Making iambiguous's day

Bob feels that abortion is the right thing to do. Bonnie feels that abortion is the wrong thing to do. But either way, they feel this as the embodiment of dasein. Their own particular subjective “truth” is just an existential contraption that might have been the opposite had the variables in their lives been otherwise. In other words, had Bob lived Bonnie’s life and Bonnie his.

There does not appear to be a way for them to feel as they ought to feel [using the tools of philosophy] in order to be deemed rational human beings.

Yes, if this works for them as a way in which to claim their own “personal truth”, that’s fine.

But it does not work for me. To the extent that personal truths related to value judgments are basically existential fabrications/contraptions, I recognize them for what they are: political leaps of faith rooted subjectively in personal prejudices.

I’m questioning the extent to which a “relativistic truth” stacks up against an objective truth. We still live in world where the irresistible force “relativistic truth” embodied in the pro-life folks collides into the immovable object “relativistic truth” embodied in the pro-choice folks.

They both get to champion “truth” but either the baby is aborted [and suffers the consequences of death] or the pregnant woman is forced to give birth [or suffers the consequences of being arrested for murder].

At least in political jurisdictions where abortion is deemed to be murder – legally.

Also, I am noting the absence of relativistic, subjective truths pertaining to the components of our lives that are in fact true for all of us: math, science, logic. Empirical truths.

“For all practical purposes”, I am not at all certain what you are arguing here.

In other words, my dilemma is just the way in which I react to those particular instances in my life when my existential value judgments come into conflict with the existential value judgments of others.

Embodied in this…

1] I was raised in the belly of the working class beast. My family/community were very conservative. Abortion was a sin. Big time. Both in and out of church.
2] I was drafted into the Army and while on my “tour of duty” in Vietnam I happened upon politically radical folks who reconfigured my thinking about abortion. And God and lots of other things.
3] after I left the Army, I enrolled in college and became further involved in left wing politics. It was all the rage back then. I became a feminist. I married a feminist. I wholeheartedly embraced a woman’s right to choose.
4] then came the calamity with Mary and John. I loved them both but their engagement was foundering on the rocks that was Mary’s choice to abort their unborn baby.
5] back and forth we all went. I supported Mary but I could understand the points that John was making. I could understand the arguments being made on both sides. John was right from his side and Mary was right from hers.
6] I read William Barrett’s Irrational Man and came upon his conjectures regarding “rival goods”.
7] Then, over time, I abandoned an objectivist frame of mind that revolved around Marxism/feminism. Instead, I became more and more embedded in existentialism. And then as more years passed I became an advocate for moral nihilism.

The “extra layers” here are the new experiences that I had which prompted me to question old assumptions regarding right and good behavior.

I merely ask of the moral objectivists to note a particular trajectory of their own pertaining existentially to a value judgment near and dear to them.

How, as a moral subjectivist, does it work for you?

Why? Because they have managed to convince themselves that the “real me” is in touch with one or another political ideal, one or another natural morality. Or one or another God.

But: how does this obviate the manner in which I subsume my own value judgments in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy?

How are these components not relevant regarding their own behaviors?

And you don’t have this dilemma because [if I understand you] you are comfortable with your own “personal truth”. That “works” for you out in the world when your values come into conflict with others. But, from my perspective, this is more like a “trick” that one contrives “in their head” in order to make the dilemma go away. To me, it is a frame of mind more or less the equivalent of a psychological defense mechanism.

But: That is only from my perspective. That frame of mind [yours] simply does not work for me. The part about dasein and conflicting goods are ever pertinent in my own social, political and economic interactions.

I challenge you to note something I have posted here at ILP that will confirm this absurd accusation.

Indeed, I reduce you down to this sort of feckless “retort” time and again of late. It speaks volumes regarding the gap between the points I raise in our exchanges and your refusal to address them “out in the world” of actual human interactions that come into conflict over value judgments.

From my frame of mind you have always and ever been about “defining” moral and political values into existence.

My sense is that this doesn’t work for you because you begin by presupposing a mind-independent objective reality (what I’ve been calling the empirical reality–that Joe is 6’1" tall, for example). This seems to lead one to the conclusion that if there is any truth at all, empirical reality has the final say (i.e. it trumps any subjective truth). Therefore, objective truth is determined by empirical reality, and any subjective truth (or existential contraption, as you call it) is consequently wrong insofar as it conflicts with empirical truth (and even when it doesn’t, one still has to question how solid the grounds are for one or another subjective truth–value judgements, for example).

That, plus the idea that subjective outlooks on the world don’t make truth (however much they seem to reflect truth) would make it quite difficult (I imagine) to take the reality of subjective truths seriously.

But this is the twist that subjectivism/idealism puts on the relation between perception and reality: it’s the idea that the mind creates reality, creates truth–that it is one with the world so perceived–that gives mind and perception the power to ground reality even from within a subjective framework (or so subjectivism/idealism would have one believe). In short, get rid of the mind-independent and objectively real empirical world and substitute it with a reality-generating subjectivism (which would give you the same empirical world, but grounded in an entirely different way), and you no longer have your dilemma (at least the first prong of it).

These can be deemed relativistic as well–they would just be the same for all of us (and there are some who doubt math, science, logic, and empirical truth (as stupid as they are IMO)).

Think of it in terms of Einsteinian relativity; if one day, all of humanity decided to board a huge space craft and look for another life-sustain planet (because Earth was dying or going to explode or whatever), they could all unanimously say: “We are moving away from the Earth,” even though from a different perspective, one could say the Earth is moving away from them–it’s just that nobody takes that perspective.

Furthermore, there are some perspective that we have no choice in adopting–seeing bananas as yellow, for example–I’m sure there are very few human beings who see a typical banana as blue (though I’m hesitant to say no human beings), and I know I personally can’t will myself to see bananas as blue, but I’m sure you’d agree that it’s possible in principle for there to be an animal or maybe someone with abnormal color vision who does see bananas as blue. But as for the typical human being, he will for all intents and purposes see bananas as yellow–but since it needn’t be this way in principle, they’re still yellow relative to his way of perceiving them.

As a moral subjectivist, I don’t stick my neck out and say that my moral positions on things are objective reality, sustained independently of me, and therefore apply to everyone. I recognize them as stemming from my own personal feelings, thoughts, and conscience. This means they apply to me, so I’m still bound by my self-imposed moral obligations, but as far as imposing my morality on other people, I don’t give myself the excuse that my morals are objectively real and therefore universally applicable. Yes, this sometimes means I will have to deal with moral conflicts with other people, but like I said, this is just a part of life that we all must deal with.

I’ve come to think of it as just the nature of morality (as disappointing as that probably is for some).

Not sure I understand these questions. How does it obviate the manner in which you subsume your value judgements in dasein? It obviously doesn’t. You can subsume your value judgements in dasein all you like. And if we take this subsumption of yours for objective reality, I’d be hard pressed to imagine how others would escape it. But this is why I limited my statement to “psychologically”.

How are these components not relevant regarding their own behaviors? What components? You mean dasein, conflicting goods, and political economy? If you mean in terms of these components influencing/causing their own behavior, then again, I say it isn’t irrelevant. Only that psychologically, we’re not all struggling with the first prong of this dilemma.

Well, in my opinion, every psychological move is a defense mechanism (there’s nothing in there that doesn’t function the way it does towards securing our survival–literally defending the ego against death). But I can understand why one would say this if one does not yet see how the perspective holds in terms of logical consistency and coherency–especially when one holds an opposing or conflicting perspective. And as I said in an earlier post, the use of psychological defense mechanisms doesn’t necessarily preclude logic and rationality (I believe I argued that logic and rationality are actually tools for defending the ego against mistakes and bad predictions about reality). So if you get the logic right, your philosophy can hold water quite well regardless of how much you’re using it as a defense mechanism.

Me too, but those realities constitute the second prong of the dilemma for me. My philosophical outlook allows me to live in a world like that without feeling like the metaphysical conclusions I have arrived at in my philosophies are groundless.

Yes, the variables are what they are. My point though is that, given a particular set of variables [experiences], one is more rather than less predisposed to embrace one rather than another set of values. And that, philosophically, there does not appear to be a way in which to assess which set of values is more [let alone the most] rational.

Whereas with respect to math and science and logic and empirical fact it makes no difference how different your life is from others. Here there are truths – objective truths – that transcend dasein.

That is always the distinction that I come back to.

Yes, Bob does think/feel that abortion is the right thing to do. Bonnie does think/feel it is the wrong thing to do. But only as this becomes embodied in dasein. What they do is not as they necessarily must do in order to be thought of as rational and moral.

