Dionysa.

What is it a Dionysus does to his Ariadne? There may be both a Dionysus and an Ariadne in a human being. These are the masculine and the feminine aspect, the master and the slave, or, as Nietzsche puts it in BGE 225, the creator and the creature in man.

By referring back to its beginning, the end of that aphorism implies a paradox. Even pity or compassion for the “creator in man” is not a good rationale for political or religious philosophy (cf. aphorism 62). The only good reason for that is joy in the cause, in “form-giving energies and an artist’s conscience”. But the will to power always needs an end, as a means; and here, the end has to do with pity or compassion for the “creator in man”.

WP 367 suggests what this “pity or compassion” really is. It’s no Mitleiden, for those for whom Mitleid is felt are not suffering (see Kaufmann’s footnote). What it really is is Mitfreudlosigkeit, “with-enjoymentlessness”. What a Dionysus will do to his Ariadne is bring about in her what Jung calls “the shifting of the personality center from the ego to the Self”: cf. TSZ “The Despisers of the Body”.

One who is capable of empathy or sympathy is superior to one who is not; it’s not a fitness indicator for nothing. But superior still is (s)he who is able to master that: see WP 928. My question to you is then, as it has been to myself, what Zarathustra asks in “Old and New Tables” 29: “Why so soft?”

I’ve wrote elsewhere that pain and pleasure are not good and evil, they are sensations created by our body, our base lower body, the thing that people say is the self. There is no such a thing as bad, in some ways, because it is only bad for the reason that your body can’t handle it. Oxygen and light and heat are good in the eyes of a man, but in the eyes of an anairobic, or a virus life form, would be that oxygenless darkness is good. It is what they would prefer. Also death is not bad or good. It is ceasation. It is nutrality. Pain and death, the worst things people think of, are not real. The ego can feel them as very real, but they are not as they say. Evil is a form of self projection.

What is also true, is that all of nature is truth, and all of truth is nature. In nature there is no lie. The sun never hides its light as if it were a trick. Reality is ever doing nature. Nature is beaming itself without any sort of self suppression or deceit. And because of this principle, good and evil are real things, but they are not the lay man’s good and evil.

Morality prides itself as holy, but it contains allot of hate and aversions. There is more don’t-s than there are do-s.

Even though this is true, I love morality very much.

I do not want to be hate and aversion, but I’m in an intermediary phase. I’m in the dirt, trying to grow.

I disagree that Ariadne is Dionysos slave. At least, I’d disagree if this is what you’re saying/implying.
Not every relationship of power, dominance and submission, can be stipulated in terms of master/slave.

In fact I think that if Dionysos would have a profound love relationship with a slave he would himself have to be a slave. But their relationship is distinctly aristocratic, royal. The feminine aspect is no less royal than the masculine aspect. And obviously we can not really speak of royal slaves, unless we go with the terminology of Islam or Christianity.

All very true (thus there’s a subtle but significant difference between a sub and a slave in BDSM). However, this is where the title of my OP comes in: “Dionysa”. This would be the feminine form of the name Dionysus (or even the Doric feminine form of the name Dionysos). What a Dionysus will do to his Ariadne is transform her into a Dionysus; to transform the charcoal from TSZ “Old and New Tables” 29 into a diamond. Compare the image invoked toward the end of TSZ “In the Happy Isles”, which passage Nietzsche quotes in EH “TSZ” 8, an essential Ariadne section. This would be like cutting the diamond out of the rough and polishing it. Another essential Ariadne section, which should also be compared to said passage, is BGE 295, which Nietzsche for the longest time intended to be that book’s final aphorism. See also WTP 964.

“Sub” is a choice (having the ability to leave).
“Slave” is not (not having the ability to leave).

Addendum. The Jung citation in my OP is from one of my favourite writings of his, the chapter “On the Psychology of the Child-Archetype” from his Archetypes—section 4 of the chapter, to be exact. In another favourite of mine among his writings, the chapter “Christ, a Symbol of the Self” from his Aion, Jung writes:

[size=95]“[I]n such cases [i.e., “in situations where there are insoluble conflicts of duty”] the ego is a suffering [i.e., passive] bystander who decides nothing but must submit to a decision and surrender unconditionally. The ‘genius’ of man [cf. the term “the genius of the heart” in BGE 295], the higher and more spacious part of him whose extent no one knows, has the final word.”[/size]

The hallmark of the slave in BDSM is that (s)he chooses “once and for all” to submit unconditionally; whereas the hallmark of the sub is that (s)he chooses at every moment whether to submit or not. Be this as it may, the “genius” Jung mentions is obviously the “Self” from TSZ “The Despisers of the Body”.

