Making iambiguous's day

Your actions contradict this statement.

I think you misattributed the quote.

There was a time when our species was just starting out. Long before the invention of philosophy. And long, long before the division of labor that precipitated the modern industrial state. Survival in the caves and survival in the modern metropolis – how is it the same? how is it different? How would philosophers make that distinction?

My point though is this: Yes, perhaps, it might be possible that philosophers can accomplish this. That one day they will. But what would that argument even begin to sound like such that the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein and conflicting good is rendered more or less moot?

I don’t see this distinction. With respect to the conflicting goods clearly embedded in an issue like abortion [the birth of the baby vs. a woman’s right to kill it] there either is an optimal resolution amongst philosophers or between individuals or there is not. Or so it would seem to me.

What happens all the time? Sure, between two particular individuals an agreement can be reached in which both parties are able to overlap philosophically. But how is this the same as establishing that their agreement is a reflection of the objective truth? For example, in a democracy everyone agrees to abide by the law and the law either allows for abortion on demand, no abortions at all or some abortions in particular sets of circumstances.

But this in my view does not establish that any particular law is a reflection of the objective truth pertaining to conflicting views on the morality of abortion.

And then there those individuals who insist that morality revolves solely around their own self-gratification. Their concern with the law is only that if they break it [or if they behave in a way that the community deems to be immoral] they don’t get caught.

Well, other than in the form of a political consensus reached in any particular community [or in one or another world of words i.e. Plato’s Republic], when has such a network ever been established such that particular behaviors have been shown either to be or not to be in sync with an “ideal” or a “superior judgment”? A frame of mind in which dasein as I understand it becomes moot?

Yes, but increasingly in the modern world the child becomes an adult and acquires more autonomy. How then, in choosing more for herself, is she able to embrace behaviors said to be rational and virtuous rather than irrational and lacking in virtue? How is dasein any less implicated in her life given that what she chooses will still revolve largely around the experiences that she has [and does not have] the people that she meets [and does not meet] and the knowledge/information that she comes into contact with [and does not come into contact with]?

In my view, they become objectivists given the extent to which they come to believe that the “real me” does embody the most rational/ethical behaviors.

Once you come to grasp them as I do, moral objectivism is no longer an option. Or, rather, it isn’t until someone is able to convince me otherwise.

That part revolves around this part:

[b][i]It dawned on me: What parts of “I” transcend this? Surely my genetic makeup, my congenital predispositions, my gender, the color of my skin, the purely demographic components of my life.

But what aspects of “I” are more profoundly embedded subjectively in personal opinions and political prejudices?

In other words, that aspect of dasein far, far more problematically embodied in contingency chance and change.

The part that revolves around conflicting goods and political economy.[/i][/b]

In other words, as though, if you stripped away all of the existential layers of your life, you would get to the “core you” – the essential part able to grasp the way the world really is objectively. Including the part that revolves around “right” and “wrong”, “good” and “evil”.

In whatever manner others might construe the meaning of philosophy, my own interest in it revolves around its limitations – limitations pertaining to conflicting human behaviors that revolve around conflicting goods embraced in the manner in which I have come to understand the meaning of dasein.

Well, not me. I don’t doubt the objective reality of mathematics or the laws of physics or the logical rules of language. And our senses often deceive us.

Instead, my interest in nihilism revolves around the relationship between human identity, moral values, political ideals and political economy.

Yeah, that works for me.

iambiguous

Is the way in which someone looks on their self and their individual human identity the same as the feeling of “what it is like to be me”?

I kind of thought that dasein is more like what is experienced on the deepest level when everything else has been stripped away, our ego, our personal identify, our so-called chauvinism, our intellectual thoughts and what is left is simply a kind of nakedness which cannot be denied which we have to affirm in ourself and accept. I thought dasein was who we are and know ourselves to be at our core. Don’t mean to be redundant here.

In other words, what it is like to be me - without all of the baggage.

I suppose that I am wrong in this according to you or am I?

Sartre is famous for suggesting that, “Hell is other people”. And I always assumed that he was not merely pointing out the obvious: that people can make our lives hell. Instead, people are hell because they objectify us. They take out of us only that which they first put into us: themselves.

I merely suggest that, the more you think about it, the more we are in turn hell to ourselves. Why? Because there is so much about what we think and feel [pertaining to “I” and to our value judgments] that is prefabricated in our youth. And so much that is predicated on a particular set of experiences, relationships and sources of knowledge that we come upon [oft times fortuitously] as more autonomous adults. And in a world teeming with contingency, chance and change.

So, from my frame of mind, dasein can be as much about what you have long forgotten as about what you have not. There are thousands upon thousands of variables that came together over the course of any one particular life as they did versus how you remember them coming together. “I” is simply how you have come to piece them all together “here and now” in order to embrace one moral/political agenda rather than another.

And, besides, whichever side you happen to come down on, both sides are able to make arguments the other side’s arguments don’t make go away. That’s the part where dasein meets conflicting goods: out in a particular world rooted in political economy.

This is more or less the opposite of my own frame of mind. Dasein [for me] always revolves far more around “becoming” than “being”. At least pertaining to the relationship between “I” and conflicting moral/political values/ideals. From my frame of mind there is no “core self” able to attach itself to an objective truth. There are only the particular existential layers of the life that you have lived that predispose you to go in one direction rather than another.

There is then either becoming aware of this or not. And then deciding that, once you are aware of it, what are the implications for your own “self”, your own “values/ideals”?

My hunch is that many folks [whom I call objectivists] don’t feel at all comfortable with the implications of what I suggest here at all. What do they suggest about their own self-identity? What do they suggest about their own values?

After all, I suggest that so much here is embedded in both an existential fabrication [as a child] and in an existential contraption [as an adult]. That “I” is considerably less “solid” here than many are willing to acknowledge.

And I know this in part because I still recall so vividly my own reaction to Mary’s abortion in conjunction with William Barrett’s conjectures regarding “rival goods”. The first cracks in my own “objectivist mind” began to appear. And it became disorienting to say the least. And now here I am today ever entangled in my “dilemma” above.

Well, there are obvious differences–money, for example–but you must be talking about something much more abstract–perhaps how me must adapt our natural instincts? As a response to my comment about synchronizing philosophy with our basic animal needs, it is true that philosophy emerged long before any considerations of what its pragmatic uses might be (how we ought to live), but if philosophy has funneled down to that question, it can only be because that question has been deemed by modern philosophers as the most important, and that is because of our modern understanding of our position in the game of survival. This could change if our understandings of the world and our cultural values change.

I don’t profess to know this. Moreover, I don’t even know how it could possibly be applied. Most people who end up getting into conflicts over their values and belief, regardless of whether it stems from dasein or whether there is an objective way of settling such matters, just want to win the conflict. They aren’t interesting in a generalized formulaic solution to such conflicts that a team of philosophers may have come up with, let alone understand it or even heard of it.

This is why I’m placing all my bets on 2); that is, two individuals doing a bit of philosophy to solve their differences. Option 1), though possible in principle, is entirely impractical, even if it one day happens.

Well, for one thing, option 1) amounts to a generalized formula for resolving all differences between conflicting human values and beliefs rooted in dasein, whereas 2) amounts only to a solution to a particular problem (between two particular men); say, for example, an employer and a manager were disputing the prospect of highering a man of a different race (say X). The employer is an X-ist while the manager is not. They can engage in philosophy to raise and attempt to answer the question: is someone who is X but has Y in their blood (say Y is the race of the employer and manager) still subject to the same treatment as someone who is X through-and-through? If this question is as yet unanswered between the two men, then there is the opportunity to do a bit of philosophy to arrive at an answer that satisfies them both.

For another thing, option 1) is the approach whereby the formula is arrived at first, and then it awaits conflicts in the world to be applied to, whereas 2) starts with a conflict and then philosophy is engaged in to arrive at a solution.

Yes, but when you funnel it down to a particular conflict, like abortion vs. the right to life, you don’t need a generalized formula that is universally applicable. You can come up with solutions that make sense in the abortion vs. right to life conflict but may not make sense in other conflicts, and if it is between a particular set of individuals, the solution they come up with may not be satisfactory to other individuals in conflict over the same issue (for example, the particular individuals in question may be debating the right for a women to abort her child because she was raped, whereas the same debate may come up at a later time between different individuals but the woman in question was not raped).

Does it have to be objective? If a conflict is resolved, is that not all that matters?