Basically [to me] this is just another rendition of “you’re right from your side and I’m right from mine”. But the laws that any particular human community prescribe and proscribe regarding abortion are no less political leaps rooted in the personal prejudices of those in power.

Both sides get to embrace “personal truths” [that are in conflict] but from my point of view this is a far cry from having actually established the truth philosophically, deontologically.

Again:

How then would this be applicable to abortion? Empirical truths can be established as to whether Mary is 5’6" tall and had an abortion. But what is the empirical truth regarding the morality of these facts.

Well, there is not likely to be a conflict pertaining to her height. Who would argue that Mary ought to be 6’6" instead? But conflicting sets of facts are noted with respect to the morality of her abortion. So, in what sense then would empirical reality have the final say here? How seriously can the reality of subjective/personal truths be taken here?

Other then in measuring these “truths” based largely on who has the political power [here and now] to enforce their own subjective/personal agenda?

My problem here though still revolves around this: With respect to actual conflicting human behaviors that revolve around conflicting value judgments how “on earth” would this “work”? In other words, how in particular would you translate this frame of mind if you were in the midst of a fierce confrontation outside an abortion clinic between those on both sides of the issue?

What would you say to them? You can speak of “prongs” embedded in my dilemma but [for me] it finally comes down to an argument that is able to integrate both into a frame of mind that effectively integrates the conflicting goods in the “abortion wars” where babies either will or will not be killed.

But: Ought such behavior to be construed as murder? Ought those who either have abortions or perform abortions be punished for it?

But Einstein was concerned with understanding the immutable laws of nature. The world of either/or. And the only way I can imagine the world of is/ought being construed in that manner is if, even when matter reconfigured itself into consciousness – matter able to grasp itself as matter – it is still no less inherently embedded in the immutable laws of matter. In other words, “is/ought” is [essentially] an illusion.

Again, from my frame of mind, examples like this revolve around either/or. Either you see the banana as yellow or you see it as blue. And nature configured us to see it as yellow given a particular set of conditions. If the conditions change [less light, you’ve taken LSD, you are color-blind etc.] you might see it as another color instead.

But what if you do in fact see it as blue [for whatever reason] and someone insists that you must see it as yellow — or be punished.
Then it becomes a moral issue. And while some might argue that you ought to see it as yellow you still see it as blue. Right?

In other words, you’re right from your side and they’re right from their side. And that can work fine until you run into the moral objectivists who insist that there is in fact but one right or rational or natural or virtuous way in which to think and to feel and to behave.

And it is those folks that I address the bulk of my arguments toward.

Where I tend to make a distinction here between you and I is in regard to what you call your “self-imposed moral obligations”. This [from my frame of mind] becomes hopelessly entangled in my dilemma. You are obliging yourself to just accept that “I” was created within the parameters of a particular set of existential variables; and that the particular political prejudice that you were predisposed to “leap” to existentially will have to do given that there is no universal, objective morality.

We just see the implications of this differently. Among other things, I am considerably more cynical regarding the consequences of accepting it. I recognize “I” here as largely an existential fabrication [from my youth] and as an existential contraption [throughout my adult years].

“I” for me here is considerably less substantial [and considerably more precarious] than it is for others. Whereas for you “I” seems to be somewhere between me and the objectivists.

I provide an existential “snapshot” of my life in order to illustrate more concretely the manner in which I subsume “I” in dasein relating to my value judgments.

That is precisely what this…

1] I was raised in the belly of the working class beast. My family/community were very conservative. Abortion was a sin. Big time. Both in and out of church.
2] I was drafted into the Army and while on my “tour of duty” in Vietnam I happened upon politically radical folks who reconfigured my thinking about abortion. And God and lots of other things.
3] after I left the Army, I enrolled in college and became further involved in left wing politics. It was all the rage back then. I became a feminist. I married a feminist. I wholeheartedly embraced a woman’s right to choose.
4] then came the calamity with Mary and John. I loved them both but their engagement was foundering on the rocks that was Mary’s choice to abort their unborn baby.
5] back and forth we all went. I supported Mary but I could understand the points that John was making. I could understand the arguments being made on both sides. John was right from his side and Mary was right from hers.
6] I read William Barrett’s Irrational Man and came upon his conjectures regarding “rival goods”.
7] Then, over time, I abandoned an objectivist frame of mind that revolved around Marxism/feminism. Instead, I became more and more embedded in existentialism. And then as more years passed I became an advocate for moral nihilism.

is.

But the objectivists would seem to possess a frame of mind which makes this part go away. They embrace a so-called “natural” understanding of the world such that their own moral narrative is said to be in sync with it. But: They refuse to examine a value judgment of their own for me so that I might begin to grasp how the part I construe as dasein above goes away.

Psychologically, in my view, they become more or less the embodiment of this: viewtopic.php?f=15&t=185296

This is still really fuzzy to me. The “consistency and coherence” of my own value judgments is no less embodied in dasein. And in conflicting goods. In other words, given very different variables in my actual “lived life” this consistency and coherence might just as easily have been in defense of an opposite moral/political narrative.

Again:

But logic and rationality are available to both sides in framing an argument in defense of positions embedded in conflicts like abortion. And the “consistency and the coherence” that any one particular individual might encompass in the argument that they make [in order to rationalize the behaviors they choose] is no less embodied in dasein.

Basically, we have come to think about these complex relationships differently.

Yes, I agree with that. I only like to emphasize that, from my point of view, whatever one feels or believes at a given moment, that determines reality/truth for the person in that moment. For an objectivist, this is not so easy. An objectivist is apt to say: well, so-and-so may feel a certain way or believe this or that, but that doesn’t make it so. And given that his life could have gone in a different direction, so could his feelings and beliefs. What makes those any less real/true?

Yes, but for me, even those are rooted in subjectivity–it’s just that they don’t tend to change from one person to another or from one point in a person’s life to another.

Agreed.

I agree, but if neither of us are objectivists, then we both know there isn’t the truth–at least not for things rooted primarily in dasein–there is only my truth and your truth; you seem to regard these as metaphorical at best, or less “solid” than hard empirical truth, whereas I grant them full truth but in a relativistic sense.

There is no empirical truth about it. My point is that if you look to the empirical world for an answer to these questions and you find that, empirically speaking, there is no fact of the matter, then there is no fact of the matter. ← That’s for one who believes in the absolute objectivity of the empirical world, one who looks there for final answers. But if you’re one who believes that truth stems from subjectivity, then even if the empirical world has no answers for you, that doesn’t take away from the force of one’s subjective, prejudice-based opinions in determining truth (in a relativistic sense).

This is prong #2. I wouldn’t have much to say. I know how I would assess the situation. I would think to myself: abortion is right for him. It’s wrong for her. It’s whatever for me. Etc., etc., etc… I get the impression at this point though that prong #2 is the only thing that really concerns you. I got the impression (sort of, kind of) that you agreed that your nihilism can sometimes prove to be self-negating, but I’m not sure you really struggle with that. You do seem to be looking for an objectivist’s approach to resolving all these dasein-based conflicts and attempts to attain truth. However, it’s not clear, at this point, whether you hold out any hope of finding something or you are really trying to prove to yourself and others that no such approach can exist. ← But then what?

Just to be clear, I was using Einsteinian relativism as an analogy for two conflicting “oughts”–Jane ought to have the abortion relative to the pro-choice faction, but she ought to keep her baby relative to the pro-life faction–not for the conflict between “is” and “ought”.

Right. Again, I know how I would assess the situation: blue for one, yellow for the other. Ought for one, ought not for the other. But as far as dealing with the threat of punish over something one can’t help (or even if one could help it), I have no better solution than the next person. I could argue with the person: I see the banana as yellow, and I feel this is OK. I’m convinced that it is blue for me, and that it is OK just because I intuit that it’s OK. I don’t expect him to be persuaded. I only tell him how it is for me. If he threatens me, I would fall back on self-defense of some kind, maybe legal defense, maybe brute force (if it came to that), maybe try to ignore him and keep my distance, and any of the other modes of conduct that normal people use.

That’s if I came at the situation from my philosophical/metaphysical background. But most of the time, I do what normal people usually do: try to argue why it’s rediculous to make moral judgements on seeing bananas as blue. If we were to take a more serious example–say abortion–I would bring forward whatever reasons I normally have for siding with pro-life vs. pro-choice. I don’t think any of these would be the final answers, or the decisive arguments–as if I was the first and only one to finally recognize the real truth about the matter–but I know that whatever my reasons are for choosing this or that side of the issue, voicing those reasons can be persuasive. As I said, I am a subjectivist and a relativist, but I always recognize the power of a good argument–how it can persuade one from his prejudices over to another’s prejudices, from his truth to my truth. ← I would certain give that a try if I thought it feasible.

