“Spinoza subscribed to a modified form of Descartes’ method, and drew the standard philosophical conclusion. He became convinced that the fundamental premises of human knowledge must be established, not by experience but by reason, since reason alone can provide insight into the essence of things – an essence being precisely that which is captured in a ‘clear and distinct idea’.” -Scruton, Roger (2002-05-30). Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) (Kindle Locations 701-703). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
And here we see the shortcoming and circular nature of the rationalist approach. Ultimately, what this argument comes down to is the assumption that such essences are found rather than made. If they are made, which the rationalist approach gives us reason to suspect, then the argument turns against itself in that the essences are attributed to a given subject rather than imminent within them. If they are found, then we see the rationalist approach fully dependent on the empirical approach -in other words: experience. And I would also point out that what I’m fumbling around with here gets at the reason that while Anselm’s and Spinoza’s argument for God are convincing within themselves (within their given systems, many of us have ended up agnostic, if not outright atheist.
It basically comes down to something pointed out to me in (I believe (Joe Hughes’ readers guide to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, that there are 3 approaches to making an argument:
1: the syntactic as can be seen in the argument:
A=B
B=C
Therefore A=C
2: the semantic as can be seen in Aristotle’s syllogisms:
Men are rational animals.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is a rational animal.
(And I would note how even here the semantic is dependent on the next method, the Existential which involves experience. )
And, finally, 3: the existential in which we test our conceptual systems against reality itself.
And by recognizing these three, we can more accurately analyze the disconnect between Anselm’s and Spinoza strong arguments for God and our willingness to accept them. What we see here is how their arguments work perfectly within the syntactic and semantic (the domain of the rationalist approach (while failing to make the existential leap. We see a similar problem at work in paradoxes such as Zeno’s arrow which, while convincing, fails to inspire us to go prancing around between an archer and their target.
Therefore, what we have to do is make the existential leap of putting Spinoza (as well as Anselm (in their historical context. We have to recognize that, at the time, mathematics was an emerging and exciting technology that inspired Spinoza, in his enthusiasm, to put a little more faith in the geometrical method than it actually warranted. At the same time, I would hesitate to pass off Spinoza’s effort as irrelevant. As Scruton later points out:
“(The proof of the second proposition involves, when traced back to its original axioms, something like 100 steps; this idea of a mathematics of laughter seems less strange when set beside Spinoza’s view that merriment is more easily conceived than observed.)”
We can easily see here the justification for the rationalist approach. It is clearly easier to form concepts about merriment and work with that than actually observe it and form any workable proposition about it. It may even be, if you think about it, impossible without mental concepts about it.
I mean think about it: can we ever really think about a moment when we’re actually in it? Don’t the two seem inherently exclusive?
And to justify putting this on the Pragmatic board:
We can also see the import of the pragmatic truth test (that which just works (as a synthesis of the traditional deductive and inductive truth tests in that it made both valid ways to work and added something more. This, of course, would give some validation to the deductive tendency to appeal to the inductive and resolve the inherent self contradiction in doing so.