Some more parallels:

[size=95]“And also in discerning [Erkennen] do I feel only my will’s procreating and evolving delight; and if there be innocence in my knowledge, it is because there is will to procreation in it.” (TSZ “In the Happy Isles”, quoted in EH “TSZ” 8.)

“Their ‘knowing’ [‘Erkennen’] is creating, their creating is a law‑giving, their will to truth is—will to power.—” (BGE 211, on genuine philosophers.)[/size]

[size=95]“A pessimistic teaching and way of thinking, an ecstatic nihilism, can under certain conditions be indispensable precisely to the philosopher—as a mighty pressure and hammer with which he breaks and removes degenerate and decaying races to make way for a new order of life, or to implant into that which is degenerate and desires to die a longing for the end.” (WTP 1055.)[/size]

A pressure to compress the charcoal into diamond, and a hammer to chisel the diamond out of the rough. Nietzsche’s teaching is the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the world as will to power: it is this teaching by which Zarathustra re-creates or reshapes “every ‘It was’ into ‘Thus I willed it!’” (TSZ “Redemption”—also quoted in EH “TSZ” 8.)

Would you agree then that the affirmation of the ER is a means to an end?
That is what I think - a means to get solid ground under ones feet. It is for this reason that I can’t see the Superman sufficiently defined as he who affirms the ER. I rather think it is a means to prepare man for bringing about the conditions that permit the existence of the Superman.

So what I am implying is that the Superman would be “innocent” with respect to the “sins” (erring, degenerating) of the species we are used to calling mankind. In a sense I think that the creator of the conditions for the Superman has to endure more than the Superman himself. I certainly did not take this directly from Nietzsche, I’ll admit that right away.

Well, on second thought, it is compatible with the final metamorphosis of man - from lion to child. The transition from a ferociously attacking spirit (destroyer of slave morality) to a creature that isn’t even aware anymore of the possibility of slave morality.

In Lampert’s reading, that is not the final metamorphosis of man, but only of the man who aspires to be a disciple of Zarathustra. On the other hand, in Seung’s reading the lion symbolises what he calls “the Faustian superman” and the child “the Spinozan superman”, and these correspond to the hero and the super-hero from TSZ “The Sublime Ones”, respectively.

I do not think, however, that the creator of the conditions for the Superman is only a Faustian superman and the Superman is only a Spinozan superman. I think both are both, and both are thereby Supermen. To be sure, in Lampert’s reading only the creator of said conditions—i.e., Nietzsche/Zarathustra—is the Superman; but I distinguish between the Superman in a narrow and in a broad sense.

In any case, I think there are two things you really have to dwell on. The first has to do with the last quote in my “Anarchism of the Right” OP (http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2443551#p2443551). You expressed chagrin when I explained to you in private that the reason there would be no wars to end all wars was that at the very least the wars of the past would eternally recur. This however is crucial, and also goes for the Superman: the Superman whose conditions Nietzsche creates is in the first place Nietzsche himself—the Nietzsche of the “next” cycle. And in the broad sense, it is in the first place all the Supermen of the past (see http://www.humanarchy.net/forum/viewtopic.php?p=336#p336).

The second thing I think you really have to dwell on is the meaning of the eternal recurrence. I think that, even though you may not take affirming it lightly, you may still be taking it too lightly. It means there is no growth out of nothing, as you have postulated, no free will,—nothing besides a single fixed universal process. What happens now is as unalterable as the past. It’s a world without “goodness”, “humaneness”, “warmth”, etc.—these are all illusions. Realising this means realising you are Skynet. Today is Judgment Day.

“Peirce’s objective idealism is the paradoxical doctrine that what is most intimate and private, not observable but only introspectable [namely, feeling], in fact exists objectively: it composes the universe and all the things in it that we objectively observe. The ‘law of mind’ must be known by introspection but applies objectively, so that, by looking within our own minds, we grasp the fundamental law of the universe.
That law is fundamental, but not in the sense that all other laws–the laws of nature–may be deduced from it. Rather, […] these laws have evolved by chance, from feelings ‘sporting’ randomly. The ‘law of mind’ explains only why it is that feelings, once having ‘sported’, spread and weld together, forming habits, i.e., law-governed matter. Which habits are formed depends on which feelings sport first and in what combinations–matters of chance.” (T.L. Short, “What was Peirce’s Objective Idealism?”)

1 a : to amuse oneself : FROLIC · lambs sporting in the meadow” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sport)

Dionysus the Bodhisattva