Yes. Keep in mind that insofar as I experience myself as an “I”, that “I” exists (it is rooted in subjectivity). And the phenomenon of the “I” is much like the color of the banana; we are genetically predisposed to experience it as real–it’s not just a theory particular to a specific culture or religion.

Yes, real like the objectivists, but for completely different reasons.

That tells me that the objectivist is more subject to being attached to his views because he has intermingled them into his self-identity. Someone who manages to avoid this (or at least embraces the value of a fluid “self” who adapts his beliefs and values to his ever-changing life situations) is much more capable to “letting go” of certain attachments and values when he deems it prudent.

The consistency and coherency of one’s philosophical views was only highlighted to show how it helps to escape prong #1–how to avoid recognizing any self-negating tendencies of such views–not to show that you’ve got the right narrative or the “real” truth. That coupled with the fact that, at any one time, such views are your views leaves one with the only obvious option: keep believing in your views.

True, but I’m only saying that some are better at the logic game than others, and in a philosophical context (say a public debate), the superior player can be more persuasive or harder to beat (of course, who “wins” in a debate is rarely determined by one or the other contenders admitting defeat, and way more often by the audience or a panel of judges).

Yes, and I would say we have acquired different concerns about it.

But this is not the case with respect to that which can be shown [demonstrated] to be true objectively for all of us.

John either was or was not executed in a Texas prison. That someone feels or believes that he was or was not executed doesn’t change the fact of it.

But where things get tricky of course is that someone might believe that he was or he was not executed and behave accordingly. And that can precipitate actual consequences regardless of what the true facts are.

Still, if someone feels or believes that it is right or wrong for the state to execute prisoners, there does not appear [to me] to be the equivalent of an objective fact here in order to determine who is in fact correct and who is in fact incorrect.

Instead, that seems ever embodied in subjective opinions that come to be attached to one or another political prejudice.

Thus, from my perspective, what the moral objectivists do is to equate the two. They argue that if you understand the world “rationally” or “ideally” or “naturally” the morality of capital punishment can in turn be determined objectively. Just as objectively as the fact of an execution itself.

Or so it seems to me.

I agree that what counts out in the “real world” is what someone thinks or feels. Why? Because they will behave accordingly. And it can’t be stressed enough: it is in behaving [acting out their thoughts and feelings] that actual consequences are precipitated.

All I can then do is to, once again, make the crucial distinction between those things that one thinks and feels which are able to be demonstrated as in fact true objectively for all of us, and those things that one thinks and feels which seem only to be embodied subjectively/subjunctively in particular political prejudices.

On the other hand, in the manner in which I interpret the latter, I become ensnared in my dilemma.

The laws of mathematics and physics seem to transcend the manner in which I construe the meaning of subjective opinion and moral/political prejudice. Otherwise we couldn’t send astronauts to the moon. We can only argue endlessly over whether it is immoral to spend money on space exploration when there are so many more dire problems to be solved right here on earth.

Still, how would your understanding of this be conveyed to those objectivists on either side of an issue like abortion? How can a “full truth” be granted to a frame of mind that is largely just an existential fabrication/contraption? From my perspective, once you acknowledge that “I” here is [by and large] embodied in countless existential variables/interactions [embedded in a particular life out in a particular world] beyond both your complete understanding or control, you are faced with just how problematic and precarious your values become.

I think the crux of the problem here – the gap in our communication – is the extent to which you see truth stemming from subjectivity. For me this is to say that it is a “truth” for you “in your head”. A subjective truth given the life that you have lived, the experiences that you have had. Knowing all the while that had this life been different your “truth” might well be invested in the opposite point of view.

And that both points of view are still embedded in conflicting goods.

To wit:

I start by acknowledging this particular fact: that the overwhelming preponderance of men and women around the globe are able to convince themselves [or allow others to convince them] that morality can be grounded in either God or Reason or Nature.

One or another objective [or transcending] font/foundation.

I don’t believe this. So, sure, I am here in search of an argument that might persuade me otherwise.

For me, moral nihilism fractures and fragments “I”. How? By ever situating the “self” out in a particular world historically, culturally and experientially. And by noting the extent to which we live in world [from the cradle to the grave] awash in contingency, chance and change. As long as I recognize the extent to which “I” is just an existential fabrication/contraption pertaining to that which is of most importance to me – how ought one to live? – the subjective truth that you speak of is no less a fabrication/contraption. The fact that someone “intuits” behaving in one way rather than another, is no less the embodiment of dasein from my point of view.

This is basically my own equivalent of the “political leap of faith”. It’s just that both sides in the abortion wars are able to argue persuasively. And the leap is no less the embodiment of dasein.

Also, the argument of the sociopath/narcissist is no less persuasive. And he or she recognizes “the power of a good argument” in turn. That, in a world sans God, self-gratification is their own particular moral font of choice.

And it is nihilists of this ilk that basically run the world.

And yet there are aspects of “I” that are anything but subjective. You either do or you do not have a brain tumor. You either are or are not a citizen of North Korea. You either did or did not just get fired. You either are or you are not homosexual. You either are or are not black.

Facts. But it is in how you and others react to those facts subjectively that precipitate behaviors that precipitate consequences. And, from my frame of mind, we live in a world where it does not appear possible to determine deontologically how the rational/virtuous man or women is obligated to react. And thus to behave.

It’s just that the subjectivists here among us seem less entangled in my own particular dilemma.

I suppose what it comes down to is that you would seem to have a considerably more substantial “sense of self” here than I do. In other words, pertaining to conflicting value judgments, I have no self to negate. “I” is still more – considerably more – an existential fabrication/contraption to me.

And I “keep believing in my views” only by recognizing in turn that new experiences, new relationships, new sources of information/knowledge etc., may well reconfigure them [or even upend them] at any time.

Again, making “I” here considerably more tenuous for me than for others.

Me too. I think I agree with what you said in the last post: we seem to generally agree on the nature of the problem, but we come at it with very different approaches and sentiments about it.

I think you are missing one thing from my point of view, however, that might make more sense out of what I’m saying, but more on that below.

I take this to be a “dilemma” because you don’t know of an easy-to-implement catch-all solution to the problem.

Well, to me, “subjectivity” just means rooted in the subjective–that is, rooted in a perception, thought, experience (generally something mental) that depends on a subject for its existence. “Opinion” is a more capricious and varying form of subjectivity. Not all forms of subjectivity are mere opinion. Similar reasoning applies to “moral” or “political” prejudice. But anything one takes to be “objective fact” can be traced back to one’s thoughts or knowledge of those alleged facts, meaning that you will always find subjective roots to anything you want to hold up as objective fact. And as far as I’m concerned, that’s all there ever is.

Some forms of subjectivity are enduring and unwavering across individuals such as the laws of mathematics and physics, but this just means we all experience these in the same way and that we have little choice in the matter. The reason these seem to transcend subjectivity is because of what I call “projection”.

This is where the aspect of my views, the one I said is missing from your understanding of my views (I think), comes in. I am not just a subjectivist, but I have a theory of mind on which my subjectivism is based. The theory is really a theory of substance–what the ultimate fabric of existence is. (I PMed you a link to my book in which this theory is explained). I believe that mind or consciousness is a substance with the power to generate reality–what I call “projection”–and it projects reality as precisely that which it experiences.

I approach the philosophy of consciousness in such a way that I end up being an idealist (an extreme form of subjectivism), but not in the same vein as Berkeley. Berkeley, although disagreeing with Descartes’ dualism, was still a Cartesian in the way he conceptualize “mind”–he didn’t think of mind as a “reality generating stuff”, although he did think mind was the ultimate reality (which is really no different than saying: mind exists–but we all know that). He was an immaterialist, which is to say he was a skeptic in regards to the existence of matter, which allowed him to come at his monism by eliminating one of the components of Descartes’ dualism–but by the same token, he preserved the Cartesian concept of “mind”. But this is where I disagree with Berkeley’s idealism–I am steadfast against Cartesianism, even his concept of “mind”.

In expound my concept of “mind” (really, my concept of substance), I begin by noting three aspects of 1st person subjective experience which I propose constitute the essential ingredients of consciousness. They are: 1) quality, 2) being, and 3) meaning. I believe that mind, the general substance from which all existent things are cut, is a synthesis of these three things. I believe that we find these three aspects in every 1st person subjective experience. It’s aspect #2 in particular (being) which persuades me to postulate that subjective points of view (feelings, opinions, perceptions, intuitions, etc.) are at the same time fully real. Being is inherent to all instances of mind and perception, and because of this, all such instances project and become the real things they are experienced as being.

