[b]From “The Information Philosopher” website:
From the earliest beginnings, the problem of “free will” has been intimately connected with the question of moral responsibility. Most of the ancient thinkers on the problem were trying to show that we humans have control over our decisions, that our actions “depend on us”, and that they are not pre-determined by fate, by arbitrary gods, by logical necessity, or by a natural causal determinism. [/b]
What often surprises me are the number of occasions I have stumbled on discussions of determinism online and the question of moral responsibility would hardly come up at all.
Personally, I cannot imagine a more important relationship. Whether we are free to choose behaviors pertaining to those things that must be chosen in order to be in alignment with the laws of nature would seem to pale in interest next to behaviors that we choose only because we perceive the world around us from a particular point of view.
And it is in choices of this nature [choices revolving around value judgments] that generate the most problematic consequences. Having or not having free will here cannot possibly be more important. On the other hand, having or not having free will is irrelevant to the objective reality of mathematics and nature and logic.
But to say that today “free will is understood as the control condition for moral responsibility” is to make a serious blunder in conceptual analysis and clear thinking. Free will is clearly a prerequisite for responsibility. Whether the responsibility is a moral responsibility depends on our ideas of morality.
Conceptual analysis. Perhaps that’s my problem. I may well be less concerned with getting this “conceptual analysis” right than in delving into how, for all practical purposes, determinism has actual existential applications with regard to our social, political and economic interactions.
It would surely seem that we cannot be held responsible [re blame and punishment] for doing something that we could not not freely choose to do.
But how does this relate then to moral responsibility being dependent “on our ideas of morality”?
The distinction here would seem to be just shifting gears from those behaviors we must do in order to be in alignment with existence/reality, to those behaviors that seem to be within our capacity to have a choice in. Behaviors, in other words, in which others might ask, “should she have done that?”
No one asks the doctor if she should perform an abortion by going down through the pregnant woman’s nose. Although they may ask if she freely choose to perform the abortion. With moral responsibility though we can ask if performing this particular behavior was the “right thing to do” beyond the extent to which it is in alignment with reality/existence. If, in fact, we have free will.