But let’s see if we can answer your question anyway. Obviously, not all conflict resolutions are going to be objective, but that doesn’t mean none of them are. I guess it depends on what you mean by “objective”: do you mean using objective means (i.e. rationality and logic) to arrive at conclusions, or do you mean arriving at objective “truth”? I think it’s easily possible to be rational throughout a debate such that an impartial logician could give his assessment saying, yes, the arguments are objectively valid. But I don’t think it’s possible to arrive at an objectively true conclusion around issues of morality or value judgements, if that’s what you mean, conclusions such as “abortion is wrong” ← I don’t think there’s anything objective about that.

Well, given that your interest is in arriving at objective truth, I think the chances of this happening are dismal. I’ve been thinking more in terms of using philosophy for individuals to reason out their differences, but to arrive at objective truth is a different and much taller order. But if there is any hope at all, it might be in observing how individuals work out their differences using philosophy and reason and trying to extract a pattern or common methodology. If there is such a pattern or methodology to be discovered, it might be raised to the level of a generalized formula that can be applied to any human differences. But again, I must stress that it most likely will not be a formula that can be imposed on individuals–they most likely will have to mutually agree to use it on their own initiative.

Are you asking how it’s possible to escape the effects of dasein given autonomy and maturity? In other words, it is thought by many that through the freedom we acquired after maturing and gaining our autonomy, we can “rise above” all our past conditioning and indoctrinations, that we can see what really matters, objectively, rationally. And I think there is some truth to this, but it too is no doubt greatly influence by a culture that encourages rising above petty biases and inherited values and beliefs (assuming we know how to identify them).

It’s an interesting question as it requires distinguishing between whether such a thing is merely possible and whether it happens to any great degree. Even in thinking about the nihilists who seem to be capable of dismissing the ideas of morality and values and religious beliefs, etc., it must have been their dasein, their life circumstances and experiences that lead them to their nihilistic stance; and even if we could say that such a nihilistic stance is “objective truth” in the final analysis, they would still at least look like just another force in the social tapestry of conflicting values and positions.

That would be the rational conclusion to come to, I would think. But the irony is with the type of people you’re talking about: those who grasp the implications of dasein, as you say, but then proceed to inquire about an objective and universally applicable methodology for resolving interpersonal conflicts rooted in dasein using the tools of philosophy. This conviction must hinge on the belief that there is the potential for human thought to look at the world through objective and impersonal spectacles, and I think there is, but as I said earlier, this potential is confounded by more than just a few variables: how can one be sure they are viewing the world with truly objective spectacles instead of yet more of dasein’s effects, for example? Also, how to know whether the person you’re dealing with (the person you’re in conflict with) is willing and able to do the same. And given that this is possible, will it provide everything we need to resolve all conflicts revolving around value judgements? I mean, having the ability to view the world objectively does not convert inherently subjective value judgements to objective truths–they just fail to show up on the radar.

So this is an “I” which is projected to exist beyond “genetic makeup, my congenital predispositions, my gender, the color of my skin, the purely demographic components of my life…” This would be an extremely difficult “I” to prove the existence of, extremely difficult to prove the persist of.

And you believe arriving at objective solutions to the conflicts arising from dasein is one of those limitation.

Ah, but here, we’re talking about the objective reality of abstract things, not concrete objects. A lot of nihilists would dismiss the reality of these things on just these grounds, but I can still see how they would be relevant to your questions. Your question, if I may paraphrase, is whether philosophy is capable of establishing the objective legitimacy of certain conclusions revolving around moral value judgements (and other such things) even if that entails talking about purely abstract concepts. It’s important, therefore, to not be nihilistic about these things.

These are the things whose reality you doubt, correct?

From my perspective, the main distinction here is more in line with that which the KT objectivists always bring up: natural morality.

In the beginning – think the opening scene from the film 2001 A Space Odyssey…or the entire film Quest For Fire – “natural morality” had little or nothing in the way of historical or cultural contexts. At least not in the manner in which we have come to understand these things today. In other words, rooted in, among other things, “civilization” and “enlightenment”. Back then, at the birth of the species, it was far closer to the law of the jungle, survival of the fittest, might makes right.

Period.

And back then people basically lived in small, homogeneous communities in which there was a clearly defined place for everyone and it was just understood that everyone would go to the grave clearly embodying his or her place.

Re dasein, how far has the modern industrial state come from that?

Well, as always, it depends on who you ask.

But there are those among us today who will insist – in reflecting one or another rendition of Nietzsche’s “will to power” – that modern moral philosophy is largely just a sham. Or a scam. That, in a Godless world, we are “beyond good and evil”. But: in order to qualify as “one of us” you have to agree that what is “natural” pertaining to human behavior is what “we” say it is. And, at KT, that is always what Satyr/Lyssa says it is.

In other words, abstractly, in the lectures. In a scholastic “analysis” that is said to constitute “serious philosophy”. Serious philosophy that is said to encompass a “general description” of the human condition.

And we have the same sort here in turn.

That seems reasonable to me. And this is when I suggest one of three possible “models” that aim to achieve it:

1] might makes right – a purely autocratic regime
2] right makes might – a theocratic regime; or one propelled by political ideology; or one [theoreticallly] sustained by philosopher-kings
3] democracy and the rule of law – the modern industrial state

I merely point out in turn the manner in which [in the modern world] political and economic power will always be crucial factors in determining what those laws will be. In other words, the global economy owned and operated by the moral nihilists concerned by and large only with this: show me the money.

Though, sure, two individuals, in sharing a respect for the tools of philosophy, might use them in order to come to an agreement when one of their own value judgments come into conflict.

I merely note the gap between this and any assumption that might form between them that their own resolution reflects a frame of mind such that if others do not embrace it in turn they are wrong. Or, for the KT ilk, they become “retards” or “morons” or “imbeciles”.

You may not need a “generalized formula that is universally applicable”, true; but, in the absence of it, it would seem to always come down to the particular circumstantial parameters of this or that abortion; and then the subjective/subjunctive points of view regarding an understanding of them. But how does that obviate the points I raise regarding dasein and conflicting goods? We are still confronted with the real world implications of either allowing the baby to live or allowing the woman [and the doctor] to kill it.

And the same sort of thing can be noted regarding all of the other moral and political conflicts that have ever divided the “civilized” and “enlightened” world now for centuries. What has really changed from the time of, say, Plato and Aristotle?

As opposed to what has in fact changed regarding medical science and its capacity to perform abortions with considerably less risk to [and considerably more comfort for] the pregnant woman?

As for the relationship between abortion and rape, the fact that an innocent unborn baby exists as a result of a rape doesn’t make him or her any less dead if aborted. Is this then the “right thing to do”? How can this possibly be determined objectively?

My own frame of mind here then becomes entangled in this:

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

And that is when I ask the moral objectivists [either pro-life or pro-choice] to note how they are not entangled in it themselves.

Well, other than by noting that “in their head” they do not “believe” that they are. Or that they simply just “know” that they are not.

In other words:

But my point revolves entirely around challenging those who insist not only that it does have to be objective, but that they have in fact already discovered/invented what the actual objective resolution is. And that, of course, is precisely when I confront them with the manner in which I myself construe these conflicts [instead] in terms of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

Okay, note one that is. Note one in which if you don’t share that frame of mind you are necessarily being irrational; or you are wrong; or, if you act otherwise, you are behaving immorally.

I make it quite clear regarding what I construe to be an “objectivist mind”. It is one in which the objectivists argues that you must share their own values or emulate their own behaviors. In other words, if you do embrace their own alleged rational and logical premises than your conclusion will in turn reflect the objective truth. Why? Because theirs does.

Otherwise you are “wrong”. You are not “one of us”.

Yes, I can basically agree with this. In fact, you might even call it my point. Then we can shift gears so as to explore the manner in which I came to this conclusion based on the manner in which I scrutinize human interactions that come into conflict from the perspective of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

As opposed to the components of your own argument that had persuaded you to think like this.

Yes, this is largely what I seek to explore here at ILP:

[b][i]In my view, one crucial difference between people is the extent to which they become more or less self-conscious of this. Why? Because, obviously, to the extent that they do, they can attempt to deconstruct the past and then reconstruct the future into one of their own more autonomous making.

But then what does this really mean? That is the question that has always fascinated me the most. Once I become cognizant of how profoundly problematic my “self” is, what can “I” do about it? And what are the philosophical implications of acknowledging that identity is, by and large, an existential contraption that is always subject to change without notice? What can we “anchor” our identity to so as to make this prefabricated…fabricated…refabricated world seem less vertiginous? And, thus, more certain.[/i][/b]

In other words, using the tools of philosophy, what can we know to be true for all of us: having already recognized the extent to which as children we are basically indoctrinated to view the world [morally and politically] as others instruct us.

And it should be noted that while it is “indoctrination”, it is often imparted lovingly. In other words, out of a genuine conviction that you are teaching your children to believe that which is the one true distinction between right and wrong.

