Determinism

I guess you didn’t see my last post. Now I feel compelled to answer even though I just posted that I would like to take a break. Of course you are compelled to consider it as a necessary adjunct of the design. Once again, no one is arguing with this. I was just explaining to you that the answer I gave is not inconsistent with my knowledge of determinism. You seem surprised that I pointed out that you are making more out of it than needs to be. Obviously, you couldn’t think any differently at that moment.

Even though your perspective can only ever change as it must change before, now and later does not change the fact that each and every moment offers a new perspective based on the accumulated knowledge and experience you have gained up to that point in time. My offering you feedback on what we’re discussing may play a role in what your next choice will be.

No, nothing escapes that framework of determinism just because of new knowledge. That would mean nothing new could ever come into play because the dominoes would already be predetermined to fall in a certain way. That’s how it works with dominoes, but not with human nature. We do make choices; dominoes don’t get to. Based on new knowledge, a paradigm shift could occur and with great speed. You are making a comparison that doesn’t apply to humans, even though we cannot escape the laws of determinism. I don’t think you understand why the past does not cause the present, and why this matters.

Of course it would be of your own volition, or your own choosing, but as Lessans stated this choice (which is coming from your will, no one else’s) is correct if it means “of your own desire”, but this has nothing to do with having freedom of the will.

I will not come over to your point of view (that I can promise you) because I know for a fact that we have no free will and that there’s no ghost in the machine.

Sorry iambiguous but the fact that you are reflecting on the words, trying to grasp the context in which they will be used, and weighing the pros and cons DOES NOT GRANT YOU FREE WILL IN ANY WAY, SHAPE, OR FORM.

In the sense that he can choose not to rape Jane IF HE DOESN’T WANT TO, or rape her IF HE WANTS TO, the term “freely chose” can be used in place of “of his own desire” (which Lessans was clear about), but it does not mean he has free will to choose A over B or B over A equally. That is what freedom of the will implies. The fact that he has the power of contemplation does not mean he has the capacity to freely choose “yes” or “no.” He is compelled to choose the alternative that he finds the most preferable, which is an immutable law. In other words, the fact that he has two choices does not mean he has the capacity to freely choose since he must pick the choice that gives him greater satisfaction. That is why choice is an illusion.

Although we cannot change the past because we know that we could not have chosen otherwise, that does not mean man’s choices will be the same when these principles are introduced on a worldwide scale. The practical implications of this change cannot even be fully comprehended.

I have no idea what “truths” these objectivists are defending. All I know is what I know is true based on what I have learned. I am offering you a book that I believe will have a huge impact on your life personally, and an even bigger impact on the world at large.

This is just repeating the same thing over and over again. I am very sorry but these observations were not assumptions. He made valid inferences based on what he observed but there are no assumptions anywhere in his proposition, his observations, or his reasoning.

The irony is that these types of moral conflicts won’t even exist. How can they when the age of politics is coming to an end? You are unable to consider the possibility that what you are envisioning is impossible is an incomplete and myopic view based on the world as it is now. I don’t need you to tell me that your view is more practical one more time. =;

And I will ask again: Where does “free” in the way I qualified it have to do with freedom of the will? I already explained how the phrase “I did it of my own free will” is qualified and can be used if it means “of my own volition”. We are losing communication.

It is true that if you don’t desire to read the book, then you found it more preferable not to read the book [in the direction of greater satisfaction]. I don’t see what there is to reconcile.

You wouldn’t. You haven’t read the book. You’re just denying that there could be something valid because either you don’t want to believe there is no ghost in the machine and this might burst your bubble, or you just can’t believe that someone could make a major discovery that would cause a paradigm shift and still be within the framework of determinism. Whatever the reason you will be acting in accordance with your nature.

The conflicts that are most pressing such as war and crime are prevented by this natural law. Definitions (and words) mean nothing where reality is concerned unless they are symbolic of reality. It just so happens that his words are just that.

There is nothing theoretical about his vision based on his spot on observations. I don’t see many people not wanting to become part of this new world once it gets underway. You seem to be thinking that people will not want what they want. Who would want to live in a world where accidents, crime, medical mistakes, torture, war, and poverty exist when they can enter a world that none of these things exist? In other words, how can a person not want what is the better choice? BTW, there is nothing theoretical about this law of our nature and how it works under changed environmental conditions.

Think about that. Something compelled you to take a break from this exchange. And now something compels you to continue it. And that has absolutely nothing to do with free will?

Maybe not. But that’s the first thing that popped into my head.

But [to me] this always seems to imply that there are moments when I might have chosen to think about of it differently. But it would seem that in a wholly determined world all of our moments unfold in sequence only as they must.

You “chose” to take a break from the exchange. You “chose” to continue. There’s never getting away from these: “_______”. In other words, you chose “freely”.

Aside from the fact that, unlike the dominoes, we are matter that has evolved the capacity to know [consciously] that we must think, feel and do solely from within an immutable framework that encompasses the laws of matter encompassed within the design that is existence itself, this distinction you make here is not very persuasive. Before, now and later are always “of a whole”. The whole of reality.

We and the dominoes are always just necessary components of it. The dominoes know nothing of will and desire. Of “volition” and “freedom”. But the fact that we do makes us no more able to topple over from moment to moment other than as we must.

That’s the objectivist in you talking. On the other hand, what you “know for a fact” is still predicated largely on the internal logic of the assumptions you make about these relationships; while, concommitantly, providing almost nothing in the way of a scientific methodology for testing these “facts” empirically and experientially.

Or so it seems to me.

But this would seem to assume that wanting to or not wanting to was something that he could choose freely. You keep going back from the choice to the wanting or not wanting to make it…as though they were not intrinsically both “of the whole” that is the design.

You say:

But, from my perspective, this just takes us back to the fact that in a determined world, Jack’s “power of contemplation” results in his being able to “freely” choose – to freely “choose” – only what he was ever compelled to choose anyway.

