“While it would be wrong to dismiss the role of memory in identity, as described in Sally Latham’s ‘Shaping the Self’ (issue 110), I would also point to the role played by the perceiving thing: the fact that we are always a particular point in space and time (that is subjective time so as not to incur the wrath of Tallis) with an experience of continuity. Consider some thought experiments built around the movie The Sixth Day with Arnold Schwarzenegger. In it, a corporation has developed the technology to clone individuals and implant their memories into them. Their henchmen are killed then, thanks to capital and technology, basically resurrected.
Now, first of all, we could, for the sake of scientific accuracy, consider the implanting of memories redundant since, if the brain was cloned at the time of death, those memories would be encoded in its exact replica. However, we can assume that the redundancy is mainly a narrative device meant to suggest that not only are the memories being injected, but the person’s identity as well.
Secondly, we have to ask is if this would necessarily constitute the resurrection of the individual that died. The problem for me is that being killed and brought back as a perfect replication of myself would still involve a major disruption in the continuity of my particular point in space and time. My replication may be just like me and have my memories. But would it be the ‘me’ that died? Of course, a rash materialist (Tallis’ neuromaniac or Dennett’s barefoot behaviorist) might boast: “But of course! Same body; same brain; same you.” And we might wonder if they, that is if the technology did exist, would be willing to put their money where their mouth is. Then, being civilized people who don’t kill for the sake of knowledge, we might settle for the less drastic measure of another scenario: one in which the replication was created while the original was still alive. Once again: same body, same mental makeup and memories. But in this case, we could confidently say the original identity is not continued through the replication. Nor would the disruption be analogous to the discontinuations we might experience in sleep or under anesthesia since, in those cases, identity is anchored in its return to the same body. “
“If my memory was totally wiped and i woke up in hospital with no recollection of my past, im pretty certain that my identity remains intact. So here we need to clarify what we mean by our ‘identity’. The first entry in my dictionary distinguishes it as our ‘personality’.”
“It reminds me of the Ship of Theseus, that has over the years every part replaced with a new part, is it the same ship, etc. Also Lincoln’s Axe, has had both handle and axe-head replaced, is it still the same axe or what.”
“This is especially interesting to me now because as I finish my Modern Scholar lectures on Evolutionary Psychology, I find an alternative version of the perceiving thing as a mental module that hovers above all the various drives and impulses [while describing it as acting within] and creates a narrative in order to make sense of the activities of various mental modules. It just seems to me that there is a kind of operationalism at work here that assumes the scientific perspective that I think we really need to deal with here.”
In other words, what the science of evolutionary psychology is arguing is that our sense of identity is merely one kind of mental activity (one mental module (among others. However, I would argue that this comes from the same scientific arrogance that dismisses free-will (that is when we should be talking about a participating self since “free-will” was lost with Cartesian Dualism (through the circular reasoning that was demonstrated throughout the last 2 lectures: that which assumes that everything must work within scientific perimeters in order to be considered legitimate.
Our mission, should we choose to accept it, is to establish that our identity (that which creates an ordered narrative for our multiple drives and impulses (is not just one mechanism in the brain, but rather a result of the fact that we have a brain which is attached to a body that constitutes a particular point in space and subjective time.
In other words, as many of you have argued, we cannot think of the self (identity (as just one kind of mental module among others. We should, rather, think of it as the foundation of all modules described by evolutionary psychology.