That’s why it is invariably so effective.

I don’t doubt that the manner in which I peruse [and then construe] these things [these relationships] might not be reflective of a truly sophisticated frame of mind. That, in other words, those who do have a far more sophisticated understanding of philosophy as a discipline, might be able to poke any number of holes in the arguments I make.

“I” is after all the most complex and enigmatic form of matter that has ever evolved from the Big Bang; or from whatever it is that first brought existence itself into existence. Whatever that might possibly mean.

But it does seem reasonable to me that a distinction can be made between those aspects of my “self” that are anchored biologically, demographically, factually etc., in the “objective truth”, and those aspects which seem to be considerably more problematic. Contingent instead on the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein as it pertains to one’s sense of identity, one’s moral and political values, one’s emotional and psychological reactions to events in the world around us.

Yes, I believe that most folks embrace a set of moral values because 1] they are indoctrinated as children in a particular historical and cultural context to embody one frame of mind rather than another and 2] because they had a particular set of personal experiences, relationships, sources of information/knowledge etc., that predisposed them to go in one rather than another direction.

And that these existential components are deeply embedded in them such that they may or may not be privy to [aware of] just how much [or how little] control and understanding they really have of or over these enormously complex interactions. Some obviously more so than others. But even to the extent that one thinks this through long and hard, they are still confronted with the gap between what they think they know about them and all that would need to be known in order to actually be fully or wholly informed.

On the contrary, an objective understanding of the laws of nature is precisely what makes it possible to engineer all of things [objects] that most of us just take for granted. Including this very technology that we use to exchange these abstractions.

From my frame of mind, in a world sans God, moral nihilism seems to be the most reasonable manner in which to address conflicting value judgments that precipitate conflicting behaviors.

On the other hand, moral nihilists are just as capable of precipitating and inflicting human pain and suffering as are the moral objectivists. Even more so if you focus the beam in on those who own and operated the global economy. After all, I suspect that very few of them are motivated by…deontological considerations?

I’m not sure there was such a thing as morality back then–not in concept anyway–but I think there were certain acts or things people would say or personality types that would anger most people–lying for example–and when you think about most of these behaviors and such that usually anger people in virtue of their “immoral” character (what we would call “immoral” today) they do seem like the kinds of things that would undo the survival of the species if taken to excess. If everyone lied constantly, for example, then communication and social harmony would break down and we would lose one of the most essential pillars of our survival: social cohesion and security.

Yes, I am saying that an instinct for morality existed even back then, at least an aversion to certain behaviors and such, which was loosely rooted in our genes (I say loosely because these aversions can be easily overridden or changed, but it’s common enough to say that there must be some universal instinct within man to abhor certain kinds of behaviors).

However, it must be said that, at least in my experience, the instinct to respond to so-called “immoral” behaviors seems largely directed towards others and not to one’s self. So whereas it might infuriate you when someone keeps lying, you most likely wouldn’t bat an eye at the thought of lying yourself.

Are you saying it is the moral nihilists who will climb to the top in any of these regimes?

Yes, if the main concern is to find the ultimate objective “moral right” then this approach is useless. But as a moral nihilist, I would think this isn’t the main concern. The main concern would be: how to establish harmony and peace between people given their conflicting views and values. Though this itself is nearly just as impractical.

I don’t know. Is this taken into consideration by the individuals involved in the dispute? Is this your concern? Are you asking with a view towards finding the objective moral right or simply resolving the dispute between the two individuals involved.

Like I said, it depends on what you mean by “objective”. I asked this question because it occurs to me that you are after an “objectively true” conclusion as opposed to using objective means to arrive at what might still be a subjective conclusion. I agree with the rationalists and objectivists that reason and logic–an objective method for dispute resolution–can be used to objectively arrive at conclusions (which might still be subjective in their content); but as far as arriving at conclusions that are demonstrated to be “objectively true” in that very process, I take back what I said, at least in regards to morality and value judgements rooted in dasein.

I don’t think this is what’s at the core of the objectivist mindset; it’s just a typical end result. Whatever beliefs or values she holds, the objectivist/rationalist believes that she arrived at those beliefs (or verified them) through an objective and rational process. Therefore, it is sometimes the case that she takes it as a foregone conclusion that any disagreement with her amounts to a misuse of, or a failure to use, that same process. It isn’t just because they disagree that the objectivist accuses others of being irrational or blind or wrong, etc., but it will often correlate with disagreement.

It has more to do with stubbornness, in my opinion, than being an objectivist, stubbornness in regards to re-examining the grounds upon which the objectivist rests her beliefs and values, for unless she thinks herself infallible, she should take the time to examine the reasoning the other person brings to the table and compare with her own reasoning to see if any new light is shed on the matter which might possibly point to alternate conclusions.

But there is always going to be great resistance to this. Why? Not so much because one is an objectivist, but because objectivism is being used as a crutch, a crutch to hold up some preferred position, some preferred value system, that can be used as leverage against others who work against one’s own interests. By painting such positions and values in the objectivist light, one feels she has bolstered her position and made it all the more difficult for others to contend with. But the minute that sticking to her objectivist/rationalist guns forces her to abandon her original position (because, like I said, even objectivists make the occasional mistake), there will be great resistance to re-examining her reasoning, for that would entail a great risk to her own interests, interests that were just previously being served by that same reasoning now being challenged.

So what are you saying here? Are you saying such an “I” actually exists? And if so, is it different from the I that “fragments”?

Yes, it makes it possible, but that’s still different from saying the laws of nature really exist as tangible things. This is part of what makes human thought work so well–it actually abstracts out imaginary constructs, uses them to form inner models of reality and make predictions about it, then in applying the principles that hold these models together and allow for these predictions, you get things like technology, art, and human civilization. My favorite example is the mathematical construct i–the imaginary number–so named precisely because mathematicians are up front about the fact that they just made it up, but they would never confess to making such a bold move unless they knew it would be useful, and you do get marvelous artifacts of technology from it. Concepts and ideas can prove to be very useful, but that doesn’t mean they reflect anything real (not in a concrete/tangible sense in any case).

I hear that loud and clear.

But lying would seem to be much like anything else [even back then]: It would invariably depend on the context and the frame of mind from which that context is understood. As a rule, truth-telling is crucial to social cohesion. But, again, that assumes that the set of behaviors deemed to embody a cohesive whole in any particular community is anything other than a particular political consensus that would revolve around those able to enforce it.

How then would the philosopher today intertwine nature and nurture in order to root out a set of behaviors that comes closest to the manner in which, say, someone like Kant approached lying?

It would seem the closer we come to behaviors said to be rooted in instinct the farther away we would get from morality encompassed in an intellectual contraption where the “truth” seems more applicable to fusing definitions and deductions derived from certain epistemological assumptions regarding what is said to reflect what we either can or cannot actually know about these things philosophically. And thus objectively? And this always strikes me as rather tautological.

Yes, we rationalize it. But this sort of thing would seem to be synchronized with a world in which the assumption is made that there is no God. Why? Because if there is a God [one said to be omniscient and omnipotent] any and all lies would [could] then be judged wholly from an all-knowing, all-powerful transcendental font.

My argument here revolves around the assumption that in Godless universe, a moral nihilist able to enforce his or her own agenda, could only be supplanted by another who becomes even more powerful still.

It’s just that in the modern industrial state [one generally governed by democracy and the rule of law], might makes right is often in contention with right makes might. In other words, those who assume that, in using the tools of philosophy, we are able to either prescribe and to proscribe human behaviors based on a so-called “civilized” or “enlightened” frame of mind. Which in the modern world often revolved around one or another ideological contraption. No God but an assumption that Reason is close enough.

Well, my main concern as a moral nihilist is in coming up with the least dysfunctional manner in which to reconcile this…

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

…with a practical frame of mind in interacting with others. In other words, if you think as I do, wouldn’t you just abandon the effort altogether? I have explored this in some depth with folks like Moreno, but he has since abandoned our exchanges because, well, my frame of mind seems to…disturb him.

I’m asking with a view toward anyone offering a possible resolution such that the conflicting goods here can ever be resolved. What would that argument even begin to sound like?

By objective I mean a resolution such that one is able to demonstrate [existentially] that all rational men and women must share it or they cease to be rational men and women.

Yes, this is the sort of thing that is discussed on threads like this one: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=190059

In other words, an exchange in which it is agreed that in discussing the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” philosophically, we are all at least on the same page…epistemologically? What I do though is to ask those who believe that their own distinction is the optimal one to take their conclusions out into the world of conflicting human behaviors derived from conflicting value judgments and then to note the practical import of their premises/conclusions.

