortless manner is quite simply not true. Or rather, not demonstrated to be true.

I am an active objectivist in the sense that I believe that in order to perceive reality, to know what is true and what is not true, one must make an active effort to expand one’s perceptual horizon.

From the point of view of active objectivism, the purpose of demonstration is to help other people perceive reality, not to justify oneself by trying to fit reality into the narrow perceptual horizon of passive objectivists.

I am writing this post because earlier I claimed that truth, or rather morality, comes from within rather than from without. This is not true. Truth does not come from within, it comes from without. What comes from within, in reality, is effort to perceive reality. And this is what I really wanted to say, but failed to.

The confidence that passive objectivists have in judging the truth-value of other people’s propositions is built on nothing other than these people’s continual failure to make what they see fit inside the passive objectivists’ narrow perceptual horizons.

Iambiguous is in a state of limbo (which is how he calls his nuclear shelter) quite simply because he does not want to get outside of it.

What are “existential dynamics”?

Well, I root this in human interactions in which the manner that I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy are most applicable.

And this is generally relating to those social, political and economic interactions in which we move from either/or [things that are true for all of us] to is/ought [things which are one way that some insist ought to be another way instead].

For example, there is the manner which Americans go about the business of electing presidents every 4 years. There are particular procedures in place, particular behaviors chosen, particular steps taken etc., which result in one or another candidate entering the Oval Office in January.

In other words, it’s not just someone’s subjective opinion that we hold primaries and caucuses, that we have debates between the candidates, that the general election is held on the first Tuesday in November, that the two parties almost always coming out on top are the Democrats and the Republicans.

No, instead, the manner in which I construe the “existential dynamics” here revolves more around those who insist that either the Democratic candidate or the Republican candidate is the more rational or ethical choice. That’s the part rooted subjectively in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

The latter in particular applicable regarding the manner in which wealth and power plays a role in this political process.

Ohhhhhhhhhh.

The disease of relativism, its cause, must be understood.

In order to judge which one of the two options is better, to determine their rank, one must bring them in relation. Intellectually speaking, one must remember both options in order to be able to compare them. Biologically speaking, this means that the two energy flows – yes, options are energy flows – must be brought in close proximity, which is to say, they must be compressed.

The function of the force of will is precisely this gathering together of all external stimuli in one place. The consequence of this is the formation of the centralized structure that we call reason.

In the absence of the force of will, however, the structure decompresses, and its energy flows become separated and individualized. This process, however, does not result in the reversal of the process of no-reason evolving into reason, but in the devolution of reason into a caricature we may call post-reason. (Nietzsche was critical of reason precisely for this reason. His “restored reason” refers to the original reason reconstructed from this post-reason.)

Because decompression increases the distance between options, it makes it difficult to bring them in relation, in which case, no judgment can take place. In such a case, one cannot think of one option without immediately forgetting the other option, which leads to the illusion of equality.

Relativism follows.

Unless of course I’m wrong.

I don’t believe that in any moral decision I might just as well have chosen the opposite, and neither do you.

Might you just as well set fire to an orphanage, after blocking the fire exits, as not? No further qualifications, they’re not plague orphans or actually robots plotting to destroy the world, just regular orphans as you’ve experienced them. Could you not think of an argument against doing so?

Of course you could. And an argument isn’t a cast-iron way of changing human behaviour, but it is at least an argument.

But this basically reflects the subjunctive reaction that most will have to behaviors that are deemed to be particularly ghastly. We ourselves simply cannot imagine not being appalled morally by those behaviors.

Yet had circumstances been such in my life that I came to embrace a sociopathic frame of mind, then any and all behaviors are sanctioned if 1] it gratifies me and 2] I am willing to accept the consequences of being caught by those who are in fact appalled by what I do.

And this all becomes entangled in a profoundly problematic intertwining of variables rooted in nature and variables rooted in nurture. Which in turn becomes embodied in any particular individual’s life.

But: What is the philosophical argument [in a world sans God] establishing that setting fire to the orphanage and blocking the exits is necessarily irrational and immoral?

Sure, subjectively, I can think of any number of arguments for not setting that fire. And it is true that, given the manner in which existentially I have become “me”, I can’t imagine doing it myself. But in my view that is not the same as establishing that those who do choose to do so [for whatever personal reason] are essentially, objectively, ontologically…Evil.

