[b]Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe
by Ray Bradford
While Strawson’s arguments appear convincing, some critics may attempt to dispute their significance by stating that his contentions only argue the unavoidability of moral responsibility in a deterministic universe and say nothing of its rationality. These critics ask what the rationale behind such “moral responsibility” could be if people had no alternative courses of action. In response to these counterarguments, strong defense exists in Strawson’s writings. He notes that the question seems to miss the point entirely by failing to understand the inextricability of reactive attitudes from the human experience or the “natural human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes.” As Strawson states, “This commitment is part of the general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review within this general framework.” Moreover, as Strawson also accurately observes, should we obtain a detached God’s-eye view with which to evaluate the rationality of our morally reactive attitudes, the criteria for evaluating their rationality would not be the truth of determinism, but rather their efficacy in improving or deteriorating the quality of the human condition.[/b]
Again, from my perspective, this either revolves around the circular logic of the assumptions made or it devolves altogether into intellectual gibberish.
If, in the only possible material world, Mary must abort her baby, where does that leave us?
Is it really a legitimate “rationale” for moral responsibility “if people have no alternative courses of action”? What does it mean for all practical purposes to speak of the “natural human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes" when the manner in which others will react to her abortion is also in sync with matter unfolding in the only possible world?
And we don’t have a “God’s eye view” do we? And even from the perspective of an omniscient God, we would seem compelled always to interact only to the extent that it must align itself necessarily with that which God already knows will unfold.
Either way, with or without God, there seems to be no exit from the “brute facticity” that is the laws of matter.
And how would the “efficacy in improving or deteriorating the quality of the human condition” not be embedded in turn in this determined world as well?
What I do here is to suggest the possibility of free will without being able to demonstrate or to prove it; and then situate our moral interactions in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.
But at least I know the limitations of the language I use here.