Yet when I do so I am often greeted with disdain. I just don’t “get” that what they are doing is what “serious philosophers” pursue while my own approach is entirely inappropriate. It’s not real philosophy.

In other words:

Yes, this is perhaps the best way to put it. But why are they so reluctant then to plug their own “objective and rational processes” into a context in which their own behaviors/value judgment come into conflict with another. As though it misses the whole point of philosophy.

In fact, I often imagine a group of committed Kantians discussing value judgments of their own that clearly come into conflict while each and every one of them defends deontology.

I’m saying there is an actual physical entity that comes out of the mother’s womb; and that over the course of his or her life acquires a frame of mind encompassed/embodied in “I”. I did this, I did that. Where I focus the beam here is on the distinction between what can in fact to be demonstrated as “objectively true” regarding what this physical entity does or does not do and what unfolds when other physical entities get into a conflict regarding this: “Well, he did this, that’s true, but what he ought to have done is that instead”.

But only pertaining to moral and political value judgments. in other words, as I bring up time and again with mr reasonable, if his own “I” is playing the stock market, there are clearly those choices that he ought to do if his goal is to make rather than to lose money.

But if someone comes along and says “‘I’ believe that playing the stock market is not something that a moral person would do”, how, using the tools of philosophy is this settled?

Again, there may be Kantians who embrace capitalism and Kantians who embrace socialism. While both insist that their politcal values here fall within the framework of a deontological ethics.

Huh?

Well, that’s my reaction anyway.

Admittedly, this is the sort of analysis I have the most difficulty wrapping my head around. I think: how exactly is it applicable [for all practical purposes] to the manner in which I construe the meaning of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy as they manifest themselves “out in the world” of actual human interactions that come into conflict?

It may be entirely sound epistemologically but how would it actually be useful in resolving the sort of moral and political conflicts that generate what we call, for example, “the news” from day to day? In other words, the things that often most preoccupy us in our interactions with others.

Everything is fine as long as [for whatever reason] harmony prevails. But what about all the times when it does not? Of what “use value” and “exchange value” is the epistemological agenda then?

Well, sure, the “truth” is still subjective, but that doesn’t take away from the point that there was (or might have been) an aversion to lying (or what was thought to be a lie), which implies certain psychological precursors to morality.

Why would they want to? I understand what you’re getting at: how to translate morality qua instinct into morality qua objective truth (which is not even what Kant tried to do–he started with the assumption that man had, not so much a proto-moral instinct, but the capacity of pure reason, and from that he reasoned his way to an objective universal morality). That’s not the conclusion I would aim to reach starting with my assumption of morality qua instinct in early man. Moral relativism is the conclusion I would aim to reach. For me, morality is ultimately determined by one’s conscience–whatever one feels “right” about–which is different from simply rationalizing something to yourself so that you can sleep at night. That being said, I think morality is real, just not absolute (it will differ from one conscience to another)–and as an idealist, I believe that the subjectivity of morality is what makes it real (though still relative).

Yes, that’s a round about way of talking about the moral instinct from the other side of the coin–rather than feeling scorn for those who would lie, one feels guilt or fear about the prospect of being accused a liar in the eyes of other–and if that other is God himself, what guilt and fear!

Have you tried moral relativism?

I honestly think the best you can do is to abandon any universal or objective morality and focus on reconciling the moral conflicts between two particular moral systems–between two individuals or two groups. If morality really isn’t objective, then objective morality is impossible in principle. That leaves aligning everyone with a subjective morality, which is impossible in practice. Reconciling two particular moralities is at least philosophically possible (I suppose it probably depends on the moralities in question, but I believe with effort and a willingness to be reasonable, it can be done). You would still need all participants to honor the philosophical spirit of the reconciliation, being open to reason and new ideas, but I believe it could be done.

Like I’ve been suggesting, it depends on the individuals involved… which implies you’re focus should be more on the latter.

And what are the facts we are starting with? In order to be deemed rational, one must begin with a set of premises. Are we starting with empirical findings or are we looking for a set of shared, but undemonstrable, assumptions?

You mean, take whatever conclusions are left over when all subjective assumptions and opinions are put aside?

Well, this tells me that, for you, there is no question that the “I” is real, but it’s the “ought” which is supposed to apply to this “I” which you question. And I take it that whatever it is about the “I” which renders it subject to so many “oughts” equally comes into question when the “oughts” come into question. When the “oughts” are shown to be baseless, so are those aspects of the “I” which make them subject to the “oughts” (thus the fragmentation).

So I guess the question is: is there anything left of the “I”, after this fragmentation, other than the physical entity we are at our birth?

If I understand you correctly, you’re asking something similar to the question: why is it that everyone can agree on the results of mathematics, but not on the results of philosophy even when we commit ourselves to rigorous logic? I mean, today we have a thorough and rigorous system of logic, full with objective rules and notation that more or less mimics those of mathematics (I’m thinking of predicate calculus). Why are we not able to make the same kinds of strides in philosophy with this as we are in mathematics with its counterpart?

^^ Is that what you mean?

Yes, I would tend to agree with this. There are aspects of human interaction that some will attempt to grasp philosophically – aspects rooted in biological imperatives that we have barely begun to scratch the surface regarding. Nature intertwined in nurture. But how exactly? Where does biology end and philosophy begin here?

And lying is certainly a crucial component of this. After all, how would any particular human society sustain functional interactions if the folks in it had to spent most of their time trying to establish whether or not others were lying to them?

But how then is this implicated philosophically in deontology? Or in an ethical agenda that focuses the beam more on consequences [or on utility] construed from the perspective of dasein?

This is what always fascinates me. That crucial distinction I come back to time and again.

In other words…

For whatever reason that they might choose to. My point is more in the vicinity of exploring whether or not it is possible to do at all. In other words, what does it mean to argue that, if one wishes to be thought of as a rational human being, one is obligated to think or to feel or to behave in a particular way? But: out in a world bursting at the seams with conflicting goods derived from a point of view that I construe to be embodied in dasein?

In responding to this, I would ask the Kantian to take this generally abstract assessment out into the world of actual conflicting human behaviors. In other words, to note how he or she might translate their intellectual assumptions into actual working [functional] human relationships in a particular context out in a particular world.

For me, a “conscience” is no less fabricated existentially re indoctrination as a child; and then reconfigured over and again as an existential contraption throughout adulthood. What the objectivists then do in my view is to obviate the “agony of choice in the face of uncertainty” by subsuming it in one or another scholastic assessment. A world of words whereby a lie is deemed not only to be at odds with objective reality but as well to the extent to which others don’t share a particular moral or political agenda said to be in sync with an objective assessment of human reality.

That only works up to a point for me.

For example, one can embrace the frame of mind that “they are right from their side and we are right from ours”. But the assumption is still made that a distinction between right and wrong can be made. But: If you are convinced [as I am] that, in being on one rather than the other side, this is still the embodiment of dasein, then you are acknowledging that had your life been different you might have been on the other side. There does not appear to be a way to extricate oneself from this. And if both sides can embrace a reasonable argument for acting in opposition to each other, there does not appear to be a way to extricate oneself from this either.

Well, other than through taking that “existential leap” such that “here and now” you think this rather than that. But all the while knowing that new experiences, new relationships, new ideas etc., might yank you in another direction.

You suggest:

But what I am always more curious in exploring are actual examples of this “out in the world” such that I might begin to glimpse a possible exit from my “dilemma” above.

That is why I will invariably ask of those whom I construe to be moral objectivist to note how my dilemma above is not applicable to them when their own values come into conflicts with others. In this way they are basically forced to take their “analysis” out into the world that we actually live in.

My point though is that both sides can accumulate facts to defend their own moral or political agenda. For example, it is a fact that if you execute Jim for murdering Jane there will be many who loved Jane who view this as justice. Their pain revolves around the loss of Jane. On the other hand, there will be those who loved Jim who view his execution as unjust. Their pain revolves around the loss of Jim.

Which side then is said to reflect the objective truth? Either rationally or empirically? Instead, from my perspective, this is always profoundly [problematically] embedded existentially on particular paths such that both paths are able to be defended as “the right one”.

I’m suggesting that there are clearly aspects of “I” that transcend “personal opinion”. You either are or you are not this or that. For instance, you either are or you are not 4’ 10" tall. How then would others react if you insisted that you ought to be 6’ 10" instead? Why? Because you want to play in the NBA.

There are simply aspects of “you” that are unequivocally linked objectively to “the facts of life”.

By and large, I’m asking those intent on exploring that which philosophers can in fact know with certainty regarding the things that most interest me – human identity and conflicting goods – to take the “intellectual contraptions” that I can’t quite wrap my head around out into the world and, there, to intertwine their ideas [or ideals] existentially in a particular context.