And thus the manner in which determinism and free will are made to seem compatible is just a trick of the mind to me. It takes the world that we live in and reconfigures it into the words used by the compatibilists to give Jack a “choice” in a world where he must rape Jane.

So you say. But [over and again] you have not yet, in my estimation, been able to demonstrate a manner in which we can probe the validity of this prediction much beyond accepting the rationality of Lessans’ argument. Isn’t that always the stumbling block here? Shouldn’t you be spending more time contemplating the inevitable questions you will receive from scientists regarding how they might go about testing his observations “for all practical purposes”? Of making his predictions more fully comprehensible.

I repeat it because I believe it is important that you understand how, in my view, this will always be the pivotal obstacle when you try to convince others to give Lessans’ book a shot.

You have to be able to make that crucial leap from what he observed in watching us make our choices to how science grapples with the human mind and the human brain intertwined in the act of choosing one thing rather than another.

Understanding the biology of the brain here would seem to be an indisputable compoment of all this.

It would be like trying to understand human sexuality without a comprehensive understanding of the sex organs. Who would say, “who needs them?” in predicting sexual politics a thousand years from now?

Back to the gap between asserting these things and demonstrating how we actually do go from the world that we live in now to the world that we will live in a thousand years from now if we merely accept as true Lessans’ predictions.

And my view is predicated on a world bursting at the seams with relationships that I can encompass empirically/experientially in the manner in which I construe dasein, conflicting goods and political economy. And it is a world that down through the ages has always revolved around one or another rendition of blame and punishment.

Or, sure, one or another objectivist insisting that if only everyone would embrace his or her own “objective reality” then one or another “utopia” would be our shared destiny.

That’s my point though. It always comes down to the conditions that we set for understanding words like freely/“freely” and choose/“choose”. If we put them in what amount to scare quotes it means they are to be understood differently. Often ironically.

Thus we are “free” to “choose” in a determined world. In other words, in the manner in which we understand the meaning of those words in a non-determined world, we are not free to choose at all.

If I cannot of my own free will choose to read the book, prefer to read the book, desire to read the book etc., then every connection between me and the book unfolds out of the necessity engrained in the design.

There is never anything to reconcile here because everything is always of a whole.

The whole of reality itself.

I have no bubble to burst. I am more than willing to concede that my understanding of these relationships may well be wrong. In fact, you are the one in the bubble. You are the one insisting that your own understanding of these relationships is the objective truth. And, in my view, you have a lot riding emotionally and psychologically on/in believing that the fate of the new world rides on everyone finally embracing Lessans’ observations/principles and ridding the world of blame and punishment.

But then you don’t [and in my view can’t] provide us with a methodology for testing his prognostications about the future. Other than either believing or not believing his analysis. And all any of us really know for certain [or almost for certain] is that none of us will be around in order to confirm his predictions.

Pertaining to an actual existential moral conflict, I have no idea what this means. I know only that whatever it is that you think it means “in your head” seems to be as far as you feel you need to go in order to demonstrate to me how it is connected substantively to an issue like abortion in the context of conflicting goods and moral responsibility in a world where everything we do is ever only what we could never not do.

How could it not be theoretical when no one is able to actually show us this world for perhaps another thousand years?

Now, imagine how different your argument would be if, say, all the people in a small town somewhere had read Lessans’ book and then embodied his principles in the lives that they lived. You would be able to take folks to this town and show them what the new world will be like for all of us one day…once everyone embraced his narrative.

Instead, the new world here is purely hypothetical. A world predicted to be. A world predicated soley on everyone [eventually] embracing Lessans’ argument.

At least in my opinion.

Iambiguous, I have never ever ever disputed this. I am in full agreement. But you do not understand the second half of this equation. I am not blaming you or saying you could do anything other than what you’re doing.

How do my actions have anything whatsoever to do with free will? Where does free will even enter into this at all? My continuing to post had more to do with the fact that I felt compelled to answer your post than leave it unanswered. Your post created a new antecedent condition which I didn’t anticipate (and one that I felt was important enough to answer), thus changing my resolve to end the discussion. Every single move I have made has been in the direction of greater satisfaction; the only direction my desire could have taken me, so where is my free will?

You would have thought about it differently only if your brain gave you the thoughts to think about it differently. The fact that you might have chosen to think about something differently is also part of the natural unfolding of what must be, if that is what actually occurred. If it did not so occur, then this is what had to be. There’s no escaping determinism.

Where did I choose freely? Just because I am able to contemplate options based on an ever-changing set of conditions does not grant me free will.

That is true, but you are forgetting that our choices are based on contingent factors that are always coming into play, so what I may have chosen before the fact may not be the same thing I choose later on based on a new set of antecedent conditions. That is why, although everything unfolds as it must, we are not subject to making the same choices over and over again if those choices don’t serve us anymore.

No, but it does offer us a greater array of options that can afford us a different way of looking at a situation. Dominoes cannot do that.

But determinism IS an objective truth, one of the few objective truths that exist. We are compelled to move in the direction of greater satisfaction. This is not a theory.

I refuse to cut and paste this whole book just because you refuse to read it. However, I will cut and paste this one excerpt. I don’t think there is anything that will motivate you to read further. You will continue to tell me that these astute observations are nothing more than assumptions. #-o

[i]Decline and Fall of All Evil: Chapter One: The Hiding Place

p. 45 Supposing a father is desperately in need of work to feed his family
but cannot find a job. Let us assume he is living in the United States
and for various reasons doesn’t come under the consideration of
unemployment compensation or relief and can’t get any more credit
for food, clothing, shelter, etc.; what is he supposed to do? If he steals
a loaf of bread to feed his family the law can easily punish him by
saying he didn’t have to steal if he didn’t want to, which is perfectly
true. Others might say stealing is evil, that he could have chosen an
option which was good. In this case almost any other alternative
would have sufficed.

