morality

 It relates to an unpopular and vague concept of Freud's 'economy of the ID'  In the war example You illustrated, the maximum entropy, may be supported by a compression, of meaning it's self into the very power, which fuels the will.

This accounts for our inscrutability, and the impossibility of psychology as a pure science.
AI could only ever arise as a product of excessive networking, or the excess resonance of networking of functionaries, all productive of enormous surplus in terms of capacity and use – every program can be slightly or greatly altered to attain myriad other functions. As soon as enough applications stand in contact with each other, AI will arise. THis has nothing to do with singularity, as far as I am concerned = these is no ‘truth’ that has been reached, but a self-valuing has emerged.

We might think that such an AI is already in place, and that we are part of it - it requires us, we are its fuel. In nature, fuel serves voluntarily, as to it being used is to use.

Making the distinction between good and right is important, for it to be well explained and understood. The “good” and the “right” each have their own area of relevance and are separate. Good relates to an advantage or profit gained from something and right has to do with acting in accordance to rules. Humans seem to have an innate sense of morality which may have been taught to them by parents, religion, etc. Using right and wrong, could be seen as simply favoring or an attempt to influence another’s behavior, if this is so, the doctrine or system of moral conduct would be meaningless. Ignoring the fact that all things are for some reason interconnected, if one pays particular attention to good over right, this could also easily lead to contention, as many wars have shown, on the other hand, the action or manner of justifying such wars is usually found in a rules-based morality. “Because we so commonly take it for granted that moral values are intimately connected with the goal of human well-being or happiness, Kant insists that these two concepts are absolutely independent”. Something that is classified as “moral” does not always make it “good”.

Agreed.

Good relates to much, much more than that. It is the general positive judgment. It’s rather ‘right’ that is limited, as it pertains to morals. ‘good’ can pertain to moral standards, but often pertains to very different types of quality. ‘good food’, etc.

Is it innate or taught? The two are opposites. Innate means in-born.

But indeed morality is sourced by both genes and nurture.

I find this an all too human perspective that does not rely on observation. Violence and conflicting, differing forces are the very cornerstone of the universe. Tensions and their violent release will exist as long as nature exists.

The point to observe here is that no judgment, be it ‘good’ or ‘right’ or whatever, is ever subjective. A judgment will often be agreed upon by similar species, but never by all of nature, or all of existence. A judgment is only universal if all entities that exist make that identical judgment.

Wouldn’t you say that “fundamentally” all races and humans are “natural”? Or evolution-wise, am i wrong in this?

I would not even now why anyone needs to be reminded of this. What I am saying on the other hand is quite radical.

But said in that way, wouldn’t it pre-suppose that there is no evil? Realistically speaking, FX, conflict between good and good isn’t necessarily good it would depend on the conclusion or outcome of it. Am I wrong?

What do you mean by this?

Good luck defining “good”.

Good is really what is approved of and bad is what is disapproved of, and also what acheives the results of a preconceived program. In reality I don’t think there is an objective good or bad implanted in nature, but different natures interpret facts as good or bad depending on their affects and relation to those facts.

In a pragmatic sense you could say there exists “evil”, because we have created the term and have defined it. Oxford defines it : “Profoundly immoral and wicked:” but even that definition doesn’t demand a value judgement. Someone could come along and say immorality and wickedness is good for this and this reason, and potentially their reasoning could be logically sound.

But in the end good and bad are interpretations and as assertions which stand alone they can be denied on the basis of prejudice alone. Nietzsche for example backed up his interpretations with considerations such as, the old morality of good and evil was based a false conception of reality that saw the universe governed by a perfect diety who willed the good, so to interpret the world in the old sense is to interpret it falsely, and so forth.

Creating a new interpretation (or spreading one) requires a series of steps, logical arguments, facts, or even just tempting potentialities, all the while aware of how conflicting interpretations might view these same facts and potentialities.

I think that really morality is an interpretation that supports or is consequential of the structures of life as they progress, and this goes for all interpretation and not just morality, which is not to say it is necessarily the way of truth (which is an important distinction).

Because interpretation is an aid to understanding the world as well as dealing with it psychologically, dominant interpretations are generally attached to the various social strata in different ways and coloured by their current activity and perspectival relationships.