Isn’t that precisely why the Gods are invented? So that behaviors of this sort are not able to be rationalized by mere mortals?

Besides, you speak of setting fire to that orphanage as though there are not any number of folks in the pro-life movement who basically argue that the killing of thousands upon thousands upon thousands of unborn human babies each and every year is not in fact all that much more irrational and immoral.

iam - You have consistently failed to justify why anyone should consider a sociopath just as capable as you or me in making moral judgments. By definition, the sociopath is not as capable.

There is none and there are people who say there is one.

My friendly advice is to get over this. There is no conclusive argument against this act (outside of a specific context). No argument ever means anything at all outside of some context. No utterance means anything at all outside of some context. No political negotiation means anything outside of some context.

It is not productive to ask which philosophical argument accomplishes anything outside of a context. That context includes culture and it includes assumptions.

That’s just the way it is. Why can you not accept this? You ask the same question over and over - but there will still be people who think that Rationalism, or “objectivism” even means anything.

So what?

Yes, gods are invented to provide the ultimate appeal to authority. So what?

A baby died. These posts will not allow you to grieve or get over any guilt you feel. This line of (non)thinking won’t. It’s a dead end.

Why don’t you just quote me. I said:

^ That’s prong #1.

I’m not sure how you meant “#1 revolves around human consciousness itself [the nature of it]” but it definitely doesn’t requiring an understanding of my theory of consciousness (otherwise I’d be the only one who could potential be caught in prong #1). Again, though my theory is certainly my “ism”, these conflicts you’re talking about–whether prong #1 or prong #2–have nothing to do with it. I mean, I’m sure the nature of consciousness has a lot to do with it, but it doesn’t hinge on my “ism”–you could have an entirely different theory of consciousness, and you will still have prong #1 and prong #2 as “dilemmas” that we all have to deal with in this world, and if this other theory of consciousness turns out to be true, I’m sure you could draw some pretty substantial links between it and prongs #1 and #2. But even given that, prong #1 has way more to do with your theory than mine–it has to do with the self “fragmenting”–not consciousness being the foundation of being (<-- though that obviously has implications for everything ← Literally!).

IOW, I take your meaning of the self “fragmenting” as a “dilemma”. Wouldn’t you feel something like Sartre’s existential angst if you felt yourself “fragmenting”? Wouldn’t that be a “dilemma”? ← And can’t that be distinguished from the dilemma of being in conflict with other people? Does a pro-choice advocate feel herself “fragmenting” every time she disagrees with a pro-life advocate? I would think when it comes to conflict with others, we do everything in our power to keep ourselves together–we would need to in order to feel we are right (thereby allowing ourselves to argue our point). So in a sense, not only is there a distinction to be made between prong #1 and prong #2, but they might be polar opposites–prong #2 being the dilemma of how to win when pitted against the other, prong #1 being the dilemma of how to deal with one’s own self-destruction (i.e. fragmentation) when submitting to the other. ← I don’t think any one or other particular theory of consciousness has much to do with this–except in the trivial sense that this sometimes happens to people in virtue of being conscious human beings.

Ok, so it seems like your approach–indeed, your “dilemma”–is an inquisitive one with an eye for persuasive objectivist arguments. ← You described this a few times in this threads as just a matter of curiosity… just wondering if you might be wrong after all, that there might be an objectivist argument that holds water even by your standards. It seems like you’ve encountered a dead-end of sorts (in something like a philosophical maze) and you’re looking for a reason to backtrack–but not so much to return to a previous point you were once at (at least, not as an end in itself) but just to give yourself the opportunity to try another path.

^ This may be why we’re having such difficulty understanding each other. I’m trying to suggest a different path but I’m failing to appreciate that I first need to help you backtrack and arrive where I’m currently at (it doesn’t do much good for one to tell another “go that way” when the one is no where near the spot where the other’s at).

You’ve rejected objectivism and arrived at nihilism. I’ve rejected objectivist and arrived at subjectivism. It seems that in order to backtrack, you have to embrace some form of objectivism once again just in order to attempt a different path–and you seem to realize this on a semi-conscious level which is why you’re always on the lookout for a convincing objectivist argument.