In other words [basically] to “illustrate” their text such that their points might become considerably less abstract.

In fact, more often than not, it is when [as construed by me] their serial abstractions then become serial assertions that I often interject in order to point out that, as I see it, their arguments are generally just defined or deduced into existence as “analysis”.

And, sure, with regard to some aspects of logic and epistemology this just goes with the territory. There’s no getting around it. I just don’t believe that a substantive discussion of identity or values or political power can stop there.

Hey Biggy,

Haven’t forgot about this thread. Stay tuned.

Hey Biggy,

Sorry for ignoring this thread for so long. I seem to be losing steam. I think the reason is that I started this thread curious about the details of your philosophy, and now I feel like I’ve got the gist of it (though I’m sure I can always probe deeper). However, I don’t want to leave this thread hanging, so I’m going to continue for a little more.

This is only a problem for objectivists.

For a subjectivist like myself, what’s first and foremost real in any moral situation is the particular set of circumstances involving the particular set of people it involves, and how that makes one feel morally. Once that’s established, then one can philosophically contemplate the generalizability of the circumstance and the people involved and draw certain abstract conclusions about the highest moral principles that apply. In other words, as a subjectivist, we start with: this person is bad for lying about this or that under these particular circumstances. This is rooted in visceral feelings and emotional reactions. Joe, for example, might be pissed off at Sam for lying: “He’s a God damned liar! He lied to me about the price of the car!” ← That rage contains the seeds of what might later grow to be the abstract philosophical concept of a particular morality, but in order to derive that concept, one has to posit the assumption that one is seeing some objective moral truth in the sentiment of rage. Joe can translate his statement “Sam is a God damn liar,” into “Sam is a bad person for lying,” which in turn can be generalized as “Lying makes one a bad person.”

But then comes all the questions about whether certain exceptions might apply, or whether one can imagine a case of lying that doesn’t seem so bad after all. Lying to a murderer about the whereabouts of a potential victim, for example. Or maybe lying yourself in order to get out of a questionable situation. The question must be asked: would the same grounds for this moral scenario, the same visceral feelings and emotional reactions from which we drew our moral conclusions, be illicited under every conceivable circumstance? The answer must be this: to the extent to which these visceral feelings and emotional reactions won’t be illicited under every conceivable circumstance, we cannot generalize our moral conclusions in the abstract and the impersonally objective.

Some will try. Some will say “Lying is unequivocally wrong… except if it’s to a murderer asking where his victim is… or if it’s for your own good… or if I’m doing it, etc.” ← But there’s no end to how complicated this can get.

In other words, I, as a subjectivist, don’t feel the need to go this far. The visceral feelings and emotions that are illicited by this or that situation are enough for me to recognize instances of morality, and by the same token, I recognize the subjectivity and the relativity of it. I don’t feel the need, as I presume most objectivists do, to abstract out certain moral principles from this, moral principles that would allegedly apply universally and unconditionally. ← I don’t think this can be done. This is why I don’t see the need to answer this question any further; I don’t see why you would be so hung up on actually finding a way to translate these visceral feelings and emotions into an impersonal deontology akin to Kantian ethics–unless you only mean it as a challenge to objectivists.

I’d give this question the same treatment as above–namely, that it’s not feasible to expect to take these subjectively based, dasein-based values and beliefs and apply them to the real world. This may seem disappointing to some, but there’s a reason I keep falling back on the prospect of trying to reconcile the differences between particular parties in the context of particular stand-stills. That, in my estimation, is somewhat more feasible (though still highly unlikely to work). The question I’d ask is: what’s wrong with handling conflicts between groups of people on a case-by-case basis?

Again, same treatment.

I have no problem agreeing that the conscience is a product of intoctrination, as you say, and subject to reconfiguration and change over the course of one’s life time–it is a product of dasein like anything else–but the point for a subjectivist like me is not where the conscience comes from or what it’s rooted in, but what it feels like. If, to the subject, his conscience tells him that such-and-such act is “good”, then that is what constitutes the good for him in that moment.

You’re right, but one can still be relativistic in one’s view even in acknowledging this. One would simply say: if I had gone the other way, then only in relation to that other (hypothetical) way would my views now be wrong. But the fact remains that I am here now, with my current views and my current values, and relative to those, other opposing or conflicting views are wrong, even the ones I may have just as easily embraced in another life.

Think of it this way: it’s like Einsteinian relativism. Recognizing the inextricability of dasein in human experiences and human life, which leads irrevocably to the conclusion that our moral objectivism is really baseless, is much like recognizing the baselessness of absolute motion. For every frame of reference in which we say that object X is moving, there is an equally legitimate frame of reference in which we can say that object X is not moving. But rather than draw the conclusion that motion is illusory, we can draw the more reasonable conclusion that something is moving, but what that is exactly is a relative matter–which is to say that now we realize that to say such a thing is meaningless unless we specify the reference frame in which the object is moving.

Remember, the subjectivism of one’s position and values means that the reality of these depends only on how one feels about them–not on whether one can rigorously craft a convincing or thoroughly deductive argument, or whether one can amass irrefutable evidence, but simply on how one feels, on what reality seems to one in the moment. Any conflict resulting from that can be resolved through relativism.

I have very little else to say about this as I’ve given my opinion on this numerous times before: I think it’s just shy of a pipe dream. It’s the kind of thing to which one is apt to say: Good luck with that!

I get that for you this is a “dilemma”–you must feel passionate about it to an extent–yet I’ve gotten the impression you wish to convince objectivists of its futility–not that you’re looking to objectivists for an answer, but that you wish for objectivists to abandon the endeavor.

This could be taken in two ways: internal objectivity and external objectivity. One can try to demonstrate internal objectivity such that everyone who is “rational” must concur with it just by scrutinizing the logical structure of an idea or argument:

  1. All grass is green.
  2. All men are grass.
  3. Therefore, all men are green.

There is technically nothing wrong with the logical structure of this argument, but it obviously has nothing to do with reality (at least one of the premises doesn’t).

On the other hand, if the objective person is he who is able to demonstrate to all rational men and women what they must concede, then this presupposed a common starting point for all such men and women–some common aspect or state of reality to which we all have access, that we can all verify for ourselves–and that implies external objectivity–the objectivity of: that object there really exists.

The problem here, as with most controversial issues, is that it is a mix of both empirical facts and metaphysical assumptions. The empirical facts in this example are clear: Jim murdered Jane–everyone agree with this. The metaphysical premises is: Murder is wrong. And on this point, the parties will not agree. Jane’s family will be the first to put forward this point, but then Jim’s family will protest: murder may be wrong, but not in the case of self-defense (for example), and that’s what it was in Jim’s case. Then a whole other round of argumentation will take place–they will put aside the question of murder–whether it happened or whether it is wrong–and focus on the question of self-defense–bringing in, once again, other empirical facts and other metaphysical assumptions. This can go on indefinitely.

In other words, insofar as the “facts” are clearly empirical, there will rarely be a problem with consensus, but it’s all the metaphysical/rational assumptions which are deliberately used to muddy up the waters.

Right, and it reminds me of Hume’s distinction between “is” and “ought”–that one can never get to an “ought” from an “is”. That being 4’ 10" means that one ought to be 6’ 10" if one wants to play in the NBA, for example, does not follow, for one could just as easily argue that the NBA ought not to consist of so many tall people.

You’re right, it doesn’t stop there–it isn’t designed to–these “intellectual contraptions” that are the products of human analysis are meant to be reapplied to the world. People will naturally be inclined to do so after arriving at their abstract philosophical conclusions.

The problem, in my opinion, is that this process only works half-decently when the focus is over phenomena or subjects that one can be impersonal or unbiased about–for example, how photosynthesis works–for here, people can apply rational analysis without worrying too much that personal bias or unconscious alterior agendas will enter the picture (unless one is invested, as a scientist, in his own contrived hypothesis about how photosynthesis works–then his reputation, career, and livelihood are on the line). This, I believe, is the function for which rational analysis evolved for–figuring out the physical, tangible, hands-on aspects of the world.

Of course, we know that this function has been extended into all kinds of other realms–the spiritual, psychological, and the sociopolitical, among many others–and to an extent it works–not as well as the physical and the tangible–but it works well enough for us to have survived this long. The problem is the degree to which it doesn’t work, and the problem here is that its shortcomings in these spheres (the spiritual, psychological, sociopolitical, etc.) is that we are so highly invested in the conclusions we arrive at. If it could be determined that abortion is, in fact, objectively wrong, think about how many people would have to be accountable for this fact–how many people have spent their lives fighting for pro-choice policies, how many people have actually had abortions, how many people would have to compromise their values, their reputations, their careers, etc. This is why when it comes to issues in which we have an extreaordinary amount of personal interest invested, we will allow emotion, bias, and selfish motives to persuade and corrupt our rational thinking. We will deliberately (though most of the time unconsciously) steer our thinking towards the conclusions we have already decided beforehand to arrive at.

