You’re still positing something extra, though. When all we know are interpretations, why suppose, why “intuit” that there must be some-thing behind them? On a different forum, Sauwelios proposed the following line of reasoning (toward a different end, an end we disagreed on, as it were; but it will serve its purpose here as well):
This problematic finds its roots back in Lockean epistemology. Locke proposed the “veil of ideas” separating man from objects-in-themselves, for all man has are his ideas of those objects and so can never hope to access them directly. Locke, a confused philosopher if ever there was one, initially questioned whether we had any reason to suppose the existence of these objects behind our ideas of them at all, but eventually appealed to God’s benevolent grace to conclude that these objects do, in fact, exist.
The point is, we have no reason to suppose the existence of something behind our interpretations – perhaps all there is is further interpretation. To claim that definitionally speaking, the term “interpretation” implies “something to be interpreted” recalls, of course, Nietzsche’s criticism that our philosophy finds its footing in an age-old faith in grammar.
Indeed, I do imply this. However, I am making no claim to fact; just the opposite, actually. I am proposing that all there is is interpretation. This too, then, is interpretation! For how could it be anything besides?
But surely we can’t so radically re-conceptualize the way we understand the world (that it is interpretation, and nothing besides) while still holding onto that out-dated definition of reality. Philosophy need not weigh itself down with word games: grammar enjoys no privileged claim to the world itself.