But supposing this individual preferred stealing
because he considered this act good for himself in comparison to the
evil of asking for charity or further credit because it appeared to him,
at that moment, that this was the better choice of the three that were
available to him — so does this make his will free? It is obvious that
he did not have to steal if he didn’t want to, but he wanted to, and it
is also obvious that those in law enforcement did not have to punish
him if they didn’t want to, but both sides wanted to do what they did
under the circumstances.

In reality, we are carried along on the wings of time or life during
every moment of our existence and have no say in this matter
whatsoever. We cannot stop ourselves from being born and are
compelled to either live out our lives the best we can, or commit
suicide. Is it possible to disagree with this? However, to prove that
what we do of our own free will, of our own desire because we want to
do it, is also beyond control, it is necessary to employ mathematical
(undeniable) reasoning. Therefore, since it is absolutely impossible for
man to be both dead and alive at the same time, and since it is
absolutely impossible for a person to desire committing suicide unless
dissatisfied with life (regardless of the reason), we are given the ability
to demonstrate a revealing and undeniable relation.

Every motion, from the beating heart to the slightest reflex action,
from all inner to outer movements of the body, indicates that life is
never satisfied or content to remain in one position for always like an
inanimate object, which position shall be termed ‘death.’ I shall now
call the present moment of time or life here for the purpose of
clarification, and the next moment coming up there. You are now
standing on this present moment of time and space called here and
you are given two alternatives, either live or kill yourself; either move
to the next spot called there or remain where you are without moving
a hair’s breadth by committing suicide.

“I prefer…” Excuse the interruption, but the very fact that you
started to answer me or didn’t commit suicide at that moment makes
it obvious that you were not satisfied to stay in one position, which is
death or here and prefer moving off that spot to there, which motion
is life. Consequently, the motion of life which is any motion from
here to there is a movement away from that which dissatisfies,
otherwise, had you been satisfied to remain here or where you are, you
would never have moved to there.

Since the motion of life constantly
moves away from here to there, which is an expression of
dissatisfaction with the present position, it must obviously move
constantly in the direction of greater satisfaction. It should be
obvious that our desire to live, to move off the spot called here, is
determined by a law over which we have no control because even if we
should kill ourselves we are choosing what gives us greater satisfaction,
otherwise we would not kill ourselves.

The truth of the matter is that
at any particular moment the motion of man is not free for all life
obeys this invariable law. He is constantly compelled by his nature to
make choices, decisions, and to prefer of whatever options are available
during his lifetime that which he considers better for himself and his
set of circumstances. For example, when he found that a discovery
like the electric bulb was for his benefit in comparison to candlelight,
he was compelled to prefer it for his motion, just being alive, has
always been in the direction of greater satisfaction. Consequently,
during every moment of man’s progress he always did what he had to
do because he had no choice. Although this demonstration proves
that man’s will is not free, your mind may not be accustomed to
grasping these type relations, so I will elaborate.
[/i]

Having the option of contemplation does not grant one free choice. It just offers him options, all of which are under the reign of determinism.

[i]p. 49 The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences
otherwise there would be no choice in the matter at all as with A and
A. The reason you are confused is because the word choice is very
misleading for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but
in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving
towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences
what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two
or more alternatives are presented for his consideration he is
compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers
worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more
satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved.

Choosing,
or the comparison of differences, is an integral part of man’s nature,
but to reiterate this important point…he is compelled to prefer of
alternatives that which he considers better for himself and though he
chooses various things all through the course of his life, he is never
given any choice at all. Although the definition of free will states that
man can choose good or evil without compulsion or necessity, how is
it possible for the will of man to be free when choice is under a
tremendous amount of compulsion to choose the most preferable
alternative each and every moment of time?[/i]

He must rape Jane if his choice to rape Jane is the most preferable. If it is not, he does not have to rape Jane as if he is part of some kind of pre-programmed design that is now being forced on him.

Well, arguments are based on rationality, and Lessans’ observations and reasoning are as rational as you can get.

His predictions about a new world are based on the knowledge given in the book, which are fully comprehensible. The fact that this knowledge has not been empirically confirmed should not stop people from doing whatever they have to do to feel confident that this knowledge is accurate because its potential value is unmistakable.

We don’t need to dissect the brain to know that man’s will is not free. We cannot observe greater satisfaction in a lab, but it is a universal law. Why one person chooses one thing in the direction of greater satisfaction while another person chooses something else cannot be answered through an MRI. You are downplaying his discovery, which is really unfortunate.

There are some things we can learn about sexuality in a lab, but other things we can’t. As I said many times, not all learning is done through dissection or taking something apart. Sometimes we need to observe the entity functioning as a whole its natural setting to find answers, not in a lab.

We’re not discussing morality, remember? We are only talking about what one chooses in the direction of greater satisfaction, and when people are no longer hurt by economic downturns (not of their own doing), they will not desire to hurt others as a means of retaliation (using people as a scapegoat for their unfortunate lot in life) or for self-preservation (hurting others if not to makes matters worse for them).

The only objective reality I am asking people to consider is that man’s will is not free and what extends from this knowledge. It just so happens that when we do extend the corollary that goes along with it: Thou Shall Not Blame, we can see how the entire world of moral conflicts dissipates due to this amazing paradigm shift in human relations.

We can use the phrases “I chose freely” or "I chose of my own “free will” in a determined world if it means we are given the choice to opt for this or that, but this in no way means we have freedom of the will.

Iambiguous, I have been agreeing with you this whole time if you use the phrase “I prefer to read the book of my own free will” which only means “I prefer to read the book because it gives me greater satisfaction.” You can use the phrase “of my own free will” in the way you suggested. He said this in Chapter One, and I’ve shown it to you. You are the one confusing words to make them mean what they don’t mean. :frowning:

The term ‘free will’
contains an assumption or fallacy for it implies that if man is not
caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be
preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not
mathematical conclusions. The expression, ‘I did it of my own free
will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because
I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could
have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily
misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed for
although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because
he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free.
In fact I
shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself which
only means ‘of my own desire.’ Are you beginning to see how words
have deceived everyone?