Unfortunately, I don’t seem to be able to convey to you the technique of going anywhere you want in the maze, going down any which path you want. And this difficulty is not just with you, but is typical of any objectivist (or anyone who is still clinging to a past objectivism). They say: what’s objectively real is just where I’m at. Anywhere else is not reality. I say: it’s all just one big frickin’ maze–it doesn’t matter where you’re at. This allows me to move about the maze freely–and in the end, find the exit; I like to delve into other people’s thoughts and perspectives which is the same as delving back into the maze, but I often make the mistake of aiming for a common “meeting place”–like a foyer (metaphorical for common/conventional, usually objectivist, perspectives on the world)–and with you I’ve been failing to appreciate you’re not there. I think I understand where you are though, so I’m not focused on trying to find the path to you, but rather to explain how to get back to the common foyer. But maybe this is my mistake: how well can I really understand the path you’ve walked if I keep failing to help you backtrack?

One question that arises in my mind at this thought is: you say your inquisition into objectivist perspectives is just a matter of curiosity. How serious are you then about backtracking? If it’s just a matter of curiosity (a little armchair philosophy) then that implies you don’t mind continually hitting your head against the brick walls that constitute the dead end you’ve found yourself in. But if you are serious, and you sincerely want to find a way out, then it has to be more than just a matter of curiosity. This really has to be a dilemma for you.

Yes, and those arguments are typically brought in to defend the ego against threats that are applicable to all of us–moral theories about why sociopaths are evil, for example–we are all threatened by the possibility of others wanting to harm or kill us (kind of leads us to the boundary between Freudian defense mechanisms and Jungian defense mechanisms).

Admittedly, everyone’s “ism” will have some impact, directly or indirectly, to a large extent or a small extent, on the way they approach conflict with others. But is it so inconceivable that when they connect the dots, the final dot (i.e. how to engage with others) isn’t just: I have to convince him of my point of view. Is it not conceivable, especially with a theory of consciousness, that the final dot you come to is more like: in order to convince this person not to enter into conflict with me, I have to reconfigure their consciousness (and not necessarily to be configured like mine).

What do you think would work better in a conflict between an atheist and a theist? Should the atheist attempt to convince the theist that God doesn’t exist? Or will he have more success if he convinced the theist not to cast the first stone?

It’s a lot like the relation between a scientific theory and the technology that is possible from that theory. If you want to convince another of your scientific theory, you could try arguing it until you run out of breath. But you’re much better off demonstrating it to them with whatever technology is possible given your theory. ← This is not to say that my approach is to demonstrate to others that my “ism” is correct, but more that there are alternatives to just arguing your case as a means of ending conflict (in effect, other people’s minds are my technology). Connecting the dots, in other words may just be: I believe X is true → X implies technology Y is possible → If I implement Y, that will end the conflict.

Now it’s true that this may sound like a form of manipulation and deception–brainwashing in effect–on par with what sleazy politicians, lawyers, and salesmen often do–but on this point, I always emphasize the difference between a tool we can use (like technology) and our intentions on what to use it for. It’s like a knife–morally neutral in and of itself–but put in the hands of a surgeon, it can be used to heal, yet if you put it in the hands of a murderer, it can be used to kill. It comes down to what you want to do with a technology of consciousness: help people or harm people.

Furthermore, I find that the best way to engage in the shared invention of new ideas with another is by applying the technology to myself simultaneously with the other–I must buy my own bullshit, at least temporarily–it’s sort of a way of testing my own merchandise–if I’m not convinced by it, why would the other person be?

Yes, and that’s pretty much all it is. I’m not saying it’s anything more than that–well, except that my subjectivism makes it a bit easier for me to do this (in my opinion).

I know, but most of the time, those who are in conflict would probably agree that resolving their issues and arriving at a peaceful settlement between them is “healthy”–or at least it’s something they most likely both want.

Admittedly, there will be some who want nothing but to go to war and “defeat” those they are in conflict with, but like I said, my approach wouldn’t always work with everyone.