We have evolved with this tendency because rational thinking, it turns out, proves useful in conjunction with other motives and mental processes in, not so much arriving at objectively true conclusions, but in meeting our self-interests and ultimately our survival.

I would basically agree with your points so far. But a resolution, in reflecting what any particular subjects [as dasein] “feel” regarding any particular set of circumstances, would still seem [from my perspective] to be embedded in this:

If I am always of the opinion that 1] my own values are rooted in dasein and 2] that there are no objective values “I” can reach, then every time I make one particular moral/political leap, I am admitting that I might have gone in the other direction…or that I might just as well have gone in the other direction. Then “I” begins to fracture and fragment to the point there is nothing able to actually keep it all together. At least not with respect to choosing sides morally and politically.

And it is this “dilemma” that I am most interested in exploring with the objectivists. Or, in your case, the subjectivists. Yes, there is the way that we react to the world cognitively – the way in which we seem able [using the tools of science and philosophy] to “reason” our way to objective truths that are applicable to all of us. But there are also our subjunctive [emotional, psychological and/or instinctual] reactions to events that involve conflicting value judgments. How here are any “resolutions” that we reach not also embedded in dasein and in conflicting goods? And, eventually, out in the world – a particular world – with others, subject to the reality of political economy?

What you see as a particular contextual resolution I see more as just an intersubjective frame of mind that particular folks in a particular conflict manage to sustain “in their heads” for however long that can be done. Then something changes and the conflict flares up again.

Admittedly, depending on my “mood”, it can be one more than the other. Still, by and large, I am more intent on exploring at least the possibility of an argument that might convince me to pull back from that brutal sense of futility – and it is very, very real – I see entangled in conflicting goods embraced by folks who do not fully grasp the manner in which their value judgments are more rather than less the embodiment of dasein. At least not as I do.

And this always brings me back to the three socio-political contexts in which the “resolution” is embedded:

1] might makes right: the strong are able to enforce their own agenda
2] right makes might: there is an agreement within the community regarding the most rational/virtuous behavior
3] democracy: there are different factions convinced that their own resolution is the optimal frame of mind but they are willing to embrace “the rule of law” and do battle with conflicting agendas in the political arena

Yes, and, for me, that then comes to revolve around this:

[b][i]Here, in my view, is one particular rendition of what I construe to be the “psychology of objectivism”. Applicable to either Religion or to Reason.

1] For one reason or another [rooted largely in dasein], you are taught or come into contact with [through your upbringing, a friend, a book, an experience etc.] a worldview, a philosophy of life.

2] Over time, you become convinced that this perspective expresses and encompasses the most rational and objective truth. This truth then becomes increasingly more vital, more essential to you as a foundation, a justification, a celebration of all that is moral as opposed to immoral, rational as opposed to irrational.

3] Eventually, for some, they begin to bump into others who feel the same way; they may even begin to actively seek out folks similarly inclined to view the world in a particular way.

4] Some begin to share this philosophy with family, friends, colleagues, associates, Internet denizens; increasingly it becomes more and more a part of their life. It becomes, in other words, more intertwined in their personal relationships with others…it begins to bind them emotionally and psychologically.

5] As yet more time passes, they start to feel increasingly compelled not only to share their Truth with others but, in turn, to vigorously defend it against any and all detractors as well.

6] For some, it can reach the point where they are no longer able to realistically construe an argument that disputes their own as merely a difference of opinion; they see it instead as, for all intents and purposes, an attack on their intellectual integrity…on their very Self.

7] Finally, a stage is reached [again for some] where the original philosophical quest for truth, for wisdom has become so profoundly integrated into their self-identity [professionally, socially, psychologically, emotionally] defending it has less and less to do with philosophy at all. And certainly less and less to do with “logic”.
[/i][/b]
But [of course] this not applicable at all to that which we are able to demonstrate as applicable to all of us. It is pertinent only to the part [as you noted re Hume above] where one attempts to yank an ought out of an is.

But I continue to fail to understand why this is so important to you. Why do you feel your “self” fragments just because you recognize the relativity of it all? Why can’t you just be a relativist and say “that’s who I am”?

I understand that you recognize yourself as just another dasein, another self subject to all the whims and propensities of any other dasein, but why that should mean that your particular view, your particular values, are invalid, is what stumps me here.

Well, biggy, at this point, I can’t offer you solution to your problem. I can only suggest what I’ve so far been suggesting: start with just another individual. See if you can resolve your conflicts with that person–use philosophy and all that–and see if you can come up with a strategy. If succeeds, see how much you can generalize it to other people. In principle, you might make it all the way up to the level of politics where you will attempt to resolve your personal differences with the rest of the human race. But sometimes I think in order to succeed at our most lofty goals, we need to forget about them and focus on the little, more immediate goals. It’s like trying to jump over a wall that’s way too high–you stand a better of chance of getting over if you focus on building small steps one at a time.

Well, then you must be an objectivist yourself–if you feel that even in the midst of believing in the reality of one’s subjective experience of his situation, there is still a greater and more objectively authentic world beyond that subjective reality, then you must believe ultimately in the actuality of objective reality.

I won’t get into how a relativism of reality works this out, but I will pose the question: why are you so concerned with resolving the conflicts between conflicting subjective views, experiences, beliefs, and values in general–once and for all, so to speak?–why can’t life just a be a series of mini-conflicts–conflicts between one individual and another, or one small group of individuals and another small group–and once you resolve those conflicts, move on and prepare for the next conflict that will inevitably arise. ← This is life! It’s like getting from point A to point B in your car–like getting from Calgary to Regina–sure you have to constantly keep your foot on the gas and sit for hours on end enduring the tedious boredom–but it gets the job done–you do get from point A to point B. What your “dilemma” is all about is fretting over the question: why don’t they invent cruise control (or teleportation)! Sure, it would be nice to have cruise control or teleportation–it makes the ride a whole lot less tedious–but don’t tell me that without it, we can’t get from point A to point B.

Yes, I see the very same dilemma. My response, which I’m trying to make clear, is that the answers lies in, at least temporarily, letting go of the big world-changing, ultimate “fix” for all the world’s problems and conflicts, and instead switch gears and focus on more practical and manageable conflicts–conflicts between smaller and more regional groups; stepping down from such lofty aspirations of wanting to establish world peace and a proven methodology for avoiding conflict in a world ruled by dasein might seem disappointing at first, by my point is that we stand a much more likely chance of success if we start small and work our way up–slowly, methodically–from cases which seem manageable and doable to other cases which, by your own admittance, we have yet to figure out a resolution to.

Do you think that this is inevitable within all human interactions? That any group of people sufficiently populous will form political systems in accordance with only one of these three? It almost strikes me as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis–the first and second categories for sure remind me of Nietzsche’s master and slave morality, respectively.

I always think that the synthesis in particular manifests an aspect of creativity–the resolution to any human conflict is to be always expect to carry an element of surprise, something we would never have expected (if we could have expected it, we would have applied it before it became a conflict).

Right. That’s when our faculty of reason–which should only ever be regarded as merely a mental tool, something to help us get through complex and possibly confusing situations–gets hijacked to serve the more primitive needs of the ego–power, status, survival–it’s just like what I said in my last post: the motive for using reason gets intermixed with a whole array of different motives. That’s when the brain decides it doesn’t mind turning a blind eye to the rational mistakes and logical fallacies that appear so blatantly obvious to other, others that is who don’t share the same motives and agendas as you. Rationality is not a window to reality, it is a tool that the human brain pulls out of the shed any time it deems it useful for survival and getting ahead. Sure, it can be used to figure out reality but this is no where near an exclusive function–it can also be used to manipulate, to negotiate and make deals, even to help and heal others–so it shouldn’t come as a surprise that some end up in the bind of using reason and rationality to defend their ego–for prestige, for dignity, or even survival–for reason and rationality are just tools with which we are free to do whatever we want.

Right.