That doesn’t put me in a bubble because there’s no bubble to burst since this natural law is not one of my imagination.

I admit that I am emotionally involved, but this in itself does not negate the objective truth I am trying to share. You can’t use the fact that I was his daughter as a reason to deny that there is anything substantive to this knowledge.

The fact that we won’t be here can’t be helped, but if you took the time to read the book you might be a little skeptical and then be one of those people who pass the book onto others. If everyone did that, we might actually be here to see this great change. :smiley:

I told you that in regard to abortion, when the environmental conditions change so, too, will the need to abort as the lesser of two evils. He shows explicitly how the entire economic/political landscape is changed for the better, preventing the moral conflicts that you believe are here to stay.

That would have been further confirmation, but if you understand
these principles it’s not necessary just as any mathematical
equation can later be proven true by its application but that in
itself does not negate the veracity of the equation:

This
discovery will be presented in a step by step fashion that brooks no
opposition and your awareness of this matter will preclude the
possibility of someone adducing his rank, title, affiliation, or the long
tenure of an accepted belief as a standard from which he thinks he
qualifies to disagree with knowledge that contains within itself
undeniable proof of its veracity.

You’re completely off base. I’m sure this doubt of yours is what is causing you to resist delving into this discovery further.

What possible practical difference can it make how I understand either half of the equation if how I understand both of them is only as I ever could have undertood them? Nothing that I think, feel or do in a determined world will be other than what it was always going to be.

From my perspective then, you seem to nod in agreement here but must still insist that your argument is more reasonable than my argument; and then you must still aim to pursuade me to embrace it. Even though the fact of my embracing or not embracing it is predicated solely on the laws of matter going all the way back to whatever it was that clicked them on in the first place. Whatever that might possibly mean.

The part where you chose “freely” to continue the exchange because my post set up a new “antecedent condition” prompting a new shift in your mind/brain in the direction of a new “greater satisfaction” is still all just matter intertwined in a sequence that could not have been otherwise. Isn’t this true? The totality of this exchange is still just words toppling over onto other words as they must in order to be in sync with the design.

And that is precisely why neuroscientists study the brain: In order to determine more precisely what it means [objectively] when we speak of the brain “giving us the thoughts” – new thoughts – that we utilize in the course of engaging in an exchange like this.

And in a determined world [it would seem] the brain gives us only the thoughts [and emotionally reactions] it was programmed to in being a necessary adjunct of the design. And then I am back to “you” and “I” just going along for the ride. Typing only what we were ever scheduled, organized, arranged, planned, destined, fated, made etc., to type by the design.

But that is my point. You did not choose freely. You chose “freely”. Meaning you chose only what you could not not have chosen.

What is the point of having options if you are always obligated to “choose” the option that you must? What does it mean to speak of different ways of looking at a situation if you are always selected per the design to see it as in fact you do?

But: I refuse to read it because I must refuse to read it. What other “option” do I have here if per the design I am not compelled [here and now] to read it? I’m off the hook. But then the fact that you have thus far failed to convince me to read it is only as it must be too. So you’re off the hook too. In fact, that’s the beauty of living in a determined world: we always are.

Lessans:

The truth of the matter is that at any particular moment the motion of man is not free for all life obeys this invariable law. He is constantly compelled by his nature to make choices, decisions, and to prefer of whatever options are available during his lifetime that which he considers better for himself and his set of circumstances. For example, when he found that a discovery like the electric bulb was for his benefit in comparison to candlelight, he was compelled to prefer it for his motion, just being alive, has always been in the direction of greater satisfaction. Consequently, during every moment of man’s progress he always did what he had to do because he had no choice.

Yes, a man steals or does not steal because, as a necessary component of the design, he necessarily feels a greater satisfaction in stealing or not stealing.

But the Marxist will argue that in order to attain [and then sustain] what satisfies them, the capitalists embrace a political economy that is ever predicated on boom and bust cycles that lead to recessions [or even depressions] that precipitate the sort of poverty that precipitates in the minds of some a satisfaction that then revolves around stealing.

The question then becomes this: Is this all unfolding [historically] like clockwork – every individual intertwined with every other individual in a series of synchronized, mechanical interactions, or is there some element of true freedom involved in the choices they make.

It offers him only the capacity to “choose” – to choose “freely” – the option that he must choose.

Lessans:

The word ‘choice’ itself indicates there are meaningful differences otherwise there would be no choice in the matter at all as with A and A. The reason you are confused is because the word choice is very misleading for it assumes that man has two or more possibilities, but in reality this is a delusion because the direction of life, always moving towards greater satisfaction, compels a person to prefer of differences what he, not someone else, considers better for himself, and when two or more alternatives are presented for his consideration he is compelled by his very nature to prefer not that one which he considers worse, but what gives every indication of being better or more satisfying for the particular set of circumstances involved.

How meaningful can the differences be when choice is always expressed inside these: “________”. He is determined to find satisfaction “choosing” this instead of that. And so he “freely” opts for the greater satisfaction. Again, like clockwork.

If the unfolding design is predicated soley on the immutable laws of matter, how is this not analogous to being pre-programmed by them?

Thus contingency, chance and change in our lives are all only as they must be. It’s just that from the perspective of an individual who believes in free will, they seem to be factors that ever impinge upon his capacity to choose in the most rational manner. Or to wholly control his life. They are instead the variables that make his life seem to be topsy-turvy. You never really know what’s around the next corner. Whereas in a determined world it is always going to be what it could only ever have been. All we can do is to either acknowledge this and go with the inevitable flow or be deluded that we have a real capaity to shape our own destiny. However problematic that must always be in a world marbled through and through with the existential implications of dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

All I can do is to note how, in my opinion, this will get you nowhere fast with scientists [and others] who insist that predictions made about a future world must be such that they can be tested beyond merely arguing over definitions and the meaning of words used in arguments.