As for philosophical truth, I do think it is beyond good and evil, it simply is, and we attach value to what exists after the fact as ways of dealing with it, and because it is part of human psychology to experience affects.

When Nietzsche attached valuations to different things it was part of a political program and was a result of philosophical inquiry, it was truth in itself reached by philosophical inquiry.

It is true that he may have felt that the new valuation of good and bad was part of a philanthopy, that is, that it would benefit humanity as he saw it, which is another story and another inquiry.

I can agree to all of that, but it does seem to side step the point.

“Morality” cannot be rationally discussed nor dictated without a definition of “good”. And we all know that good has a subjective nature, “good for whom?” But what if there are specific abstract concerns that every life form shares as being to its subjective benefit?

If every life form requires “property A”, can’t we say that property A is objectively good? And if so, and other such properties are listed, we would then have a basis from which morality could be deduced … rationally. And if that deduction turned out to be exactly correct, wouldn’t that constitute an “objective morality”, verifiable from anyone’s stance?

None of that is to say that there wouldn’t still be a subjective nature to good and morality, but it seems to offer a baseline from which to append subjective nuances and amendments. The result being that in some places the morality would have a very different flavor to it than other places, but there would be a dependable baseline morality no matter where one ventured. “It is highly immoral to wear yellow on Sunday in this particular realm. But it is highly immoral to kill someone just for fun in every realm.

Speaking for myself, I’m not so rash as to rule it all out in one sweep without much in depth contemplation (that is what philosophy is all about), but it does seem like the task might be much harder than it at first appears. One thing that might strike me as fitting your description could be something as vague as “food”, but what is for some series of reasons the subject doesn’t even want to live? What if they are paralyzed in all but their eye (I’m thinking of Jean-Dominique Bauby here) or a possibly worse scenario, that eye was also blind? Just theoretically… Or what if someone was suffering from an intense stomach illness that all food made them violently ill and stricken with pain, food might seem then necessary to life, but good becomes more of a shakey assertion.

Like I said, I’m not willing to throw out the endeavour all at once. I personally think there is some merit to Nietzsche’s interpretation for bringing the eyes and the heart back to reality, and at least begin to stop denying the earth, but it seems like many people accept most/all of his assertions of value dogmatically which to me is unphilosophical, and I don’t even think he meant them for philosophers, except as a tool.

It seems like the earliest pantheistic gods were representations of diverse attributes of reality. They made commandments, or were at least willful in relation to humanity, but their true strength lied their relation to natural phenomena, they both mirrored and explained it.

Now gods appear cartoonlike, or childish, and we would rather represent nature through scientific or “natural” description, so morality becomes more difficult to conceive and represent in any permanent form, and is best held as unconscious prejudice, generally instilled through operant conditioning. It seems like an excess of thought now might move us towards materialism because we can’t really relate to abstract characterizations in any serious manner, they just appear fanciful.

I think the closest thing to what you might be desiring would be prudent virtues, which, while they might not be accepted by the general population (as good, ie. morally elevated), if understood and followed could be a tool kit for effective action on various intentional programs.

Indeed. My proposed morality here is a result of that.

Arc this is also for you.

humanarchy.net/self-valuing-ethics/

Remember that N’s spearhead-thoughtform Zarathustra has as his highest justification the affirmation lf everything that had ever existed and would ever exists, to recur infinitely.
That explicates, in practical terms, into the morality which I proposed.

I do not accept that “race” is a valid definition.
What goes bad is the arbitrary division by which people sunder the human species into separate races which leads to conflict.
The only valid nation is humankind.

The root of all conflict is founded on herd mentality and group division.

I understand where you’re coming from, don’t get me wrong. I was just trying to say that valuations no matter what they are based off of have are of the realm of prejudice. They have no real place in philosophical inquiry (though they can be a product of philosophical inquiry), which is not to say they do not have a place in living. But because every value system is a prejudice for something (for life, for power, for truth, or what have you), it’s purpose is to aid in a particular type of interpretation of the world. It is not concerned with truth alone, but with a goal which is manifest in the valued object.