^ With that understanding of the nature of mind in the background, I approach the issues and dilemmas you bring up with the view that one’s subjective way of perceiving or experiencing things literally are reality for that person. The relativism that accompanies my views requires some additional argumentation to see how it fits in, but with those two items–my brand of subjectivism and my brand of relativism–I don’t really struggle with prong #1 of your dilemma (not that you do, but like I said in my last post, I’m not as certain at this point that you ever struggled with it).

^ Sorry, that was lengthy, but I find I always have to write something close to a novel in order to get at the nuts and bolts of my views.

When you describe one’s values as “problematic and precarious”, this to me hints at prong #1–how one can retain conviction in the grounds and rational cohesiveness of one’s values (and the “I”)?–but again, I’m not really as focused on this prong as I was earlier in this thread (unless you still wish to pursue it).

At this point, I wonder if my theory of mind as reality generating substance makes sense out of this for you. Do you see that this is neither here nor there if my subjective truth is what I experience (or believe) in the moment? If it’s there in the mind at this moment, then it projects and becomes reality for me (even if it’s true that I could have gone in a different direction and adopted different beliefs). The only thing remaining in order to make full sense out of this is, AFAIC, my brand of relativism, and I haven’t fully gone into that.

And why do you wish to be persuaded otherwise? Do you wish to have a universal and thorough-going solution to your dilemma (prong #2)? Why does it need to be an objectivist’s solution?

Given what I explained above (about my theory of mind), does it make more sense now how I can say that such truths can be existential fabrication/contraption yet also full truths in the literal sense?

You mean politicians? That is indeed a problem.

Well, if you’re only concerned with prong #2, then I’m in the same boat as you (though I don’t feel as much angst over it as you seem to).

Yes, if what you mean is that “I” is identified as an “ist”, then I understand.

This [to me] is the part where we become hopelessly entangled in describing/depicting the very nature of what it means to “see” something. Trying to pin down the “ontological essence” of what reality really is when two subjects see a chair.

But: Next thing you know we are careening down the rabbit hole — debating solipsism and/or Cartesian demons and/or the virtual reality of being characters in some cosmic entity’s dream.

Instead, the discussion I want to focus on is always the same: in making the distinction between arguing that Barack Obama either is or is not now president of the United States and arguing that the policies of Barack Obama either are or are not moral.

I maintain that objectively he is the president of the United States. That this is in fact true for all of us. And that our reactions to his policies can only reflect personal [subjective] opinions and political prejudices.

But: If your point of view is basically a fabrication/contraption rooted existentially in dasein [as is the case for those you come into conflict with] what does it really mean for either one of you to try to persuade the other?

What doesn’t change is this: That, had things been different for either of you, you could be taking her side and she yours.

And [in turn] your values are still embodied in conflicting goods. Thus the “resolution” is no less entangled in my dilemma. It’s just that you have managed to convince yourself that you are less entangled in it. Or even that you have succeeded in extricating yourself from it.

Or so it seems to me.

You speak of a “not perfect” point of view as though there might be one from which to measure our own subjective, political prejudices. And, sure, there might be. But, from my point of view, in the absence of a demonstrable proof of this, our values remain ever under construction – a work in progress – from the cradle to the grave.

Well, I haven’t found one of late. Neither with respect to the conflicting goods embedded in any of the dozens and dozens of moral and political conflagrations that we are bombarded with on the evening news nor with respect to the argument of the sociopath that morality in a world sans God is rooted in self-gratification.

Yes, thoughts and perceptions may be embodied in a particular subject but they are either in sync with the world objectively or they are not. In other words, sans solipsism and all the rest of that stuff out on the end of the metaphysical limb.

Again, this sort of thing is of interest to me only to the extent that what you believe or think you know about these relationships are demonstrable beyond the theory. And to the extent that they are relevant pertaining [existentially] to identity, value judgments and political economy “out in the world” of actual human interactions.

Thus when you speculate that…

…my own reaction is always the same: How might this be relevant to John and Jane, flailing about in a conflict over Jane’s unwanted pregnancy?

If you were to expound on this in a room filled with Trump and Clinton supporters [going at each other] what lesson might they learn?

In other words [from my perspective], whatever might “literally be the reality” for any particular subject, if they interact with other subjects, they are going to come into conflict sooner or later.

And that is when the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy seems to be a more reasonable way in which to understand these altercations.

[b]But:

[u]Here[/u] you say that you don’t [u]care[/u] that you don’t know what to say to them. And while that is certainly your perogative, it doesn’t make the conflicts [or the consequences] go away. Instead, from my point of view, you seem to have concocted a theoretical, intellectual set of premises that allow you [in a way that I don’t fully understand] to obviate the conflicts by subsuming them in the assumptions that you make. [/b]

Perhaps [or perhaps not] analogous to Jacob’s VO or to James S. Saint’s RM/AO.

The difficulty I have then is in grasping the significance of your ideas/ideals insofar as they are relevant to our lives “for all practical purposes”.

I don’t view conflicting goods or moral/political conflgrations as having “prongs”. I view them instead as actual human behaviors in actual circumstantial contexts that precipitate all manner of actual human pain and suffering.

First and foremost, I am curious to see if there might actually be an argument able to persuade me to think about these things differently. Secondly, my aim is to expose what I construe to be the dangers inherent in moral and political objectivism. While acknowledging in turn the dangers inherent in moral nihilism. Instead, I champion democracy and the rule of law as [perhaps] the best of all possible worlds. Within the context of political economy.

And yet both sides will ever claim the capacity to decide such things.

We simply think about this differently. From my perspective, there are no “stronger” arguments from either side. There are no more “sophisticated” arguments that come closer to the “perfect” frame of mind. If, for whatever personal reason, a sociopath decides to murder you, she is able to justify it as furthering her own self-gratification. And that’s the end of it. For her.

And it is important to make a distinction here between psychopaths and sociopaths. Psychopaths may well be compelled to behave as they do because, chemically and/or neurologically, it is literally “beyond their control”. Sociopaths are in control, but predicate their behaviors solely on self-interest. Psychopaths come closer to living in a world that is wholly determined by the immutable laws of matter. In that world, even this exchange that we are having is only as it ever could have been.

I mean those who own and operate the global economy. The Bilderberg ilk. And their equivalent in Russia, China and all the other main players.

I agree.

Sure.

Ah, but what does “in sync” mean here? Does it mean: a mirror image of how we perceive and think about the world, or could there be an isomorphic mapping between our perceptions and thoughts and the outer world without it being an exactly mirror reflection? ← Of course, that gets into solipsism and all the rest, so if you cut off that avenue of thought from your considerations, you’re left with objectivism and naive realism.

^ Here, I take you to mean: is it practically useful towards untangling ourselves from the common dilemma dasein has us wrapped up in? And to that, I’ve said numerous times, it’s not.

I agree, which is why I haven’t been arguing against it (though it seems not to have borne you a solution).

Again, I never said I obviate the typical conflicts people get into with each other in this disharmonous world. I’ve only ever been saying that my views help me to 1) assess situations like the ones you’re interested in in a different light, and 2) make sense of the world on a metaphysical/ontological level.

Really? I see them more as cartoon characters on a movie screen.

^ Joking. I will repeat that the “prongs” belong to the dilemma you have presented to me (as I have interpreted it), not to moral/political conflagrations. You presented your dilemma to me as though it were partially rooted in philosophy, which is where I got prong #1 from, but lately you seem to regard your dilemma as just the common one were are all ensnared in (not philosophical at all, though one like yourself can take a philosophical glance at it)–the dilemma of being creatures bound to dasein and entangled in a world of conflicting value judgements and political prejudices, and trying to reach for some objectivism as a means of persuading/dominating over those we are in conflict with. I thought maybe part of your dilemma was how to make sense, philosophically, out of this fact while at the same time adopting one or another objectivism (or subjectivism), as we must, knowing all the while that this would be just another existential fabrication/contraption. ← But I guess this doesn’t phase you. You are only concerned with the common dilemma we all struggle with (and are using philosophy to bring it to light and challenge others who disagree, or in my case agree).

Good! At least you’re able to settle on the best thing we have available, even if it’s not a catch-all solution.

True. It should be said, however, that often the most reliable outcomes of our attempts to persuade the opposition is not that the latter will be convinced but that bystanders will. For example, in a public debate, or in a court of law.

What if “stronger” simply meant: more potential to persuade, not more right. Surely, you must agree, that if a child got into an argument with his parent, the parent is way more likely to be able to persuade the child than visa-versa (even if the parent is ultimately wrong). Or a murderer trying to persuade the judge that he had good reason to kill his victim. Compare that to the persuasive power of the victim’s family. Which do you think will have the “stronger” arguments in terms of the ability to persuade/convince. All of this is conditioned by many other factors than just the truth and logical fortitude of the arguments–for example, the culture in which those involved operate, the abilities of each party to argue a point, the prejudices of the judge, and even things like money. But all these things do culminate in making one side of the argument or the other “stronger”.