As I have noted a number of times above, my own interest in determinism revolves largely around how one can grasp the meaning of “moral responsibility” in a world where blame and punishment are ever by rote.

Do we or do we not live in a world where what one person finds satisfying invariably precipitates behaviors that others will find anything but satisfying. It is in fact our conflicting satisfations that generate the conflicting behaviors that revolve in turn around the conflicting narratives we espouse regarding what is deemed to be good or bad.

You just make the booms and the busts of capitalism go away by insisting that in the future everyone one will somehow be in sync regarding all of those behaviors we are anything but in sync regarding now.

In other words…

You make predictions about a world that you assert must exist because you assert further that the manner in which you construe determinism is necessarily true.

In my view, this is how most will always react to your argument until you can make the argument more than just the theoretical constructs that Lessans links together in what I construe to be largely an intellectual contraption.

But we are given the “choice” only in the sense that our sole option is to choose what we must choose.

We will just have to agree to disagree regarding the practical implications of this. That being basically this: we practice only what the design [necessarily] preaches.

And so around and around and around we go…

…and where it will stop only the design knows.

He shows no such thing. Not in the excerpts that you provided. Instead, he makes the assumption that if his arguments about free will and blame and punishment and universal consciousness etc., are correct, then the world he predicts will come about.

If there is a way in we can actually test this “out in the world of conflicting goods”, I haven’t come across it yet.

In other words, you want us to understand [and to accept] these principles without being able to actually show us any flesh and blood human communities that practice what Lessans preaches. Instead, you predict it in a future world where none of us will be around to see it confirmed one way or another.

[b]From “Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe” by Ray Bradford

Philosopher Daniel Dennett provides a sufficient definition of determinism on page one of his book Elbow Room when he states, “All physical events are caused and determined by the sum total of all previous events.” When people conceive of the choices they must navigate in everyday life, they appear to implicitly assume such an outlook on the universe–after all, choosing between alternatives only proves meaningful if one deterministically expects certain choices to result in certain consequences. Yet the application of determinism to human behavior itself elicits overwhelming hostility. A primary criticism tends to center on the issue of moral responsibility. Critics often argue with a mixture of disbelief and indignation that the concession of a deterministic universe (from which human behavior is not exempt) would entail the breakdown of morality and personal responsibility. They contend that if humans lack the capacity to act otherwise given a set of initial conditions in the universe, morality loses its basis of rationality and its raison d’être. They not only find such a world preposterous, but they imagine society would spontaneously disintegrate into anarchy as individuals justify their unbridled selfishness with “I could not have done otherwise.” [/b]

Yes, this is an excellecnt summation of the problem that determinism poses for me. In other words, if we do assume that hard determinism is true, what does it mean “for all practical purposes” to speak of moral responsibility at all?

Iambiguous, I appreciate your posting this but do you actually think Lessans didn’t know this? Do you actually think he overlooked this problem? I hope that after talking to me all this time you will have a little faith that he overcame this problem as he extended the corollary, Thou Shall Not Blame. You won’t let me continue because of your doubt that anyone could make such a discovery. What can I say other than you’re wrong. =;

I am considerably less interested in what Lessans claimed to know about this and considerably more interested in the extent to which he was able to demonstrate that what he thought he knew about it is what all rational men and men must believe about it in turn.

And that [for me] will always revolve around the extent to which he was able to offer us a methodology for testing and replicating his observations such that we too must come to embrace the new world as he did.

In any event, very little in his argument seems able to adequately contend with the points I raise regarding dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

All he seems to be suggesting instead is that the manner in which I have come to understand these relationships is the only manner in which I ever could have come to understand them.

And if that is the case I am always covered no matter what I might think and feel and do. From my perspective, if I am “wrong” here and now, it is only because I must be “wrong” here and now.

Just as you must now react to this only as another necessary component of existence. In fact, there would seem to be no exit from the only possible reality here until we die. Then our matter reconfigures back to “star stuff”.

And then the mystery that is mindful matter – the mystery that is “I” – is gone forevermore. Or so it seems.

A quote from Stephen Hawking

If there really is a complete unified theory that governs everything, it presumably also determines your actions. But it does so in a way that is impossible to calculate for an organism that is as complicated as a human being. The reason we say that humans have free will is because we can’t predict what they will do.

What is he saying here? Just because the complexity is such that we can’t predict what we will do, does not mean that, in a determined world, it can’t be predicted.

Right?

And if what we do can be predicted because what we do is only what we must do in order to be in sync [necessarily] with the laws of matter, then free will is no less an illusion.

And thus moral responsibility would seem to be subsumed in that as well.

[b]From: “Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe”
by Ray Bradford

Any discussion on the bearing of determinism upon issues of moral and personal responsibility first requires an adequate understanding of determinism and its distinction from fatalism. Dennett’s definition of determinism adequately captures the viewpoint as, “All physical events are caused and determined by the sum total of all previous events.” Human behavior, as with all other causal sequences in the universe, is a function of antecedent states and causes. Popular misconception often interprets this viewpoint as the position that all our behaviors, including me writing this paper, are the direct one-to-one result of our genetic composition. While such a position is one form of determinism, genetic determinism, it is not the most widely accepted version. By and large, determinism instead suggests that human behavior results from an incredibly complex function of inherited genetic predisposition, environmental and cultural influences, and prior responses to, and interpretations of, environmental influences (learning). However, the theory holds that given an initial set of conditions external and internal to the mind, only one “choice” or behavior will result. Thus, given any set of actual initial conditions in this world (as opposed to slightly different “possible worlds”), any person’s “choice” could not have been otherwise.