And just a note: I’m not entirely convinced that Hume was right. The philosophy of utilitarianism comes close to refuting Hume, in my opinion–the philosophy that says: in experiencing certain forms of “is” we abstract an “ought”–being in physical pain is certainly an “is”–there’s very rarely any question about it when one feels it–in fact, with physical pain, one can even say it is empirical, a tactile sensation. But in the midst of the experience, one gets a sample–an empirical sample–of something that, inherently, ought not to be experienced–that is, it is in the subjective experience of pain itself that we get the idea of “this is not good; it would be better if it wasn’t”. We catch a glimpse, in other words, in the experience of physical pain, of that without which things would be better–and that is a rudimentary “ought”.

I’m not really as much of a utilitarian as I used to be–but ^ this ^ still holds a bit of water for me.

It’s important to anyone who is in a situation where they are expected to choose one point of view over another. Or one behavior over another. Why? Because those around them do expect them to choose the “right” behavior. To be “one of us”.

If they choose the “wrong” behavior, or if they argue [as I do] that there is no objectively right or wrong behavior, there can be consequences. For example, I was just reading an article about the presidential election in the US. It seems that, regarding the Clinton/Sanders race, there have literally been long-standing friendships dissolved because one of them supported Clinton and the other supported Sanders!

Now, there are folks [the overwhelming preponderance of men and women on the planet] who manage to convince themselves that their own choice [their own behavior] is 1] in sync with who they really are and 2] reflects the most rational and virtuous point of view.

This is not an option for me. And one either grasps the significance – the existential significance – of this or one doesn’t.

But: short of someone being able to crawl inside my head and think about this as I do, I may never be able to communicate my frame of mind here to most folks.

In any event, there are no “valid” or “invalid” values from my point of view. There are only particular values embodied existentially in dasein; and values that are no more necessarily right or wrong than the values of those one might be in conflict with.

Sure, that’s basically the option we all have at our disposal if we choose to interact with others. But it doesn’t make my own dilemma any less intractable.

I don’t see how you are able to draw that conclusion. With respect to conflicting value judgments there may well be a “greater and more objectively authentic world beyond that subjective reality”. But I don’t believe that there is. And I do believe in an objective reality pertaining to mathematics, the laws of nature, the rules of language, that which we all agree is true by definition, the world empirically etc.

Let’s just say that the “resolutions” here are not thought of by me in the manner in which they might be thought of by those who are not entangled in my dilemma. In other words, to me, they are still no less existential contraptions that [eventually] will reflect the power of those able to enforce their own agenda. It always comes down to that. And not because the “resolution” really does reflect The Right Thing To Do.

And my aim here revolves more around exposing the dangers of the objectivist frame of mind as it relates to conflicting value judgments.

And, besides, what if there actually is a way in which philosophers can resolve these conflicts “once and for all”? What have I got to lose by hearing the objectivists out?

To wit:

From my point of view, whether the conflict is between two individuals, two groups, two communities or two nations, those are the options: Brute power, a deontological truth, moderation, negotiation and compromise.

I would generally agree. The point that I stress always revolves around what I construe to be the limitations of reason once we shift gears from those things applicable to all of us [either/or] to those things – human behaviors in particular – in which there are conflicts regarding the way it is said that things should be [is/ought].

As for our individual reactions to physical pain, the pain will always be a particular one out in a particular world; and some will want the pain to stop while others may, instead, want the pain to be all the more excruciating. There still does not seem to be a way for philosophers to choose one over the other as [deontologically] The Right Thing To Do.

It’s still largely a subjective reaction rooted in dasein and conflicting goods.

Or so it seems to me.

So you’d give up relativism because of peer pressure? Why can’t you tell them: “I’m a relativist”?

^^ Yeah, politics.

Right, I get that (I think). For me, this would only be a problem if it entailed that no moral perspective or value system could ever be compatible with this form of relativism (or nihilism or existentialism). But to me, not all moral systems are logically incompatible. I brought up utilitarianism in my previous post. Even a relativist can look out at the world and become convinced that everyone experiences pain and pleasure, and that pain feels horrible and pleasure wonderful, and feel intuitively that this is grounds for a morality. ← This is not inconsistent with relativism. (With nihilism, maybe. Nihilism says that all such contrived moralities are, at their core, baseless, and therefore even one’s own is baseless. ← Maybe this is your problem; perhaps your nihilism is where your lingering objectivism is hiding).

Well, I’m beginning to suspect that your dilemma is not with how to deal with other people without clashing with their dasein-based values and beliefs, but with how to deal with your own. It seems you can’t escape the inevitable conclusion of nihilism (or relativism) when you live in this modern age, but to you that means that all beliefs and value systems, including your own, are baseless and meaningless. How then can you continue to be compelled towards the conclusion of nihilism?

Well, if you’re unsatisfied with the conclusions your premises relentlessly lead you to, try different premises. ← Those are always exchangeable.

Yes, that’s the world I’m talking about. When you said that “…an intersubjective frame of mind that particular folks in a particular conflict manage to sustain “in their heads” for however long that can be done. Then something changes and the conflict flares up again.” I imagined you meant that something outside the shared intersubjective frame of mind does the changing, something more objectively real than the contents of the intersubjective frame of mind. A death in the family, for example, which would occur in the empirical world, could very easily disrupt the agreement within the intersubjective frame of mind.

^ I see this as possibly the source of what compels you towards nihilism.

Right, because the “right thing to do” according to each party turns out to be just existential contraptions. This leaves a void in the moral playing field, correct? A void in which there is no “right thing to do”. So you’re dilemma is to fill that void? With what? Something that is more than just the next existential contraption? Something truly objective?

Those dangers being the existential contraptions it comes up with? (I think we coined a term here :laughing: ).

So do you feel that if you could find a solution to your dilemma, you’d have the grounds for a fourth, possibly better, option?

So are you questioning the efficacy of reason when applied to interpersonal conflicts stemming from different beliefs and values?

You may be right. But I only brought up utilitarianism as an example of how an “is” can be translated to an “ought”. ← As for whether that’s a real objective ought is another question. I only mean to show where the idea of an “ought”, and later morality, comes from.

I will give up moral relativism [situational ethics] when someone is able to demonstrate to me that it does not reflect a reasonable understanding of a world teeming with conflicted human behaviors.

But in any number of contexts, others will not just pat you on the back and say, “okay, fine, my friend, you’re a relativist”. There is often just too much at stake if the “other side” prevails.

Besides, my argument is especially a threat to the objectivists because it undermines the capacity to choose sides such that behaviors can be thought of as either right or wrong.

Isn’t that why the objectivists here often react to me as they do? They recognize that threat.

As did I myself when [for years and years] I was one of them.

Sure, this is reasonable to me. I just don’t see how it makes much of a dent in my dilemma above. There will always be only particular pains in particular contexts and particular reactions to them. People rationalize inflicting pain on others for any number of reasons. Their pain is often seen as our gain. And the sociopaths among us need but rationalize their own morality by embracing the idea that in a Godless world, self-gratification becomes the center of the universe.

As for my own nihilism being just another kind of objectivism, well, that becomes largely a language game to me. It reflects the limitations of language in being able to pin down exchanges of this sort. In any event, I am always the first to acknowledge that, given new experiences, new relationships, encounters with new ideas etc., I may well abandon this frame of mind altogether. As I have so many others in the past.

Yes, that’s true. Sartre once speculated that “hell is other people”. Well, suppose “I” is too? Sartre focused the beam here on how others objectify us. But my point is aimed more at suggesting how we tend to objectify our own self. If you manage to convince yourself that you are in touch with some “essential self”, then that allows you to imagine this “real me” is able to grasp the nature of the “real world” in turn.

I make the distinction between essential meaning and existential meaning. Essential meaning revolves around that which is true objectively for all of us. Existential meaning revolves around that which is deemed true subjectively by me but may or may not be true objectively for all of us. Or it may not be true at all.

That’s the part that pertains largely to identity and value judgments.

All I have at my disposal here are my own existential/political leaps of faith. And it’s really not all that different from Kierkegaard’s leap of faith to God. Only with No God. I tell myself that there may well be The Right Thing To Do. But until someone is able to demonstrate that there is, I can only choose my behaviors intuitively, viscerally, problematically – going in one rather than another direction.

Constructively, this affords me more options. I’m not anchored to The Right Thing To Do. Destructively, I am never able to know that feeling of having done The Right Thing. I choose this knowing that had my life been otherwise I might have chosen that instead. And whether I choose this or that is largely moot because either choice can be rationalized merely by commencing with a different set of assumptions.

But, again: You would have to actually be inside my head to grasp how precarious everything can seem when you think like this.

Exactly. But: What could that possibly be? I’m here in part looking for arguments that might at least nudge me in that direction.

I’m exposing what I construe to be the limits of logic and knowledge here.

I do understand this part: “I only mean to show where the idea of an ‘ought’, and later morality, comes from.”