Yes, but again, I’m not arguing that my approach will demonstrate the most optimal moral perspective to be had, just that it would be more effective (in my opinion) than the traditional objectivist approach at resolving conflict. Again, this raises the question of what is more of a dilemma for you: resolving conflict or proving who’s right (morally speaking) (<-- both of which are prong #2, keep in mind).

^ This seems to be the most telling of the nature of your dilemma. I’m guessing that by “enforce” you mean “convince”–to demonstrate objectively that your values are correct (and if that doesn’t work to convince the other, then at least you know you’re right). It would make sense, therefore, that you’re ever on the lookout for an objectivist argument to actually demonstrate a true morality, for in that case, you’d feel like you actually have something with which to enforce your values.

It may make no difference to you, but my values happen to be of such a nature that I feel they need only be “applied,” not “enforced”. Enforcement implies conflict, but upholding your values and applying them to the real world need not always involve conflict (think about feeding the homeless–will the homeless, or a homeless shelter, fight you in your attempts to live up to your moral codes of feeding the homeless?). If my moral values are to work with the other person to invent new shared truths starting from his/her point of view (even if the other person is not aware that this is my pursuit), there’s very little in the way of conflict standing between me and my moral goals (unless the person is a relentless contrarian by nature).

So I take it you’ve resolved the dilemma of prong #1–you have a strong sense of self grounded in the either/or world, a self that doesn’t fragment so easily.

And do you actually hope that this happens? Hope it doesn’t happen? Don’t care?

If it’s just a matter of curiosity, then I would think the answer is: if you find an objectivist answer that gives you pause, your curiosity will be satisfied (a good thing, I guess). If not, you will continue to be curious indefinitely (a bad thing, I guess).

Well, I’m not sure what you mean by reasoning here, or “rationalizing a behavior”? In a world sans God, if there really is no grounds for morality (as you say), what’s being rationalized? The sociopath can’t be arguing for the moral righteousness of his pursuit of self-gratification. What is he rationalizing then? The fact that it’s not immoral? The fact that he can’t help it? The fact that it could be beneficial to others as well? What?

Perhaps, but think about this: if it actually works (i.e. it convinces us not to slit each other’s throats), then it works in the real world. That means, thought–perspectives, opinions, even prejudices–can be useful, at least sometimes–at resolving conflict–and this remains true even when you don’t believe in said perspectives, opinions, prejudices; this is where my subjectivist approach comes in handy. You don’t have to presently believe. You just have to recognize the utility, the effect, of the belief–and if the objective truth of your beliefs matters less to you than your health and the health of your relation to others, then it becomes worthwhile to consider possibly adopting said healthy beliefs, even if you don’t presently have them, for the sake of living peacefully with others.

What does “morally appalled” mean?

Sociopaths are irrelevant to the argument. People can behave immorally; it’s not a law of physics we’re dealing with.

What would count as a valid philosophical argument, to you? Hypothetically, that is. What criteria of success are you demanding?

Who said anything about immoral acts requiring the actors be “ontologically evil”?

In other words, only your own assessment of this is fully in accordance with the manner in which all rational men and women are obligated to think about it. It is the philosophical equivalent of 2 + 2 = 4.

Now, obviously, if we conclude that “by definition” a sociopath is “a person with a personality disorder manifesting itself in extreme antisocial attitudes and behavior and a lack of conscience”, and we assume that this involves a clinical condition “in the brain” then we would be punishing their anti-social behaviors as though it were within their capacity to control them.

And, perhaps, it is not. Indeed, perhaps, in a wholly determined world, it is not within the capacity of any of us to control our behaviors. Sure, there’s always that path to go down.

My conjecture however is that, assuming some level of autonomy, it is not necessarily irrational for a man or a woman to conclude that in a Godless universe self-gratification is a reasonable moral font. Thus their “extreme antisocial attitudes and behavior and a lack of conscience” is derived less from an abnormal or defective brain and more from a reasoned – reasonable? – point of view.

They just do not share your own sense of what it means to be reasonable in interacting socially, political and economically with others.

Again, from my frame of mind, this is the objectivist frame of mind. There is no philosophical argument here because you have concluded that there is none. As though this in and of itself establishes that.

Now, I would agree that the fact of the fire – if in fact there was a fire – either can or cannot be established such that it is true for all of us. The fact of the fire [and the facts embedded in the consequence of the fire] transcend the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein.

