Hi Carleas, I think the parallel with language is a very good one. No-one’s going to argue that English doesn’t exist, and no-one will argue that people don’t behave morally. But similarly, there is a gap that needs crossing between the social conventions of a language and the world to which it refers. I can be correct that a sentence in English should start with a capital letter. That has nothing to do with meaning, or anything about the way the world is, it’s a convention. If everyone decided to drop the convention, the language would be no less meaningful or relevant or usable.
Similarly, Paris is the capital of France - very few people would say this is a subjective fact. Yet if everyone decided tomorrow that Lyons were the capital of France, Lyons would be the capital of France. People who thought Paris were the capital would be flat out wrong; books that stated it as such would be considered outdated. “Paris is the capital of France” is true by virtue of it being held to be true by people - no redefinition of terms is necessary. Compare that to “Everest is the highest peak in the world” - public consensus can’t alter that, except by redefining the words as commonly understood.
If you want to make an objective statement about pronunciation or grammar, you have to limit your pronouncement to a particular language/dialect at a particular time. We no longer pronounce “nothing” as “no-thing”, as English-speakers did in the past. And we don’t pronounce “dog” as “Hund”, as they do in Germany - and I don’t think anyone would hold that “dog” is objectively the right word for it and that the Germans are wrong to use the word “Hund”, nor that they are objectively wrong to capitalise their nouns.
So how mind-independent are linguistic facts? Why should mind-independence be a prerequisite of holding something to be right or wrong, having established a context? Why should a “cultural relativist” who sees language as a series of social conventions be committed to disallowing criticisms of poor grammar by an English speaker - or for that matter, why should they not criticise other languages’ conventions on the grounds of unclarity, inefficiency, over-/undercomplexity or misleading conceptual structures? We can learn from other languages, talk meaningfully about differences and confusions and assess the effects of changes on our own language with time.
It would be clearer to show examples of choices where there is a potential conflict between prudence and morality. Hiding a Jewish neighbour from the Gestapo would be considered by many to be hands-down the moral choice, but the consequences of his being discovered on you and your family, as against any personal benefit, would arguably make it highly imprudent. A soldier taking a stand against overwhelming odds may be driven by morality, but certainly not prudence. They’re clearly not equivalent, although they are very often associated.