When people get their value systems from others you can pretty much guarentee that it is being imbued in them for some purpose (and not so they should question it). For example, Nietzsche’s valuations which give respect to the sources of power has the effect of securing power structures and relations. It’s really an ingenious way of causing individuals to affirm a situation that is not in their own interest, but it’s not really something to take seriously as philosophical inquiry (that is, inquiry backed by prejudice). The inquiry would be the other way around, that you would look at reality and then use the contents of reality to back the prejudice to use as a tool, a Platonic tool, of imbuing the population with morals that progress your cause.

The point I was making is not that Nietzsche had his head in the clouds — he did look at the world as it is, but seeing that the reality and affirming the reality are two different things. It is the process of affirmation that is the prejudice, it is like a moral imperative “Thou shalt…” (affirm reality).

If you say, the strong will crush the weak, that could refer to an actual state of affairs, a truth. If you say, the strong “should” (or are right to) you are translating a truth to a moral prejudice. I was just saying that Nietzsche’s goal to change the moral landscape was part of a political program, it was intentional, the concern was not with truth in the way that a philosophical or scientific inquiry is. Philosophy is more flexible than science because it can work with things like moral imperatives and construct them. Philosophy is like Science + Art, in a manner of speaking. Not only does it discover the nature of things but it is also an intentional action, it constructs political programs and uses the discoveries to artfully to bring about an effect. Nietzsche’s values were his art. I’m not saying they’re shyte or anything, he was a brilliant thinker but that doesn’t mean he needs to be obeyed… unless you are willing to be dominated by his ideas, or you share his political goals or prejudices, or are unable to extricate yourself from his imperatives (to think beyond them), but the underlying teaching was that philosophers (who are above even kings) do not become dominated by the values of others, they are the creators of values and use them to rope others into their political programs.

“Good” is based upon what is of benefit. What someone wants can form a subjective good concerning that want/desire. And any or all desire can be said to have an abstract good associated.

Is watering a dehydrated plant of benefit to the plant? Must we ask the plant for its subjective intent before we can determine what we should do in order to benefit the plant? We can objectively determine what is of benefit concerning any entity. We can even objectively determine what is of benefit to any chosen want or desire. And when we see that a want is benefited by what is detrimental to its own host-body, we have to choose which one to serve. It is much like kicking one of two people out of the boat because there is only enough food for one.

This situation proposes the exact problem of the locked logic (how does one decide when both directions are exactly equal) and also the problem of insufficient known variables for a set of simultaneous equations. And the solution is simply to focus on the unknown variables, to look for extraneous priorities.

In the case of the desire being contrary to its host body, both the desire and the body have objective benefits or goods. But the logic is locked concerning which to serve. It isn’t an issue of the existence of the objective good, but rather an issue of which to serve, which would be more moral.

Morality is about the interaction between entities such that the greater good is served. When the logic is locked on a local subjective level due to equal opposition, the greater good can be found by raising the scope of the interactions being assessed. Because the two entities are in opposition, a third entity must be considered in order to determine the greater good and the “moral choice to make”. Examples might be; “which has a dependent child”, “which will be able to be better off in the future”, “which is most likely to be of benefit to someone else”, or in a socialist society, “which better serves the state” (which is intentionally used to authorize the state).

So even though the logic is locked by contrary directions of the local good, an increase in scope unlocks the logic to provide an objective good and a moral code; eg. “in the case of divorce, the state is best served if the women gets to keep the pink panties” or “in the case of the baby on the train tracks, which ever is most likely to benefit future anentropic harmony has the priority”.

So regardless of the situation, conflicting goods or not, there is always an objective greater balance of good to be found and upon which to deduce an objective moral code or structure as a basis for subjective amendments.

But ultimately you are basing the logic on presuppositions, like the best interests of the state, and an abstract notion of which is most likely to benefit. In the case of the state it becomes a subjective assertion that the best of the state is best, but the best for whom? The best for the state may not serve the individuals who make up the state. And depending on the characteristics of the state the outcome might change. The state might value gay rights, for example, the woman not like pink panties and the male be a transvestite who in fact had bought those panties himself. The state might simultaneously be engaged in a PR campaign about its support of gay rights, and the man appearing in a TV spot wearing them might benefit the state, if the audience is receptive.

And the notion of the future benefit again is in need of clarification, what does benefit entail, according to whom? And answers to these questions can involve infinite regression.