My point again is this: that there are ideas we have “in our heads” that tie things like this together “theoretically”. But to what extent are we able to take these ideas out of our heads and to demonstrate how, when human behaviors do come into conflict over value judgments, an objective morality can be ascertained philosophically?

Granted, but then let’s make a distinction here: there’s a difference between preaching what you believe vs. preaching what you think will have the best, or optimal, effect on people.

Granted.

I think we all were, as objectivism (I believe) is the default human perspective.

Which actually betrays that they aren’t really sociopaths if you think about it: a real sociopath wouldn’t even bother trying to rationalize his behavior. But that’s an aside…

But do you know how to do so now? Do you know how to explain your nihilism in a non-objective way? In other words, do you know how to say: There is no such thing as objective reality.

Yes, I completely agree with that (although I’m not sure that’s the only way to grasp a real world).

Might I suggest that we make a distinction yet again: there’s a difference between recognizing (objectifying) the self and just being the self. One need not recognize the self just in order to be one’s self–with all one’s experiences, perceptions, beliefs, and values. The recognition of the self is something that comes after all this, and is indeed a kind of objectification.

In fact, I’m inclined to say that any kind of conceptualization–which is just “recognition” on a cognitive level–requires objectification. The word “objectification” finds its roots in “object”–that which is focused upon, the target, the “other”–the objective, that which we aim at (where the “beam” aims, as you would say)–it is that which the mind has carved out from its experiences and made into a “not-me”–any kind of “not-me”–so long as it is other.

As this concerns the self–there ends up being a kind of paradox–if what it means to “conceptualize” is to objectify (i.e. to make into an object, into the “other”), then how can the self be objectified? How can the self become the “other”? Isn’t that a contradiction in terms according to all the foregoing?

What this means to me is that the process of objectification that the mind must undergo just in order to conceptualize (anything period!) fails in an essential way when it comes to the self, for objectification of the self completely negates the very essence of the self, which is just to be subjective (i.e. to be the subject).

(Sorry, I know that was a long rant, but the point (in order to bring this full circle) is that: the “real me” or the “essential self” as you put it is just the form that the objectification of the self takes–however it is that we conceptualize ourselves in the moment of objectification–and that is another aspect of “objects”: they tend to be thought of as “frozen” or “permanent”).

Right, and I take it there is essential meaning in the world in your view–scientific facts, for example: like the fact that at the core of all suns is a nuclear fission factory, converting hydrogen into heavier elements. Then problem, then, from my perspective, seems to be that there will always be this world of essential meaning (of objective facts) from which existential meaning (or subjective facts) arises, and when it comes to nihilism, just recognizing this fact reinforces nihilism, the paradox being that nihilism ends up being just another subjective fact.

I’m sure this is true. All I can do, in this thread, is, if not show you an alternate way of looking at this, a way that removes the struggle of your dilemma (because I don’t struggle with it), to attempt to explain why my own philosophical look on this problem, which involves my brand of subjectivism and relativism, is not affected by this dilemma. But we’ve been going through a bit of back and forth in this thread, which to me seems largely based on the fact that you are attempting to explain to me why my philosophical perspective doesn’t work (either for you, or even for me ← as in, I’m not seeing the flaws in my own philosophy). I’m not seeing the problem with my philosophy yet, so I’ll continue for a bit longer. At this point, I’m seeing the crux of the problem as the fact that there remains an objectively real base for you (essential meaning) from which all subjective reality (existential meaning) stems, including your nihilism. As a subjectivist and a relativist, I don’t have this problem because the objective reality for me is still founded on subjectivism ultimately. How to make sense out of this for you is probably what makes this difficult for you to swallow, but I haven’t really gotten into that yet.

Well, given that neither of us is even close to being in a position to answer this, I’m afraid I can’t be of much help. I will say this however: I think all three systems are really variants of the first system: brute force. The other two, deontological and democratic, feature mechanisms by which the people are conditioned to accept the fact that they don’t get what they want or that life is unfair, thereby obviating the use of brute force unless necessary. For example, in a deontological system, one is given justifications for why one must comply with a system that doesn’t agree with them or even harms them. They say: “Well, I don’t like it, but I suppose it is my moral duty.” Or in a democratic system: “Well, I don’t like that the outcome of the last election wasn’t what I voted for, but that’s how the system works and fair is fair.” Law enforcement in both these systems still has the means and the legal rights to apply brute force–for example, if someone decided to assassinate the President because he wasn’t the candidate that someone voted for–but the conditioning of the people in these systems is really a means of psychologically removing them by one degree from the impulse to revolt against what they would otherwise perceive as unbearable oppression.

Given that brute force is involved in all three system, I’m skeptical that it would be removed in a fourth. Give the intricate involvement of dasein in human nature, and the conflicts between people that this results in, it is fair to say that such conflicts are a part of human nature, and therefore the only way one group of people can have their way against an opposing group is by threat of brute force (and psychological conditioning if they’re lucky). Given that this is human nature, it is hard to imagine how any of this will change with a fourth political system.

You’re right, the experience of pain and pleasure, even though everyone experiences them as bad and good (respectively), is not enough to convince people that they carry moral weight. It cannot be demonstrated publicly. Even privately, if one wasn’t convince, one need not take one’s experiences of pain and pleasure as bearing any moral weight, particularly if one holds a different moral theory. One can simply say: “It’s true that I’m in pain, and I don’t like it, and it’s bad, but this has no relevance to morality as such.”

It is true that few sociopaths you come upon on, say, true crime reality tv [dateline, 48 hours, 20/20 etc.] are likely to sit down and explore their behavior “analytically”. Thinking solely of their own self-gratification is basically the default frame of mind. Psychologically, he or she is more or less on automatic pilot.

But if you did try to bring the discussion around to their behaviors “philosophically”, what really could you argue by way of convincing them that their behaviors are necessarily irrational/immoral in a Godless universe? From my frame of mind you need God here. No God and mere mortals are on their own. And I just don’t see [philosophically] a deontological alternative to God.

Is it really possible to concoct an “instruction manual” to accomplish something like this? Instead, all I can do is to ask the moral objectivists to note how, when their own value judgments come into conflict with others, they do not themselves become entangled in my dilemma.

The preponderance of my interactions in [and reactions to] the world around me are experienced objectively. They don’t need to be objectified because they are objective. Instead, my aim here [as always] is to focus the beam on those interactions/reactions that are clearly more subjective/subjunctive. And they revolve by and large around conflicting value judgments.

Here we seem to become entangled in “dualism”: I the body, I the conscious mind and [for some] I the soul. What can I demonstrate to be true objectively about myself and what becomes more problematic.

And then there’s the whole question of determinism. If that’s the case what here then becomes moot? Everything?

Well, I certainly argue that my frame of mind here is sheer speculation. It’s a “subjective fact” in the sense that “I” am a particular subject who has in fact come to believe that this is a reasonable point of view. But that doesn’t make it so. All I can then do is to go in search of arguments that contend with it.

Oh, it is. I can assure you. So much so that I suspect the objectivists react to me as they do [even going so far here as to “foe” me] because they are troubled that perhaps my frame of mind might be applicable to them too. But, again, that can only be sheer conjecture on my part. They are not inside my head, I am not inside theirs. And that’s a really, really important factor in exchanges like this.

Fair enough. But how don’t you struggle with it? That’s the part that still eludes me. Why? Because there does not appear to be a way to avoid it. Not for mere mortals in a Godless universe.

In other words, here I try to grasp what you are suggesting as it might be applicable regarding the many, many moral and political conflicts that I have encountered in my interactions with others over the years. The distinction between the times that I [the “real me”] was sure I was right [as a Christian, a Marxist, a feminist etc.] regarding issues like abortion, and the times [of late] when I more clearly recognize “I” as dasein able only to grasp how both sides are able in turn to offer reasonable arguments for embracing what are clearly “conflicting goods”.

You seem to have found something analogous to an “exit” here, I have not.

For me “brute force” is merely a reflection of the fact that within any actual human community, one way or another, a set of mores/laws will have to be enforced. There will [existentially] have to be a system of rewards and punishments. What’s crucial then [for me] is the extent to which others become self-conscious of this. Do they believe [wholly] in survival of the fittest, deontological truths, the rule of law etc., or [like me] are they just groping about, grappling to come up with the least dysfunctional social, political and economic interactions.

Is there a “human nature” here…a natural way to behave…or [historically, culturally, experientially] is nurture able to reconfigure human behaviors into any number of hopelessly subjective/subjunctive “contraptions” ever subject [n a world of contingency chance and change] to new interpretations and assessments.

Think for example of how birth control pills or AIDS rerouted the human sexual libido in particular historical/cultural/experiential contexts.