“Like a painter, I start with the broad swashes: 3 points that have become central to how I understand Difference and Repetition at this point thus far:
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Joe Hughes’ point in his reader’s guide to the book: that it is primarily a critique of representation. It is here that I see a pragmatic overlap with Rorty, no matter what differences the two may have shared.
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(And this is where I risk going off the grid: the analytic/metaphysical understanding and core I have extracted from the book and secondary text:
a: even a pure repetition can only consist of different instances of the same thing
therefore b: the only thing that is ever repeated is difference.
And, finally, 3. The creative act is never that far from Deleuze’s mind.”
And in hindsight, I now realize there is yet a 4th point: that in terms of the analytic/metaphysical dyad of the two, Deleuze seeks to take the privilege given to repetition throughout our cultural history and give it to difference: a clearly postmodern move. And as I see it at this point, much of the book is a survey of the various strategies he has found to do exactly that.
But for today, I would like to focus on one he pursues in Chapter Three, “The Image of Thought”. In it, he seeks to undermine the notion of recognition (that which we do with the objects that occupy our space (as the basic model of thought. And it is a seductive image in that it seems to lie at the very foundation (especially in evolutionary terms (of the various things we can do with mind and brain. We assume, by studying this basic act, we can somehow find clues to the more complex activities of our minds such as philosophy. But if we really look at it, the act of recognition seems too automatic to account for the kinds of things that philosophy (along with the arts and sciences (try to do. Deleuze writes:
“On one hand, it is apparent that acts of recognition exist and occupy a large part of our daily life: this is a table, this is an apple, this the piece of wax, Good morning Theaetetus. But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognize, we are thinking?”
And later:
“However, the criticism that must be addressed to this image of of thought is precisely that it has based its principle upon extrapolation from certain facts, particularly insignificant facts such as Recognition, everyday banality in person; as though thought should not seek its models among stranger and more compromising adventures.”
This is why he makes the distinction between the passive synthesis of sensibility, memory, imagination, and thought and (with the overlap of thought)that of the active synthesis: where we creatively create concepts and engage in philosophy.
And we see the folly of this misguided image of thought even today in scientism and Rand’s objectivism which talks a lot about facts (as if they were simple acts of recognition (then steps into conjecture while acting as if they were simple facts. Once again, it’s like saying:
“1+1=2; therefore Capitalism is only valid economic system on the face of the earth.”
Or:
“We can demonstrate and correlate mental activities with brain activity; therefore, all mental activity is little more than brain activity.”
It’s as if we are to be so impressed with the incontestable premise that we should automatically accept the conjecture of the conclusion. In other words, the image of thought that conflates thought with recognition leads to a common doxa (socially programmed responses to socially programmed cues (that those engaged in power discourses can use to shut down the discourses of others. We need only look at what facts can actually tell us in order to understand how erroneous the above jumps and conclusions actually are:
1+1=2
If I hold up a pencil and let it go, it will fall to the ground
And even a relativistic hippy knows better than to step in front of moving bus
Enough said. So how do we, as Deleuze asks, get from recognition (and simple facts like water, at atmospheric pressure, boils at 212 degrees (to the kind of things that philosophy concerns itself with? How else do we approach what philosophy is actually interested in (that which distinguishes it from science: that which can only be sensed as compared to known (but through literary and metaphorical methods?