The issue is infinite regress. Zeno’s Paradox references the idea of infinitely regressive distance inside distances; Turtles all the way down idea references the idea of infinitely regressive causalities within causalities.
I’m not sure what you position exactly is and where you disagree with hume… it’s hard to tell from your post.
“That the sun will rise tomorrow, because it has allways risen” is no ‘valid’ induction. Validity implies that the conclusion allways follows from the premises. In this particluar example the conclusion only necessarily follows if we assume the future will allways resemble the past… but we in fact have no justification for such assumption.
If your point is that you have no use for that kind of strict necessity, but that induction is practical and usefull enough in life without that kind of necessity, then i don’t think Hume would disagree. He in fact rials against radical scepsis in one of the sections of his Enquiry.
While I think I agree with your assessment of the is/ought problem, I don’t quite understand why you roped that together with the idea that there is no gap between cause and effect.
As for induction, I think Hume might agree with what you’ve said. He didn’t say induction was altogether bullshit, he just said it was problematic for fairly straightforward reasons. He was questioning what, or if, we can really claim to know based on induction.
I don’t know man, the is-ought problem seems to still be as unresolved as ever… but i think it’s only a problem if you want to have a foundation for morality.
Well I didn’t say it was resolved, I just said I agreed with his assessment. I personally never really got the is/ought problem, so I’m not even convinced there is anything to resolve. I don’t have any problem deriving an ought from an is. Maybe I’m doing it wrong, I don’t know.
Allright, how do you derive an ought from an is? I don’t see how it’s possible.
Now, I do remember being involved in a topic with you about the exact same thing a while back. If i remember correctly your stance was that you could derive morals (ought) directly from things like pain and suffering (is). But that wasn’t sufficient for me, and some other posters, because you still need to inject an intentional element (an ought) into the equation, namely that pain should be avoided. I don’t know exactly what your answer to that was then?
Edit: yeah Von exactly, that thread 
You disagree that pain should be avoided if not for a greater benefit? I take that much as self evident.
It’s the easiest thing in the world. Take a watch, for example. A watch is something that keeps time. So what should a watch do? —That’s easy, Watson! A watch should keep time!
Why was that so easy, you ask? Well, it’s just because descriptive components are blended into normative language, and normative components are blended into descriptive language. You just can’t pull them apart. It’s enough to tell you that a printer prints, to know that a good printer is a printer that prints—and that how a printer ought to be is to be a thing that prints.
Humans are more complicated than watches and printers. That’s why philosophy and ethics is interesting… the basic questions of ethics (How ought I to live?) are really explorations of who you are, because once you find out who you are—your purposes and functions and etctera—you’ll know what you ought to do. It’ll just fall right out and be clear… because the descriptive and evaluative components of everything are blended together throughout.
Function = Purpose, according to Von. When a watch functions, it actuates its purpose. Purpose means something like a goal, and a goal is a meaning. All things in time and space have a certain eventual result, a process, and according to that idea, the eventuality is the meaning of the object.
Personally I try not to constrain meaning and purpose. I consider Von’s position as mildly constraining the meaning and purpose of all watches to only tell time, and nothing less, nothing more.
Well, you might think the purpose of a watch is to express your sense of style, and to tell time, and to bling, or whatever else. That’s all compatible with what I’ve said.
Oh, ok, thanks for explaining.
Normally meanings and shoulds are forms of restriction.
A dog must be a good dog, for example.
Restriction is filtering. The wisest people filter their own nature. That is restriction in its good form, however,
morality has been used to undermine and control people also.
Yea, I agree.
Von doesn’t understand how just because a watch keeps time doesn’t tell us what a watch should be used to keep time for. For example, if a group of people were discussing what should a single watch keep time for among multiple options, Von wouldn’t have a way to suggest which option to pick.
That sort of indecisiveness doesn’t help when deciding what decision should be made.
Yes he would, and his suggestion would be based on what is. If the people in the group were a bunch of gym rats, he might suggest that they keep time to schedule workouts. If some of them are on a diet, he could suggest that they keep time to schedule their meals. Why would everyone in the group need to choose the same option? One watch can be used for many different purposes.
Is a watch meant to keep time, or is let’s say, a silver watch, meant to be melted down and made into a spoon?
Also I think goodness can stand on its own two feet, it doesn’t need purpose. This is incomprehensible, but, if you can think about it, what I’m saying is that if and when or where ever things are good, those things will always be good. The events in time are permanent.
As a spoon, the melted down watch can no longer judge time. The purpose of a good spoon is to scoop food well, but, that is a purpose we assign which involes people and how they relate to objects. The person wants a good spoon, and that is why there is such a thing as a good spoon. Morality is desire, and meaning is desire. Very similar to will.
What time you set your watch for has nothing to do with what a watch is. If someone has a watch on the eastern seaboard, and someone else on the western, the fact that they set their times differently doesn’t mean that we’re not still talking about watches. A watch is something that keeps time, no matter what you keep time for----and therefore, a good watch is something that ought to keep time.
That is a metaphysical statement. Good watches are real things, according to you. People who crave a separation between concepts and “real things” will probably disagree, but I don’t have big problems with it.
Uh, I don’t believe it was…
Sure, I own a good watch.
If I don’t care about keeping time, or if I have a better way of keeping time, a watch might make a decent bookmark, or a way of bundling some sticks together.
Anyway, a watch is an example of producing an is from a want, and nothing more. Getting this completely backwards takes some real talent.