The case of the plant being watered is particular in that all we know by plants is that they live by water (and other factors of course) and die without it, at least some measure of it. Whether the plant should live or die is the realm of morality — and in a garden, if the plant is a weed, we might wish it gone.

Also, when we are talking about morality we are talking about a human process of relating to the world with meanings and principles which provide behavioral laws. In nature, either the plant will get what it needs or it won’t. For humanity, the question is whether there is some “moral” obligation, and there is no obligation to do what is objectively beneficial to a plant despite the fact that it is beneficial to the plant.

Obligations, it seems to me, are conventional, not universal or stable. With the right amount of coercion or the proper circumstance, they may be more or less stable, but not because they represent some underlying law of moral truth.

Again, although I agree completely, you seem to be missing the point.

The fact that most people presume does not constitute a fact that presumption is the only option. Thus the fact of the existence of presumption doesn’t negate logic as a viable option, it only implies a typical misuse. There wouldn’t be so much conflict on these issues if there was no misuse of logic. So the point is actually to get the logic straight void of presumption, not to presume presumption and thus presume defeat.

And it is the complexity of many situations that tempts presumption; “It is just too much trouble to figure all of this out, so let’s just presume…” or in the case of authority, “it is too much trouble to know the truth about the situation, so let’s just handle it this way…” But still such complexity does not negate a logical solution. It merely means that more honesty, patience, and scrutiny is required (the very essence and purpose of philosophy).

The ultimate foundation of logic and the escape from presumption is simply “the declared definition”. And that is why I first said, that any rational discussion can’t be made until a definition is provided.

In effect, we are trying to provide an ontological truth concerning “good” and “moral” that is coherent with physical reality. One cannot have an ontology, an understanding of existence, without declared definitions. Definitions are not physically objectively either right or wrong. They are declared for the sake of a chosen understanding, not to be altered within that ontology.

For example, to me this all a moot point already rationally resolved. In my RM:AO:Psychology, Sociology, and Economics, the word “good” and “of benefit” are defined as “maximal anentropic harmony” and is equivalent to the religious concept of the “Son of God” for mortal entities (“God” being defined as the ultimate determiner of what can or cannot happen). And with those definitions, rational decisions concerning morality can be rationally assessed such that the minimum amount of suffering and/or death occurs. And note that it is issue of minimal achievable, not absolute zero.

With such an understanding, there can be no ambiguity concerning morality. Morality can be objectively assessed even though subjectively amended. If one chooses to not define the relevant words in his chosen ontological understanding, he cannot resolve anything rationally and must merely bow to another and/or never be able to assess good from bad nor morality (which is why it is called “Rational Metaphysics”, RM, the very seed of the last enlightenment era).

But then there is a presumption that the minimum amount of suffering and death is the basis for moral judgements, which is a prejudice. I’m not saying I disagree with it, but it is a prejudice nonetheless.

A chosen ontology with its definitions is NOT “a presumption of truth”. It is a declared foundation for understanding to be compared and verified against objective reality. A declared definition cannot be a prejudice (although it might be declared due to prior prejudice) because it is not a judgment, but a declaration of language for communication and thought. There is no choice in making such declarations if communication or thought is to take place. And any definition can be chosen. But of course in the end, if the definitions don’t allow for a strong comparison to reality, the chosen ontology is useless. We are not concerned with useless understandings. And whether something is useless or not, is an objective issue relating to each subjective attempt.

So no, I cannot agree that prejudice has anything to do with the chosen definitions for “good” or “moral”. The definitions either work out to achieve the rational goal of understanding for the purpose of decision making or they don’t.

A similar example is the definition provided for existence itself as “that which has affect”. That definition is chosen for the rationale that I am not concerned about anything known to have absolute zero affect upon anything. It is not a declaration of objective reality, but a chosen declaration for rational thought so that rational (useful/effective) decisions can be made.

And in effect, even the choice of which ontology to use at what time, is an objectifiable moral issue. Anyone can choose any set of definitions as they please and construct any kind of ontology. But in the end, one ontology with its definitions will be more useful than another. And that which is more useful, is more good (by default). Thus even the choice to use ontology A or ontology B is actually an objectively moral issue. Using a bad ontology (perhaps fairy tales) can be immoral because they do more harm than other available options.