While easy to confuse, determinism carries a subtle but significant distinction from fatalism. Fatalism suggests that certain events will occur regardless of how humans act. This is a significantly different conclusion than determinism. Dennett aptly sketches the distinction in his interview with Reason magazine, “Fatalism is the idea that something’s going to happen to you no matter what you do. Determinism is the idea that what you do depends. What happens depends on what you do, what you do depends on what you know, what you know depends on what you’re caused to know, and so forth–but still, what you do matters. There’s a big difference between that and fatalism. Fatalism is determinism with you left out.” [/b]

This distinction has always been one I can never quite seem to grasp “for all practical purposes”. How “in the world” is it applicable?

Fatalism, after all, is defined as: “the belief that all events are predetermined and therefore inevitable.”

Either I must type these words or I have some capacity [however problematic and/or inexplicable] to choose not to. Or to choose other words instead.

I can understand that events will unfold because of how we choose to act. But: if we choose to act only in accordance with the immutable laws of matter, then there is still nothing other than those particular events unfolding in the only possible world.

I still see “choice” here as equivalent to the falling dominoes. Only the dominoes are utterly mindless matter not able to be conscious of toppling over per the natural laws of physics.

[b]From “Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe” by Ray Bradford

One option pursued by defenders of the forking paths model of decision making involves focusing on the randomness or indeterminacy involved in obtaining multiple potential effects from a given cause. Libertarian philosopher Robert Kane attempts to locate this indeterminacy on the quantum level. He argues that the mind essentially harnesses the existence of quantum indeterminacy and uses it to generate alternative paths. Many philosophers and physicists, including Einstein, have argued that describing quantum mechanics as indeterminate may ignore a critical, deterministic, hidden variable. However, even if quantum indeterminacy were conceded as ontological for the sake of argument, Kane’s argument still has a large burden to truly support the forking paths model. As Dennett points out, how can random resolutions of quantum-level events provide people with any control over their behaviors? Behavior arguably occurs on a much more macro-level where Newtonian physics apply. Moreover, while the movement of an individual particle on a quantum level may be ontologically indeterminate, its distributions prove easily predictable–hardly a strong starting point for the argument that indeterminacy can percolate up to alternative paths.[/b]

This is yet another fascinating aspect of the debate that revolves around free will. The role played by “reality” on the quantum level. Can the mind [does the mind] “essentially harnesses the existence of quantum indeterminacy and use it to generate alternative paths.”

And, if so, how does a mind operating on the macro-level even begin to pin this down? How precisely are the macro and micro worlds intertwined re “existence”?

And some [as with Einstein above] suggest the “indeterminacy” that seems to prevail on the level of “quantum mechanics” is really just reflective of the fact that physicists have simply not yet discovered the laws of matter [the bigger picture] that takes this indeterminacy away.

In other words, we will just have to sit back and wait patiently for the next Newton or Einstein to come along and shift the paradigm yet again.

There is always that tricky balance between those things we seem to control with one or another measure of autonomy and the truly mechanical parts that unfold both in and around us like clockwork.

And that always takes us back to the marvel that is mind. Matter like nothing else there has ever been before.

[b]From “Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe”
by Ray Bradford

In his essay “Freedom and Resentment,” the philosopher P.F. Strawson provides strong rebuttal for the claim that moral responsibility would evaporate in a deterministic universe. Strawson takes a unique approach to the conflict by challenging the assumption that a theoretical question of determinism could pragmatically alter the reactive attitudes we undergo as part of the human experience. Strawson focuses on what he describes as “personal reactive attitudes” that include feelings of anger or resentment in response to another individual’s demonstration of ill will. He takes great length to show when they do and do not arise in the course of human behavior, and to demonstrate that human existence without such attitudes would be largely inconceivable. [/b]

When confronted with claims like this, the first thing that always pops into my head is this: how is the claim more than just an intellectual contraption? In other words, how would it become applicable to Mary “out in the world” when she is confronted with the agonizing predicament of choosing or not choosing to abort her baby?

And, in my discussion with peacegirl above, she seemed of the opinion that our emotional and psychological reactions to the world around us were also wholly subsummed in the “design” – in the immutable laws of matter.

Thus:

According to Strawson, when we find ourselves knowingly wronged by another individual who exhibits both awareness of the wrongdoing and a normal psychological state, we react with “morally reactive attitudes” of anger or resentment. In contrast, when someone wrongs us under the pretense that “he didn’t realize what he was doing” or “she was not herself at the moment,” or if the perpetrator possesses psychological abnormalities (compulsions, moral underdevelopment in the case of children), we tend to suspend our personal reactive attitudes and take what Strawson calls an “objective attitude” toward the individual. We discuss the ways the individual should be managed or directed most efficaciously. Occasionally we demonstrate such attitudes with fellow human beings in normal psychological states as well. Adopting an objective attitude toward “normal” individuals usually results from either intellectual curiosity or the desire to “avoid the strains of involvement.” On the pragmatic level, Strawson sees the claim that determinism would destroy the basis for moral responsibility as tantamount to claiming that a theoretical conviction of determinism would cause us to abandon personal reactive attitudes altogether in favor of objective attitudes.

What does it mean to make a distinction regarding a “pragmatic level” when all levels of human interaction [including the subjunctive] are subsumed in the only possible reality? How are “normal” and “abnormal” psychological states not also but necessary components the only possible reality?

I keep thinking there must be some aspect of “compatibilism” here that I’m always missing. And perhaps someday it might finally be within my grasp. If in fact it is there to be within one’s grasp at all.