While I’m not entirely convinced the psychopath is not in control if the sociopath is, I take your point to be: the sociopath can contrive whatever arguments/justifications he wants for the sake of contending with another’s arguments/justification. But that doesn’t take away from what I said above: we aren’t helpless automatons who must yield to the persuasive powers of the sociopath’s reasoning. It may be true that this will not compel the sociopath to relent, but what else can we do?


Well, Biggy, given that you are not interested in my metaphysical/subjectivist views (or prong #1) and only wish to discuss prong #2, I won’t bother you with the former any longer. I won’t say that this necessarily brings our discussion to a close as I am open to discussing prong #2 (though I’m afraid I might not have much interesting to say aside what I already said–i.e. tackling the smaller, more immediate conflicts one at a time as opposed to ending all such conflicts once and for all), but I think I got what I wanted out of this thread anyway–a chance to get to know your arguments and your approach to the objectivists on this board (and why many of them look at you derisively). So if you wish to end this discussion, that’s fine.

And I’m sorry if I sounded snappy with that “I don’t know and I don’t care” bit–I was feeling a bit frustrated with the fact that I’ve been saying that my subjectivist views aren’t designed to be applied to the conflicts you’re interested in examining–at least, not by the objectivist approach of simply explaining them to those with whom you come into conflict. (However, my views do prescribe a certain flexibility of mind with which one can change his point of view such as to see things from another’s point of view ← but that’s definitely not the objectivist’s approach).

If there’s one thing I’d like to leave you with as a subjectivist, it would be the difference in approaches between one like myself and an objectivist. I think I understand that what you’re interested in is not just how to deal with the dilemma we’re all caught in (resolving the many conflicts that result from our dasein based prejudices and value judgements) but whether it is possible for one or another form of objectivism to actually decide who’s right and who’s wrong (morally speaking) and therefore, if not bring about peace by way of forcing others to concede to whatever is the demonstrably correct moral position, then at least justify the perpetuation of conflict on the grounds that we now know who’s right and who’s wrong. While a subjectivist might utilize this approach, it wouldn’t be in the spirit of getting at the ultimate truth, but in trying to persuade the other person over to his point of view. That’s if a subjectivist utilizes this approach, but there would also be ample reason to go with an entirely different approach.

If absolute truth is not of the utmost importance to a subjectivist, then the creation of truth comes at a close second. The ideal approach to resolving conflict, as far as I’m concerned as a subjectivist, is to work together with the opposition to contrive a new truth, one by which you can both agree leads to mutually compatible arrangements. I wouldn’t say this is bound to work with everyone, but I’m not looking for perfection; I’m looking for practical workability–what has the best chances of doing the most good. So long as you can get the opposition to act and think and engage with you reasonably, there is opened the possibility of finding new ways of looking at the issue/problem (which can be done starting with either’s starting position–that is, without forcing one or the other party to compromise), and both parties can engage actively in crafting new ways of looking at the issue/problem such as to become more closely aligned with each others values and demands. ← It’s called negotiation, and isn’t entirely out of reach.

Bigous is a moron, how many times does it have to be said?

What I want is to recognize that out on the metaphysical limb, we are all subject to that which we do not [or cannot or will not] know about the very essence of “reality itself”.

This being embedded further in the quandary that revolves around living in or not living in a “determined world”.

Thus we all have to take that particular leap of faith when differentiating between that which we construe to be an objective reality applicable to everyone, and a mere point of view rooted subjectively in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy – [b]out in a particular world construed from a particular point of view.[/b]

So: What is it that we do believe “in our head” to be true that we are then able or unable to demonstrate to others?

And here I make that crucial distinction between “either/or” and “is/ought”

Again, my focus here is “is/ought”. The difference between doctors trying persuade other doctors of a newer [better] method for aborting fetuses vs. pro-life doctors trying to persuade pro-choice doctors that abortion is immoral. Is there an ethical element in your example above? In other words, is there or is there not a way in which to determine objectively which point of view is in fact more reasonable?

Then the confusion [from my end] lies in this distinction that you make between the prongs. As long as someone has no solution to offer with respect to the manner in which I construe conflicting goods, then of what real relevance is their “metaphysical views on consciousness”? In other words, for all practical purposes in confronting the actual consequences of conflicting goods – embedded in the news that we watch from day to day – the “human condition” ever remains beyond the reach of this “serious philosopher”. The logician. The epistemologist. The philologist.

Or so it seems to me.

Consequently, when you propose that…

…my reaction is always the same: What “on earth” does this mean? How would those embedded in one or another actual moral/political conflagration react to this? What might they learn from it so as to mitigate their conflicts?

You argue that, “my views aren’t designed to resolve conflicts like this”, while my own argument is more along the lines of this: "sans God, there does not appear to be a methodology available to mere mortals enabling them to resolve these conflicts.

And then [personally] I cite the dilemma that I am now entangled in when confronting conflicted goods:

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

Thus exchanges like this are just my way of encountering reactions to that.

I suppose then that I am more or less of the opinion that on a “metaphysical/ontological level” mere mortals have no capacity to make sense of these conflicts — other than from inside “intellectual contraptions” that revolve [more or less didactically/scholastically] around what folks like James S. Saint call “definitional logic”. Thus folks like him will show you a graphic in which the top block is “Ratiocination [and Logic]” and the bottom block is “Law [and Ethics]”.

In other words, the sojourn from the a priori to the hard sciences to the soft sciences to “is/ought” is still ever embedded philosophically in the definitions that he gives to the words in his argument [“analysis”].

You always more or less lose me here. It is as though you are focusing the beam [in your own analysis] on prong #1 but are then acknowledging that, for all practical purposes, out in the world of actual human social, political and economic interactions [that come into conflict on prong #2], prong #1 is of little substantive importance in actually confronting the conflicts.

Then it comes down to whether your rendition of prong #1 is more or less reasonable than James’s or Jacob’s or one of the others here.

Whereas my main focus revolves more around the extent to which these intellectual contraptions are relevant pertaining to the “common” dilemmas that have rent the species now going back to the caves.

Sure, some arguments would clearly seem to be more persuasive. But from the perspective of the sociopath the most persuasive argument of all still revolves around the assumption [and an assumption is all it can ever be until the existence of God is established] that in a world sans God, self-gratification makes the most sense. Then you merely have to calculate the chance of being caught doing something that others will not abide. What can the judge or the victim’s family really say to the murderer other then “well, you got caught.”

How does the philosopher establish necessarily that self-gratification is not a reasonable assumption in a godless universe?

What I am most interested in is in examining how prong #1 might be made relevant “for all practical purposes” to those impaled on prong #2.

That was basically my reaction in turn to folks like James [RM/AO] and Jacob [VO]. What “on earth” do they mean here when their own moral/political values come into conflict with others? And how is the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy relevant to their prong # 1 assessment?

You note:

Fair enough. But the “point of view” that revolves around the “subjectivist” attempts to persuade others to accept his/her own point of view [re any particular value judgments] is [to me] still no less the embodiment of dasein.

In other words, here and now their argument might seem persuasive. But that is not as a result of “thinking it through” philosophically [in a Kantian sense] so much as rooted in the experiences that tipped the balance and [existentially] predisposed them to embrace one subjective point of view rather than another. While acknowledging in turn that new experiences [relationships, source of information/knowledge etc.] might persuade them to move in the other direction instead.

And that, sans God, there does not appear to be a frame of mind that would obviate conflicting goods out in a particular world where what counts are the behaviors that those in power are able to enforce.

From my perspective this is just an existential consensus. A particular political prejudice that, within any given human community, certain folks decide/agree to call the “truth”.

You mean: since we cannot know, it doesn’t belong in the realm of “objective fact”?

Well, this is the crux of my theory: I think experience exposes us to reality–to its very essence in particular things. ← But this is just my response to what you just said. I know you’re not interested and it doesn’t help you with your dilemma.

You mean, in a moral sense? Not really; I mean, I’m sure you could somehow tie it into morality–for example, if we were building a system for doctors to use, one could argue that the proper design is vital for saving patients’ lives–but even then, I take your context to be one in which there are different moral opinions in conflict, not different designs that tie into an agreed-upon morality.

Still, my example was rather innocuous, morally speak, for a reason: to expose the power of reason to settle differences in opinion; whereas you want to bring up examples that go to the opposite extreme–moral controversies people often kill/die for. I’m just not sure it’s as black and white as that. I think the more invested one gets in a particular moral position, the more reason gets hijacked to serve that morality (as opposed to working with others who differ in opinion in order to arrive at a common workable truth); but I do believe this is something we can control–I can put a sincere effort in trying to be unbiased when arguing my position when there are moral stakes at hand; the problem is: this usually never happens in the real world when the moral stakes are high.