But once we leave the world of either/or and enter the world of is/ought, there will be those who argue that the fire can be rationalized [for whatever personal reason and no matter the context] or that the fire can never be rationalized and is essentially wrong, immoral, evil. In all contexts. That we can establish a deontological frame of mind here.

Well, the context that I have chosen is one in which a particular individual behaves in an extremely anti-social manner because she has come to conclude that her own self-gratification is the default when deciding whether to do or not to do something. And for whatever personal reasons [rooted in dasein] she has chosen to burn down the orphanage. What then is the most productive philosophical argument that she can be confronted with?

Unlike you, I do not just assume that because I believe this [here and now] that makes it so. I simply do not think about conflicting value judgments in this way. And in part this revolves around all of the times in my past when I always came up with the same answers to questions like this until one day the answers changed.

Or am I to just assume that this time the answers I propose [re moral nihilism] are in some Hegelian sense the embodiment of my one true self. Am I now the embodiment of the final synthesis?

My problem remains…

I read all of this about prong#1 and I am still fuzzy – really fuzzy – regarding how the conclusions that you have come to [here and now] are relevant out in a particular world in which conflicting behaviors are precipitated by conflicting value judgments.

For me, the “self” fragments only to the extent that “I” becomes embedded in moral and political conflicts. It is more or less whole – intact – regarding those aspects of your life that are embedded/embodied in objective reality. For example, I at any given point in time is embedded in a body that, in accordance with biological laws embedded in the evolution of life on earth, is what it is. It may riddled with cancer, it may be on the brink of death. Those are facts about I the body – as regarding all other empirical facts about your existence – that [at any point in time] are substantially real.

Moral objectivists do not feel fragmented precisely because they have managed to convince themselves that 1] they are in touch with their true self and 2] that their true self is in sync with the objective reality of the world around them.

It is only when your own value judgments do come into conflict with others that prong#1 encounters the possibility of being fragmented. Or so it seems to me. You could live alone on an island totally apart from everyone else and come to encompass a wholly unfragmented sense of self. Why? Because it is just a mental contraption in your head that is never challenged regarding the things you choose to do.

Only if you believed in God, is there a possibility of fragmentation here.

I would have to be convince that when the behaviors of two or more individuals come into conflict over value judgments, there is a philosophical argument available to them such that they do not become entangled in my dilemma.

This will either happen or it will not. But there is little or no possibility of it occuring if I do not come into places like this and encounter the arguments.

With you, the quandary revolves more or less around my inability to understand how your “subjectivism” would be any more effective when your own value judgments come into conflict with others given the manner in which I construe these conflicts as – existentially – the embodiment of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

And yes, at this point in my life, being effectively cut off from others [other than virtually] my motivation does revolve more around curiosity: is there a way out of my labyrinthian dilemma – the maze – that I simply have not thought of yet?

Here, I always make the distinction between what someone believes is true “in their head” and what they are able to demonstrate as true for all rational human beings. And since it is the theist who believes in the existence of God, it is incumbent upon the theist to demonstrate that this is in fact true. Otherwise one can argue that God exists at the center of the universe and then challenge the atheist to prove that He does not.

Yes, it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it. It’s just that for scientists this is almost always relating to the world of either/or. What is the nature of reality? And not “ought it to have been something else instead”?

And yet among the objectivists, an issue is almost never resolved until you agree to become “one of us”. And that rarely revolves around moderation, negotiation and compromise. Many here detest democracy precisely because it is said to be out of sync with the only “natural” way to behave. The way that they do.

There appear to be two ways in which to enforce your values in a non-democratic context:

1] via brute force [autocracy]
2] in sharing a conviction that right makes might [theocracy or one or another political/ideological “Ism”]

But: Is there one? And how exactly would they go about obviating conflicting goods? How, for example, can we live in a world where babies have the right to be born and women are not forced to give birth?

And how [realistically] is a distinction to be made between “applying” one’s values and “enforcing” them? The law is going to have to draw the line somewhere, right? At some point, women are going to be forced to give birth or face the possibility of sanctions from the community. Otherwise, it becomes “abortion on demand”. And that will surely enrage those in the pro-life camp. Indeed, many want to charge women with murder once the point of conception itself is reached.