[b]Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe
by Ray Bradford

While Strawson’s arguments appear convincing, some critics may attempt to dispute their significance by stating that his contentions only argue the unavoidability of moral responsibility in a deterministic universe and say nothing of its rationality. These critics ask what the rationale behind such “moral responsibility” could be if people had no alternative courses of action. In response to these counterarguments, strong defense exists in Strawson’s writings. He notes that the question seems to miss the point entirely by failing to understand the inextricability of reactive attitudes from the human experience or the “natural human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes.” As Strawson states, “This commitment is part of the general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review within this general framework.” Moreover, as Strawson also accurately observes, should we obtain a detached God’s-eye view with which to evaluate the rationality of our morally reactive attitudes, the criteria for evaluating their rationality would not be the truth of determinism, but rather their efficacy in improving or deteriorating the quality of the human condition.[/b]

Again, from my perspective, this either revolves around the circular logic of the assumptions made or it devolves altogether into intellectual gibberish.

If, in the only possible material world, Mary must abort her baby, where does that leave us?

Is it really a legitimate “rationale” for moral responsibility “if people have no alternative courses of action”? What does it mean for all practical purposes to speak of the “natural human commitment to ordinary inter-personal attitudes" when the manner in which others will react to her abortion is also in sync with matter unfolding in the only possible world?

And we don’t have a “God’s eye view” do we? And even from the perspective of an omniscient God, we would seem compelled always to interact only to the extent that it must align itself necessarily with that which God already knows will unfold.

Either way, with or without God, there seems to be no exit from the “brute facticity” that is the laws of matter.

And how would the “efficacy in improving or deteriorating the quality of the human condition” not be embedded in turn in this determined world as well?

What I do here is to suggest the possibility of free will without being able to demonstrate or to prove it; and then situate our moral interactions in dasein, conflicting goods and political economy.

But at least I know the limitations of the language I use here.

[b]Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe
by Ray Bradford

Dennett turned to the idea of the prisoner’s dilemma, well-known to economists for its relevance to self-interest models. In the prisoner’s dilemma, two individuals suspected of committing a crime are caught, but there is not enough evidence to convict either unless one confesses. If neither confesses (they cooperate with each other), both will be set free. If one confesses (the defector) but the other does not, the individual who confesses will be set free while the other (the cooperator) receives a long jail sentence. If both confess, they will both go to jail for a shorter, but still significant amount of time (two defectors). Under this scenario, an efficacious and low-risk, short-term policy for a self-interested individual would entail confession. The individual would either receive no jail term or a short jail term (defecting) as opposed to the alternative of a no jail term or long jail term scenario (cooperating). An even more beneficial short-run strategy for the self-interested individual would involve convincing the other prisoner of your intentions to cooperate, but confessing instead (bluffing for self-interest). While these policies may have short-run benefits to the self-interested individual, they are obviously not optimal for the “society” (both individuals). Over the long haul, if the prisoners could develop a way to know they could count on one another to avoid confessing (by obtaining an ability to accurately distinguish other cooperators from bluffing defectors), they both stand to benefit significantly more than they would by pursuing their own short-sighted self-interests as defectors. [/b]

How, in a determined world, could any of this be “calculated” other than in accordance with that which each prisoner is compelled to calculate in order to be in sync with the only possible world? Thus it’s not a question of doing either what is moral or what is expedient – only in doing what is always necessary.

How [realistically] can there be a distinction made doing what is or is not in your own self-interest when the “self” itself is just one more inherent component of the only possible reality?

Always I come back here to this: What in the world am I missing when I can only ever miss that which I am compelled to miss?

Then it all becomes entangled [for me] in the, at times, exasperating relationship between words and worlds. The limitations of language in grappling with things like this. Back perhaps to Wittgenstein’s,“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

Lessans offers nothing of this, he only asserts that it is so. There is no revelation of what he observed, only the assertion that his observations were astute and “spot on”. Details were sadly lacking either in the book or in Janis’s responses.

[b]From: “Moral Responsibility in a Deterministic Universe”
by Ray Bradford

Dennett goes on to say that our unadulterated inclinations have a bias toward short-term rewards at the expense of larger benefits down the road. This makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint of survival, since long-term benefits prove meaningless to a dead organism. Yet, as we have found with the prisoner’s dilemma, it is advantageous to us as organisms to pass up these smaller short-term gains for more sizable long-term ones–and convince others of our ability to do so. Thus, we have problems of both self-control and convincing our peers of our capacity for self-control, and it is from these grounds that moral responsibility emerges as the pinnacle of the arms race. [/b]

But just as with the choices that are being made regarding the dilemma faced by the prisoners, are not the choices that we make regarding the dilemma embedded in short-term vs. long term benefits, also embedded merely in the illusion of free choice?

Is not the evolution of life on earth just another inherent manifestation of the laws of nature? And of the necessity built right into it? How different really is that from the evolution of planet earth itself? In other words, before the advent of life. Is not the only distinction here that life has evolved to the point of mind – minds able to grasp that per the inherent laws of matter there really is no distinction to be made between the evolution of matter before and after the creation of life?

Yes, minds become conscious of the choices that they make…whereas before minds matter was consciuous of nothing at all. But the choices that they make would still seem only as they ever could be in the only possible reality there ever could be because reality is matter and matter unfolds only as it must.

This pivotal point for Dennett reflects the fact that our long-term reward consists of a sterling reputation of “moral” character that we must sacrifice short-term benefits’ “temptation” to obtain. What we consider morally responsible behavior emerges as a self-control mechanism, since demonstrating self-control at individual points of temptation proves difficult with our bias toward myopic self-interest. Thus, we essentially co-opt our emotions into “moral responsibility” to control our own behavior with “broad brushstrokes.”

But what can it even mean to speak of this in terms of “self-control” in a wholly determined world? Thus the need to speak of “moral” character rather than of moral character. We are tempted only in that we cannnot not be tempted.

All of the strokes [however broad] would seem to be at one with the mechanism that is the design unfurling itself like clockwork. One tick at a time.