It’s obviously not relevant to you, but that’s because you’re only interested in responses that solve your dilemma. This is a philosophy forum. What one can expect from a philosophy forum is for others to give their thoughts, opinions, insights, and so on, on a particular subject, or in response to a particular question–regardless of whether one finds it relevant or not. This is all I’ve been doing: giving my take on the scenarios, problems, and questions you’ve been posing. We’re not all here to solve Biggy’s problems. We just like voicing our opinions.

Probably not much. So let’s not speak of it.

At this point in the argument, given the limited extent to which I understand you, this seems like too broad a statement; you seem to be interested only in an objectivist’s methodology, and only the traditional objectivist methodology of attempting to resolve conflict between one’s self and one’s opposition by arguing the best case one can for why one is right and one’s opposition wrong (and then, I’m not even sure this “resolves” the conflict more than it merely justifies one’s own reasons for entering into conflict, thereby establishing a bit of reassurance that at least one is in the right and that it is ok to continually attack, in whatever way that is, one’s opposition).

What I’ve been hinting at in this thread is that there are other methodologies that (in my opinion) work a whole lot better, methodologies that work fluidly with a subjectivist point of view. For example, when one is a subjectivist, absolute, objective truth matters less than relativistic, subjective truth–which is just to say: truth that one in conjunction with another can invent and be regarded as “truth” just between one and the other; one must be willing to entertain other points of view, other “truths”, in order for this to be effective, but it can be done, and certainly isn’t the traditional objectivist method of arguing relentlessly for one’s own pre-established point of view (if not to resolve conflict then at least to justify one’s position). In being open to discussing alternate truths, the subjectivist is not arguing his subjectivist philosophy. ← But his subjectivist philosophy does allow him to do this without feeling he is betraying his values.

Again, not saying this methodology (or any other) happens readily all over the world–it is somewhat of a stretch away from human nature–but my point is that it can be done if both parties are willing.

Well, what I’m trying to say is that I’m realizing, at this late hour in the discussion, that prong #1 is irrelevant to you… so maybe we ought not discuss it further.

That’s why my point focused more on bystanders than the actual sociopath you’re trying to convince. If you put forward a relatively persuasive argument to a group of presumably representative people, then you stand to gain strength in numbers, which is useful when confronted by a sociopath.

But if your worry is how to convince the sociopath himself–at least, when using the traditional objectivist method–I’m with you in assuming there is no easy way to do it (probably no hard way either). It’s just that my approach to these kinds of problems aren’t so narrow as to be limited to the traditional objectivist’s methodology (personally, I’d just persuade the sociopath with: don’t hurt me or I’ll slit your throat).

In regards to the bolded text, my point was that the approach available to a subjectivist is something other than trying to argue why his subjectivism is correct. The subjectivist, at least myself, is able to take the reasoning behind his subjectivist position and allow that to sustain his point of view for himself only; i.e. to be content with seeing the world through subjectivist lenses without feeling compelled to convince the world of it; having contented himself with his subjectivism, he can then move beyond it and try to persuade others using absolutely any point of view (including that of his contender) so long as he can find or conjure up some logic with which to bolster it. That’s why I say it becomes a creative process, not a search for “the truth”–stepping outside one’s perceptions and experiences turns those perceptions and experiences into mental “objects” or “tools” with which one can build whatever existential contraption/fabrication one wants. This is difficult for the objectivist because he would see such an approach as sophistry or lying (or worse, deluding himself)–which he can do but at the expense of his dignity–whereas for the subjectivist, the truth of whatever existential contraption/fabrication he comes up with depends on who believes it (and the subjectivist can convince even himself), and if there are any ethical concerns to be had (over lying/sophistry), then it falls back on what the subjectivist intends to do with his invented contraptions/fabrications (help people or hurt people, manipulate them for selfish purposes or offer perspectives/insights for their purposes).

Yes, it is. But as far as the concern is to resolve conflict stemming from dasein-based value judgements and political prejudices, it works (to an extent). ← But this is why, in the last couple of posts, I’ve been noticing that your concern is a little more narrow than that: you seem to be concerned, not so much with resolving conflicts of this sort, but with seeing if it can be done by one side or the other proving their point of view objectively (which I say, again, wouldn’t necessarily bring peace between the parties but simply show how the justification falls on one side and not the other–at least we’d know who the “good guys” are and therefore who should win).

I don’t know if we can or cannot know the “objective facts” about “reality itself”. Last night on the Science Channel they aired a documentary on the search for “particle X”. Some argue that if we find it, it will confirm the existence of “super-symmetry”. And once this is grasped we will be that much closer [perhaps] to understanding the nature of reality itself.

But: maybe the discovery will just precipitate more mysteries.

So, where does the philosopher fit into all of this? Let alone the ethicist?

What I am most interested in is the extent to which what you think you know or claim to believe about this “in your head” is pertinent to what I think I know or claim to believe about it “in my head”. But: as this might then be demonstrated “out in the world” of human interactions that come into conflict around the question “how ought one to behave”?

Someone will either bring both prongs into sync here for me or they will not.

Think of all the stuff that we encounter from day to day to day — on the news, in movies, in books, in works of art. So much of it does revolve around the question “how ought one to live?”.

That’s where the drama is. That’s where conflicts are derived. That’s what pulls us in.

Well, that’s what pulls me into philosophy. There are aspects of philosophy that are “technical”. In other words, aspects that revolve around the logical rules of language, around that which we either can or cannot know: the either/or stuff.

And not the is/ought stuff.

Me, I am interested in the parts that philosophers have come to encompass re A = A. Sure. But more insofar as those things are in fact true for all of us as this relates further to our conflicting value judgments and political prejudices. And here in particular relating to the manner in which existentially we come to acquire a sense of identity. And then the manner in which both play out politically in a world of wealth and power.

If others would prefer not to go there…or if they basically agree with me that, in all likelihood, philosophy cannot go there…fine. My main interest though lies in those philosophers who not only insist that philosophy can go there, but, as philosophers, claim to have accomplished what I am unable to: to obviate this…

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

…as it pertains to behaviors of their own that have come into conflict with others.

I agree. And to the extent that others are not interested in probing prong #2 as that relates to the manner in which I have come to construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy, well, they should move on to others.

But, in fact, in the OP, you broached precisely what does intrigue me: the notion of “I”. It’s just that the notion – “a conception of or belief about something” – of “I” becomes increasingly more problematic [and precarious] out in the world of conflicted human behaviors derived from conflicted value judgments derived from dasein.

Right?

Instead…

But: That just brings me back to wondering what it must be like to think and to feel and to act as you do when your own behaviors do come into conflict with others.

This is simply what I find most intriguing in the reactions of others to my dilemma above. And the prong #1 components – sooner or later – would seem to inform you so as to choose what you do regarding the existential implications of prong #2. Or so it would seem to me.

However, from my perspective, I want to take the broad assumptions that many moral/political objectivists come to embody in this…

1] I am rational
2] I am rational because I have access to the ideal
3] I have access to the ideal because I grasp the one true nature of the objective world
4] I grasp the one true nature of the objective world because I am rational

…and have them focus in on the manner in which this is relevant pertaining to a particular context “down on the ground” when they are confronted [in a considerably more narrow manner] with those who challenge their values.

Actually, I am interested in how their methodology takes into consideration the components of my own. My own being rooted in moral nihilism. And that being rooted in a Godless universe.

And, here, my argument is that no one – necessarily – is either right or wrong.

Here of course we go around and around in circles. These “subjectivist truths” that you speak of are…

1] no less the embodiment of dasein
2] no less entangled in conflicting goods
3] no less entangled in political economy

…out in a particular world construed from a particular subjective point of view. Or so it seems to me.

I would need you to intertwine the points that you make in this argument — in this analysis — in an actual context in which the behaviors that you chose [in conjunction with the values that you chose] came into conflict with another.

And here you may or may not be able to convey to me how this subjectivist methodology of yours “works” — works “for all practical purposes”. I note it because my own methodology does not work at all. I simply recognize that what I choose to do is just a subjective personal opinion rooted existentually in a political prejudice no more necessarily reasonable than the political prejudices of those who choose an opposite [or different] point of view.

In short:

But my point is that [here and now] prong #1 is not seen by me as relevant only because you have not been able to convey to me the manner in which it might be important to grasp it in order that the manner in which I have come to embody the existential implications of prong #2 may shift in another direction.