Even regarding the homeless there are political arguments hurled back and forth: debate.org/opinions/should-w … e-homeless

Indeed, some argue that rather than just feed and house them we should bring them into a political movement that brings down the capitalist political economy. And then embraces socialism instead. Then the conflicting arguments arise regarding the extent to which this can or ought to be accomplished through revolutionary stuggle. To use or not to use violence.

For many, many years I was active in the political struggle to change people’s minds. A veritable alphabet soup of organizations: CP, RCP, SWP, NAM, DSOC, DSA. Back then in other words I was still more or less an objectivist myself. There was no dilemma to contend with.

Now, due largely to health issues, I am no longer “out in the world” politically. But: As I disengaged from political activism, I came more and more to embrace moral and political nihilism.

So: Is that a fortunate or an unfortunate thing? Well, one would have to be inside my head and think about these things as I do now to grapple with that. And trust me: I do still grapple with it. If for no other reason that I still react subjunctively to the news from day to day to day.

I construe rationalization here more as a psychological defense mechanism. You come up with a reason for doing what you do that allows you to feel the least critical about yourself.

Again, as I noted to Faust on another thread, here the sociopath is either more or less self-conscious in choosing self-gratification as a moral font.

He is either a psychopath, someone way, way beyond reasoning with, or I can attempt to ferret out the reason if he is not. Then I am either able to convince him of a better reason not to or I can’t.

My point though is that I am not able to concoct an argument such that whatever he does I have at least established that which he is morally obligated to do.

And I suspect many react to my arguments here such that a concern begins to creep into their head. A concern that I might be right. And, if I am, what does that tell them about their own value judgments?

Here and now, I think it means this: that, aside from any philosophical argument that we might come up with pertaining to particular human behaviors we construe to be immoral, there is almost always an emotional and psychological reaction as well. Thus there are those that are appalled by the aborting of human babies, while others are appalled by the thought of forcing women to give birth.

Doesn’t this connote a subjunctive frame of mind? Is there a way [realistically] to separate out a purely intellectual – philosophical – reaction to human behaviors?

There are sociopaths who are more or less self-conscious about being called a sociopath. If you are convinced that, in a world sans God, acting out your own perceived self-interest is a rational frame of mind, what some will insist are immoral behaviors on your part, you will not. And, precisely because mere mortals are not able to circumscribe the world of is/ought as physicists are able to circumscribe the world of either/or, morality is only able to be stuffed into one or another deontological intellectual contraption.

Or [as always] so it seems to me. Though I am always open to being persuaded otherwise.

An argument able to demonstrate that the reasons someone might use to do this [rooted existentially in dasein] are necessarily irrational and immoral.

With God there is no question of this. God is said to be omniscient. There is no question of a behavior either being or not being a Sin. And He said to be everywhere. There is no question of not getting caught. And He is omnipotent. There is no question of not being punished.

Are you arguing that philosophers [using Reason] are able to concoct a frame of mind [or a legal system] anywhere near the equivalent of this? In fact, I have always seen this as the reason that folks like Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky took their leap to God. Because [as with Plato, Descartes and Kant] they recognize the need for a transcending frame of mind here.

Something would seem to be evil or not. And it is either evil universally or it can be established as being evil in each and every particular circumstantial context.

Please cite example of behaviors you deem to be immoral. And if this is not rooted in one or another ontological font [which most call God], how on earth do you establish that it is in fact immoral?

And what’s the point you’re making here? What’s the relevance here to how we’re defining prong #1 and how that relates to prong #2? I would completely agree that one can identify the ‘I’ with something more substantial and enduring (like the body) and thereby obviate the fragmentation of the ‘I’. If this works for a particular individual, it would effectively solve the dilemma of prong #1. But obviously, prong #2 would remain. Having a strong, cohesive sense of self doesn’t make the world’s problems go away, let alone inter-group conflicts precipitated by dasein-based value judgements. I’m not saying it should. Rather, if anything, it would work the other way around–solve prong #2 first, then the resolution of prong #1 becomes simple if not automatic. Remember, prong #1 is a consequence of recognizing the existential implications of prong #2 (which not everyone does)–recognizing that if we live in a world in which our dasein nature results in conflicting values and beliefs and prejudices, etc., then it stands to question whether anyone’s values, beliefs, prejudices are grounded on anything solid (i.e. objectively real/demonstrable), including one’s own. This leads to the undermining of one’s own “ism”, and insofar as one identifies one’s self with one’s own “ism”, it undermine’s one’s sense of self–the ‘I’ fragments. ← Prong #1.