Hey peacegirl,

I’ve finally found the time to give you some feedback on Chapter 2 of your father’s book. Sorry about the delay. I didn’t find as much this time around to pick apart and scrutinize, but there were a few points:

Is it justified to strike back in retaliation when you are a determinist? I mean, when you know the first person couldn’t help but to strike you first? Your father did say:

I agree with you.

People take risks when they choose that which they might be punished for, but all the more reason to choose when you won’t get punished. I realize there is an argument coming up for why someone would have no incentive to strike the first blow when there are no risks (i.e. no blame, no punishment), but that makes me wonder what the current argument is trying to support.

This is a point that keeps coming up, and I’m still not clear on it–how can one be free and not free at the same time? Compelled from a 3rd person’s point of view but free from your own 1st person point of view. What does “free” mean in this case?

I know I agreed with this earlier, but does this imply that one who knows he will never be blamed or punished will also take full responsibility for his actions? I mean, keep in mind, not all actions are under our control even if it isn’t other people who are responsible for them. Being bed ridden because one is sick is no one’s fault, not the one who is sick nor other people.

Finally, I’m compelled to question what the ultimate incentive is to refrain from striking the first blow when you know there will be no blame or punishment returned to you. Is it unbearable guilt? Is it risking making enemies or hatred/fear of you? Is it that there is no logical possibility of getting anything out of it (like stealing might get you riches)? Is it just that it wouldn’t accomplish anything useful to you?

I would also like to question exceptional circumstances–like when one is compelled by some kind of brain abnormality which results in his compulsive and uncontrollable harming of others (like turrets syndrome), or when one is starving and must steal in order to eat (the desire in this case wouldn’t be to harm another, certainly not to retaliate, but to satisfy one’s hunger only, which may outweigh the harm caused to others or the deterring effects of causing such harm, and may be carried out with at least the attempt to satisfy one’s desire without harming the other)?

[b]Why Buridan’s Ass Doesn’t Starve?
by Michael Hauskeller

Imagine you go to a restaurant. Looking at the menu, you discover that they serve your two favourite meals – say asparagus and spinach tart. What will you do? You may hesitate for a while, but then you will make your choice. You have to make a choice, don’t you? Even if you’re hungry or greedy enough to order both, you have to decide which to eat first.

Now, how do you decide? Given that you like both equally, why do you choose, say, spinach tart, and not asparagus? There are two possible general answers. You can say either that:

a) There is no reason (no cause) for your choice. You just act, and you could equally well choose the other meal. Or:
b) There is a reason, but it’s unknown to you.

The second answer seems more plausible, because it accords with a principle that’s fundamental to the way we think. This principle is commonly called Leibniz’s Law, or the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It can be stated in various ways:

• Nihil sine ratione: Nothing is without a reason.
• Nothing happens without a sufficient reason/cause.
• For each event A there is another event B (or a combination of events) that precedes it and fully explains why A had to happen.
• Ex nihilo nihil fit: Nothing comes out of nothing.[/b]

Just how mysterious are the choices that we make? Leaving aside those that revolve around moral responsibilty, the mere fact of choosing what to eat [or what to eat first] can be made to seem quite perplexing.

We know that “I” is in there somewhere but we don’t know if “I” can ever really grapple with this wholly.

Try as I might, I am not able come up with an argument that would seem to contain the whole truth here. I know that my choice of foods is embedded in dasein. Which is to say that I choose the sort of foods that I have become acclimated to choose given the life that I have lived. For example, I don’t choose the foods that someone who was raised in a more affluent/cosmopolitan family/community might choose. In other words, those who are more familiar [existentially] with far more exotic, “gourmet” meals from around the world.

That’s just never been a part of my life. Now, sure, I could perhaps choose to explore that world. Anyone who has the financial wherewithal, always has that option. But, given the manner in which I have come [again, existentially] to think about food in my life, it is just not something I have any inclination to do. But that too is no less embedded in dasein.

So, the reasons that I choose to eat as I do seem apparent to me. But is there actually the possibility that what seems apparent to me is only that which must seem apparent to me? Is my “agenda” regarding food no different from my moral and political agendas: merely the embodiment of matter unfolding as it only ever could have unfolded?

But then I am back to the seeming futility of devising a methodology for determining this…given all of the conflicting arguments I have come accross over the years that tug me ambivilantly in equal and opposite directions.

As for nothing and something, some seem to argue that everything there is came out of nothing at all. And how do we pin that down?

[/b]

I’ve always thought Buridan’s Ass conflates two philosophical concepts and confuses one for the other: the concept of determinism and the concept of (let’s call it) mathematical equality, by which I mean the case in which you have a force F1 counterbalanced with an equal and opposite force F2, the net result being a kind of balance or suspension leading to inaction. Determinism does not necessarily entail mathematical equality between opposing forces, at least not in the consequences. For example, in the Ass’s brain there could be some neural circuitry that jumps into action only when other neural circuits are at a standstill. The latter may have computed with some degree of mathematical precision that the choice to go left and the choice to go right are equally justified, and therefore cannot decide which one to act upon. But when such neural circuitry enters into such a state, that’s when the former circuitry comes into play, operating by some (possibly arbitrary) rule that says: when at a standstill, choose left. This is a general principle that can be extended beyond neurons and brains. In principle, you can have systems in nature in a state of equilibrium or balance (due to equal but opposite forces keeping each other in suspension) without the end result being a form of inaction. You can have the end result being equivalent to that which would occur if one of the forces overpowered the others. So long as this followed consistently in all such cases, you would still have a deterministic system.

Suppose John Doe has chosen to tether the ass to a stake in the ground. Why? Because, in the manner in which I construe dasein, he had become predisposed to take pleasure in watching the animal starve to death. Given the manner in which you construe determinism [re the human mind] can he then be held morally responsible for doing this? In other words, given the manner in which peacegirl seems to embrace the immutable laws of matter unfolding [out of necessity] into the only possible world, could he have ever freely chosen not to do this to the animal?

I suppose not. Why do you ask?