Is prong #1 just an intellectual exercise that “serious philosophers” probe among themselves or do the conclusions reached regarding consciousness on this level have real-world implications with respect to conflicting human behaviors?

True, but that does not make the sociopath’s rationalization [self-gratification] any less persuasive to me. It just means that for all practical purposes the bystanders might stand a better chance of being able to stop him.

Yes, I understand this. But the sociopath does in fact live out in a particular world. And her behaviors will unfold in a particular context. In other words, the narrower the actual circumstantial context the less relevant the objectivist methodology seems to be.

What seems more relevant here is a kind of “dog-eat-dog” mentality — if the sociopath is not stopped by the officers of the law.

Here I think is where we are most “stuck”. I read this and I wonder: What would it be like to follow Gib around and record an actual confrontation he had with a moral objectivist. I’d sit down with both of them and probe the extent to which their reaction to the conflict was or was not in sync with my own dilemma above.

In other words, I still basically react to your words above as an “analysis” — as an “intellectual contraption” far removed from the narrow confines of an actual existential “incident”.

From my frame of mind, there can be no “good guys”. And the “winners” are those able either to convince the other side that “here and now” their point of view is more reasonable, or have the power – the brute power – to enforce their own perceived interests.

Interests no less perceived through the profoundly problematic prism of dasein.

Well, I think at this point, it needn’t be said that I’m in the same boat as you where this is concerned. I would like to see an objectivist (or any philosopher) obviate this as much as you would.

I suppose–I mean, if we’re defining “I” in terms of “ist”–as in, I’m a determinist. When we realize just how fragile such an “ist” is in a world of varying opinions and value judgements, the “I” indeed begins to fragment, and we lose a huge chunk of it. We realize that I the determinist is grounded on nothing–nothing objective at least–and is a fraud. All of what your “ism”–your morality in particular–was rooted in suddenly evaporates and you find yourself standing on nothing.

Well, what I’ve been trying to say in this thread is that when I come into conflict with people–real conflict, the kind that poses a danger to me and makes me think: I’d better put up my guard–I don’t have a habit of bring my subjectivist theory to the fore, as if it is my primary weapon of choice–I save it for my writings (like my book) or my philosophical discussion with people like those at ILP–which can evolve into conflict, but I don’t think this is the type we’re arguing about here (is it?)–the kind that often means risking life and limb, the kind that leads to bloodshed and war. In the latter case, the last thing I want to do is argue for my theory about consciousness and why it is the foundation of being. Instead, I would think my reaction to such forms of conflict wouldn’t be all that different from anyone else’s.

What do you mean? You mean when we reach the point at which the “I” fragments because of the realization that our “ism” is vacuous? And then that “informs” us of what to do regarding the existential implications of prong #2 (conflict with others)?

Yes, what you’re talking about here is what I’m calling the “traditional objectivist approach”, and I would agree that “sans God, there does not appear to be a methodology available to [these objectivists] enabling them to resolve these conflicts.”

So what is your approach if not the traditional objectivist’s one? So far it seems to be an inquisitive one (to put it lightly); maybe an aggresively inquisitive one, aggressive because, I would think, one would have to be aggressive in forcing the typical objectivist to face up to the dilemma you pose–to admit to being in the same dasein boat as the rest of us, to seeing how his “I” fragments the minute he recognizes that he could have gone in the other direction, or might as well have.

But once at that point, there’s nothing for him to cough up (at least insofar as I can imagine)–he’s simply struck bear and made painfully vulnerable–I guess your strategy is to put him into that position in order to see what he does, to be surprised at what he might, after all, coughs up. But I’m left asking: what can one cough up when all the pressure put on one is to strip him of anything he might cough up?

But do you at least see how this approach I’m describing is an alternative to the one I’m calling the “traditional objectivist approach” (i.e. attempting to resolving conflict by arguing for the objective reality of what you believe in)?

Well, ideally, it would work best if both parties were cooperative enough to use the same approach (of looking for or inventing a new truth that works for both of them)–so my disclaimer is that it isn’t guaranteed to work with everyone–but supposing I was a pro-choice advocate and someone I come into conflict with was a pro-life advocate; if I somehow managed to get on their good side, I may persuade the person to work with me to come up with ideas that satisfy both our values. For example, I could propose that for every abortion a mother undergoes, she must legally find a way to incubate her fetus such that it stands a reasonable chance of surviving until it can be cared for by a foster parent (and then still survive, of course :slight_smile:). ← It’s kind of a Mickey Mouse example, I admit, but I hope it’s enough to get the point across. If the pro-life advocate is serious about the only thing mattering being that the unborn child has just as much a chance for life as any other child born in the natural way, then this should be reasonable. It satisfies her values, it satisfies mine.

Another example, taken from real life, is the sorts of ventures we’ve all seen wherein big oil companies cooperate with environmentalists. There are numerous ad campaigns that speak of “cleaner, more environmentally friendly, fuel sources” ← These innovations are inspired by what were originally conflicting groups–but somebody had the bright idea of putting aside the traditional approach of arguing for what was important to them against what was important to their opposition in favor of inventing a whole new argument that worked for both of them–if the big oil companies could continue to extract and sell oil in a way that didn’t harm the environment, then both the oil companies and the environmentalists could have their cake and eat it too.

Well, let me put it this way: if prong #2 can be summed as: conflict with others, then prong #1 can be summed up as: conflict with one’s self.

I realize there’s a lot more to it than that, but I think for our purposes that’s a good enough “rough and ready” interpretation.

Prong #2 happens all the time all around the world–it more or less arises naturally–but prong #1 arises only through the realization that you’ve made plain several times:

Notice that this ends with “I” fragmenting. So this realization, which few people come to despite their being enmeshed in prong #2, results in one being conflicted with one’s own self. The self “self-desctructs” so to speak.

Earlier in this discussion, I took you to be troubled (to be caught in the dilemma of) your own “I” fragmenting. I mean, I would think you of all people would admit that you too are caught in this dilemma. So you too must be quite familiar with being faced with the vacuousness of your own “ism” (if I may put it that way)–even if that “ism” is your existentialism/nihilism–and thus you are ever troubled by your “I” fragmenting.

Later I got the impression that this doesn’t trouble you so much, and it seemed to me that the reason for this is that I made the mistaken assumption that the force by which the “I” (your “I”) fragments equalled that which reinforced your existentialism/nihilism–but later it seemed to me each force was unequal; that is to say, the force by which your existentialism/nihilism is reinforced is just the volumes of evidence that exist around the world that we, as the human species, are steeped in conflict revolving around dasein and the consequent moral values and judgements that ensue. I mean, that’s quite undeniable as far as I’m concerned. The force by which one, or you in particular, is pressed to admit that the conclusions drawn from this–namely, your existentialism/nihilism–apply even to one’s self–that is, to the very existentialism/nihilism drawn (it is an existential fabrication/contraption like any other, after all) would, in principle, fragment the “I” (you, IOW, would be forced to admit that you, the existentialist/nihilist, are vacuous). But I eventually got the impression that, though this may be true in principle, that principle carries less force (i.e. is less convincing psychology) than the real-world evidence that we are indeed enmeshed in our own dasein-based existential contraptions/fabrications. Real-world evidence is often very powerful–way more powerful than principles and philosophical theories. Therefore, I soon abandoned my attempt to dig into prong #1 with you on the presumption that this really wasn’t a struggle with you. The evidence that your existentialism/nihilism is indeed correct seemed to far out weigh, at least for you psychologically, the (rational/philosophical) evidence that your own existentialism/nihilism, in principle, undermines itself.

A very long winded way of answering your question–I realize–but I guess my response is: since prong #1, to me, is just how I would think your quote above (about how the “I” fragments, and why) applies to yourself, I need to ask: are you mostly concern with how this quote applies to others or how it applies to yourself.

The only reason I feel I have risen above prong #1 is because my particular existential fabrication/contraption–the logic of it–is not self-destructing–it doesn’t draw conclusions that say: this very philosophy, with this very conclusion being drawn, undoes itself. Thus, my “I” doesn’t fragment–at least not so easily. What I’ve been trying to convey (obviously not successfully) is how this very philosophy of mine draws one to the conclusion that if only it just is and existential fabrication/contraption, it actualizes itself, not nullifies itself–it has the opposite effect (and I realize I haven’t given the full justification for how this works, but I’m just conveying to you the effect it has–at least on me).

And what more do you want to resolve the problem? Do you want everyone to be happy? Even the sociopath?

Yeah? That’s my point too.

Yes, because if the sociopath is not the least bit concerned with the welfair of others, then there is no other choice but to resort to “dog-eat-dog” mentality with him. Doesn’t mean that we have to commit to this mentality, just when dealing with the sociopath.