^ Well, that part I’m not so sure about. Surely one can believe in a particular moral “ism” without being a theist, can’t they? I mean, you might mean to say that you can’t imagine how an atheist could possibly believe in an objectivism moralism, but that doesn’t mean it can’t happen in the real world. There are tons of atheists out there who firmly, objectively, believe in a certain moral “ism”. ← Their “ism” doesn’t have to be perfectly rational per se, they just have to believe in it. You may see the flaws in their reasoning, but that doesn’t mean it’s impossible to cling to an objectivist, atheistic morality as a means of identifying one’s sense of self with an “ism”.

What purpose do you think this curiosity is serving? If you believe that human beings are curious by nature, and that nature bestows us with the features and mechanism and propensities that we have for the purpose of survival, then what purpose do you think your curiosity in this matter is serving?

If just a bit of intellectual frivolity–just something to pass the time (which can serve a survival function: avoiding stagnation/atrophy from inactivity)–then what is the nature of your dilemma at this juncture in your life? Is it just that you need some kind of intellectual stimulation? Something to kill the boredom? Or is it to figure out a way to get back into the fray of engaging with others despite the conflict and aggravation that it causes–to get back into prong #2 and truly overcome it?

Hmm… then maybe I’m misunderstanding what you mean by “demonstrate”. ← So far, I’ve been taking you to mean “prove” in the vein of the traditional objectivist approach (that term again), meaning to exhaustively and thoroughly illustrate an immaculate logical deduction from a set of premises you and your contender both agree upon and arriving at a conclusion that matches your objectivist beliefs and values. But when you say “it is embedded in the distinction between arguing about something [scientific or otherwise] and demonstrating it,” I’m not sure whether the traditional objectivist approach falls into the one category of the other. For a scientist, “demonstration” is certainly not the same as just “arguing”–to demonstrate, according to a scientist, doesn’t require uttering a single word, it just requires doing something out in the empirical world that, sans any contending theories, can only be explained by the theory the scientist is trying to convince his contender of (coupled with the assumption that his contender will consequently “connect the dots”–which of course won’t always happen even then).

So when you say you’re looking for a “demonstration” of one moral “ism” in contrast to another, what exactly do you mean?

Yes, but that’s because here at ILP, there is very little danger of blood being spilled over disagreements–even angry, obstinate, fanatical disagreements–and in some cases, it might even be “healthy” (i.e. venting, catharsis, getting it out); I’ll bet that if you took the members of ILP and had them argue with each other face-to-face, you’d see way less hostility and animosity arising amongst them–face-to-face confrontations work as a far stronger trigger for social instincts and impulses to arise within us, instincts and impulses that sway us more towards resolving conflict and less towards proving our point definitively–towards moderation, negotiation and compromise, and away from war and blood shed. Why? Because obviously, when the conflict becomes face-to-face, the risk of full fledged bloodshed and war breaking out becomes a lot more immanent, and we, on an unconscious level, are aware of this. ← In this situation, I’m sure people would be far more likely to agree with each other that they ought to aim towards a “healthy” resolution (however you want to define that) to their conflict.

Yes, you can take any set of moral values and conceive of certain hypothetical (or actual) scenarios in which one comes up against resistance in one’s efforts to practice them. But I’m just saying there exist people out their who hold certain moral values that don’t inevitably come up against resistance in their efforts to practice them. My point merely stems from my reply to you regard my own values and how I wouldn’t say I need to “enforce” them in order to practice them. True, I can imagine living an alternate life in an alternate world–a different time, a different culture, with a different historical background–one in which people not only recognize when I’m trying to practice my values but actively fight against me in those efforts. But this is not the world I’m living in, and it is not my experience. It is possible to practice your values without inevitably having to “enforce” them.

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