Well, sure, it’s an analysis, but do make a distinction between this analysis, which I contrived in order to respond to you, and what I would say to this moral objectivist whose argumentation with myself you would be interested in observing. Please realize that when you put this scenario forward–that of me having a discussion with a moral objectivist (presumably one with whom I disagree)–I can’t predict how I would respond. It all depends on what he’s saying.

You seem to be expecting that, in my response, I woud bring forward what I believe about my subjectivist theories. I’m trying to say that I wouldn’t necessarily bring forward anything about my subjectivist theories. What I’m trying to say is that my subjectivist theories allow me to move beyond what I actually believe (without rejecting what I believe) such that I don’t feel the need to convince the other of those theories. Instead, what I would do is focus on what they believe, and based on that, figure out what they need to hear in order to be persuaded by what I say to them.

I mean, maybe I can appreciate the fact that you want to hear what I would have to say if I were to attempt to persuade the other using the very logic and the actual contents of my subjectivist theory, but as I said before, I’m not 100% confident that this logic and this content will be persuasive at all–I mean, that’s the whole point, isn’t it? Isn’t that what we both agree on? That nobody ever seems to be convinced of the other’s point of view if they begin in opposition to each other? That as hard as one objectivist might try, he will never convince another opposing objectivist of his point of view? So I don’t really have much motive to try (not that I never try)–coming to grips with this fact is what motivates me to move beyond it and try the next best thing: persuade the other based on his point of view.

Right, which is what I’m saying. The objectivist method can, at best, only result in bolstering one side at the expense of the other.

You seem to suggest that the bystanders OUGHT to stop the sociopath. But moral nihilism says that there is nothing wrong with the actions of the sociopath. The concepts of right and wrong don’t even apply.
There will be a resolution to the problem . If the bystanders win and they are able to stop him, then it merely demonstrates their might. If he wins, then he is mighty. In that case, he will be happy and the bystanders will be unhappy. Nothing wrong with that result.

For a subjectivist, there is a desired resolution but that’s just a personal preference. There is a moral attitude but that’s just a personal preference.
The sociopath also has personal preferences.

What about a moral objectivist?
(Let’s say, for argument, that the sociopath is a killer.)
The objectivist has come to the conclusion that “Life is good and therefore it should be preserved.” He does not need God to come to such a conclusion. It is easily the product of observation and logical thought within a godless universe.
It becomes his guiding principle. This principle applies to all people and that it is not simply his opinion or personal preference.

Based on that principle, the actions of the sociopath are wrong and he ought to be stopped. The morality of the sociopath is wrong.
If the sociopath wins, then it is an undesirable and unfortunate result. It is a bad result. You know … objectively. :wink:

Can it be demonstrated that the principle of the objectivist is correct? I think so but apparently there is no convincing demonstration for the moral nihilist. :confusion-shrug:

(Sorry for the interruption. I couldn’t help myself.

Carry on. ) :smiley:

No, I’m saying that one can use bystanders as a means of protecting one’s self from the sociopath if one persuades them. He can even persuade them that they ought to protect him but this would be more of a psychological effect than the truth (at least for the moral nihilist).

True, but the scenario Biggy seems fond of putting people into is one that presses them to answer: what would you do? I know the sociopath would want to kill me (and all bystanders if he can), but that’s what he would do. I myself would do everything I can to prevent that.

Right, but what I always question is: why go with the sociopath’s preference when you already have your own?

Yes, that’s probably how a moral objectivist would see it.

Yes.

Right, because he recognizes everything as a existential contraption/fabrication. ← For me, though, it doesn’t follow from this that existential contraptions/fabrications are unreal–it just means they are invented (if I baked a cake, would you say it’s not real because I invented it?).

Remove yourself and your self-interest and self-preservation from the scenario. The sociopath is attacking a woman who you don’t know. Ought the bystanders stop him? Why or why not? Is anyone wrong or right?

Again, the more important question is what to think and do if you have no personal stake.

And sure, one can argue that as a member of society, you always have a personal stake in the outcome of these conflicts. You don’t want sociopaths roaming around and potentially killing someone who you do care about in the future.

Why not go with the sociopath’s preference?

One needs to answer ‘which way to go’ when you construct a moral code and use it as the basis for the laws of a society. And one needs to give reasons for the answer.

That’s a challenging line of questions. I have no simple answer, but I do have a complex one (bear with me). My gut tells me the bystanders ought to help the woman. But this gut feeling is rooted in the actual me in the real world, not some absent me in the imaginary scenario whom we agreed would be removed. My feelings, thoughts, values, etc. still get projected into the imaginary scenario we’re toying with, but they get projected therein as facts and actual states of affairs in that scenario. If my gut, here in the real world, tells me the bystanders in the scenario ought to help the woman, then that becomes a moral fact in the scenario untied to any “me” that would have been there if we didn’t remove him.

Furthermore, I realize this gut feeling isn’t grounded on any rationalization and isn’t an objective fact in itself–it’s just a feeling–and it may waiver–I may feel differently tomorrow. You could probably convince me quite easily that it is baseless, but insofar as this feelings
reasserts itself as a natural impulse produced by my brain, whatever argument you use to convince me will have to suppress that gut feeling, and when I relax my focus on your argument, the gut feeling reasserts itself.

My view is that whatever mental state or experience or thought asserts itself like this–ex nihilo as it were–it counts, not as baseless but as fundamental. If my gut feeling is that the bystanders ought to help the woman, and if I just find that feeling there in my mind, sustaining itself, asserting itself, then it’s just a fundamental/irreducible part of my subjective reality.

Well, obviously, if I don’t have any personal stakes involved, nothing would matter to me as to what should happen. The sociopath could kill me and I would be all right with that.

But this is a different scenario than what Biggy usually pushes people into. When I get put into this context in one of Biggy’s hypothetical scenarios, I assume it’s the usual me who has a stake involve in his own life.

Because I have a preference of my own. I’m not arguing that my preference ought to take precedence over the sociopath’s but that, just being there, my preference is what’s going to drive me. It would be very odd if I chose to fight against my preference in favor of the sociopath’s, particularly if I had no opinion on what ought to happen morally speaking.

This is true for a moral code that one wishes to convince a whole community/society about, but I’m not so sure it’s needed for a legal syste. I can imagine a whole society of moral nihilist. I think they too would agree that a legal system that bound all citizens under it would be very desirable indeed. No one, not even moral nihilists, want chaos and anarchy ruling society (well, unless you’re Joker), so I would predict they would resurrect a legal system just for practical purposes or because it is their preference.

Morality does not come from without, fuckers.

That’s what moral objectivism is, the belief that morality comes from without.

Mr. Bigger is only superficially against objectivism. In reality, he himself is an objectivist. This is apparent from the fact that he is looking for morality in the external. That’s the reason he is disappointed: because he cannot find any.

The retard does not consider himself to be an objectivist merely because he is not enforcing any kind of morality onto others.

There is no almighty God with a beard that can tell you what is right and what is wrong.

There is neither Holy Book written by some prophet that can tell you what is right and what is wrong.

There are no scientific laws that can tell you what is right and what is wrong (contrary to what that Jew named Sam Harris wants you to believe.)

There is no Being that you can communicate with through meditation that can tell you what is right and what is wrong (contrary to what Easterners and New Age druggies want you to believe, among them Schopenhauer and more recently David Myatt in his plagiarized version of Schopenhauer’s “On the Basis of Morality” that he calls “The Numinous Way”.)

There are no self-proclaimed authorities that can create morality using imagination and then make it true by enforcing it onto everyone else.

Morality comes from within.

That does not mean that morality is a product of imagination (the position of, I suppose, solipsism.)

That does not mean that morality is a product of meditation (the position of mysticism.)

It might sound strange, but solipsists and mystics do not really derive their morality from within.

Morality that comes from within is only that morality that is a product of biological fusion (= centripetal, form-giving, will-based, concentrative motion.)

Morality that comes from without is only that morality that is a product of biological fission (= centrifugal, form-diluting, instinct-based, decentrative motion.)

My position, which is true position, is neither that of moral objectivism (the belief that morality comes from without) nor that of moral subjectivism (the belief that morality is a product of meditation, or in other cases, that morality is whatever you feel it is or whatever you want it to be.)

Both moral objectivism and moral subjectivism are fundamentally objectivist positions because they seek morality in the EXTERNAL even though that is less evident in the case of moral subjectivism.

That’s it.

Mr. Bigger is simply an idiot who is stuck in his own fantasy land made out of nothing other than words.

How does that work in a specific case. For example, moral rules against stealing are common. If morality comes from within then how does a rule which forbids stealing develop? Not everybody thinks that stealing is bad since there is a general human desire to get something for nothing.